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The General Staff and its Problems

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The History of the relations between the High Command and the German Imperial Government as revealed by Official Documents

By General Ludendorff

Author of "My War Memories, 1914-1918"

Translated by F. A. Holt, O.B.E.

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PREFACE

In "My War Memories" I gave a connected description of the events of the World War, so far as they are associated with the names of Field-Marshal von Hindenburg and myself. Even at that stage I had decided to publish records bearing on the subject in order to enlighten the world as to the thoughts and actions of the Supreme Command, its sphere of labour and dealings with the Imperial Chancellor, as well as to substantiate what I said in my memoirs by documentary evidence.

What I am giving now is a series of significant documents drawn from existing originals. At the time a good deal of the negotiation was carried on by word of mouth but it was always along the same lines as are revealed in the written records.

From my sphere of activity as Director of the Concentration Section of the Great General Staff I have taken the letters which form Chapter I. in order to show what great pains the General Staff took to build up the army of the German Empire and enable it to face the coming war in a military sense.

My object in reproducing diplomatic documents, though some of them are already known, is to bring home to every German that a peace of understanding was unattainable, and to reveal how much was kept secret from the Supreme Command by the Imperial Government.

The publication of the official White Book, "Vorgeschichte des Waffenstillstandes,"* compelled me to define my attitude to this document in three volumes—"Das Scheitern der neutralen Friedensvermittlung, August–September, 1918,"† "Das Friedens- und Waffenstillstandsangebot,"‡ and "Das Verschieben der Verantwortlichkeit,"‖ and to start publishing individual documents at once. These are utilized again in the present work.

May these records, like "My War Memories," fill the German people with fresh national resolution and open their eyes to the truth.

All the documents published here will be an additional proof that the confidence was justified which the majority of the German people reposed in Field-Marshal Hindenburg and myself throughout the war.

LUDENDORFF.

Berlin,
May, 1920.

* "The Preliminaries to the Armistice."

† "The Failure of the Attempts at Mediation by a Neutral in August and September, 1918."

‡ "The Peace and Armistice Overtures."

‖ "The Attempt to Shift Responsibility."

CONTENTS

VOL. I.

CHAP.		PAGE
I.	WORK IN PEACE TIME ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERMAN ARMY	1
II.	AUXILIARY SERVICE LAW, RECRUITING AND LABOUR QUESTIONS	70
III.	FINANCIAL QUESTIONS: WAGES AND WAR PROFITS	167
IV.	FOOD	195
V.	THE QUESTION OF POPULATION AND PROVISION FOR MEN RETURNED FROM THE WAR	200
VI.	THE SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN, WILSON'S PEACE MEDIATION AND ATTITUDE	274

THE GENERAL STAFF AND ITS PROBLEMS

CHAPTER I

WORK IN PEACE TIME ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERMAN ARMY

DEPARTMENTAL business of Section 2 (Concentration Section) of the Great General Staff before the war:

1. The military affairs of Germany.
2. Home defence.
3. Mobilization and concentration.
4. Troop exercises, with the exception of Kaiser Manœuvres.
5. Exercises with signalling units, exercises in reconnaissance, technical artillery and engineering questions, so far as these are concerned with operations against fortresses, in conjunction with Section 4.
6. Results of Kaiser Manœuvres, in conjunction with Section 6.
7. Observing and working out the technical development of Transport, both at home and abroad.

LIST OF THE MEMORANDA REPRODUCED.

No.	Memo. No.	To	Contents.
1	No. 14711 I., 28/1/09.	General War Department.	Supply of ammunition, etc.
2	No. 1323 I., 25/2/10.	War Ministry.	Increase of war material.
3	No. 11153 I., 29/9/10.	General War Department.	Ammunition trains for field artillery.
4	No. 2501 I., 2/3/11.	War Ministry.	Increase of war material.
5	No. 12472 I., 24/11/10.	General War Department.	Question of automatic rifles.
6	No. 1484 I., 8/2/11.	War Ministry.	Need of foot artillery for attack on fortresses.
7	No. 13985 I., 10/11/11.	„ „	Artillery ammunition.
8	No. 16002/11 I., 6/1/12.	„ „	Reserve ammunition for field artillery.
9	No. 15246 I., 1/11/12.	„ „	Ammunition supply of the army.
10	No. 878, 1/7/10.	„ „	Employment in war of depot formations of field troops.
11	No. 878, 20/8/10.	„ „	Mobile employment of depot formations.
12	No. 13077, 11/11/10.	„ „	„ „ „ „ „
13	No. 2500 I., 2/3/11.	„ „	Construction of airships.
14	No. 3350 I., 9/3/12.	Insp.-General of Military Transport.	Aircraft supplies.
15	No. 5367 I., 23/4/12.	„ „	Equipment of aircraft.
16	No. 348/12, April, 1912.	War Ministry.	Organization of aviation service.
17	No. 12751 I., 26/9/12.	„ „	Establishment of aeroplane formations.
18	No. 16452 I., 6/11/12.	„ „	Organization of aviation service.
19	No. 18450 I., 3/12/12.	„ „	Artillery aeroplane units.
20	Section 2, 14/1/13.	Section 7 of War Ministry.	Further development of military aviation.
21	No. 8428 I.	Various authorities.	Germany's wireless communications with her colonies.
22	No. 13108 I., 17/10/11.	War Ministry.	Wireless communication Nauen–New York.
23	December, 1912.	Imperial Chancellor and War Minister.	Memorandum to serve as basis for the Milliard Marks Bill.

I.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Army.
"No. 14711 I. Secret.
"Ref. No. 1221/08 Secret. A 4 of 11/12/08.
"Ammunition, etc., supply.

"Berlin,
"28/1/1909.

"To the General War Department.

"In view of this year's report on the Administration Staff-rides I consider it necessary that the supply of ammunition should be put on a sounder footing than heretofore. Otherwise the army will be faced with a shortage of ammunition after the first great battles which we must expect when operations begin.

"The supply of ammunition on hand, in accordance with the special orders 11 p. M. Pl. will suffice at first—taking into account the practice ammunition which can be used in the field—for the infantry and foot artillery, which moreover could have the fortress stocks at its disposal. It is in the field artillery that a shortage of ammunition is to be anticipated. My demand that in addition to the practice ammunition one complete war establishment should be formed as a reserve will only limit this shortage if the rapid manufacture of larger supplies of field artillery ammunition in the factories is technically possible, scientifically provided for, and pursued with unremitting energy from the first day of mobilization.

"This must be regarded as a necessary second-line measure for the ammunition of the other arms also.

"The time for assembling the existing ammunition supplies has not been fixed satisfactorily everywhere. For all arms we must have more ammunition trains than I had stipulated for, and these must be loaded and ready earlier. In any case, between the eleventh and fifteenth days of mobilization each

normally constituted army corps (including Guard Reserve Corps) must have as first instalment an ammunition train for infantry, '96/98 field artillery and '02 heavy field howitzers, while the reserve corps and divisions have five ammunition trains of the '96 field-artillery ammunition, and one each is assigned to the mortar battalions of the heavy artillery of the field army and the Spandau 10 cm. gun battalion.

"A second large instalment of ammunition, including all the field-artillery ammunition trains provided for as above, must be loaded and ready as early as possible, the twenty-first day of mobilization at the latest.

"As regards foot-artillery ammunition these demands can easily be met, but in the case of infantry, and especially field artillery ammunition, their fulfilment involves very serious difficulties which I fully realize. Yet I must request the Department to proceed with the execution of the scheme, if at all possible.

"(1) The first ammunition instalment will be allotted, according to the order of battle, to the armies, or rather their L. of C.* Inspectorates, and assembled at the L. of C. main depots and collecting stations. The L. of C. Inspectorates will forward this ammunition to the fighting troops. The L. of C. Inspectorates will indent directly on the Department for further ammunition.

"The Department will have at its disposal the second instalment already loaded and on the rails, as well as everything else in the way of ammunition manufactured or in course of manufacture in the country. From these sources further ammunition trains must be continuously supplied. By directing the movements of these trains to correspond with the course of events, the Department can meet the demands of the L. of C. Inspectorates. Main Headquarters will be able to give the Department some assistance in this respect by furnishing information.

* L. of C. = Lines of Communication.

"(2) As regards methods of procedure.

"It is necessary to simplify the methods of indenting for arms, ammunition, war material and fuel. The troops will address their demands to the L. of C. Inspectorates which are to be equipped accordingly and in individual cases directed to sources of supply. The L. of C. Inspectorates will meet their further demands, as explained under (1), by indenting on the General War Department, or in certain cases directly on the Inspectorate of the Communication Service.

(Signed) "v. MOLTKE."

2.

Extract.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Army.

"No. 1323 I. Secret.

"Ref. No. 2281/09 Secret. K.M. of 12/1/1910.

"Increase of supply of war material.

"Berlin,
"25/2/1910.

"TO THE WAR MINISTRY.

"I am grateful for the attitude taken up by the War Ministry in the memorandum referred to above. I have nothing fresh to add to the considerations urged there. I am of opinion that we have no option, in spite of the financial sacrifices involved, but to develop our measures if our cause is not to suffer injury.

"As regards the compilation of the 1911/12 estimates I will here recapitulate the measures which seem to me particularly urgent as far as they relate to 'permanent expenditure.' Etc., etc.

"Further, I attach great importance to the following:

(3) Accelerating the process of rearming the troops with the latest rifles and carbines and equipping the infantry with telephone material; also the immediate introduction of field kitchens.

(4) Increasing the number of machine-guns.
(5) Introduction of Scheer telescopes for higher staffs.
(6) Co-ordination of the wireless service of the field army.

(Signed) "v. MOLTKE."

3.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Army.
"No. 11153 I. Secret.
"Ref. A.D. of 8/9/1910. No. 1246/10 Secret. A 4.
"Ammunition trains for field artillery.

"Berlin,
"29/9/1910.

"TO THE GENERAL WAR DEPARTMENT.

"With regard to the considerably larger number of rounds which the French allow to each gun, we must devote ourselves untiringly to increasing our supply of ammunition; otherwise we shall have to anticipate a failure of supply, perhaps at the most critical moment.

"As I have already explained in my memorandum of 28/1/1909, No. 14711 I, it is also necessary that, with a view to mobilization, the manufacture of further field artillery ammunition supplies in the munition factories should be methodically planned and pushed on from the first day of mobilization with the greatest energy.

(Signed) "v. STEIN."

4.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Army.
"No. 2501 I. Secret.
"Increase of supply of war material.

"Berlin,
"2/3/1911.

"TO THE WAR MINISTRY.

"As last year under No. 1323 I. Secret, of 25/2/1910, I here indicate for this year the measures for the compilation of the

1911/12 budget, which seem to me particularly urgent, so far as they relate to 'non-recurring expenditure.'

"The increase of our artillery is now, as ever, the most important point. I consider the following measures particularly vital:

(1) The production of the heaviest high-angle-fire guns.

(2) The increase of the war establishment of field artillery ammunition. I assume that in view of the prospective increase in the number of light field-howitzer *Abteilungen** (K. M. of 30/11/1910, No. 1481/10 A 1) the supply of '05 E ammunition will be correspondingly increased.

"With regard to the discontinuance of the E ammunition for the guns of the field artillery I refer to my memorandum of 29/12/1910, No. 15954. In this connection I must lay the greatest emphasis on the fact that even with the heaviest high-angle fire we now possess we shall not be able to dominate hostile fortresses and that our field-artillery ammunition will prove insufficient if, as is probable, we have to fight several great battles at the very outset of operations and the deliveries provided for the case of emergency are not yet ready. I regard this situation as serious and beg you to take all measures to relieve it.

"Further I attach importance to:

(1) Accelerating the introduction of field kitchens.

(2) Scheer telescopes for higher staffs.

(3) Co-ordination of the wireless telegraphic service.

(4) Production of aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons.

(5) Arming the reserve cavalry with the '98 carbine.

(6) Production of entrenching tools for reserve infantry regiments.

(Signed) "v. MOLTKE."

* An *Abteilung* is a group of three batteries. [Tr.]

5.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Army.
"No. 12472 I. Secret.
"Ref. No. 690/10 Secret. A 22 of 6/10/10.
"Re Automatic Rifles.

"Berlin,
"24/11/1910.

"To the General War Department.

"I have considered with great interest the memorandum relating to the question of automatic rifles.

"If France introduces a rifle superior to ours, the formation of the machine-gun companies we still lack will be an inadequate compensation for us. At the moment France is ahead of us as regards the number of machine-guns and we shall only catch France up by forming these companies, as has so strongly been urged. It is true that our machine-gun is said to be the better of the two, but this advantage will not compensate for the drawback of an inferior infantry rifle.

"I am therefore thankful that we, too, are even now devoting ourselves to the question of the automatic rifle and that efforts are being made to manufacture an efficient automatic rifle for our infantry. Whether it will be found possible to introduce it later is another question; in any case we are secure against surprise.

"If an automatic rifle is introduced it will be desirable to increase the supply of small-arm ammunition to be carried on the person; the experiments to make the cartridge cases lighter are therefore of great importance. But, on the other hand, I must insist that in the infantry action it will not primarily be a question of shooting more with the automatic rifle. It is rather that its greatest advantage lies in the fact that the infantryman will be able to shoot more accurately and easily than under the old system, thanks to less 'kick' and the partial elimination of loading movements, especially in rapid fire.

"In other cases, e.g., in sweeping from trenches in fortress operations, the high rate of fire will obviously be of the greatest importance for the introduction of the automatic rifle. The question of the ammunition supply, on which I have touched, will play no part in this matter.

"I must ask the Department to keep me in touch with the progress of its experiments.

(Signed) "v. MOLTKE."

6.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Army.
"No. 1484 I. Secret.
"Ref. No. 1128 sec. A 5 of 17/11/10.
"1646 10 sec. A 5 of 12/12/10.
"Shortage of foot artillery for attacking fortresses.

"Berlin,
"8/2/1911.

"TO THE WAR MINISTRY.

"In the war we shall need rapid and decisive victories. Our artillery must therefore be on such a scale that in the west we can capture numerous barrier forts on the frontier and in the interior, and at the same time be in a position to attack two larger fortress systems. It needs no demonstration that in addition we shall require heavy artillery for use in the field. The situation in the east can be left out of consideration for the moment. If we are prepared for the attack on the French fortresses we shall be ready for that on the Russian also.

"I agree with the Inspector-General of the foot artillery that we must be content with the foot artillery which we shall have at our disposal after the Five Years' Law has been carried into effect.

"I.—For the field and the attack on the barrier forts on the frontier and in the interior we must use primarily the heavy artillery of the field army and a few coastal mortar batteries.

The heavy field howitzer batteries of the reserve foot artillery from Metz and Strasburg must also be drawn upon with a view to a rapid breach of the hostile barriers. On this matter I agree with the Inspector-General of the foot artillery. (C. 4 of the annual report of 23/10/1910.)

"We shall be able to manage with the material thus at our disposal for the attack on the barrier lines. I assume that as a result of the operation of the Five Years' Law the number of mortar batteries of the heavy artillery of the field army will also be increased. We have therefore still to set about making the coastal mortars and the heavy field howitzer battalions of the reserve foot artillery in Metz and Strasburg mobile, the former by the use of mechanical transport and the latter by better equipment with columns. (See III.)

"II.—1. Basing myself on our first measures and the scheme of attack (and bearing in mind the deliberations of the Artillery Testing Commision) I have laid down the following as our minimum requirements in siege batteries for the attack on the two fortress systems:

"Eight battalions of 10 cm. guns, 3 battalions of 13 cm. guns (each battalion of 4 batteries), 30 battalions of 15 cm. howitzers of 4 guns, 14 battalions of 21 cm. mortars, 8 batteries 30·5 cm. (equipment for every two guns), 4 batteries 42 cm. (equipment for every two guns).

"In view of the strength of the French fortresses and the results of the artillery experiments of the summer of 1910, I regard the large number of medium, and more particularly heavy, high-angle-fire guns as absolutely necessary.

"The heavy coastal mortar batteries and the field howitzer batteries of the reserve foot artillery mentioned under I. are included in that number and are taken into account.

"It is otherwise with the heavy artillery of the field army. As I have already explained we shall need these, in addition to the siege artillery, for the campaign in the field and also for dealing with the enemy's fortresses in the interior after the

sieges have actually begun. Only such field howitzers of the heavy artillery of the field army will be available for sieges as are actually with the corps which, pursuant to the order of battle, are engaged in the siege. Further, we must be extremely careful in counting on the 21 cm. mortar batteries of the heavy artillery of the field army. If we regard about three howitzer battalions and at the most half the mortar batteries of the heavy artillery of the field army as available for sieges, it is seen that there will be a lacuna of 27 15 cm. howitzer and 11 21 cm. battalions to be filled up in some other way.

"2. We shall use our foot artillery, at least such of it as is not earmarked to form the heavy artillery of the field army or compose the heaviest mortar batteries, for the defence of fortresses. We shall also employ it for sieges. This system is sound and we must adhere to it. We are faced, however, with the extraordinary difficulty in this case that we do not know whether the situation will allow us to bring the foot artillery from the eastern fortresses for use in the west.

"Apart from the foot-artillery complements of the coast defences, after the Five Years' Law has been carried into effect we shall have in our fortresses about 12 active battalions of foot artillery, 50 reserve and 25 Landwehr battalions. The depot battalions are not included in this calculation; nor is the 2nd battalion of the Foot Artillery School. I leave the Landwehr battalions out of account, because it seems to me out of the question that we could call on them for sieges.

"These figures show that from the point of view of numbers we shall have enough troops at our disposal to form the units required for sieges.

"It is desirable that we should make good the shortage of siege artillery, especially medium and heavy high-angle fire, from the fortresses in the west as well as the interior, in case we find ourselves compelled to keep the eastern fortresses in a condition of effective defence. I am hoping that we shall be able to arrange such a distribution of the troops and material

as will permit this. I intend to return to this matter. I will only say this now—that the heaviest high-angle-fire batteries are to be manned with field troops, either from the 2nd battalion from the artillery school or from the war garrisons.

"3. Our greatest difficulty will, generally speaking, be the production of material, including ammunition. The first thing in importance, as well as in the scale of the material required, is the increase of the heavy high-angle-fire batteries. This matter cannot be postponed unless we are to renounce once and for all the idea of overcoming the hostile fortresses.

"We shall have four 21 cm. mortar battalions. As the Artillery Testing Commission proposes, five more battalions can at first be equipped with the former steel mortars of the heavy artillery of the field army. The material for the two battalions required in addition must be provided.

"There is no shortage of heavy field howitzers, especially if we have large numbers of the heavy '02 field howitzer at our disposal as a result of rearming the howitzer battalions of the heavy artillery of the field army. Until that has been done we must manage with the old howitzers.

"We have enough 10 cm. guns. But I regard it as extremely desirable that we should proceed with the provision of teams and columns for reserve foot artillery battalions. Further, special attention will have to be devoted to securing the ammunition supply. I have already discussed the necessity of drawing on the reserve foot-artillery ammunition columns for this purpose. At the same time we must try to increase the capacity of the field railways. It appears essential to increase the number of field tramways. We must adhere to the principle of one field tram train to every battalion. We must therefore not let the number of tram trains fall below 50. For this purpose it is desirable to construct a vehicle which can be used both on the field railway and field tramway. Whether that is possible must be left to further discussion.

"Lastly, we must devote all our efforts to making the fullest

possible use of motor transport. In particular, motor transport will have to be responsible for the supply for the heaviest high-angle-fire batteries brought up by road.

"4. I am fully conscious that the production of the equipment still required will consume a large amount of material. Just as we have had to consider the amount of material required for the further development of our system of fortifications, we shall have to consider the question of producing material for our offensive plans. More especially we must examine the question how our defensive and offensive measures are to be reconciled from the point of view of the material they will require.

(Signed) "VON MOLTKE."

7.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Army.
"No. 13985 I. Sec.
"Ref. K.M. of 29/10/11, No. 1347/11 sec. A 4.
"Artillery ammunition.

"Berlin,
"10/11/1911.

"TO THE WAR MINISTRY.

"The figures given in the memorandum under notice show clearly how important it is to give the question of ammunition the attention it deserves. I need only indicate what influence the ammunition supply would have had on our conduct of operations if we had been involved in war five or six years ago. For that reason I have always welcomed every improvement —witness my memorandum of 29/9/1910, No. 11153 I.—though I have repeatedly emphasized the necessity of a yet greater increase in our ammunition supplies. When I gathered from the memorandum of 29/9/1911, No. 1226/11 sec. A 4, that the production of the E (universal) ammunition for the field artillery was only possible 'on the scale of the requirements

of the annual practice,' I was extremely concerned, and therefore expressed my opinion that the supply of field-artillery ammunition must be increased greatly beyond that scale by the introduction of special measures. As I am now informed that this can be done I can only once more express my thanks. Meanwhile the War Ministry draws the conclusion that, for the *foot* artillery only, the supply of ammunition will be sufficient. The question of the supply for the *field* artillery is still open. On this head I am still anxious, as I have said. As we have now seen, we must be prepared to find ourselves involved in a war at any time, and I must be in a position to have a comprehensive view of everything that can affect the conduct of operations. I must therefore ask for the figure of the amount of ammunition (including fuses) which can be manufactured after six to eight weeks, and then every four weeks after the proclamation of mobilization. It must be remembered that after the introduction of the universal shell the manufacture of that species only is in question for the purpose of calculation.

"As regards the foot artillery I have always realized that the heavy artillery of the field army is in a better position than the field artillery, though it is not as good as I was bound to assume earlier on, in view of my memorandum of 28/1/09, No. 14711/08 and the reply of the A.D.* of 31/3/09, No. 189/09 sec. A 4, Para. 6, against the views of the K. M.† (See the last conclusion of the memorandum of the K. M. of 20/10/1911, No. 1276/11 sec. A 5.) In the memorandum of 31/3/1909, in accordance with my proposal, a second instalment of ammunition for the howitzers of the heavy artillery of the field army was prepared. That this was done at the expense of the siege artillery I could not know before the memorandum of the A.D. of 14/7/1911, No. 738/11 sec. A 5, which separated the trains for the heavy artillery and the siege artillery for the first time, in accordance with my request. If we draw on the

* General War Department. (Tr.)

† War Ministry. (Tr.)

stocks of the siege artillery, including the supplies of the fortresses, there will certainly be no shortage of ammunition for the heavy artillery of the field army. But there will still be the question how, with the supply of ammunition available, we shall be able simultaneously to carry on sieges, the rapid conclusion of which must also be the object of speedy operations.

"I intend to return to this question of the consumption of ammunition and the measures to make good such consumption in operations against fortresses in another connection. It needs elucidation. For the present I can only express my satisfaction that with regard to the heavy field howitzers the War Ministry actually sees eye to eye with me and intends to improve the supply of ammunition of the heavy field howitzers by the proposed creation of a second instalment for the heavy artillery (Para. 6 of the memo. of 20/10/1911, No. 1276/11 sec. A 5). I must ask for information as to when this second instalment will be ready, as also what will be the position as regards the manufacture of ammunition for the heavy field howitzers in case of mobilization.

(Signed) "P. p. v. WINDHEIM."

8.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Army.
"No. 16002/11 I. Secret.
"Ref. Memo. No. 1483/11 I. Sec. A 4 of 7/12/1911.
"Ammunition reserve of the field artillery.

"Berlin,
"6/1/1912.

"TO THE WAR MINISTRY.

"I can only welcome the intention of the War Ministry to continue the development of the ammunition reserve of the field artillery to such a point that for every single gun there will be a total of 1,200 rounds available.

"The figure of 1,200 rounds seems to me absolutely necessary in view of the small amount of ammunition which, as I now hear and in spite of all our efforts, can be manufactured after the proclamation of mobilization. I must ask that that figure be reached as soon as possible.

"At the same time I must draw your attention to the necessity of developing the capacity of industry to produce ammunition in the case of mobilization, in order that it may be able to cope with any emergency.

As appears from the French army estimates for 1912 (Report of Deputy Hubert), France is also endeavouring to increase her ammunition establishment for the field artillery.

"I am in complete agreement with the War Ministry with regard to the necessity of training the troops to economize ammunition, and putting the further supply of ammunition on a sound footing. Measures for that purpose are particularly urgent, because while France allots about 72,000 rounds per army corps we only allow 50,043 + 4,286, or* only 42,894 + 8,572.

"In the first place, the supplies which are allotted to the army corps must be increased by the assignment of a second artillery (field-howitzer) ammunition column for each light field-howitzer *Abteilung*. With regard to the penultimate sentence of the memo. of the General War Department of 24/6/1911, No. 645/11 sec. A 4, I should be glad to have information as to whether this increase can be included in the 1912 Estimates.

"In the second place, more L. of C. ammunition columns must be formed to facilitate the bringing up of ammunition from the ammunition trains to the army corps. In this connection I must refer to my proposals of 17/3/1911, No. 32671 and 22/4/1911, No. 3065, I. sec., with regard to the formation of L. of C. horsed ammunition columns, and my memorandum

* Where there are two light field-howitzer *Abteilungen* (see note on p. 7) per army corps.

of 30/12/1911, No. 16267, with regard to the formation of L. of C. mechanical transport columns by drawing on the reserve of army mechanical transport in the L. of C. mechanical transport park.

(Signed) "VON MOLTKE."

9.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Army.
"No. 15246 I. Secret.
"Ref. No. 1645/12 s. A 5 of 4/10/12.
"Ammunition supply of the army.

"Berlin,
"1/11/1912.

"TO THE WAR MINISTRY.

"As my frequent memoranda on the question of ammunition show, I have never ceased to devote my attention to the matter of the ammunition supply of the army and its further development. As early as my memorandum of 29/1/09 I put forward a demand for a second relay of ammunition trains from the 21st day of mobilization onwards. It was only from the memo. of the General War Department of 14/7/1911, No. 738 sec. A 5, that I was enlightened as to the amount of ammunition really available for the heavy field howitzers. In my memo. of 2/9/1911, No. 9332, I therefore repeated my request for the establishment of a second relay of ammunition trains, referring expressly to my memo. of 29/1/09.

"In that memo. I pointed to the connection between peace establishment and the deliveries under mobilization. The smaller and slower those deliveries, the larger must the peace establishment be. It was only in reply to my query of 12/10/1911, No. 12564, that I was able to grasp the extent of the mobilization deliveries: for the field artillery from the memo. of 8/6/1912, No. 1081/12 sec. A 4, and for the foot artillery from the memo. of 4/10/1912, cited above.

"This survey compels me to return once more to the whole question of the supply of artillery ammunition so far as this relates to the field army, and therefore to reply to the questions put to me in the memo. of 4/10. I must more particularly emphasize that the further I look into the matter of increasing the supply of ammunition the higher I place the level at which the peace establishment of ammunition should be maintained. My sole desire at the moment is to be absolutely clear about this extraordinarily important question. I am therefore placing a copy of this memorandum before the Inspector of the Field Artillery and the Inspector-General of the Foot Artillery, and request an exchange of views with these authorities and myself on the following points. This must be regarded as particularly important, in view of the fact that the problem can only be solved theoretically for the time being.

"Besides the peace establishment of ammunition and the deliveries on mobilization there is a third factor—our total equipment. If this were on such a scale that we could overthrow our enemies with one mighty blow at the very beginning of operations and thereby rapidly terminate the war, in addition to the ammunition supply of the troops in the field (which is to be regarded as a certain quantity, including the supply for the light field howitzers) we should need only a small peace ammunition reserve per gun and need attach no importance to extensive production after mobilization.

"Unfortunately our military power is not on a scale to realize so great a goal. We must realize now that we are faced with a tedious campaign, with a series of severe and long-drawn-out battles before we overthrow *even one* of our enemies; our efforts and wastage will increase if we are compelled to obtain successive victories in different theatres of war in the west and east, and have to fight against superior numbers from the outset. A large amount of ammunition for a very long period of time will become an inexorable

necessity. In view of the relative numbers it will make itself felt in *all* parts of the army and be materially aggravated at those points of our long front which are only held lightly.

"At the moment the ammunition situation is as follows:

"(1) Peace Establishment.—The field artillery has about 400 rounds per gun with the army corps and a reserve of about one and a half times that figure in Prussia.

"The light field howitzers have an entirely inadequate supply with the army corps. This situation is being improved, but even after these measures have been completed the number of rounds per army corps is still extremely small. The comparison with the ammunition reserve is apparently more favourable than in the case of the field artillery. But in actual fact it is not so, as the number of rounds available for the light field howitzers at the moment will be at least 100 less than those available for the field artillery. I shall not return to the question of the light field howitzers; what I have said in the case of the field artillery applies with greater force to them.

"The heavy field artillery, which has 432 rounds per gun with the army corps and, therefore, a high standard of equipment, will take 6,912 rounds with the army corps. As reserve it has *one* ammunition train of 6,000 rounds, i.e., six-sevenths of establishment. In this connection siege ammunition cannot be drawn on as it is needed for sieges, and the supply itself requires supplementing.

"(2) Deliveries on mobilization.—Mobilization deliveries will begin in the case of the field artillery in the seventh to eighth week in Prussia on the scale of 120,000 rounds, i.e., about 40 rounds per gun for the field and reserve field artillery. 40 to 50 rounds per gun will follow every four weeks.

"For the heavy field howitzers 35,000 rounds will be delivered by the eighth week, and thereafter 26,000 to 28,000 rounds every four weeks. Unfortunately we do not know the time when the 35,000 rounds will be actually in the

artillery depots and ready for forwarding, unlike the case of the field artillery ammunition, the dates for which were established in the memo. of 8/6/1912. This ammunition will also be used for sieges.

"The field artillery will therefore have to be satisfied with the ammunition supply produced in peace time until the seventh to eighth week.

"The heavy artillery of the field army cannot rely on mobilization deliveries at all, and there will be a shortage of ammunition either in field or siege operations.

"(3) Consumption of ammunition in the field.—There can be no possible doubt that the first great battles will be fought on the prospective battlefields immediately on the completion of the concentration, and probably in these battles, which will presumably last for days, the entire supply of ammunition with the army corps, etc.—in the case of the field artillery, more—will be used up. For example, in a battle which lasts for several long summer days, a consumption of ammunition of 500 rounds per field gun and heavy field howitzer is possible, more particularly when the lack of war experience and practice in peace time are taken into consideration.

"After the first great battle there will still be enough ammunition with the field artillery for a second battle—perhaps somewhat more—but with the heavy field artillery the supply will not perhaps be fully replenished. With this quota we shall have to manage until the seventh or eighth week and even longer, as the mobilization deliveries can only be regarded as a slight supplement. It seems to me quite impossible that we should be able to manage with this, as immediately after the first great battle further severe battles will follow. Thus, as the position develops, even if we assume that there will only be a small consumption of ammunition in the first great battles, our supply of ammunition will be exhausted between the 30th and 40th days of mobilization, possibly later in the most favourable circum-

stances. In some places there will be a shortage of ammunition before that; in others there will still be a supply, but there will be no possibility of effecting an adjustment.

"(4) The measures proposed and their influence on the consumption of ammunition in the field.—The measures proposed, i.e., increasing the establishment of field artillery ammunition to 1,200 rounds per gun and a second ammunition train for the heavy field-howitzer battalions—will of course improve the position. Even then there will be a shortage in the amount of ammunition required for really energetic and continuous operations (as we have possibly to anticipate fresh opponents after the 40th to 50th day of mobilization), especially as the scale of the mobilization deliveries is of no material help. As that scale must apparently be regarded as a fixed quantity, there is nothing for it but to increase the peace establishment of ammunition. It is with that end in view that I have demanded a third and fourth relay for the heavy field howitzers; in the case of the field artillery, the remedy is to increase the establishment beyond the 1,200 rounds per gun.

"I am not forgetting the efforts of the War Ministry to secure the ammunition supply of the army. I have already expressed my appreciation on various occasions. On the other hand, as soon as the basis of my representation—that, in consequence of the position in which we find ourselves, the peace establishment and the mobilization deliveries will not cover the demands for ammunition—is accepted, it must be admitted that as regards the question of ammunition our preparations for war are incomplete, and that in consequence the conduct of operations may be faced with serious difficulties. Everything must be done to shorten the duration of this serious situation. For example, if the second relay for the heavy field howitzers—which I ordered as early as 29/1/09—cannot be forthcoming before the year 1917 I should regard such a delay as in the highest degree regrettable. I must

demand really effective measures and the immediate production of the material required. When the factories extend their operations they will bear the increased demand in mind.

"I am firmly convinced that the last full limber will have a material influence on the issue of a great European war. As we have to deal with opponents who together will be greatly superior to us, we must have at our disposal a considerably larger amount of ammunition than any single one of them.

(Signed) "VON MOLTKE."

10.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Army.
"No. 878 sec.
"Employment in war of reserve formations of the field troops.

"Berlin,
"1/7/1910.

"TO THE WAR MINISTRY.

"The last war-game in the General Staff, which was based on the assumption of a war of Germany against France, Russia and England, combined with the relative General Staff ride, in which the problem was an English landing in Schleswig-Holstein, have made it quite clear that in an emergency we shall not be able to deal with the situation without immediately calling on the depot formations of the field troops for employment in active operations. I have in mind only those depot troops which are definitely incorporated in units. Even if their employment in active operations must be regarded as an evil in itself and an emergency measure, and though I am entirely in agreement with the view of the War Ministry that the true function of the depot formations is to make good the losses of the first line troops, there can be no doubt that it would be a fatal mistake if we ran the risk of being beaten for

the benefit of that function. In a coalition war against Germany the numbers at our enemies' disposal are so great that it may be our urgent duty in certain circumstances to deploy against them at the very outset the entire manhood of the empire capable of bearing arms. Everything turns on our ability to win the first battles; if we succeed in that it matters little if the depot troops are drawn from their proper function by being employed in active operations. Moreover, those depot troops which have to be used to oppose a hostile landing can presumably be returned to their proper duties after a victory.

"The emergency in which the Supreme Command must draw on the depot troops for active operations may arise at a very early stage. For example, a landing of English troops in Schleswig-Holstein may take place after the 15th day of mobilization. If we have to concentrate on our western and eastern frontiers we cannot leave an army in Schleswig-Holstein which is equal to the English. Nor could we withdraw an equally strong force from the regular concentration on the eastern and western frontiers to be transferred to that quarter. We need our whole force if we are to be victorious at the decisive point in the east or west. Of the regular active formations we can, therefore, only leave in Schleswig-Holstein a nucleus sufficient to form a first line of protection. To defeat the enemy when he arrives at this point we shall need depot formations at an early stage.

"If we fully realize that in case of emergency we shall have to draw on depot troops for the field, and that early, it becomes our duty and a peremptory demand of self-preservation that we make thorough preparation for that employment in conjunction with the extension of the principles of our plan of mobilization in peace.

"The first step has been taken in the fact that our depot formations are constituted of trained troops only. The second step has been started. The reserve *Abteilungen* of the

field artillery will all be prepared for active employment, and equipped accordingly. Transport has been prepared in peace for some of the depot battalions of the field troops. The production of more transport is provided for in Appendix 125 to I.1, and arranged in the case of the IX, X, XIII and XIV Army Corps through the special regulations. These regulations must be extended to the other arms, and more particularly to the depot formations of the III, IV, XI, XII and XIX Corps and part of the depot formations of the Guard and II Corps. Existing depot troops are primarily intended to oppose a hostile landing.

"It is therefore of the greatest importance that the equipment of the depot formations should be improved as much as possible, and especially that their medical equipment should be perfected.

"Another measure is to proceed with the formation of mixed brigades (Para. 89 of the Scheme of Mobilization). For this purpose an acting brigade staff must be formed from every division—with the exception of the XV and XVI Army Corps—according to the establishment lists H.a.1 (2). These must be for home service at first. In the case of the Guard Corps, which can only release a part of its depot formations, an Inspector of the reserve Guard infantry would have to be appointed.

"In the case of those army corps which have the whole or the bulk of their depot formations quartered in fortresses, these brigade staffs might be regularly appointed to the fortresses (Appendix 204, Para. 89 of the Scheme of Mobilization) and the fortresses could make good use of them.

"In order to deal with depot business an acting brigade staff may be left with every division (Appendix 5, Para. 4 of the Scheme of Mobilization).

"Finally, higher commands must be established and placed at the disposal of the Supreme Command, approximately in accordance with the establishment lists H.a.1 (1). These

must eventually have the rank of Corps Commanders. The formation of several brigades into larger units is essential. I must first request the appointment of a higher command to the III, IV, IX and X Corps; or instead of the IV and X, as the case may be, to the XI and XII or XIX Corps. I assume that the acting G. O.'s C. of the Army Corps districts will preserve their functions.

"To avoid the expense of the formation of the brigade staffs and the higher commands we must draw on the depot formations.

"We shall have to do without the formation of horse transport units. It is desirable to form field transport companies out of the depot transport battalions.

"With a view to employing depot formations in Schleswig-Holstein, as regards the production of transport for the transport columns it will be enough if we establish two or three transport depots in the area of the IX and eventually the X Army Corps. For the rest, the Headquarters Staff will have to manage as best it can.

"I hope that my proposals will be carried into effect without any particular difficulty. I repeat that I regard the fulfilment of my wishes as an urgent measure of self-preservation. I request the War Ministry to co-operate with me whole-heartedly in this case, as they have so often done before, and to give effect to my proposals by 1/4/1911 at the latest.

(Signed) "VON MOLTKE."

II.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Army.

"No. 878.

"Ref. M.I. No. 914/10. A 1 of 3/8/1910.

"Active employment of depot formations.

"Berlin,

"20/8/1910.

"TO THE WAR MINISTRY.

"Our political and military situation makes it our duty to assemble all our available man-power for a struggle which

will decide the existence or destruction of the German Empire. If we are really to cope with that situation we must primarily expand our forces and build up our resources in the manner which corresponds to the number of potential fighting men and reservists which are now at our disposal.

"I need not insist that the only proper course would be the formation of entire new units. That would be the safest way of meeting a serious crisis with a prospect of success. However, I have not lost sight of the difficulties of our financial and domestic situation. In agreement with the War Minister I have therefore refused to demand a material addition to our peace strength, and even now I do not ask for the formation of new troops from our large establishment of reservists.

"All the greater is our duty to do all we can to make existing formations available, as no special financial resources but only a systematic preparation will be required to render them fit for active service. For this reason I have put forward the demand that we should take measures to mobilize the depot troops, and in that demand I see nothing but a political measure of self-preservation—an obligation from which nothing can release us.

"In my memorandum of 1/7/1910 I emphasized that I primarily regard the depot army as an available reserve, parts of which can be withdrawn 'in an emergency,' and with the support afforded by fortresses, river courses and other obstacles prevent some fresh enemy from securing a footing in the country and laying hands on the material resources which are urgently required for the operations—or at least delay him in so doing.

"The War Ministry appears to fear that what is intended is an immediate employment of the entire mobile depot reserve in common operations with the active field army. That would be impossible, if only on account of the railway concentration. If the employment of the depot formations proves unnecessary we shall be able to restore them to their

proper functions—making good the losses of the field army, without prejudice to their participation in active operations.

"The very existence of a really effective reserve force in the interior after the field army has been concentrated on the frontier is of great importance in dealing with a hostile coalition, as in all probability we shall have to do. A fresh opponent who sees our country defenceless before him will be much less inclined to attack if he knows there is an organized army to meet. In extreme need that army could be employed as freely as the field army, either singly or in conjunction with the field army or parts of it. Every state which is fighting with the greatest vigour for its existence must throw in all its human and material resources if it is to meet its highest obligations.

"In my memorandum of 1/7/1910 I drew particular attention to the preparations required for the protection of Schleswig-Holstein, because a breach at that point would strike us at an exceptionally sensitive spot. It is impossible to say for certain whether an English landing is intended there or in Jutland. The reports of a military attaché cannot be a guarantee for the security of our northern frontier. I cannot agree with the proposal to form a new force to meet an English landing by withdrawing supernumerary battalions from various army and reserve corps with the addition of the 3rd Reserve Division. Apart from the difficulty of assembling many small units of different corps (a difficulty which would be aggravated by the railway concentration), and the possible necessity of leaving the 3rd Reserve Division on the Russian frontier, we should only be transferring forces from one point for employment in another, and thus there would be no addition to our total resources. It is to be remembered, moreover, that some of our reserve corps and divisions have not their full complement of 24 and 12 battalions respectively, so that the supernumerary battalions will only be just enough to bring them up to strength.

"I must particularly insist that it is not merely a question of mobilizing the depot formations which are primarily earmarked for the defence of Schleswig-Holstein. We must be prepared to employ all the depot formations of the field troops in active operations.

"Their function of supplying drafts and maintaining order in the interior, for which purpose reserve and landwehr depot formations are also available, will not at first be affected by that measure. If we succeed in winning a great victory over one of our opponents at the very outset of hostilities the employment of these troops as independent fighting units will certainly be unnecessary. But such a victory can only be hoped for, it cannot be guaranteed. If the entire field army is employed for a decisive blow at one of our opponents, and perhaps finds itself engaged in long indecisive battles at a moment when a new enemy appears on the scene, no part of the field army could be withdrawn to meet him, and the depot formations must be called upon. Anxiety lest its capabilities, both as regards numbers and training, should be insufficient for victory cannot be regarded as a reason for neglect. In any case it will be better to try and secure such a victory by having the available troops ready than to make no preparation at all and then be compelled to resort to improvisation.

"I need not stop to prove that an organized force with efficient leaders is better than a moderate conglomeration with too few officers. At the outset I do not expect great operations from the depot formations, but rather a stout resistance in selected positions, whether the Vistula or Netze and Warta with the associated system of fortresses in the east, or the Eider and Schleisein in the north. These formations will give of their best for the defence of their native soil—all the more if they have become fit for active operations by adequate training. The higher commanders can be produced without injuring the field army. We have enough higher

officers on the reserve list. The only shortage is of regimental commanders for the infantry. But it is not even essential to fill these posts (Mobilization Scheme 89 (2), Appendix 68). As early as 1866 depot brigades were formed without regimental units.

"I must ask you again to look more closely into the proposals in my memorandum of 1/7/1910.

(Signed) "VON MOLTKE."

12.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Army.
"No. 13077.
"Ref. M.I. of No. 1282/10. A 1 of 21/10.
"Employment of depot formations
in active operations.

"Berlin,
"11/11/1910.

"TO THE WAR MINISTRY.

"As regards the importance of the Ersatz reserve for the field army I am in entire agreement with the views of the War Ministry and my predecessor. I also agree with the latter that in a future war emergencies may arise which can only be overcome by the greatest efforts. With that in view, in his memorandum of 4/11/1905, No. 11077, my predecessor demanded the 200,000 reservists then surplus to establishment.

"As the discussion of this question was not concluded and it was becoming ever more urgent to have further forces at our disposal, as an emergency measure I proposed in my memo. No. 590 sec., of 7/4/1906, that from the trained men of two depot battalions, which were then composed of 50 per cent. untrained Ersatz reservists, *one* effective battalion should be formed. The War Minister saw in this proposal 'not inconsiderable disadvantages, both for the newly formed battalion and the portion left untouched.'

"After it appeared that the 200,000 men could not be incorporated into supernumerary formations, at my suggestion and after hearing the views of the Corps Staffs the War Ministry ordered that the untrained men of the depot battalions should be replaced by the surplus trained men and the recruit depots enlarged. This was at first experimental and then made permanent. The memorandum of 18/6/1907 established this measure, with a further demand that in a given case depot troops could be drawn upon for active military operations. This was also the origin of Appendix 68 to Para. 89 of the Scheme of Mobilization, which provided for the formations of depot brigades by the acting G. O's C. of the Corps Districts, as well as my memo. of 1/7/1910, No. 8305 sec., which suggested systematic preparation in peace time.

"I have referred above to the previous War Minister and his views because at that time he recognized the justice of my demands, for to my intense regret the representations in the memo. of 21/10/1910, M. I. 1282/10 A 1, have not allayed my fears with regard to the measures the War Ministry have in mind for the depot battalions.

"The situation is rather more favourable, thinks the War Ministry, in respect of the number of depot battalions available for supplying drafts for the moment. But this is so long as that extreme crisis does not materialize, during which the depot battalions earmarked for war garrisons by their isolation and the others through their employment on active fronts would be prevented from supplying drafts. I am glad to see that the War Ministry recognizes the justice of calling on the depot army for employment in active operations in an emergency—and there can be no question of anything else.

"The constitution of the battalions formed in accordance with these proposals is good. The cadres left behind are suitable for supplying drafts but not for active service—an eventuality which is recognized to be possible. The War Ministry hopes to turn these cadres into fresh and efficient

troops, but whether this is possible must remain doubtful in view of the officers available. In any case it will take a considerable time. Whether the enemy will give us time is more than doubtful.* We must all the same anticipate the most unfavourable eventuality. Nor are these cadres suited for emergency garrisons. The pooling of all these cadres to form complete battalions would offer a certain, though not too attractive, advantage.

"We must also bear in mind the varying circumstances of the different army corps districts. Thus, the I Army Corps uses its depot battalions to guard railways and form emergency garrisons, while the XVII employs each of them as an emergency garrison. The IX, X and XIV may possibly rely on employing all their depot battalions at an early stage, while the VIII appears to be anxious to use all its depot battalions in the concentration area. It is doubtful whether it will be to the advantage of these corps to reconstitute these depot units once they have been formed.

"In the case of the Guard Corps, whose depot formations are close together, it should be possible without difficulty to go further in the direction desired by the War Ministry.

"With a view to making further progress with this matter I should be very glad if effect could be given to the measures in which we are already aiming at uniformity, and if the way could be cleared for the Corps Headquarters to constitute the battalions for the next mobilization year. For my own part I will only ask that instructions be given to the Corps Headquarters to have the battalions ready for employment at the front by the 14th or, at the latest, 15th day of mobilization, so that from that moment in case of emergency they can be sent straight to the front, and so that the formations earmarked for supplying drafts form complete battalions after the 15th day of mobilization. At the same time the Corps Headquarters,

* The failure of the new formations at Ypres is still in everyone's memory. [The Author.]

as in 1906, would be summoned to report progress on this question, and further decisions can be taken on the basis of those reports. Until then any changes in the scheme of mobilization can be postponed.

(Signed) "VON MOLTKE."

13.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Army.

"No. 2500 I. Secret.

"Production of airships.

"Berlin,

"2/3/1911.

"TO THE WAR MINISTRY.

"In my memorandum 401/08 of 13/1/08 I said that the number of airships required by the Supreme Command was 15. Meanwhile the airship trials and the Kaiser Manœuvres of 1909 and 1910, as well as the memo. of the Inspector-General of Military Transport, IIc No. 12401 of 28/12/1910, have shown that the achievements of the airships have fallen far short of the assumptions on which the demands above referred to were based. Moreover, the artillery experiments at Rugenwaldermunde in 1910 have revealed the great dangers which airships run from howitzers and anti-aircraft guns, even when at considerably higher altitudes, such as 1,000 metres. Lastly, the progress of aviation has led to the employment of aeroplanes as one of the means of reconnoitring from the air.

"All these developments have led me to examine the question whether the original demand for 15 airships is still advisable in view of these changed circumstances.

"As it is impossible to say with certainty how far it will be possible to overcome the present defects of our airships, and to what degree aeroplanes will be in a position, either in conjunction with or in substitution for airships, to take over the business of reconnoitring, I have become convinced that for

the time being the Supreme Command may be satisfied with the establishment of nine ships available for the army, until we are in possession of reliable data as to the employment of airships and aeroplanes in the field.

(Signed) "VON MOLTKE."

14.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Army.

"No. 3350 I. Secret.

"Aviation.

"Berlin,

"9/3/1912.

"TO THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF MILITARY TRANSPORT.

"With a view to perfecting my knowledge of the use of aeroplanes I must ask for the following information, to be furnished as quickly as possible.

"(1) With what weapons of defence are aeroplanes equipped, and are there any special difficulties in the way of employing these weapons?

"(2) What weights have hitherto been thrown from aeroplanes and what are the chances of hitting?

"I must ask that the chances of hitting be established by throwing weights from aeroplanes in flight at war altitudes on roads and tracks.

"(3) What is the position as regards the feasibility of night flights and the risk that the aeroplane will be badly damaged on landing?

"(4) Can the airman reveal his identity to his own troops by using distinguishing marks, such as red flags? Of course, the use of this or some similar mark would first have to be arranged in the deployment instructions.

"Are other distinguishing marks possible?

"I attach the greatest importance to complete secrecy about the experiments in (2) and (4).

15.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Army.
"No. 5367 I. Secret.
"Ref. I.-G. of M. I. 27/12, of (missing) April, 1912.
"Fighting equipment of aeroplanes.

"Berlin,
"23/4/1912.

"To the Inspector-General of Military Transport.

"With reference to the information sent under the above I. No., I make the following remarks:

"(1) The equipment of our aeroplanes with the '08 pistol is of little use. I must ask you to make experiments in equipment with more effective long-range weapons and to inform me what value can be attached to the Euler system.*

"(2) I attach the greatest importance to an immediate estimate of the heaviest weights which can now be thrown from aeroplanes of different types without danger to the machine. This estimate forms the basis for all future suggestions and measures for the equipment of our aeroplanes with bombs. I shall be glad to have a report on the result.

"(3) Have we any experience as to what bombs are particularly suitable for use by aeroplanes for the destruction of airships? If not I consider practical experiments are immediately and urgently necessary.

"I should be glad to be kept *au courant* of the progress of this and the other experiments mentioned in the above cited I. No., and request that I should be given an opportunity of witnessing and sending General Staff officers to witness such experiments.

(Signed) "von Moltke."

* A machine-gun device. [The Author.]

16.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Army.
"No. 348/12 Secret.
"Ref. Memo. of 6/4/12, No. 519.12 Sec. A 7.
"Aircraft organization.

"Berlin,
"—/4/1912.

"To the War Ministry.*

"In face of the assertions in the memo. under consideration I must point to the systematic and wholesale organization of the aviation service in France—*vide* my memorandum of 10/4/1912, No. 5400, II. The document promised in the memo. will be forwarded as soon as possible. Against the view, the existence of which has occasionally come to my knowledge, that the aircraft organization in France really exists only on paper or will remain there, I must protest that this is a dangerous piece of self-deception. Even if there are still *lacunæ* in the 1912 scheme of organization they still have so great a start in comparison with our measures that the French have a perfect right to look upon their extraordinary superiority in this department with proud satisfaction. It needs no argument to show that in a war that superiority will be associated with all kinds of disadvantages for us. It is therefore in the highest degree regrettable that with us the same attention is not being devoted (and if I am to accept the memo. in question, will not be devoted) to the air service.

"In view of that statement I will refrain from going into details. I will, however, insist that in my view we should proceed as systematically with the development of our air service as with the organization of all other formations of the army. As long as we are working without definite objectives we shall find that in a crisis we have not the resources at our disposal on which we are relying on paper in peace. The

* General von Moltke drew up this memorandum personally. [The Author.]

difficulties in the mobilization of our flying squadrons last autumn is a serious lesson in that respect. Moreover, the scheme of concentration and the associated preparations for the employment of all our forces against the enemy have reached such proportions that they can only be mastered if we have definite aims in view (*vide* my memo. of 15/3/1912, No. 3717 I.). For that I am responsible. I must, therefore, ask to be informed as soon as possible of the final measures for the autumn of this year.

"Now, as previously, I do not regard Darmstadt as suitable for the third aviation station. It is essentially a frontier station.

"It is peculiarly regrettable that decisions have not yet been taken with regard to the development of military aviation for the years 1913 to 1916. The new Army Bill establishes the army strength for that period. It is quite impossible for us to be satisfied for the five-year period with the number of men available on 1/10/1912. We can count with certainty on fresh detachments and reduction of the establishment, even though the Army estimates be not discussed and we have no men to spare. I cannot regard as valid the reasons which the War Ministry puts forward for its attitude. If things had been made clear to me I should have raised objections to these defects on the estimates. I assert positively that with regard to this point of the Army Bill the War Ministry and I are not in agreement and that I was not given an opportunity to express an opinion on these matters before the form of the Bill was settled. Nor was this procedure consistent with the usual custom.*

"My efforts to find out what figure the number of effective aeroplanes will reach at the various times at which reports should be sent in during 1912 does not mean any usurpation of the authority of the War Ministry, as has apparently been claimed. But as, judging by para. 6 of the memo. of 5/3/1912,

* This astonishing fact was due to the melancholy situation in domestic politics. [The Author.]

No. 329.12 sec. A 7, the number of our aeroplanes at the various periods has not been fixed, I made the inquiry in question. The Supreme Command, in case of sudden mobilization, must know exactly what resources it has available for the field army and what replacement is in sight."

17.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Army.
"No. 12751 I. Sec.
"Formation of aviation units.
"Ref. G.W.D. 1157/12 s. A 7 of 19/8/12.

"Berlin,
"26/8/12.

"To the War Ministry.

"With regard to the proposals of the I.-G. of M.T.* for the establishment of aviation stations in peace and the formation of aeroplane units in case of war (I.G.M.T. 132 s., I. 12 IIc. of 13/8/1912) I enclose in the appendix a summary of my views and wishes on the basis of our further organization of the flying service. The principles which are outlined in the attached summary will be vital for the establishment and further evolution of this new and important weapon, even though progress is made in the science of aviation.

"I fully realize that my demands, which exceed the views of the Inspector-General, will make extraordinary inroads on money and *personnel.* We must proceed to intensify our efforts if we wish to overtake the obvious and material inferiority under which we suffer in this department of our defences in comparison with our western neighbour. I have never ceased by frequent and continuous reports to draw the attention of the War Ministry to the progressive achievements of France in this department during the last few years. It will only be by extraordinary efforts on our part that we can get the lead

* Inspector-General of Military Transport.

again, a lead which is of vital importance for our operations. I do not doubt that the resources required will be granted by the Reichstag, even though they exceed previous demands, so that the question of money will form no obstacle to the establishment of the proposed organization. I referred to the importance of the question of *personnel* at the conferences on the last Five Years' Bill.

(Signed) "VON MOLTKE."

THE ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY AVIATION.

I.—*General fundamental proposals.*

The first goal—which must be reached as soon as possible—in the organization of our military flying service is the provision:

(a) Of several (two or three) mobile field reconnaissance flights and an aeroplane park for the army headquarters.

(b) One mobile field reconnaissance flight for each army corps, including the reserve corps.

(c) One mobile field reconnaissance flight for the cavalry corps.

(d) Fortress reconnaissance flight for the important fortresses.

If the present fluctuating experiments with aeroplanes for the purpose of directing artillery fire show that special flying squadrons will become necessary, to this list must be added:

(e) Artillery squadrons for the army corps.

Our minimum demand in aviation formation up to 1/4/1914 is thus:

8	mobile reconnaissance flights	for	armies	=	8
26	„	„	„ „	corps	= 26
				Total	34

8 aeroplane parks.

Cadres for 13 fortress reconnaissance flights at Cologne, Mainz, Diedenhofen, Metz, Strasburg, Germersheim,

Neu-Breisach, Breslau, Posen, Thorn, Graudenz, Lötzen, Königsberg.
8 depot detachments.

II.—*Strength of the aviation service.*

(a) Mobile Field Reconnaissance Flights.—In pursuance of the report of the I.-G. of M.T. 1458. M. 12/13 I b. of 23/7/1912, their strength will be fixed at: One commander, 8 aeroplanes, 8 pilots and 8 observers, plus the required subordinate *personnel.* The squadrons must be mobile, and formed in such a way that rapid entraining and detraining, as well as quick advance by road in connection with the operations of the army, are possible. The motor transport* attached to each squadron for the purpose of carrying tents, accessories, spare parts, workshops, *personnel,* as well as the machines themselves, must be organized in such a way that there will be not the slightest difficulty about dividing the squadrons into half squadrons of four aeroplanes.

It will thus be possible that at the outset half squadrons can be attached to the army cavalry.

(b) Fortress Squadrons.—The squadrons to be formed can be of varying strength. Königsberg, Lötzen, Thorn, Strasburg, Metz, Diedenhofen and Neu-Breisach must have aeroplanes available from the first day of mobilization. The other fortresses will only need aeroplanes after the 20th day of mobilization. I suggest that at first the cadres be formed of half squadrons, i.e., four planes with *personnel,* as well as workshops and supply depots, so that in case of a siege the cadres can be strengthened.

* The French aviation squadrons in the grand manœuvres of 1912 were formed into "Escadrilles," each of four planes, and equipped with motor transport in the following way:

One small tractor for each plane, including small spare parts and accessories and a canvas cover for the machine, which could be hauled as occasion required.

One large motor lorry for every two aeroplanes, with the large spare parts, a second engine, etc.

One mobile motor workshop, as field workshop for the "Escadrille."

Therefore, a total of ten motor lorries for each "Escadrille."

(c) Aeroplane parks.—For the armies these will be mobile, and will be used to supply, supplement and effect repairs to all aviation units at the disposal of Army Headquarters. Moreover certain flying formations attached to the army cavalry are to be referred to the aeroplane parks of appointed Army Headquarters for their requirements in those respects. With that end in view the aeroplane parks are to be supplied with reserve equipment, spare parts, workshops and other usual necessaries, which the field aeroplane squadrons are unable—or only in limited quantities—to take with them for fear of hampering their mobility. The aeroplane parks are therefore to be regarded primarily as a great reserve of *matériel* for the field squadrons and must be made so mobile (by the use of motor transport) that they can always follow the armies and in case of need be brought right up to the aerodromes.

III.—*Establishment of aeroplane depots in peace time.*

In accordance with the review in the appendix aeroplane depots must be established in peace in such a way that by 1/4/1914, if possible, every corps must have one available. For peace purposes (tactical training, employment with troops) this will be under the control of the Corps Headquarters, while in case of mobilization, in addition to the aeroplane squadrons of the corps in question, it will have to supply the additional units for the Army Headquarters (and subsequently for the army cavalry and the higher artillery commanders also). The aeroplane depots in the frontier fortresses will also furnish the cadres for the fortress aeroplane squadrons.

The result of all this is that the establishment of the peace depots in the various corps districts will vary with the extent of the mobile formations they will have to furnish. Döberitz itself will continue to retain its character of a central experimental station.

IV.—*Material, personnel, training and instruction.*

The full number of aeroplanes required for all the fighting

formations must always be assembled at the aviation depots. But beyond that it is desirable to have a certain percentage of fighting planes for the purpose of at once making good damaged and lost machines and thereby assuring the possibility of mobilization.

For all practice flights in peace only war machines shall be used on principle, while instructional and learners' machines can be employed for first instruction. Future experience must decide what "the life" of an aeroplane is. In view of natural depreciation and the rapid progress in motor construction, a continual renewal of our establishment of aeroplanes will be inevitable if we are always to have our active formations equipped with the most efficient material (the French Army authorities estimated the "life" of an aeroplane at one year in their Army Bill of 1912).

For this purpose, and that of replacing the high rate of wastage we must expect in the field, the extension and higher efficiency of the aircraft and aircraft motor factories which we have in mind for army supplies is an extremely important question. We must make all possible efforts to secure those objects, if necessary by State subsidies.

Besides material, the *personnel* must be in existence in peace time at full war establishment, especially for those aviation formations which it is intended to employ on the first days of mobilization. For the formations which come into service subsequently, the existence of a cadre of about half of the existing establishment of pilots will suffice, while the other pilots and observers who will come out in the case of mobilization are to be sent on four or six weeks' courses at different times of the year. How far this system will be modified by the employment of N.C.O.'s (or men) as pilots will depend upon the results of the experiment we are now making. It is to be considered whether, so long as we can only rely on a limited number of aircraft units in case of mobilization, all of these could not be put on a war footing and employed

at the autumn manœuvres. In this way we shall get valuable experience of the mobilization of these formations.

Civilian aviators will at first be considered for employment only in depot formations, but this must not exclude the possibility of employing particularly efficient and suitable civilian aviators in field formations.

With a view to covering our requirements at an early stage, the training of officer pilots must be more decentralized than it has been hitherto. It is the business of the competent authorities to say whether it will be preferable to carry out the training at private factories or at the larger military aerodromes. It is probable that for the present both courses will have to be adopted.

Training.—Thanks to the subordination of the aircraft stations to the Corps Headquarters for tactical purposes, that co-operation of the aeroplane force with the other arms and the command which is absolutely vital will be greatly facilitated. In the frontier aircraft depots familiarity with the frontier region must be the object of special instruction. Civil aviators who are suitable and appointed to employment with field formations will be called up in péace for certain tactical courses with them. The exercises and experiments, such as are now taking place at Döberitz, for the purpose of converting aircraft into an effective weapon of war must, as soon as tangible results have been obtained, be extended to the other aerodromes, which should follow the instructions of the Döberitz Experimental Section. The same system must apply to experiments in photography.

V.—*Concentration and Command of the whole Air Force.*

The very great development which is bound to take place in the Flying Service when the measures already discussed have been put into operation, and the inevitable increase in the numbers, duties and importance of that force, even now raise the question whether the complete independence of the

Air Force (and its separation from the Department of the Inspector-General of Military Transport) is not a step which will become necessary in the future and, therefore, should be taken now.

An independent "Inspectorate of Military Aviation" at the head, under its "G.O.C. Air Force," to have the control of a definite number of aviation stations in technical matters and be responsible for training, would be a simple central authority such as is required by the needs and developments of the new arm.

18.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Army.
"No. 16452 I. Secret.
"Aircraft organization.
"Ref. Memo. of 30/10/12, No. 1487/12 Sec. A 7.

"Berlin,
"6/11/1912.

"To the War Ministry.

"To my regret the conference of October 24 has not led to a complete elucidation of the question. The figures given by me or my representatives referring to the French Aviation Services are based on the reports of our military attachés in Paris and the careful work of Section III. of the Great General Staff. I should be glad if all the material on French military aviation, and any other material unknown to me which our attachés have in Paris, could be submitted to me personally so that I could give it to Section III. to work on and harmonize the conflicting views.

"But first of all I will send the Ministry of War the memorandum on the condition of French aviation to which I have already referred. It also reveals the future developments which are intended. On the 1st of April, 1914, the assumption of 450 military aeroplanes and somewhere about 350 aviators

will not be too high. For that time I consider we should require 324 aeroplanes, including the Bavarian formations, while the War Minister, if I counted in three sections of six machines for Bavaria, intended to have 156 machines with *personnel.**

"In view of these figures I do not share the hope that we shall catch up with France within a calculable period.

"At the conference, to show that my programme was not feasible, the material fact was brought forward that the Inspector-General of Military Transport could not produce the required number of pilots and observers. I cannot share that view. The development that has already occurred in our air service forms a very different basis for the training than that which we had twelve months ago. If we could start the training of our pilots by making the most possible use of our military aerodromes, having two instead of one flying school (Halberstadt), and in addition calling on the aircraft factories in spite of the difficulties (of course, with sufficient military supervision), I cannot doubt that we shall succeed in doing what France has done.

"I am not ignoring the difficulties which flow from the shortage of officers in the infantry. I intend to deal especially with the question of this shortage. At the moment I can only put forward my request that as many officers as possible should be drawn from other arms and that the training of N.C.O.'s and men should be resolutely pressed forward in spite of our early failures. In Bavaria favourable results are said to have been obtained. At the French grand manœuvres of this year almost 25 per cent. of the pilots in the squadrons were N.C.O.'s or men. Apparently there has been no complaint about the lower efficiency of these pilots. An invitation circulated among all the units of our army would undoubtedly attract suitable men to our Air Service.

* The demands of the General Staff were not met. In 1914 our reconnaissance work at the Marne and the Ourcq had thus to struggle with the greatest difficulties. [The Author.]

"In my view the obstacles to the realization of my programme are not the objections urged above, but simply the question of money and *personnel*.

"My memorandum of 8/11/1911 was written before the conference on the Five Year Bill and dealt with a restricted programme covering the period up to 1/10/1912.

"My proposals for the five-year period are contained in the secret memorandum of 22/12/1911 I.N 960. In spite of the last sentence of the memorandum of 19/1212, No.122, and my numerous requests I have only just been given definite figures for the organization of our Air Service after 1/10/1912 or 1/12/1912.

"I realize now to my extreme regret that what has been done does not correspond to my proposals for the five-year period. The solution of the *personnel* and money question now makes it much more difficult of course. Yet, as before, I have no doubt that, in spite of all the difficulties, in these serious times the Reichstag will give us everything we ask and that we shall be spared from solving the problem of *personnel* by reducing the establishment of other arms. In any case the Five Year Bill must not be allowed to become an obstacle to this side of our military development also.

"As regards the programme of the War Minister, as I have said it falls very far short (about 50 per cent. in the matter of manned aeroplanes) behind my proposals, and therefore leaves us a long way behind France and Russia.

"The absence of reconnaissance flights at Army Headquarters will be severely felt. The Headquarters Staff will be without the machinery required for tactical reconnaissance from the air. Further, we shall be unable to assign aircraft to the army cavalry. Both omissions will place our commanders at a serious disadvantage in comparison with the enemy commanders. (See my programme of 26/9/1912 V a.)

"The construction of Zeppelins and rigid airships of equal

value is no substitute. Like the army cavalry Zeppelins will supply the Supreme Command with data for their operations and be employed in long-range bombing. The duties of Zeppelins are therefore quite different to those of aeroplanes. Our manœuvres do not illustrate those differences accurately.

"I shall return to the question of airships when I have received the reply to my memorandum of 27/9/1912 I., No. 14388. I will only say here that I understand "effective air cruisers" to mean only Zeppelins and other rigid airships of equal value. With reference to my previous communications on this matter I must ask that the P-ships and M-ships, which are of less value as reconnaissance and fighting ships, should no longer be procured or constructed.

"I do not like the reduction of the establishment of the Corps Sections to two machines with *personnel*. The equipment of our corps with machines is already inferior to that of the French in the proportion of one to eight. The artillery will not be assigned anything like sufficient machines for its purposes, while we ourselves will have to reckon with excellent artillery reconnaissance on the part of the enemy.

"The fortress manœuvres at Thorn have clearly revealed the importance of air reconnaissance in conjunction with photography. It will be difficult for airships to defend themselves. They or their sheds will soon fall victims to hostile artillery or bombs. Captive balloons also are in great danger from artillery fire. Thus the aeroplane remains the only method of aerial reconnaissance. The fortress flights must be drawn upon for sieges and in this case put under the orders of the Reserve Corps.

"It is patent that replacement also will be left behind. The measures proposed by the War Minister seem to me inadequate. I have serious objection to leaving the aeroplane parks behind. The extra seventh machine of each flight will not make any difference. The question of replacement must be taken in hand on the broadest principles in order to

cope with the heavy wastage of material. In exceptional cases the most important workmen in the airship establishments which deliver to the army may be temporarily exempted from military service. We shall have to have efficient private factories.

"In the foregoing I have clearly set forth the reasons which show that my programme both can and should be carried out. I regard it as the minimum which we can put at the disposal of the armies, corps and cavalry divisions, the artillery, the fortresses and siege troops, for the purposes of tactical reconnaissance from the air, if they are not to be at a disadvantage compared to their enemies. Nor must we fall behind the requirements of my programme if we are to feel secure in the matter of replacement.

"I therefore adhere to my former standpoint, that my programme must be carried into effect by April 1, 1914. Please see that this is done.

"As the proposals of the War Ministry form a part of my programme I agree to them, while referring expressly to what I have said above as a necessary extension.

(Signed) "VON MOLTKE."

19.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Army.

"No. 18450 I. Secret.

"Artillery aeroplanes.

"Berlin,

"3/12/1912.

"The annual reports of the Inspector-General of Foot Artillery (III. 62375/12 of 8/11/1912) and the Inspector of Field Artillery (I. 3740/12, Secret, of 26/10/1912), which I have now received, both show plainly that officers controlling artillery fire will be very materially assisted by spotting and

observation from aircraft. Indeed, in the case of fire against concealed targets, no other arrangements can be a substitute. When the Inspector-General of Foot Artillery in Para. 2 (page 2) of his report goes so far as to say that he regards the French advantage in the employment of aircraft for artillery purposes as to a certain extent compensation for the present inferiority of the French in heavy artillery, this shows how absolutely vital it is for us to assign machines permanently to the artillery, first for further experiments and finally as a substantive part of its organization.

"The experiments of the past training year in this matter have suffered very severely from the fact that few machines were available for the purpose. The Inspector of Field Artillery emphasizes the deficiency and regrets it. I can only emphatically support the proposals in both the reports that aircraft sections shall be assigned to artillery practice schools. During the training year which has just begun we must come to some definite conclusions in this matter in order that we may start the system of equipping our artillery with the means of air reconnaissance in connection with my proposal of 26/9/1912 for the organization of the Air Service.

"It is essential that obstacles should be overcome. Experiments must be made in this matter in the course of the current training year. As regards the employment of aeroplane photography for artillery purposes in field and siege operations, I gave you my views and wishes in my letter 16806 I. of 27/11/1912.

"I shall return to the proposals for the organization of our Field Aircraft Section as soon as the report on the Kaiser Manœuvres has been worked through.

(Signed) "VON MOLTKE."

20.

"Section 2.

"Further development of military aviation up to 1/4/1917.

"Secret.

"Berlin,
"14/1/1913.

"To Section 7 of the War Ministry.

"As soon as my programme of 26/9/17, No. 12751 F. (secret), i.e., the establishment of:

7 Reconnaissance flights for the Army Headquarters (i.e., one for each Army Headquarters)
23 Reconnaissance flights for the Corps Headquarters (i.e., one for each corps)
each of 8 aeroplanes with *personnel* — excluding Bavaria

Cadres for 12 fortress reconnaissance flights, each of 4 aeroplanes with *personnel*
7 Aircraft parks
7 Reserve flights — excluding Bavaria

has been completed (the limitations up to 1/4/1914 given in my previous letters being borne in mind), as far as the development of the Air Service can now be foreseen, we must aim at the following establishment:

(*a*) The provision of a second reconnaissance flight of 8 machines for each Army.

7 flights = 56 aeroplanes.

(*b*) The provision of a reconnaissance flight of 8 machines for each reserve corps.

12 flights (on present establishment) = 96 machines.

(*c*) The provision of 2 half flights, each of 4 machines, for the Army Mechanical Transport Staffs.

8 half flights, each of 4 machines = 32 machines.

(*d*) The provision of special artillery flights, each of 6

machines with *personnel* (the troops themselves to supply observers), for the divisions and reserve divisions.

46 flights of 6 = 276 machines.

For reserve divisions } 25 flights of 6 = 150 machines.

(*e*) For aircraft parks for each army, comprising 60 per cent. of the machines

about 500 machines.

(*f*) For reserve flights, comprising 40 per cent. of the machines

about 350 machines.

(*g*) For fortress flights for 12 fortresses (Cologne, Metz, Mainz, Diedenhofen, Strasburg, Neu-Breisach, Königsberg, Lötzen, Graudenz, Thorn, Posen and Breslau)

8 machines apiece;

deducting the 48 machines with the existing cadres =

48 machines.

Total requirements:

		By 1/4/14.	By 1/4/16* (if possible).
a	Armies	56	112
b	Corps	184	184
	Reserve Corps	—	96
c	Army Mechanical Transport	—	32
d	Artillery flights (including reserve divisions)	—	426
e	Aircraft parks (60% of whole establishment)	144	500 (in theory)
f	Reserve flights (40% „ „)	96	350 („ „)
g	Fortress reconnaissance flights	48	96
	Total	528	1,796 machines

"Of course, the figures are only a quite general basis. They take no account of any further increases in the peace

* We must decide later on our requirements up to 1/4/15 or 1/4/16. If the results of the 1913 experiments with artillery flights are good *the artillery flights must have* first consideration.

establishment of our army, and moreover Bavaria is excluded, though she is to have a corresponding aviation establishment.

"Whether more will be desirable later on must be left to the future and technical developments.

(Signed) "LUDENDORFF."

21.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Army.

"Ref. 8428 I. Secret.

"June 30, 1911.

"WIRELESS COMMUNICATION BETWEEN GERMANY AND HER COLONIES.

"The advantages which accrue for military interests through the use of wireless telegraphy in communication overseas are of special importance to those Colonial Powers which have not a safe cable communication to and between their possessions at their disposal. As early as my appendix to the Memorandum of 1908 I pointed out how seriously we had felt the effects of our dependence on English cables during the troubles in German South-West Africa. In case of developments in Europe this disadvantage would be much more serious. With a view to changing the situation, which is uncomfortable in peace time and would do us an immense amount of harm in war, I propose to make experiments for direct wireless communication between Germany and her African colonies. Since then a step forward has been taken by the laying of the German-South American cable which is shortly to be extended from Monrovia to our West African possessions, as well as by the long-range experiments between Nauen and the Cameroons (or ports of call of the Woermann Line), although hitherto these have been without result.

"We must not forget, however, that even after the laying of a German cable to Togo, the Cameroons and South-West Africa,

in time of war we shall be none the less without reliable communication, because the unavoidable intermediate stations of these cables (in Teneriffe and Monrovia) have had to be fixed on non-German territory. But even a direct cable from the Motherland to the Colonies would not be an adequate guarantee of secure communication in time of war, as, in the first place, international regulations on the subject of cables in time of war has left the question of cutting even neutral cables outside the three-mile line undecided, and in the second, the observance of international agreements by belligerents becomes increasingly a matter of doubt.

"It is significant that England, the Power which possesses an immense advantage in the matter of communications through her cable connections with the whole world, is devoting the greatest efforts to erect a connected chain of wireless stations between the Motherland and all her Colonial possessions. A proposal of this kind, which was launched with the co-operation of Marconi, was laid before the English Parliament as early as 1908. Nothing is known of its fate. However, in the following year the English Postmaster-General made a public statement that at no distant date England would be connected with wireless to all her Colonies. The English stations which have already been established clearly show that some such systematic organization is coming into being, and, though there are still several links missing in the chain at the moment, it was expressly stated at the Imperial Conference in June of this year that in accordance with the wishes of the representatives of the English Dominions the Government would complete the chain of imperial wireless stations which were to serve both commercial and military interests.

"France, which possesses in her station on the Eiffel Tower an apparatus of immense range, has had wireless communication with her North African Colonies established for some considerable time, and is at present engaged in joining up her

Colonial possessions as far as the Congo and Madagascar by erecting further stations.

"As such wireless communication is only valuable for military purposes if the individual stations are in protected places on national territory, the problem of establishing such communication is incomparably greater for Germany than for the two States above mentioned. To cover the distance between Germany and her African Colonies a range of about 6,000 kilometres is required.

"In the opinion of the authorities and leading men among our German wireless telegraph companies, assuming that the construction of stations sufficiently powerful is possible, we may expect that such ranges will be reached.

"Presumably, therefore, the decision is mainly a matter of money.

"Hitherto, relatively small resources only have been placed at our disposal for carrying out necessary experiments, and we have not yet succeeded in definitely solving the preliminary problems. But even if the pending experiments, which unfortunately have been greatly delayed by the destruction of the receiving station at Togo, lead to no final results, there can be no question of our abandoning the project. Rather must we continue the experiments on improved lines. Military interests make this course imperative, for in addition to the reasons urged above there is another aspect which is of the highest importance.

"In case of war, Germany can only rely on communication through States directly on her frontier which remain neutral. Even to-day the communication of news from Spain, Norway and Sweden, as well as North Africa and Asia, is impossible without making use of foreign lines. I have already shown above how unlikely it is that the latter would remain available for our news service in time of war. But if we remain dependent for our news practically upon neutrals on our own frontier, we shall be in great danger that our General Staff

will be inadequately informed of what is going on among their enemies in every department during war. It is just because of the growth of all means and methods of communication that their exploitation for intelligence service purposes has become vital to the operations of great armies of the present time.

"In case of a European war the great commercial towns of the United States of America will be the most important centres for obtaining news. The American Press is in a position to spend very large sums on obtaining the first and best news. A European theatre of war will see a large number of experienced American newspaper correspondents distributed among all the States involved in the war. There can be no doubt that the American Press will be the best and first informed about all the movements and events in progress among all the European belligerents. For that reason it is one of the most important tasks of our Military Intelligence Service to get American news to Germany by the shortest route.

"Seeing that we must anticipate the destruction of German lines, and the closing of foreign cables to our news service, we must devote all our efforts to getting this news by wireless communication.

"Of course, there may be doubt whether in time of war the wireless service could continually perform its functions in the usual manner. Breakdowns are probable from time to time. But it is only by careful preparation and a thorough use of *all* resources available to our Intelligence Service that we can hope to get sufficient information about the affairs and intentions of our opponents in war.

"*The safety of the Empire*, therefore, demands the rapid erection of great wireless stations in Germany and simultaneously in her Colonies (the African first), in order that we may secure in war direct communication with America, or the use of the most important sources of information by roundabout ways over other wireless stations. Direct wireless com-

munication between our possessions in Africa and those in Eastern Asia and the South Seas is not feasible at the moment, but it is possible to get an extremely useful connection through an intermediate station (perhaps on Dutch-Indian territory).

"To give effect to these urgent demands makes it necessary for a large amount of money and material to be placed at our disposal.

"We shall only do justice to the high military interests which are bound up with this question if for these purposes a sum is made available which:

"1. Enables us to proceed at once with other experiments on broader lines if the pending long-distance experiments fail.

"2. Allows us, apart from the pending experiments, to take in hand the immediate erection of stations in our African Colonies, with a view to putting those Colonies in communication with each other, and with the Mother Country as soon as the experiments mentioned in (1) above have been successful.

"3. To erect stations in the Cameroons or Togo for the purpose of wireless communication with the continent of South America.

"4. To buy the station of Nauen after wireless communication has been established between Nauen and Togo (or the Cameroons), or erect a new station of equal power in Germany which shall serve for wireless communication with North America also.

"5. To offer a handsome subsidy to German private companies which intend to erect stations on foreign territory, so long as the stations in question are of value to us from the point of view of our national interests.

"The Royal Ministry of War has from the outset given its complete approval to demands which I now put forward for the fourth time, and presses them most insistently whenever opportunity arises. In my opinion we should be taking a

serious responsibility upon ourselves if their final realization was postponed still further through lack of money.

(Signed) "VON MOLTKE."

22.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Army.

"No. 13108 I. Secret.

"Berlin,

"17/10/1911.

"TO THE WAR MINISTRY.

"At the sitting of the Committee for joint action in the sphere of wireless telegraphy on the 13th of this month the representative of the Imperial Ministry of Posts, said that the wireless station which was being erected at New York by the German Wireless Telegraphic Company would probably be ready to function by the end of 1911. Although the station was originally intended only as a receiving station for wireless messages from steamers of the German-American lines at sea, it would have such a range (after a slight increase in its power) that the Company did not despair of eventually securing direct wireless communication between Nauen and New York. The Imperial Ministry of Posts had not yet decided to take over the Nauen-New York wireless service, nor had the Company yet put forward any request for the grant of a corresponding concession.

"In reply to this statement my representative at the conference put forward a demand that every effort should be made to get this wireless service into order as soon as possible. In so doing he acted in the sense of my instructions to him.

"I have no need here to repeat the reasons for the urgent necessity of establishing such a wireless service as soon as possible. They were set forth by me in detail, time after time, in the course of recent years (for the first time in my letter 3210 III. B of 20/11/1918, and for the last in 8428·I.

of 30/6/1911). If the realization of all these demands is now at length imminent, not a moment should be lost in carrying the work to completion. The existence of the two stations is not enough in itself. A permanent service, well tried in peace time, can be the only basis of the advantages for which we hope in time of war. I ask the Royal Ministry of War to support my demands and take all necessary steps:

"1. To compel the German Wireless Telegraphic Company to make their wireless station at New York as powerful as would be necessary for communication with Nauen.

"2. And to have the erection of the station followed immediately by the initiation of a Nauen-New York service.

"In view of the urgency of the matter I have had a copy of this letter sent directly to the Imperial Ministry of Posts.

(Signed) "VON MOLTKE."

23.

THE MEMORANDUM OF DECEMBER, 1912.

Part I.—Germany's Military Situation.

The outbreak of a general war will, as a result of the alliances on both sides, follow on a collision between two of the great powers of Europe. In any such war the Triple Entente will dispose of the entire military and naval forces of France—so far as these are not tied down in North Africa—the sea power of England, and the English Expeditionary Force and the forces of Russia in Europe with the exceptions of that part of her army which must probably be retained at home to suppress disorder in the interior.

Compared with these forces of the Triple Entente, the Triple Alliance will have at its disposal the whole German army and fleet, as well as, but within the limits to which I will refer, the military and naval forces of Austria-Hungary, Italy and Rumania.

As long as the tension between Austria-Hungary is not relieved once and for all, the former will be compelled to leave troops on her Balkan frontier in case of a war with Russia. Presumably also Austria will find herself in the same position with regard to Rumania so long as no satisfactory agreement is come to between these two States.

The effect of the growing power of the Balkan States on the military situation of our neighbour and ally in case of a general European war cannot be clearly assessed. It is certain that Austria will have to accommodate herself to the rise of new military powers in the Balkans. It is absolutely necessary for her to increase her forces.

In the same way, as the result of Italy's not yet having secured her recent conquests in Africa, greater claims are being made on the Italian army in a direction which is not in the line of the great political goals pursued by the Triple Alliance. Thus with both our allies circumstances have to be taken into consideration which involve weights which we can throw into the scale of a European war.

Of course, at the moment the Triple Alliance forms a firm political compact of the greatest political importance. But if, in case of war, we are to make a proper use of our military power, we must not be satisfied to face the resources of the Triple Entente merely by reckoning up the total number of our battalions, but must find out what force each separate State can and will put at the disposal of the Triple Alliance for common action in case of war. Only in that way can we arrive at a proper estimate of the resources available for the common purpose.

In a war for the Triple Alliance, self-preservation alone will compel Austria to bring up all her forces against Russia, so far as they are not tied down by the attitude of the Balkan States. Thanks to her relations with Italy, which are more friendly at the moment as the result of the Albanian question, she will be able to leave her south-western frontier

open. The importance of that advantage is not to be underestimated in the present position. It goes without saying that Germany will employ the total of her armed forces. On the other hand, Italy has no vital interest in a general European war which takes its origin in a conflict between Austria and Russia. While Germany and Austria will be fighting for their existence, Italy will hardly be threatened; she will not be attacked directly, for in a war with Germany neither England nor France will be in a position to send an expeditionary force to Italy. If she makes any sort of an attempt to protect her coasts, nothing serious can happen to her. If, therefore, she takes part in the war, it will not be because she has to fight for her existence like Germany and Austria, but by virtue of her alliances, and we can calculate with fair certainty that we cannot count on a whole-hearted and wholesale employment of her military forces. She will adopt an attitude of cautious reserve and wait to see how events develop on the other side of the Alps in order to be able to retire without material loss if the two other allies suffer defeats.

I am confirmed in this view by the conferences which I have had in the last few days with a representative of the Italian General Staff who was sent here. No matter what the pretext, I have ascertained that Italy will not send her 3rd Army, the transport of which to the Upper Rhine we worked out years ago. The result is that Germany loses five army corps and two cavalry divisions against France. We shall have to face her and England without direct assistance.

Further, when we consider the military resources of the Triple Alliance in the future, we must not lose sight of the fact that though relations between Austria and Italy are satisfactory at the moment, in all probability the latent hostility between the two States will assert itself when the Balkan question has been settled, and restrict Austrian action

against Russia. Apart from that, this settlement of the Balkan question, unless it results in a complete victory for Austria—whether political or military—will mean a loss of prestige to the Triple Alliance, and to Austria herself an incalculable weakening of her position. The Monarchy will then fall irrevocably into internal dissolution. We must keep that before our eyes.

The Triple Alliance was formed as a defensive union. It has all the weaknesses of such an association. If one of the three allied States is attacked the other two must go to its help, and therefore, without itself being attacked, embark upon a war for which it is quite possible that the nation had neither inclination nor understanding. It is only when the whole nation absolutely realizes that its own vital interests are involved in any injury done to an ally that that spirit of sacrifice will flame up which every State needs in these days in which "Cabinet" wars are not tolerated, if it is to wage war with real energy.

As in the case of the Triple Alliance, the Triple Entente holds itself out as a defensive compact. But while the idea of defence expressly forms the basis of the agreement between the Triple Alliance, marked offensive tendencies are to be observed in the Triple Entente, i.e., positive objectives, the attainment of which must seem worth fighting for to the members of that association. Russia has a not unnatural ambition to appear as the protagonist of Slavdom in Europe as the result of the overthrow of Austria; she also wishes to secure an outlet to the Adriatic with the help of Serbia. Austria has the defensive interest of preventing that.

France wants to recover her lost provinces and take her revenge for the defeats of 1870. Germany, on the other hand, only desires to retain her possessions.

England wants the help of her allies to rid her of the nightmare of German sea-power. Germany is not thinking of de-

stroying the English fleet: here again she only wishes to defend herself. Thus at all points there are offensive plans on one side, defensive on the other. In case of war that means greater internal cohesion for the Triple Entente as compared with the Triple Alliance, for the action of striving for a definite object—the offensive—is the more powerful form of action in political affairs just as much as in military operations.

The position of the Triple Alliance, not only in the present political tension, but prospectively for the future, can be put shortly thus: Austria is the member of the association which is most threatened politically. Germany is the most threatened in a military sense, while Italy is the least interested, both politically and militarily. If war ever comes there can be no doubt that its main burden will fall on the shoulders of Germany, surrounded as she is by enemies on three sides.

Yet even if we succeed in framing the *casus belli* in such a way* that the nation takes up arms with one mind and real enthusiasm, as things are now we shall not be able to face our heavy task with confidence. As the military resources of the country have long since ceased to bear any relation to the number of men fit to bear arms, the numerical strength of the army, as I shall show later, will not suffice to cope with our future task.

If there is no change in the political situation in Europe, Germany's central position will compel her to form a front on several sides. We shall therefore have to hold one front defensively with comparatively weak forces in order to be able to take the offensive on the other. That front can only be the French. A speedy decision may be hoped for on that side, while an offensive against Russia would be an interminable affair. But if we are to take the offensive against France, it would be

* General von Moltke was afraid that Austria-Hungary might let herself be swept along by over-hasty measures which involved us without affecting our vital interests. Moreover, he had little confidence in our diplomacy. He doubted whether it would adopt the right course at the critical moment. [The Author.]

necessary to violate the neutrality of Belgium.* It is only by an advance across Belgian territory that we can hope to attack and defeat the French army in the open field. On this route we shall meet the English Expeditionary Force and—unless we succeed in coming to some arrangement with Belgium—the Belgian army also. At the same time, this operation is more promising than a frontal attack on the French fortified eastern frontier. Such an attack would necessarily give our operations the character of a war of position, cost us a lot of time, and rob the army of its impetus and the initiative, two elements which will be all the more indispensable the greater the number of enemies with which we shall have to reckon.

If Italy were prepared, as was the case twenty years ago when a united offensive was talked of, to participate in the war in the resolute manner which was then planned, we should be able to promise the combined Italo-German operations a practically certain success. Unfortunately, that is no longer the case. The help of Italy will not go beyond tying down relatively small French forces on the Alpine frontier. Germany must rely on her own resources, and therefore she cannot be too strong.

If, on the one hand, it is necessary materially to increase the forces of the German Empire, on the other the importance of strengthening our fortresses on the eastern front, i.e., the point at which we shall be compelled to stand on the defensive, becomes patent to all eyes.

The Appendix† deals primarily with the situation I have described and the relative strength of the two sides, based on our calculations for a war at the present time. It clearly reveals

* In the General Staff the "violation of Belgian neutrality" was never mentioned except in connection with the notion that we could not wait, in case a war was forced upon us, until the agreement between Belgium and the Entente was made public. The material available was sufficient to enable General Count von Schlieffen to incorporate the march through Belgium in our plan of deployment. [The Author.]

† Not in my possession. It contains an estimate of our own military forces and those of our prospective enemies. [The Author.]

the problems which the Triple Alliance, and more particularly Germany, will have to face. The figures speak for themselves.

Under I. of the Appendix are the forces which Germany can put into the field in the west in a war with the Triple Entente, in battalions, squadrons and batteries which can be opposed to the forces at the disposal of France and England. The tables show an inferiority on the side of Germany of 124 battalions; if Belgium be added to the number of our enemies, the figure is 192 battalions. The Italian army is left out of account, as it will not participate. On the other hand, the French Alpine army, which will be immobilized by the Italians, is also left out of the calculation.* If the Italian 3rd Army were brought to Germany, the two allies would have a slight superiority. But it is immaterial to us whether Italy assembles two or twelve army corps behind her Alpine frontier. It would be an extraordinary operation to force that frontier. Until it is opened the whole Italian army will be standing idle, rifle in hand, without being able to fire a shot. Germany must gain the decision alone and unaided. While in 1879 she had a superiority in infantry of 106 battalions over France, as well as an immense preponderance of artillery, and fought this one opponent with her rear secured, she has now to take the field against France with a great inferiority in infantry (though still with a slight superiority in artillery), and will further be attacked in the rear by Russia. The superiority of our artillery rests at the moment on our more marked development of high-angle fire (field-howitzers) and our heavy artillery of the field army. Moreover, we are ahead of the French with the provision of field-kitchens and tents, as well as our infantry rifle. But it is only a question of money for France to catch up with us in these respects. In time she will be able to get level with us and even overtake us. On the other hand, she cannot overtake

* Things turned out otherwise in 1914, and our inferiority was considerably greater. [The Author.]

us as regards the number of men fit for service who are at our disposal as long as we manage to secure them for the army.

Part II. of the Appendix shows that in the east Russia enjoys a very great numerical superiority. A comparison of the forces which Germany, Austria and Rumania combined can put into the field against Russia reveals a Russian superiority of 1,374 battalions, 319 squadrons and 82 batteries. At the present moment Russia is still very much behindhand with the reorganization, equipment and arming of her forces, so that for the time being the Triple Alliance need not be afraid of an armed conflict even with her, in spite of her numerical superiority. But when we look forward into the future we must keep present in our minds the fact that in view of the enormous sums Russia is spending on the reorganization of her army she will be stronger with every year that passes. It is just as impossible for Germany to try and compete with Russia as a land power as it is for her to attempt to catch up with England as a sea power. But it is just as incumbent upon her to leave no stone unturned to employ all the resources which are still at her disposal on a large scale in order to maintain that position *vis-à-vis* our neighbours which we enjoyed before they brought their armed forces up to the present level and began to think of increasing them.

The military situation in our frontier provinces requires special attention. We have to expect, certainly in the east and possibly in the west also, an attack immediately on the proclamation of mobilization. If such an attack were not beaten off, by the destruction of railways, bridges and tunnels our mobilization, the arming of the fortresses and our deployment would be seriously interfered with. It is of the very greatest importance that our troops in these regions should be reinforced and our fortresses be put into an advanced state of defence.

I believe I have established the necessity of increasing our military forces and improving our home defences in what I have said above. The political situation will make these measures an inexorable necessity. Of course, the satisfaction by the nation of the demands made here and dealt with in greater detail in Part II. of the Memorandum will involve great personal and pecuniary sacrifices. But in any case these sacrifices will be far less than those we should have to face in case of a lost war.

We must also point out that our neighbours have made, and are now making, similar sacrifices in order to strengthen their military forces.

France makes much greater personal demands on her population than we do on ours. During the first Morocco crisis she spent about 300 millions on the strengthening of her eastern fortresses.

This year Russia demanded and obtained from her national assembly 1,300 million marks.

In the last three years England has spent large sums to give effect to the Haldane reforms.

Switzerland has introduced a new army organization at a heavy cost.

Belgium is now carrying through a new Defence Bill, by which her army will be brought up to a mobilization strength of 300,000 men. She has laid out enormous sums to modernize the fortifications of Antwerp.

Under the pressure of the political crisis Austria has been compelled to demand very large credits for that reorganization of her army which is long overdue.

Germany, too, must be prepared to make sacrifices. The programme for the provision of the most urgent requirements which is drawn up in Part II. must be carried through with the greatest energy so that in the future Germany, trusting to her own strength, can give the political leaders of the nation a support which is solid enough to meet all emergencies.

Part II.—A. The Increase of our Army Establishment.

We have ample man-power available for increasing the establishment strength of our army.

Definite figures, beyond the existing number of available and effective men who have not been called upon, cannot be given, owing to the lack of precise data at the moment. Data must be accumulated and our records revised accordingly. A reference to the position in France alone must be enough to convince us of the necessity of making greater calls on the men available and effective for military service. France calls up 82 per cent. of her available men for service in the army; Germany between 52 and 54 per cent. If we make the same call on our man-power as France, by enforcing the general liability to service we at once increase the annual contingent of recruits by 150,000 and our peace establishment by 300,000. A greater call on the younger classes is actually a social duty. By so doing we should relieve the burden on the older classes, which include a large number of fathers of families, and make it unnecessary to send them to the front. We should avoid the anomaly of having to send into the field a large number of landwehr who are now posted to reserve formations while thousands of young men remain at home because they are not trained.

The increase in the strength of our army which must be demanded will have to be directed along the following four lines, which I will shortly discuss:

1. Increase of the establishment.
2. Increasing the strength of the armies.
3. Improving the second line formations.
4. Supplementing and improving the *matériel.*

I.—Increase of the Establishment.

This must apply to all arms and comprise both *personnel* and horses, so that our infantry, cavalry and artillery will, as a minimum, be brought up to establishment. The number of

men effective and now available will play a vital rôle under this head. The covering corps on the frontier, a certain number of troops for special employment and the cavalry regiments, which mobilize six squadrons, must be increased to reach the following strengths:—

800 men per battalion.

A minimum of 150 riding horses or remounts, 6 horse-drawn guns, 4 horsed ammunition wagons and 1 observation wagon per battery.

The special arms must be strengthened *pro rata.*

With these increases of establishment our active formations would have a superiority over France, if not in numbers, beyond all doubt in constitution and striking power, and France would no longer be able to catch us up in this respect.

II.—Increasing the Strength of the Armies.

At least three new army corps must be formed if we are to have the required strength for an offensive in the west while simultaneously affording sufficient protection to our eastern front. For this purpose some of the fifth brigades now available can be employed. The formation of the third battalions must be regarded as a vital necessity. We must, however, avoid anything like half measures, and therefore in addition put forward the following requirements:—

(*a*) The establishment of army inspectorates, one for each army corps;

(*b*) The formation of several cavalry regiments in order to improve the organization of the cavalry;

(*c*) The strengthening of the foot artillery and pioneers;

(*d*) The strengthening of communication troops, particularly telegraph battalions and wireless companies;

(*e*) Establishment of an Inspectorate of the Air Service and separation of the communication troops. Progressive and extended organization of the air service. Establishment of aircraft depots among the army corps and

fortresses. The organization of army airship troops for an air fleet of (at first) 20 airships of the largest model;

(*f*) Improvement of the transport formations.

III.—Improving the Second Line Formations.

It is absolutely essential that we should rejuvenate and develop the existing reserve formations by getting rid of the landwehr element. This will be possible by increasing the peace establishment. The reserve units must be given extensive opportunities for training. With a view to a better supply of active* officers for these units, the number of officers, especially captains, must be increased. Further, the reserve units must receive a better supply of machine-guns and field artillery. On this point in particular I must point to the latest efforts of France to increase the war efficiency and inherent value of her reserve formations by her new Cadres Law. As in France, fresh units, equipped with field artillery, must be formed in increasing measure from the landwehr thus becoming available.

IV.—Supplementing and improving the Matériel.

The following are the requirements:—

To complete the provision of all formations and reserve formations with field kitchens.

To furnish a larger ammunition reserve.

The increase of our resources for attacking hostile fortresses.

The production of anti-aircraft guns.

B. *The Defence of the Country.*

Our frontier fortresses must be equipped and supplied on such a scale that they are in a state of defence at any moment. Their armament may be left only just short of completion. In the case of fortresses in the interior the

* As opposed to officers of the reserve. [F.A.H.]

armament must be so far advanced that it can be completed within a short time.

In the east the fortresses of Graudenz and Posen must be so strong that our defensive plans find a sufficient *point d'appui* in these fortresses in any and every emergency.

Signed: Von Moltke.

CHAPTER II

AUXILIARY SERVICE LAW, RECRUITING AND LABOUR QUESTIONS

LIST OF MEMORANDA REPRODUCED.

(Only the numbered memoranda are given verbatim.)

No.	Registered No.	To	Contents.
1	No. 33825, 31/8/16.	War Minister.	Recruiting and war material.
2	II. No. 34647, 13/9/16.	Imperial Chancellor.	Of vital importance for the successful outcome of the War that recruiting should be on a secure basis and the output of war industries increased. The following measures are necessary: Raising limit of military age to 50. State training of youths from 16. Extension of the War Work Act, and its application to *all* men and women. Immediate action required.
3	Ic No. 1 sec. op. 14/9/16.	War Minister.	Drafts and new formations.
4	Rc. No. 9512 K. I. 30/9/16.	Chief of the General Staff.	Reply of the Imperial Chancellor to No. 2.
5	II./Ic No. 34647, op. II. Ang. 5/10/16.	War Minister.	Against the views of the Imperial Chancellor I remain of the opinion expressed in my memo II. 34647 of 13/9/16 (see above). Particularly urgent to restrict freedom of movement and extend general operation of War Work Act.
	II./Ic No. 36529, op. 7/10/16.	Imperial Chancellor.	1. All resources not yet employed must be drawn on to fullest extent. 2. Freedom of movement of workmen must be restricted.

No.	Registered No.	To	Contents.
5	II. No. 37053, op. 14/10/16.	Imperial Chancellor.	Restriction of private building.
	II. No. 37768, op. 23/10/16.	„ „	Imperial Chancellor does not agree. (Extension of War Work Act. Restriction of freedom of movement. Closing of universities. Compulsory work for disabled soldiers.) In these circumstances only one course: Extension of liability to service both as regards classes affected and time. Training of youths. Extension of compulsory work to women.
6	II. Gen. Field-Marshal.	Major-General Groener.	Absolutely necessary to introduce legislation to extend the liability to military service along the lines I have often suggested. Only possible with co-operation of the Reichstag.
7	II. No. 748 sec. op. 1/11/16.	Imperial Chancellor.	Of greatest importance to secure the co-operation of the representative House. Therefore no resolution of the Bundesrat, but a bill to be approved and passed by the Reichstag.
	II. No. 773 sec. op. 2/11/16.	„ „	Memorandum on the extension of liability to military service.
8	II. No. 995 sec. op. 15/11/16.	„ „	Solution of the labour question becomes more urgent from day to day. Months taken up with discussion instead of action. Therefore urgently request that passing of Auxiliary Service Law be expedited.
9	I. Q.M.G. 23/11/16.	President of the Reichstag.	The settlement of the Auxiliary Service Law.
	26/11/16.	Chief of the General Staff.	Reply of the President.
10	Kr. II. No. 290/3, 14/3/17.	Field-Marshal von Hindenburg.	Correspondence with the Chief of the Military Cabinet on labour and equipment questions.
	II. No. 2635 sec. op. 27/3/17.	Chief of the Military Cabinet.	
11	II. No. 64550, op. 10/9/17.	Imperial Chancellor, War Ministry, War Bureau.	Our enemies make desperate efforts to secure victory. Following countermeasures necessary: Securing recruiting situation. Maximum output of war industries. All internal difficulties to be overcome. For this purpose it is necessary (1) To improve Auxiliary Service Law. Revision of exemptions. Increase of individual effort. Preparations to recruit from industry in the spring. Time extension of liability to service. Energetic and immediate action required.

No.	Registered No.	To	Contents.
12	II. No. 65317, op. 25/9/17.	Home military authorities.	Recruiting position demands restriction of exemptions to exceptional cases (individual, agricultural and industrial experts).
13	II. No. 67455, op. 15/10/17.	War Bureau.	Reception of labour representatives. Relations between employers and employed often very unsatisfactory. Joint conferences desirable. Extra food rations and higher wages for workmen. Full exploitation of our labour resources not being carried out everywhere.
14	7451. 17g. AI. 8/12/17.	War Minister.	Attitude of the Courts to strikes.
15	II. No. 74120, op. 26/12/17.	" "	The transport situation has involved considerable labour restrictions in war industries, coal mines, etc. Thousands of workmen with nothing to do. These men must be made available for the army by calling them up on larger scale. Exempted men fit for active service must be released more rapidly.
16	17/2/18.	Imperial Chancellor.	Strikes.
..	II. No. 6626. sec. op. 18/2/18.	War Minister.	
17	II/Ic.	" "	Proposal for more thorough combing-out of industry and introduction of female labour. 50,000 men a month were required. Then declared impossible. *Now* approximately being carried into effect.
	18/4/18.		Reply of the War Minister. (War Bureau.)
	II. No. 8305.	War Bureau.	Limitation of output of war material for the purpose of recruiting.*
—	II. No. 86161.	Minister for Trade and Industry.	Further release of coal miners impossible. Measures must be taken to increase the individual output.
—	II. No. 86258, op. 17/5/18.	Imperial Chancellor, War Minister, War Agricultural Office.	Every effort must be devoted to recruiting labour from the occupied territories. In addition labour must be obtained from foreign and allied countries for our purposes. For this purpose we must increase our recruiting operations in foreign countries and bring pressure to bear on the Allies.
18	II. No. 87893, 4/6/18.	Imperial Chancellor.	State of opinion among industrial workers.
19	II. No. 8771 sec. op. 18/6/18.	" "	Fresh proposal to extend liability for service and increase industrial output. State regulation of wages and profits. With minutes of the Conference.

* The Memorandum refers to later chapters also. [The Author.]

No.	Registered No.	To	Contents.
—	No. 89664, op. 21/6/18.	C.-in-C. in the East. Eichhorn Group, 8th Army Headquarters.	Shortage of labour at home. Enlistment of labour, especially experts, for employment at home, must be carried on with greatest energy.
—	II. No. 89674, 22/6/18.	C.-in-C. in East. Gov.-General, Warsaw.	All agitation of organs of Polish Central Committee against recruiting of labour for Germany must be suppressed.
—	II. No. 89766, 24/6/18.	Foreign Office.	In view of recruiting position increase of enlistments of foreign labour is necessary. War Ministry's proposal to make agreement with Ukraine and Russian Government about permitting and facilitating enlistment of workmen thoroughly approved.
20	Ic No. 10220, 8/9/18.	War Minister.	Recruiting regulations. Reply to query of War Ministry.
21	March, 1918.	—	Correspondence with Professor Dr. Kraft-Dresden about the expression imputed to me: "The German workman is too cowardly for a general strike."

COMPULSORY LABOUR IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY.

No.	Registered No.	To	Contents.
22	No. 290/10 16. A. H. (S.), 7/10/16.	—	Attitude of the War Ministry.
23	—	—	Result of a departmental conference in Berlin.
24	P. A. I. 1652.	Chief of the General Staff.	Memorandum of the Governor-General of Belgium.
25	II. No. 49000, 3/3/17.	Gov.-General of Belgium.	Deportation of workmen from Belgium.

I.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"No. 33825.

"G.H.Q.,
"31/8/16.*

"To the War Minister.

"The offensives of our enemies show marked improvement on each occasion both as regards mounting and execution. There can be no doubt that future offensives will impose even greater tasks on our powers of resistance as our opponents dispose not only of:

"1. Practically inexhaustible man-power, but also

"2. The industrial power of almost all the rest of the world.

"As regards 1. In contrast to the enemy's man-power our human resources are limited. This, the worst of all defects, can only be overcome to a certain degree by getting all our men who are fit for active service to the front. Their places on the Lines of Communication and at home must be taken by men fit for garrison duty only—the number of which must be kept at a minimum.

"As to 2. Even by adopting the course mentioned we shall be more and more inferior in numbers to our enemies. Men, and horses too, must be increasingly replaced by machines. This will be all the more difficult as the enemy too has realized this necessity. The view put forward by me (i.e., General von Falkenhayn [The Author]) earlier on that it was a case of putting on the screw, and that it was purely a question of which side would give the last turn to it at the right moment, applies with even greater force to-day. If we are to get through, in the first place the labour question is vital. It will be necessary to increase our labour army with men disabled in the war, prisoners of war, women and the

* The Field-Marshal and I had taken up our duties at Main Headquarters on 29/8. [The Author.]

young. Courses of training for these classes at the public expense are indispensable and will be required on the largest scale. Under these circumstances, if it is necessary to release a few thousand highly qualified experts from service at the front for a long or short period I am prepared to face the disadvantages involved. All other branches of industry must be considered after war industries. In case of need we must adopt compulsory measures, as in England. It was for this purpose that I recently pressed for the introduction of Sunday labour. At the same time it appears to be advisable to enlighten the public as to the seriousness of the situation and the corresponding duty imposed on each individual. This would not fail to produce its effect.

"Further, we must endeavour to relieve human labour by appropriate machinery, and make possible increased individual output.

"The increase of output must apply to all branches of war industries. The following are particularly urgent:

"1. Munitions of all kinds.

"2. Guns, field artillery, heavy howitzers, medium long-range guns.

"3. Machine-guns.

"4. Trench-mortars.

"5. Aeroplanes.

"6. Tools and material for the construction of trenches.

"To give definite data I must ask that the output of munitions may be doubled by the spring. The output of guns, on the other hand, must be considerably more—approximately three times the present figure, for in the last few months the loss of material in the field artillery has considerably exceeded replacement (by several hundred) and even in the foot artillery to a lesser degree. As, owing to the high rate of fire, most of our guns become useless by their own firing, even a doubled output would mean but a gradual increase in the number of guns at the front, if any increase at all.

"In the case of trench-mortars the output must be doubled at least and that of machine-guns trebled. I will go into the question of aeroplanes in greater detail later. The great achievements of the War Ministry hitherto are fully appreciated. I know also that in all directions a great increase of output is already in progress. But it is important that this increase should be expedited and that the figures given above should be reached as soon as possible.

"I put forward the suggestion that in the first place, and at once, the chief representatives of the branches of industry under consideration should be invited to a conference at which the seriousness of the situation should be made clear, and they should be asked to produce comprehensive and definite proposals for the increase of output and the measures required. I must ask you to give me prompt notice of the meeting so that I can send a representative.

"In conclusion I must again point out that nothing but the most intensive exploitation of all our resources, and more particularly our highly-developed industry, in the service of the war can bring us to final victory, and that any neglect to make the most of the possibilities may have the most serious result.

"I must ask the War Minister to support me in the fulfilment of my demands with all the resources at his disposal. Financial and other difficulties can no longer have any weight.

(Signed) "VON HINDENBURG."

2.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 34647.

"G.H.Q.,
"13/9/16.

"TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR.

"As I pointed out in my memorandum of 31/8 (No. 33825) the questions as to (1) how recruiting for the field army can be

put on a secure basis and (2) how our war industries—without prejudicing agriculture—can be extended, are extremely urgent and of vital importance for the outcome of the war.

"It already appears quite out of the question that these problems can be solved without far-reaching legislation.

"The first problem imperiously requires that all men fit for service (for the exceptions see under 2) should be called up. For that purpose the following measures are necessary:

"I. Steps to limit the number of exemptions, and more especially stringent inquiries in each individual case.

"II. Calling up all men who are temporarily unfit on account of curable defects, such as weak heart, sporting heart, general physical weakness, etc., in separate batches, so that they may undergo a cure at suitable stations. More particularly it is of vital importance to get the youths of our great towns away from influences which are injurious to their health. Such a measure would raise the general level of the nation's health also.

"III. Raising the military age for active service or service in the Landsturm. I consider it feasible to go up to 50. Even if the number of men between 45 and 50 fit for active service is not very large, we shall gather in a great number of men fit for garrison duty who can be used to release general service men behind the front.

"IV. A thorough military training at the public expense of youths from the age of 16. This is only possible if there is a corresponding release from usual work (in factories, continuation classes and higher schools).

"As regards 2. The most effective and just method of raising labour is a War Work Act, as has already been suggested.

"It is possible that political considerations may form an objection. Unfortunately the critical nature of the situation makes it essential, and I hope that after quiet and practical

demonstration the nation will not hesitate to take up the burden of duties which are certainly not to be underestimated.

"A War Work Act would make it possible:

"(a) To take labour from branches of industry which are almost at a standstill (such as branches of the textile industries, etc.).

"(b) To restrict the amount of labour absorbed in non-war industries (warehouses, etc.) and employ it elsewhere.

"(c) To make full use of the capacity for work of every individual.

"But above all I must insist that a War Work Act is primarily an act of common justice. Especially in view of the universal suffrage it is a crying injustice that some men (and these on the average the best and most useful to the State) should have to sacrifice their lives and health in fighting and be most seriously prejudiced in their callings in civil life, while others remain at home in safety, and in many cases, unfortunately, do nothing but work for their own profit. Even though a large part of the nation shows the highest sense of self-sacrifice there is another section of which the reverse is the truth.

"It is necessary to extend the operation of the War Work Act to women not engaged in essential occupations. There are untold thousands of childless soldiers' wives who are only a burden on the finances of the State. In addition there are thousands of women and girls at large who are doing nothing or are engaged in quite useless callings. The principle that 'he who does not work shall not eat' is truer than ever in our present situation, *even as applied to women.*

"Apart from or by virtue of the War Work Act the following measures must be considered:

"1. Taking a census of all skilled workers on the English pattern, carefully specifying their special branch of training. This measure must be applied to men called up for army service also.

"2. Compulsory state training and employment of men

disabled in the war in munition industries and agriculture. In the same way labour released from branches of industry which are lying idle must be trained, if necessary, for war industries.

"This measure is already in operation on a small scale, but *compulsion* is required for its successful operation. For the rest, thanks to the technical abilities of our people and their high level of education, a great deal can be done in a short time.

"3. Closing of universities, schools, etc., so far as the peremptory requirements of the individual professions (doctors) allow. For example, students of chemistry and technical callings will be employed in factories. This, also, is only an act of common justice, as at the present moment men not called up for service and women are getting a start of students, etc., now fighting in the field, and in future will deprive them of their posts. Even now, it is in the interests of the increase of our population that we should make efforts to secure that it will be as easy as possible for young men returning from the war to found a family.

"I do not doubt that once our people fully realize how serious the situation is—and they must do so—they will acquiesce in such measure. If they did not do so, Germany would be unworthy of victory.

"It is high time that we should put a stop to the mischievous tub-thumping and agitation, as well as the ignoble profiteering and love of pleasure which are rampant in some places, and that can only be done if the competent authorities make the situation perfectly clear and, if necessary, use the powers of the law. The whole German nation must live only in the service of the Fatherland.

"Speedy action is necessary if we are to be successful. *Every day is vital.* The necessary measures must be taken *at once.*

"A copy has been sent to the War Minister.

"To the War Minister at General Headquarters.

"I have the honour of enclosing a copy of a letter to the Imperial Chancellor.

"The following are my proposals:

"1. Side by side with, or under the Supply Organization, a Labour Bureau should be established which will be in the closest touch with the Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, will issue all general regulations and collect all statistical data.

"2. The Labour Bureau will have authority over the whole population of the German Empire (including prisoners), with the exception of the fighting troops and their immediate reserve. This aspect needs strict emphasis. All the occupations of soldiers on the Lines of Communication, in garrisons, etc., except soldiers belonging to fighting units or units destined for the front, is 'labour' within the sphere of the Labour Bureau's powers.

"3. The active agents of the Labour Bureau will be the military authorities and, if required, the communal authorities.

"4. A general order, applying to the military also, will be issued forbidding anyone in Germany to employ labour without the consent of the Agents of the Labour Bureau.

"5. In principle the consent will take the form of a certificate, which will give particulars of the employer, the labour and the number of working hours required.

"6. The number of working hours required will be classified in three groups. Working hours

"(a) of men of military age,

"(b) of other males,

"(c) of women.

"7. All labour required by the military to carry out works, etc., will be fixed before the work is given out, and indeed set apart for the firms employed to execute the work. The same course will apply to military 'labour' in the sense of Par. 2 above.

"8. Compulsory labour will be introduced for the whole population, more or less in conjunction with the distribution of food tickets. Exemption from compulsory labour shall be given only upon a doctor's certificate or a certificate from the agent of the Labour Bureau (weekly) to the effect that there is no work available.

"9. Wage questions and the like will in principle not be touched by the Organization of the Labour Bureau for the moment, but it shall have power to deal with individual cases.

"10. The local statistics of working hours required and available, as well as of unemployment, will furnish the Labour Bureau with a basis for a general statistical review, on which it can every month come to a decision with regard to transferring labour and so on.

"11. The branches of the Labour Bureau will also undertake to get out a statistical record of the nature of the requirements and the offers of employment to suitable labour. In that way the Organization will be in a position, as occasion requires, to establish teaching and training courses and improve the effectiveness of the working hours.

"12. If necessary, public works, agricultural operations, etc., shall serve as a transitional stage. The unnecessary movement of labour from one place to another will be avoided at all costs.

(Signed) "VON HINDENBURG."

3.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.

"I c. No. 1. Secret.

"G.H.Q.,

"14/9/1916.

"TO THE WAR MINISTER.

"After the present critical phasê has been surmounted, next spring will demand another supreme effort from us. Whether

it will be the last we cannot say. We must be equal to whatever is coming, and that soon.

"The extension of our front which the intervention of Rumania has involved has compelled us to move a large number of troops from west to east. Our reserves, which were formerly adequate, have sunk below a permissible level. Our next and most urgent task is to create new reserves, in order to be able to face any emergency. We must have new effective units by February, 1917, at the latest. We must not be frightened by the fact that these new formations, which are absolutely necessary, will reduce the reservoir available for ordinary drafts in subsequent months. At the time when man-power gets short the war-machine (machine-guns, guns and trench-mortars) must have grown so large that we can hold our lines with fewer men.

"These considerations involve a *definite demand* that *all* men now fit for service, including the 1918 class, who are not employed in munitions industries should be immediately called to the colours and begin their training. We are under a duty, which we cannot take too seriously, to equip our last available men for the task which will shortly face them with everything which careful and thorough training can give them.

"We shall be able to see how many men will be available for new formations by reckoning up the number to be called up as above, as well as the men still in the depots, and deducting the number which experience has shown will be required as current drafts up to March, 1917.

"We intend to form infantry regiments out of seasoned troops drawn from the front and recruits. Whether these regiments shall be formed at home or behind the fronts, and in what units they are to be incorporated, must be left for future consideration. Further we must devote all our energies to creating field artillery and heavy artillery units, trench-mortar and machine-gun detachments, as far as the material we can secure will permit—partly with a view to

bringing existing units up to strength, and partly to form army reserves.

"I know that I am at one with the War Ministry in saying that, even after this programme has been carried through, every conceivable effort must be made to get hold of the last man who is physically capable of carrying a rifle in the trenches, in order that the supply of drafts to the army may be secure after the spring of 1917. The road to the attainment of that goal is indicated in my letter of 13/9/1916, II. No. 34647.

"Please let me know your views at an early date.

(Signed) "VON HINDENBURG."

4.

"The Imperial Chancellor.
"Rk. No. 9512 K. J.

"Berlin,
"30/9/1916.

"TO THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF.*

"In reply to Your Excellency's letter of the 20th [13th.—The Author] of this month—II. No. 34647 op.—I have repeatedly declared my readiness to bear in mind, so far as circumstances at all permit, the suggestions therein put forward for the purpose of securing the supply of drafts to the army and increasing the output of the munitions industries. I believe that I am in agreement with Your Excellency when I say that if we are to avoid producing unrest among the civil population legal and official measures of a far-reaching kind must only be considered when they offer a certain guarantee of success.

* The letter is given as revealing the views of the Government on the exceedingly important questions of the conduct of operations. They were not the views of the Supreme Command. The latter had to adhere to their demands in order that the entire energies and resources of the nation should be employed in the service of the war. It was a struggle for our very existence. [The Author.]

"Turning to details, may I make the following remarks:

"A—Men.

"Even now all men from 18 to 45 inclusive are at the disposal of the military authorities. Within those limits all men of 19 and over fit for field service—exempted men excluded—have been called up for the army. The others—those of them fit for any kind of military service—are engaged in garrison service or military labour. Thus at the moment all that are left are the exempted men, boys under 19 (except those who joined up voluntarily, as relatively large numbers did, or have been called up for military labour, as is said to have been done in particular frontier regions, especially Alsace-Lorraine) and the men who had completed their forty-fifth year at the outbreak of war. Lastly, of course, the permanently unfit.

"As regards the last class, all men in any way fit for field, garrison, or labour service are picked out in the repeated 're-examinations,' so that, even if re-examination were made still more strict, it would be difficult to get for the army any considerable amount of useful human material out of the rejected men.

"Every single case of exemption is considered most carefully and strictly, first by the civil authority concerned and then by the officials of the War Ministry, with whom the decision lies, and the furloughs and exemptions from military service are generally for definite periods, at the end of which there is a fresh inquiry into the claim to indispensability.

"Where the circumstances at all permit, exempted men fit for service in the field are exchanged for officers and men only fit for garrison service, so that, even if the conditions of exemption are subjected to an even more thorough scrutiny, we can hardly expect any very great result. We must not forget in this connection that almost all the civil officials, including those in industry and the banks, as well as those in

other civil professions in question, are to all intents and purposes engaged in war work directly or indirectly, or else performing functions which are indispensable to the existence and health of the civil population. All these duties are now being performed by barely adequate staffs, and it would be impossible to reduce them still further without inflicting serious injury on the community.

"As regards the men who had attained the age of 45 on the outbreak of war, and are therefore no longer fit for military service, an overwhelming majority of the stronger men fit for work are engaged in coal-mining, the iron industry, munition establishments, agriculture, or otherwise in the 'heavy' industries which are working without exception to-day for war purposes.

"As regards men who are not strong enough for such heavy work owing to defective physique, these are engaged in other branches of industry and commerce, such as the textile industry, pharmaceutical instruments, optical instruments, handicrafts. Their activities are again directly or indirectly profitable to our war economy.

"The man of private means who is no longer liable to military service is such an uncommon phenomenon in Germany that the attempt to get any labour worth consideration from this quarter is condemned to futility from the outset.

"For that reason there seems to me no basis for the assumption that any considerable amount of fresh male labour can be obtained for the arms and munitions factories by the method of compulsory transfer from other industries, or the introduction of obligatory labour for men fit to work who are not now working. Men fit for mining, foundries and heavy industry have already decided, almost without exception, to enter real war industries owing to the high rate of wages prevailing. This is particularly true of those workers who can no longer be fully employed in their former positions in certain

branches of industry which are not working full time owing to shortage of raw material.

"We must not deny our gratitude to German industry and the German people for the wonderful way in which they have learned how to adapt themselves to the requirements of war economics, and of their own free will put themselves at the service of national defence in a surprisingly short time and with complete success. I am afraid that by compulsory measures, the practical results of which are bound to be very small from the outset, this healthy situation would be disturbed and our whole economic structure might be shattered.

"So far as the transfer of labour from peace to war industries could be promoted by state intervention, this has been done by the positive measure of compulsory arbitration, as well as the negative measure of preventing the use of capital and labour for purposes which do not help the war. Apart from the restrictions imposed on certain branches of industry, mainly by the shortage of raw material or the necessity of husbanding such raw materials as we still have, restrictions have also been imposed in cases where there is no question of a shortage of raw material. For instance, the sinking of new shafts for potash and the working of shafts, the sinking of which is not already complete, have both been forbidden by imperial edict. In the same way the construction of new cement works has been prohibited. Public building has been very severely restricted, and in a number of corps districts even private building has already been largely forbidden. However, I shall be glad to consult the federal Governments and authorities concerned once more on this question with a view to imposing all possible restrictions on industrial activities which are not essential to our economic existence for the sake of obtaining more labour for genuine war industries. Unity could easily be reached along these lines.

"On the other hand, I do not anticipate any success from a system of cures for men now unfit who suffer from weak heart, general constitutional weakness, and so on. It would be

very difficult to get them fit for army service. The result would only be that we should take these men from their former occupations, in which they could have rendered useful service for the benefit of our economic life.

"I am also very doubtful about the suggestion of state training for military service of boys of 16 and upwards who will be released from other work.' In view of the present serious shortage of labour, young workmen, i.e., workmen from 14 and upwards, are already to a great extent occupied in war and heavy industries so far as it is feasible having regard to the physical strength of these boys. To take them away either wholly or partially from these occupations would be a disadvantage to the efficiency of our war industries, and there would certainly be no corresponding gain to their military training. To add a training for military service which would impose a further great strain on their physical strength to their heavy work in these occupations would mean making excessive demands on the physical and mental capacity of these young men. However, I shall be glad to consult the Minister of Education and the Minister of Commerce and Industry on this question, and will bring up the subject again later on.

"Further, I consider that there can be no question of closing universities, technical establishments, schools, and so forth. It is not merely that a most unfavourable, and indeed disastrous, impression would be created abroad and at home by a step which would result in the closing of universities and higher schools at home at the very moment when we Germans were re-opening universities and higher schools in the occupied territories in the east and west. I think it would be a failure from the practical point of view. All students who are in any way physically efficient have already been called up for army service. The students in technical schools who are unfit are now to a great extent engaged in war industries or food production, attracted by the very high rates of wages

in these branches. The only course we could consider would be to ask (through the medium of the Minister of Education) the directors of universities and technical schools to make every effort to secure that those students who are still at the universities because they are not fit enough, and who seem suitable for employment in definite posts in war industries, should try to obtain such posts.

"With regard to the male population the following measures might be considered as feasible and, within modest limits, promising:

"1. A far-reaching restriction of all building not directly or indirectly required for war purposes;

"2. A very careful training of men disabled in the war with a view to restoring their capacity to work, followed by their posting to war industries;

"3. An earlier calling up of the classes (men of 17 and 18) which have not yet been called up;

"4. As an emergency measure, raising the age of liability to military service to 50 (although by so doing we should only get two or three classes of men, whose physical strength and stamina will in many cases be no longer at their old level).

"B.—Women.

"We have succeeded on a very large scale in substituting female labour for the lighter forms of male labour, both in public (post, railways, canals) and in private services. Further developments along these lines are comparatively narrowly restricted by the physical constitution of women. Moreover, we have succeeded in taking large numbers of women from branches of industry which have had to close or work short time owing to shortage of raw materials. We may maintain without fear of contradiction that, even in workshops occupied in genuine war work, female labour has been provided for those operations for which it is in any way suitable. Yet it

has not been possible to transfer women who have found themselves without occupation in other branches to munitions or allied industries, even on a small scale; according to last month's figures for every hundred berths open about eight men and 160 women are seeking employment. Thus—in contrast to male labour—the supply of female labour is much greater than the demand. The problem to be solved with regard to women is therefore—both at the moment and presumably for a long time to come—not: How can we get more female labour? but rather: How can we find more and suitable employment for women? Even now the greatest possible pressure is being put on the factories, and indeed the factories themselves, for reasons which it is easy to imagine, are doing their best to provide suitable employment for women. I am taking the liberty to append two statistical records which clearly show that the participation of women in industrial occupations, especially genuine war industries, has greatly increased in the course of the war, both absolutely and relatively, while the number of male workmen has considerably diminished. The only exceptions from the point of view of female labour are the textile and clothing industries, where the figures clearly reveal the tendency of women to leave these occupations. The introduction of general compulsory labour for women would therefore be a useless measure, and at the same time open to the most serious objection from the economic, moral and social point of view. Until there is a complete change in the present circumstances of industry I should therefore oppose the adoption of this course with the greatest vigour. If the measures to be taken do not anticipate any very startling results, their general effect must not be under-estimated. To go further than I have proposed above, and especially to close down all branches of industry which are not directly or indirectly engaged on war work and transfer the labour thus released compulsorily to genuine war industries, must have the most disastrous results for the present and the

future of our nation. We shall expose our economic constitution, whose breath and energies cannot be replaced at a moment's notice by official regulations, to nothing less than derangements dangerous to life. We should impose—and this is a point I cannot ignore—an almost intolerable burden on that confidence of the civil population which we need if we are to conquer. Lastly, we should completely destroy the frame-work (which is already frail enough) which will be indispensable to us for the reconstruction and continuation of our economic life after the conclusion of peace.

(Signed) "VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG."

5.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II—Ic. No. 34647 Op. II.

"G.H.Q.,
"5/10/1916.

"TO THE WAR MINISTRY.

"I enclose a copy of the reply of the Imperial Chancellor to my letter of 13/9/1916, II. No. 34647.

"The answer has not succeeded in shaking my convictions. I regard the prohibition of labour migration from war industries and a general extension of the War Work Act as particularly urgent. In my opinion there is a large amount of undiscovered energy which has hitherto rendered little or no useful service to the common welfare.

"I should be glad to have a speedy answer from the War Ministry to my letter of 13/9/1916, II. No. 34647. With reference thereto I must ask you to look into the following points in the letter of the Imperial Chancellor:

"1. What measures must be taken to release a very large amount of labour from industries which are not working for war purposes, and other occupations.

"2. The training of disabled men for employment in

industry and agriculture. Their posting to such employment.

"3. What would be the effect on the labour market of raising the age for service in the army and the Landsturm to 50, the training of boys and a scheme for restoring the unfit to health.

"4. Would the extension of the War Work Act to include compulsory labour show greater results than are possible without the adoption of such measures of compulsion?

"5. Measures to compel employers to employ more female labour.

(Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II/Ic. No. 36529 Op.
"Ref. letter of 30/9/ Rk. 9512 K.J.

"G.H.Q.,
"7/10/1916.

"TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR.

"I am extremely grateful to Your Excellency for the assurance that the suggestions put forward by me for the purpose of securing the supply of drafts to the army and the increase of output in war industries shall be borne in mind.

"I cannot to-day go into what Your Excellency says in detail and must therefore confine myself to the following points:

"1. It is absolutely necessary that men who have not hitherto helped in the defence of the country, directly or indirectly, should now be called upon to do so. I am as convinced as ever that we still have a reservoir of energy which has not yet been tapped.

"2. It is particularly important to take steps to restrict the freedom of movement of men engaged in war industries.*

* This freedom of movement completely hindered control of the workmen, and more particularly the supervision of exemptions. Men sent back from the army for definite occupation by special request often vanished from their place of work a few days later. [The Author.]

"3.. I have ascertained that efforts are on foot to repeal the Emergency Measure of 4/8/1914 with regard to the employment of female and child labour to meet the special circumstances. In my opinion there could be no question of such a step.

"I enclose a review of the measures which have been taken in France, England and Russia for the purpose of drawing on civilians unfit for military service for work in the service of national defence.*

(Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 37053 Op.
"Restrictions on Building.

"14/10/1916.

"TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR.

"With reference to my letter of 7/10/1916, II/Ic. 36529 Op., I have the honour of informing Your Excellency that, like Your Excellency, I regard the imposition of extensive restrictions on all building which is not directly or indirectly required for war purposes as a useful measure, mainly because this course will enable us rapidly to release a considerable volume of labour for employment in war industries. I should therefore be particularly grateful to Your Excellency if the decisions we have come to could be put into execution as soon as possible.

(Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 37768 Op.

"G.H.Q., 23/10/1916.

"TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR.

"In reply to Your Excellency's letter of 30/9/16, 9512 K.J., I had the honour of sending an interim answer on 7/10 under II/Ic. 36529 and 14/10 under 37053.

"I will now take the liberty of dealing with Your Excellency's points in detail.

* Not in my possession. [The Author]

"1. Extension of liability to service of the male population.—Your Excellency declines to restrict the right of free movement, to extend the War Work Act, to close the schools and introduce compulsory work for disabled men. In my opinion there is *only one way* in which to supply once and for all the requirements of the army in drafts and the growing requirements of our war industries in labour. The only method, in my view, is a great extension of liability to service from the point of view of both physical capacity and age limits. As regards physical capacity it must extend to all men fit for work,* and as regards age limits to all males from 15 up to 60. In such circumstances an extension to 50 only would no longer be adequate. It is only by so materially greater an extension that the whole male population that we have in mind will really be put at the service of the State, either in the army or, by the method of furloughs and posting, in occupations at home. Of course in saying this I am not thinking of sending the older men indiscriminately to the front or to the lathes. On the contrary, it will be the business of the recruiting and labour authorities to employ every man at the spot where he can be of greatest service to the State.

"I cannot agree with the view that such an extension of liability to service in the army and war industries would not have considerable results. We are bound to give consideration for the consequences to our subsequent peace industry second place to the requirements of our war industries. In my opinion such industries and trade as do not help in the prosecution of the war must be greatly restricted, and indeed closed down the moment the situation requires such a step. In any case, after the war the transitions to peace conditions will be so gradual that restrictions and stoppages will not have the serious consequences that are assumed in many quarters.

"Nor am I in any doubt that the step of extending the

* By that I mean all men who are capable, mentally and physically, of any sort of work in war industries. [The Author.]

liability to service must be taken soon. Our war industries require that step now and the Field Army will require it before very long.

"Such an extension would simultaneously settle the following problems for the majority of the male population:

"I. The restriction of the right to freedom of movement;

"II. Extension of the War Work Act;

"III. The employment of students of the higher schools and universities (see 2);

"IV. Compulsory labour for disabled men.

"At the moment freedom of movement is restricted by the measures which were proposed at the Conference on 17/10 at the Ministry of the Interior. Further, the employment of disabled men in war industries has been facilitated by the steps taken by the War Ministry (furloughs for work *immediately* after leaving hospital). On the other hand, special attention should be devoted to the question of training new skilled workers for the purpose of releasing skilled workers for the Field Army who are fit for field service. The army cannot do without them for ever. For that purpose the disabled must be primarily considered, and after them all men not fit for field service.

"2. Training of boys.—This can be carried out in addition to the employment of boys in war industries, and by careful arrangement there need be no disturbance of work. The calling up of boys for labour and state physical training will in any case be without serious consequences for the future only if more appropriate measures are taken to lower the standard required for matriculation and State examinations, as well as leaving certificates after the war. Otherwise there will be gaps in all callings, which will only be filled by the employment of women. That would be a disaster.

"3. Women.—In my opinion it is important that female

labour should not be over-estimated. Practically all mental work, heavy physical work as well as all real creative work will continue to fall upon men—not to mention the conduct of war. It would be a good thing if emphasis were given to this fact publicly, and some check put on the feminist agitation for equal positions in all callings, including of course political life. Further, I entirely agree with Your Excellency that compulsory service for women would be a mistake. We shall need women as wives and mothers after the war. I can only approve all efforts for that purpose in the way of legislation, privileges, material help and so on. In spite of the strong resistance to be anticipated we must make efforts to prevent the female competition which has so evil an influence on the family life. Your Excellency will see from this that even I am not thinking of the war alone, but fully realize the necessity of a healthy social life, i.e., primarily the protection of the family, for the development of our nation. If notwithstanding this I am now pressing for the extension of compulsory labour to all women either without work or only engaged in occupations of secondary importance, it is only because in my view female labour could be employed on a much larger scale than hitherto in many quarters and men could thus be released for other work. In any case industry and agriculture must be prepared to employ women more freely than before, and further the choice of occupation must not be left to the women alone, but must be settled with reference to their capacity, training and position in life.

" I must emphasize once more that I regard it as a peculiarly mistaken policy to keep the higher schools and universities open for women after practically all the men have left these establishments owing to the extension of the liability to military service. It is futile because the educational gain is small, it will promote that very competition with the family which must be resisted, and finally because it is the grossest injustice to give the young man who gives up all for

his Fatherland second place to women. In these circumstances I cannot see any disadvantage in closing universities which have already lost their men. We can be indifferent to the impression made abroad if we reach our goal in the war. For the sake of fairness the closing of universities in the occupied territories will also have to be considered.

"In general, may I emphasize my opinion that the legislative bodies will stop at nothing when they are really shown how serious the situation is and how necessary it is for the whole nation to devote itself utterly to the tasks with which the war faces us, and when their responsibility is put before them clearly and unambiguously. It would mean a menace to our existence as a State and nation if we hesitated, out of regard for a passing phase of opinion at home or the impression that might be made abroad, to take measures which are necessary and to which I am firmly convinced we shall have to come some day, though it will then be too late. The depression at home—which I fully realize—will in my opinion be cured by wholesale and resolute measures. They will not make it worse. By far the greater part of it is due to the fact that we have not succeeded in promptly remedying abuses of many kinds at home. The most simple remedy will be the proposals I am now making and other suggestions with which Your Excellency is more familiar.

"As the responsible adviser of His Majesty in military matters I have no doubt that, in the first months of next year at the latest, there will be a struggle which will decide the question of to be or not to be for Germany. In that struggle we shall succumb unless we put forth *all*—it must be all—our strength. This prospect compels us, as I must again insist, to take immediate action; I am absolutely convinced that we have no more time to spend in long discussions.

"If the Reichstag fails to solve this problem we shall see what portion of it is prepared to turn a deaf ear to the demands which the very maintenance of the State involves. I

have no need to discuss the measures which are required to-day.

"I am taking the liberty of enclosing copies for the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Education; a copy has been sent direct to the Ministry of War.

(Signed) "VON HINDENBURG."

6.

(Telegram.)

"30/10/1916.

"To MAJOR-GENERAL GROENER, DIRECTOR OF THE NEW WAR BUREAU.

"I have been through your report.

"I still hold that it is necessary that there should be a law by which the liability to service shall be extended in the measure I have already proposed, both with regard to age limits and application. In view of the seriousness of the situation we must find some definite solution; in my view that is only possible on the basis of my proposal and with the help of the Reichstag, which definitely bears the responsibility. Otherwise the scale and meaning of the whole question will not be clear to the nation. I am quite convinced that the Reichstag will not refuse its consent to such a law when it is made perfectly clear that we can only win the war with the help of some such law.

"The proposals of the Minister for Trade and Industry will receive consideration to a certain extent when drafting the provisions of the Bill; on the other hand I do not think the course which the Secretary of State for the Interior proposes is feasible. It does not lead us directly to our goal, and his proposals do not reveal the outstanding importance of the matter.

"Turning to details I suggest that, with a view to laying emphasis on the *duty* of the nation, the following change is necessary in the first clause of the Draft Bill; '. . . . is in duty bound to perform patriotic auxiliary service, and for that

purpose can be called up during the war by decree of the Minister of War.'

"Will the Imperial Chancellor be good enough to examine these my views as soon as possible?

(Signed) "VON HINDENBURG."

7.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.

"II. No. 748 Secret.

"G.H.Q.,
"1/11/1916.

"TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR.

"I have now the conclusions of the conference on 30/10/1916 before me.

"I must ask Your Excellency to accept my special thanks for the readiness with which Your Excellency has met the views of the Supreme Command and the energetic efforts Your Excellency is making to solve this, the most important problem of the moment, as soon as possible. May I ask Your Excellency to convey this expression of my gratitude to the Secretaries of State and Ministers who are co-operating in this matter.

"In view of the outstanding importance of this question to the whole Fatherland and the issues of the war, however, I cannot refrain from asking Your Excellency to look once more, and more closely, into my desire to secure the extension of the liability to military or labour service by means of a bill to be passed by the Reichstag, and not merely by a decree of the Bundesrat.

In my opinion it is of the highest importance that the representatives of the nation should be called in to co-operate; I am certain that in that case the nation would be more willing to take up its new task. I am convinced that the conclusions reached by the Committee will provide a good basis for a law to be laid before the Reichstag; but in that case

express emphasis must be laid on the *obligation* of auxiliary service.

"If, as I hope, the passing of the bill by the Reichstag takes the form of an imposing declaration of the determination of the German nation to conquer, that will not fail to make an impression abroad, and is likely to bring us a good deal nearer peace.

"I am taking the liberty of sending Your Excellency a short Memorandum which may serve as a basis for the proceedings in the Bundesrat and the Reichstag.

(Signed) "VON HINDENBURG."

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 773 Secret.

"G.H.Q.,
"2/11/1916.

"MEMORANDUM TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR ON THE EXTENSION OF LIABILITY TO MILITARY SERVICE.

"As the war has proceeded the influence of its mechanical side has come more and more to the front. On the other hand, the importance of animate forces has diminished. It is no longer the high quality of the troops alone, though that can never be high enough, which is decisive, but rather in increasing measure the question of superiority in guns, ammunition and machine-guns.

"The factories and labour of the whole neutral world are at our enemies' disposal. Germany and her allies are practically confined to their own resources.

"The moral superiority of the German soldier, his greater courage, his higher sense of duty and honour, cannot cancel out that superiority because the enemy is also greatly superior to us in numbers.

"The same thing is true of the nation's food supply. This question too may be of supreme importance for the issue of the war, and in this department again the more abundant

resources are available to our enemies. Thus we can only win the war if we give our army so much war material that it can face the hostile armies on equal terms, and further, if we put the food supply of the whole nation on a sound basis. In view of our enemies' greater resources this will only be possible if we lay hands on all the treasures of our country's soil which industry and the plough can make available, and then apply them exclusively for the purpose of the war. *This maximum effort, however, can only be attained if the whole nation puts itself at the service of the Fatherland. All other considerations must be secondary. They can have no place in a struggle which will settle the question of existence or extinction of the State and the independence, the welfare and the future of our people.* After a victorious war our national economic life will flourish as never before, even if we say farewell to peace economy at the moment. On the other hand, after a lost campaign our adherence to peace conditions will have availed us nothing. We should be struck out of the pages of world history and doomed to complete economic slavery. As His Majesty's responsible adviser in military affairs I feel it my duty to urge these views on the Government and give the greatest emphasis to the seriousness of the situation and the vital importance of this matter. If we do not solve this problem rapidly and completely the Supreme Command will be deprived of the resources for victory.

"It is no function of mine to decide by what methods the problem of harnessing all our forces and resources in the service of our war industries is to be solved. But I do not think that I should omit to say a few words about my views on this matter.

"In my opinion it is of the highest importance that there should be a law in which the liability to service of the whole male population should be extended, as regards age limits to 15 at one end and 60 at the other, and as regards application to the whole of our war industry. We must have a definite solution and reach our goal by a definite path, as other-

wise the scale and importance of the whole question will not be clear to the nation.

"Every man must be assigned a duty which corresponds to his capacity: the lathe, the writing desk or any other occupation in which he can render the State the greatest service.

"A law is necessary because the people's representatives must share the responsibility and the nation will show greater readiness to take up its new task if the Reichstag co-operates. I am convinced that the nation's representatives will not withhold their consent to the Bill, nay, that the passing of the Act will be such a declaration of our strength and resolution that a great impression will be made on our enemies and we shall take a long step nearer peace.*

"In conclusion, my duty compels me to insist that our decisions must be speedy and that there is no time for long discussions. The details and regulations can be settled when the problem as a whole has been solved.

(Signed) "VON HINDENBURG."

8.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.

"II. No. 995 Secret.

"G.H.Q.,

"15/11/1916.

"TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR.

"The solution of the labour problem becomes more urgent from day to day. Deliveries of war material threaten to fall off instead of increasing. I must decline to take further responsibility for the future course of the war if the Homeland does not support me in securing that the available labour in the interior shall be employed exclusively for the war. Since I made my first suggestions months have been occupied

* The impression on the enemy was actually realized, but to those who could see the negotiations were an unpleasant revelation of the level of the political barometer at home. [The Author.]

mainly in *discussion*, while our enemies *have been acting*. Even the establishment of the War Bureau can only begin to show results when the patriotic Auxiliary Service Act gives it the legal powers which are indispensable to it. I therefore ask Your Excellency most earnestly to hasten the passing of the bill. I should be very glad to know when the Reichstag will be summoned and the bill passed.

(Signed) "VON HINDENBURG."

9.

"The First Quartermaster-General.

"23/11/1916.

"To DR. KAEMPF, PRESIDENT OF THE REICHSTAG.*

"YOUR EXCELLENCY,

"In the letter which I sent to Your Excellency on 25/10/1916, I said that the Ministry of War and the imperial authorities were faced with a solution of extremelv important problems, i.e., the establishment of the 'War Bureau' and the duty of placing the whole population at the service of war industries. The War Bureau has meanwhile started on its career. The draft of the Auxiliary Service Bill was approved by the Bundesrat on 21/11. In a few days' time the Reichstag will decide whether the entire nation shall be put at the service of the war which is to settle the fate of the Fatherland for weal or woe.

"At this moment I am impelled to lay before Your Excellency the considerations which have led us to have such a Bill presented to the Reichstag.

"The inherent superiority of the German troops is great. Their training and leading are better than those of the enemy, but they are not enough to master the great and growing power of our foes.

"We must place all our national resources at the service of our war industries; only thus shall we have any prospect of

* Sent with the consent of the Imperial Chancellor. [The Author.]

holding our own with the enemy. If we do not put forth the supreme effort we shall succumb to the dead weight of numbers.

"*Time is pressing!*

"Next year will bring the decision for which both we and our enemies are arming ourselves. The side which is the first to put all its national resources at the service of the war without regard for anything else will be the victor. Every day's delay in passing the Bill involves the risk of our being too late, and will certainly cost the lives of German soldiers, for living men have to be put into the gaps at the front which should have been filled by war machines.

"A failure in the matter of this Bill would mean certain defeat,*

"There is another aspect of the matter. The news of the imminent introduction of a bill for Patriotic Auxiliary Service has made a deep impression upon our enemies. We should intensify that impression very greatly if the passing of the Bill by the Reichstag took the form of an impressive declaration of the unanimous resolution of the entire German nation to stake everything for victory. The more emphatic and determined the form that resolution takes the nearer we shall be to peace. On the other hand, opposition and public discussion of the bill will diminish that impression.

"From the outset the Field-Marshal has anticipated a great effect at home and abroad from the acceptance of the Bill. That anticipation is the main reason why a Bill to be approved by the Reichstag was preferred to a decree of the Bundesrat —an alternative course which would have been open to us.

"We should be deceived in our idea of the moral and spiritual level of the German nation if all other considerations, some of them perhaps conflicting, did not take second place to such a goal.

(Signed) "LUDENDORFF."

* This prophecy was fulfilled, for the form in which the Bill was passed made it equivalent to a failure. [The Author.]

"Berlin,
"26/11/1916.

"I have received Your Excellency's kind letter of 23rd of the month and am very grateful to Your Excellency for it. The matter of the Draft Bill for Patriotic Auxiliary Service is taking (and indeed nothing else could be expected) a course which leaves me in no doubt that it will be passed by the Reichstag some time this week.

"The general debates in committee have shown that all parties, with the exception of the Social Democratic Labour community, agree with the fundamental principles of the Bill. The wishes expressed by the fractions are mainly concerned with two points—the co-operation of the Reichstag in the detailed regulations and the labour question. As far as I can see, the views of the Committee are so near to those of the Government that an understanding may be expected in the next few days. For that reason it has also been possible to fix the plenary sitting for Wednesday. The great majority of the House is in favour of an early date for the sitting.

"I therefore hope that our goal of an impressive introduction of this great measure will be reached. In that hope I am, etc.,

"Dr. Kaempf,
"President of the Reichstag."

10.

"Chief of the Military Cabinet.
"Kr. II. No. 290/3.

"Berlin, W. 66,
"14/3/1917.

"To Field-Marshal von Hindenburg.

"In pursuance of His Majesty's command I have the honour of sending Your Excellency the enclosed Memorandum.
(Signed) "Baron von Lyncker."

"The Ministry of War.
"No. 568/17 G.K.M.

"Berlin, W. 66.
"14/3/1917.

"Confidential.

"With reference to the telegram of the Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army, enclosed with the letter of the 10th inst., I have the honour of making the following communication to Your Excellency.

"The difficulties in the munition industries were known and assumed. They were due primarily to the transport crisis, which will be relieved when the milder weather comes. These difficulties were also responsible for the labour movement because the potato supply was hindered by the frost. It is not certain whether agitation and foreign money also helped in the strikes, which have hitherto been purely local. We have employed all our available labour to remove the supplies accumulated at the stations. The Deputy G. O's C. were instructed to form a police force of soldiers to assist the local police, who were everywhere too weak, at threatened points. We also sent out detectives to look out for agitators. I have asked the Imperial Chancellor to have the situation explained to the working classes by the trade union leaders. It has not been necessary to use force hitherto, and it will be avoided in future at the express wish of the G. O's C. and the industrials. I am sure that the trouble which has arisen in some places is mainly due to the food question.

"I may remark that the arms industry has been hardly affected, though the output of ammunition has. The supply of raw material to the powder factories was prejudiced, as also by the shortage of coal, owing to the transport difficulties. Notwithstanding all this our munition reserves are better than at the time before Verdun and the Battle of the Somme. The great increase of our artillery, however, and the attacks on several fronts at once will increase the demand for

ammunition. But whatever comes we shall hold out and devote ourselves wholeheartedly to overcoming the difficulties. May I ask Your Excellency to be good enough to bring this matter to the notice of His Majesty.

(Signed) "VON STEIN,
"War Minister."

"The Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 2635 Secret.

"G.H.Q.,
"27/3/1917.

"TO THE CHIEF OF THE MILITARY CABINET.

"With reference to the letter of the War Minister sent to me on 22/3 I am taking the liberty of stating, for Your Excellency's own information, that I do not share the opinion of the War Minister on some points.

"1. The difficulties in our munitions industries were not foreseen on the scale on which they actually materialized. If they had been they would have been avoided, at any rate partially. Counter-measures were taken much too late, and it was much more difficult for them to take effect owing to the cold weather.

"2. I still regard the labour question as a serious one, although I know that by far the great majority of German workmen will do their duty to the Monarchy and the Fatherland. Wise propaganda would produce great results so long as the food situation does not get worse. This propaganda, however, must be the business of the *authorities*. I consider it a mistake to leave and entrust the propaganda to the trades unions and a certain section of the Press. (See 'Vorwärts' of March 18 and 19.) It is nothing but setting a fox to mind the geese.

"I have never spoken of using force. On the other hand, I hope we shall never reach the stage of having to use it. The

food difficulties, I am afraid, are a favourable breeding ground for unrest among the labouring masses of the nation. We must not allow ourselves to be deceived as to the rate at which this unrest might develop evil forms.

"3. Our arms industry was and is inadequate. For instance, in September, 1916, our output of field guns was as high as that in February, and it is not enough. I am compelled to raise my voice against this shortage. The output of ammunition is far behind the figures promised and, as I have said repeatedly, is paralysing operations. It is true that at the moment we have greater reserves than we had before the Somme offensive began. These reserves, however, are not the fruits of good or increased output, but the result of the greatest economy by the armies, an economy which was imposed by me in very definite orders. Moreover, there is no doubt that this economy cost us lives, and that the training of the artillery suffered from it.* We must further remember that the shortage of ammunition for minor enterprises will increase, and that the requirements in a great battle will put all previous experience completely in the shade.

"That we shall 'hold out' I have never doubted. We must do so, however, with the minimum expenditure of human life, and, in order that we may attain that end, I still adhere to a munitions programme which can be continuously expanded, and a sound food and labour policy which alone can make the realization of this programme possible.

(Signed) "VON HINDENBURG."

* The Supreme Command had no more cruel duty than to cut down the demands of the army, time and time again. The soldier paid for the failures at home with his blood and his life. [The Author.]

II.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 64550.

"G.H.Q.,
"10/9/1917.

"To the Imperial Chancellor.

"As a result of the Conference at G.H.Q. with the Imperial Chancellor, the War Minister and the officers delegated by him, I send you the following conclusions which were reached on the question of drafts and the supply of labour:

"Our enemies are making desperate efforts to secure victory. They have at their disposal a vastly superior amount of human material, and this will be increased by the intervention of America, even though the capacity of the latter must not be over-estimated.

"The same thing is true of war material, especially ammunition. In this department we are struggling with the industry of the whole world. The power of the enemy's artillery is superior to our own.

"I do not doubt that the U-boat campaign will bring us relief, but the time at which our enemies will be weakened to a vital degree cannot be fixed with any certainty now. In any case it is certain that our enemies will make efforts to end the war in their own favour by a military decision before that time comes.

"Yet it will be still possible for us to hold our own successfully so long as:

"1. The supply of drafts for the army is put on a sound footing;

"2. Our munitions industry does everything that is possible;

"3. An unshakable resolution to continue the war until we can attain a peace which will secure our future animates everyone and holds firm in spite of the difficulties and privations which the winter will doubtless bring.

"*As regards* 1: The supply of drafts to the Field Army is at present inadequate, and in particular there is a shortage of trained reserves for all arms, which is a source of anxiety. The question of reserves is paralysing our military operations to a considerable extent even now.

"The prospects for next year in this matter of drafts will be even more serious if we do not succeed in releasing exempted men in large numbers. (See under II. below.)

"If we do not succeed in obtaining the drafts required for the army the issue of the war will be in jeopardy.

"*As regards* 2: Even with regard to munition industries a satisfactory state of affairs has not been reached. The so-called Hindenburg Programme, which in itself only met the most urgent necessities, has not materialized even yet, although its scope has twice been cut down.

"There is a considerable shortage at the moment of the most important war material of all kinds. In any case our war industries must not be cut down still further. On the contrary, we must adhere, as a minimum, to the programme agreed upon with the Ministry of War. Any cutting down would not only cost many lives, but, like the deficiency in drafts, place the issue of the war in doubt. The solution of this problem is all the more complicated as (under Section II. below) exempted workmen will have to be called up for the army.

"*As regards* 3: The spirit of the civil population and its determination to win seem to have improved somewhat. There are, however, disintegrating influences in the shape of radical agitators, the international Press, and selfish or evilly minded politicians who are pursuing their own particular aims. The danger is not great at the moment, but it is continually on the increase and will immediately become formidable when difficulties arise, for instance with regard to the food supply. We must therefore co-operate to take counter-measures against it. Appropriate measures have already been taken in the case of the army. At home the *moral* of the working classes must

be raised, with a view to increasing their willingness to work and their output.

"If we are to remedy the evils referred to in para. 1 to 3 above, it is necessary to get hold of and employ all available males, either as recruits for the army or for labour.

"The following measures might serve that purpose:

"I. *Improvements in the Auxiliary Service Law.* Hitherto this has failed in the most important points, and there are so many gaps that in practice any one with any wits can get out of the compulsory labour provided for in Clause I. On the other hand, there is no doubt that it has promoted agitation and insubordination. We might even consider repealing the Act and depending exclusively on the State of Siege Act* and the War Work Act. It is for the Government to decide whether such a step would be useful from the point of view of domestic politics. It seems to me certain, however, that a mere indication that the Bundesrat might see itself compelled to repeal the Act would force the parties of the Left to behave, as in practice the Act has only presented the working classes with large rights instead of imposing obligations upon them, as was the intention of Clause I.

"The following points might be considered as improvements:

"1. Larger powers for the Establishment Committees. (Section IV.)

"2. Shortening the period allowed for finding work. (Section VII.)

"3. Cancellation of the fourteen-day interval. (Section IX.)

"4. Permission to leave employment only where the man goes to the same kind of employment, and to be refused altogether in particular branches of war industry. (Section IX.)

"5. Punishment of the practice of evading the

* This corresponds in some respects to our Defence of the Realm Regulations. [Tr.

liability to work through the Establishment Committees, etc. (some short and simple form of prosecution).

"6. Better control over all persons liable to auxiliary service. (Lists to be sent from one labour authority to the other via the War Bureau. Duty of employers to report this.)

"7. Extension of the liability to auxiliary service to persons of fifteen years of age.

"II. *A change in the position of exempted men.* The present equality of exempted men with workers called up for auxiliary service is unjustifiable.

"We must see that the exemption of every man applies to one definite occupation, and he must not be allowed to change his place of work. Only the competent authority at the War Bureau must be empowered to allow transfers to other places of work. Rejected men who do not perform their duties must be called to the colours.

"III. *Increasing individual output.* In places the output of the workman, particularly exempted men, has dropped by thirty or forty per cent.* This is not a question of food. It is due to passive resistance and, in the case of the exempted men, the desire to make work last longer so that calling-up can be avoided. In addition to the measures outlined in I. and II. above, it is necessary to enlighten working men as to their duties to the State and their fighting brothers. At the same time the strongest steps must be taken against unscrupulous agitators.

"IV. *Préparation must be made to obtain from industry by next spring at the latest the largest possible number of men fit for field service for the army.* An essential means to this end would be a *prompt* notice to all factories to state how many men they will be able to release in the spring; otherwise they will not be able to train substitutes. Another essential step is

* I was frequently told that that of the women had dropped very much less and that in many cases the output of women was even higher than of men. [The Author.]

the closing-down of works, in spite of all the serious objections. It is well known that the small establishments are not on a paying basis, having regard to the employment of labour and the consumption of coal. They must therefore disappear.

"Finally, businesses and works which are unimportant for war purposes must be closed or restricted to the essential minimum. In this category are cinemas, theatres, restaurants, music halls, modistes, warehouses, hairdressers, etc.

"V. *Extension of the period of liability to service.* This may become necessary, in addition to modifications in the Auxiliary Service Law. The older men fit for field and garrison service will in that way be used to release all young men fit for field service who are now on the lines of communication. Assuming that the conditions of exemption will be changed, it will become much easier to call up these classes for work.

"It is not my business to bring forward other suggestions as to what further changes should be made in practice, in view of the conclusions of the conferences referred to above. But my duty compels me to insist that the situation must become critical if we do not take vigorous and immediate action. If we act along the lines indicated, the army will bring the war to a successful conclusion. An immense responsibility thus rests on all the authorities concerned with the questions discussed above. In particular, the Reichstag, the trade unions, etc., must be left in no doubt that the heaviest burden of guilt will rest upon *them* if there is any procrastination or opposition.

"After months have been spent to no purpose I need hardly say that speedy action is required.

(Signed) "VON HINDENBURG."

12.

Telegram of 25/9/1917.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 65317.

"To all Army Groups.

"(Compare II. 50684 of 21/3/17.)

"1. Our situation with regard to drafts does not allow us to agree to exemptions in the field army on the same scale as hitherto. Requests for the release for work in war industries at home of officers, N.C.O.'s and men of the field army, fit for field service, who were born in or after 1876 will, therefore, be granted only in quite exceptional cases, i.e., in cases where refusal would be a danger to our war industries, and no substitute could be found for the man concerned at home. As a general rule, these releases will be confined to principal foremen, individual agricultural and industrial experts, and similar cases in which the working of the particular business in question is dependent upon the release of the particular man.

"Application for release from the lines of communication of officers, N.C.O.'s and men fit for garrison service and the exchange of soldiers, born in and after 1875, which is now in progress, will not be affected by the above order.

"2. Please regard these limited claims for release favourably if service interests are not prejudiced.

"3. In future, with a view to diminishing the volume of correspondence, the requests for release will be sent straight to the unit. If objections are raised to the release, the unit will report on the matter through official channels to the military authority from which the request for release proceeded.

"4. The skilled workers who have been asked for hitherto under the code word 'coal' are to be sent back home without reference to the orders above.

(Signed) "P. p. Ludendorff."

13.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 67455.
"Reference Staff P 3, No. 16017 Secret, K.
"G.H.Q.,
"15/10/1917.

"To the War Bureau.

"Now that all the widely-heralded labour representatives have been received at G.H.Q. I send you the following observations on the impression they made on me and the views and wishes they put forward.

"1. *General Impressions.*

"All the representatives were obviously animated by the excellent intention of doing what they could to secure that the labour world should remain peaceful and do its duty. Moreover, they were so far certain of their people that they considered strikes and unrest on a considerable scale need not be feared so long as unforeseen circumstances did not arise.

"In some quarters there was a certain amount of bitterness against agriculture on account of the high prices of food. Sympathy with other circles of the civil population, many of whom are suffering considerably more than the working classes, was small. I am certain that a broad-minded explanation would go a long way to reduce this class-feeling.

"2. *Special Requests.*

"(*a*) The representatives of the free and Christian trades unions emphasize the fact that the relations between employers (especially in the great industries) and trades unions were not very friendly. For instance, in many places there were still no workmen's or employees' committees, and the employers blankly refused to discuss the question of wages and so on, in spite of the large profits they themselves were making. A

wish was expressed that representatives of employers and labour should meet for joint conferences.

"I myself have previously put forward that view to the War Bureau, and take the liberty of drawing attention to it once more. Whether the suggestion of such conferences or the invitations would best be issued by the War Bureau or the Imperial Economic Office I will not discuss. But the matter seems to me urgent, even from the point of view of transitional and peace conditions.

"(*b*) The Christian trades unions further propose that 'Joint Economic Committees' of employers and employees should be set up to assist the acting G. O's C. of the Corps Districts. This proposal also seems to me feasible. They might prove useful in settling questions relating to exempted men (fixing the wages of exempted men in case of dispute, their transfer and calling up).

"(*c*) There were no objections to strong control of exempted men in itself, but there was a general fear that these men would, so to speak, be delivered over to the tender mercies of their employers, and more particularly that they will be at a disadvantage in the matter of wages, and will be simply sent into the army by their employers if they make themselves disagreeable to them. In my opinion this objection is not to be lightly dismissed. On the other hand, as the employers do not understand, so far as is known, that questions of wages for instance are decided by the authorities at the War Bureau, perhaps the Committees under (*b*) above might have a good effect in this matter.

"The Christian trades unions said that exemptions sometimes lead to favouritism. That is true, but I think it would be very hard to find a remedy.

"(*d*) Representatives of the labour unions for technical industries mentioned that the question of the salaries of employees was a burning one. Of course they did not strike. But as regards pay many of them were actually now a long

way behind working men. Further, in spite of the very heavy work which many of them performed, they had no extra rations. The complaints seemed to me quite justified. Perhaps the War Bureau authorities could lend a helping hand here by taking the matter up with the employers.

"(*e*) The representatives of the Christian trades unions told us that in Government institutions men fit for garrison service or labour (and disabled men as well) were employed as workmen, but only received military pay, while men called up under the Auxiliary Service Law and other workmen drew high pay for the same work. I do not know how far that is true. It is, however, certain that there is a great and unjustifiable disparity between the earnings of men liable to service and those not so liable, and a remedy for this anomaly is desirable.

"(*f*) The representative of the free trades unions complained that their activities were frequently hindered by the acting G. O's C., that the latter were under the thumb of the industrials, and that the regulations and decrees of the Ministry of War or Corps Districts on the question of public meetings, strikes and so forth, were both irritating and harmful. The result was that the spirit of the workers was not good. From detailed cases given me, I think I must assume that there have been many mistakes, and that it is important to avoid them. It might be possible, perhaps, to call greater attention to the difference between the peaceful and reliable elements and those unruly elements which deserve short shrift. Some control of the powers of the G. O's C. is perhaps the right course. It is obvious, of course, that this does not mean weakness on our part. I have told the labour representatives here repeatedly that I regard strikes as unjustifiable in *any* circumstances, and that strikers should be considered as traitors to their country.

"(*g*) The Auxiliary Service Law was only lightly touched on here. Generally speaking, it was realized that it is

necessary to fill in the gaps and that this step will not hit the genuine workman at all, but only the slackers from other circles. In my opinion it is clear that these changes in the Auxiliary Service Act are necessary, and I can only beg that they be put into effect by legal channels.

"(*b*) The representatives of the national professional unions alleged that the late Government had attached too much importance to the Social Democratic trades unions and therefore treated them too well, while their own unions had been politically left out in the cold.

"I must say that I myself have not understood hitherto why associations that are absolutely reliable, such as the Yellows, are deliberately slighted. In my opinion they have the same absolute right as the Social Democratic trades unions to be heard at arbitration committees, as well as by the authorities (War Bureau, War Food Office, Economic Office, etc.). I must therefore ask that this question, which I regard as very serious, shall be looked into. For political reasons it seems to me improper that the authorities should simply ignore people who are nationally-minded and know something about economics simply because they are reliable and the Government is sure of them. In various quarters a complaint was made that many authorities, particularly military authorities, had no idea of economizing labour. For example, many authorities were satisfied with a working day of four or five hours. From private information I have received I believe this is true of the depot battalions, for instance, but higher authorities are equally guilty. I think it will be desirable to look into the matter.

"I have sent a copy of this letter to the Imperial Chancellor, the Minister of the Interior, the Imperial Economic Office and the War Minister.

(Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

14.*

"Ministry of War.
"No. 7451, 17 g A I.

"Berlin, W. 66,
"8/12/1917."

"SECRET.

"In pronouncing sentence on 19/10/1917 (C 85, 1916 X 1482, 1917) in the prosecution of the writer Berta Thalheimer for attempted treason in promoting strikes prejudicial to the conduct of the war, the Imperial Courts used the following language:

"'It is not true, as the prisoner suggests, that the only purpose of the pamphlets was to create opinion in favour of a particular view. The intention of the prisoner was, so far as it was in her power, to bring about the end of the war by the withholding of their labour by the working masses in the industries devoted to the production of war material. The "prejudice" within the meaning of Section 89 St. G B, does not require any public incitement to a *definite* cessation of work. All that is necessary is any action which prejudices the armed forces of Germany, even indirectly.

"'There was no question of a mere so-called "demonstration strike" in this case. The intention of the strikers was a general strike for the purpose of preventing the further prosecution of

* The letter is based on the standpoint that striking is treason. It therefore adopts the same ground as that taken in the decree issued by the Minister of Railways, Oeser, on August 9, 1919, to the railway servants: "This strike propaganda . . . is a crime against the German people, particularly at the present moment. . . .

"I cannot allow any doubt to exist . . . that if these plans and activities of the strike organization are continued, legal action will be taken against the officials responsible. . . . Our Fatherland, shattered as it is, and bleeding from a thousand wounds, needs for its recovery an even higher degree of loyalty from the State officials than before the disastrous war. He who appreciates that has alone realized what social service means, for social service does not mean putting one's own interests first, but rather devoting oneself to the common welfare." (Signed) "Oeser."

The need of the Fatherland was just as great in the war. Our own efforts were only directed to securing that every man devoted himself to the common good.

Although those efforts were then stigmatized as an attack on the holy spirit of social democracy, the latter now finds itself compelled to adopt the same view *after* it has brought our world to ruin. [The Author.]

the war. That was no secret to the accused. It is useless for her to contend that the strike is a weapon of the working classes which is secured to them by law, the question of the form in which it is declared or carried out in individual cases being immaterial. Section 89 G B applies for the duration of the war. As the Senate has laid down in previous cases, it imposes on every German a vital obligation to do nothing which is likely to assist an enemy power or prejudice the military efforts of the German Empire or its allies. All individual rights are limited by this civil duty. There can be no right to treason. The accused herself realized this, as appears clearly from the secrecy of her proceedings.'

(Signed) "P. p. VON WRISBERG."

15.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.

"II. No. 74120 op.

"G.H.Q.,

"26/12/1917.

"TO THE WAR MINISTER.

"The serious transport situation has led to considerable reductions of output in the munitions industry, coal mines, etc. In consequence, at the present time many thousands of workmen are involuntarily either completely idle or only working a few days in the week. Apart from the fact that these unoccupied workmen are, as a result of their reduced earnings, a particularly easy prey to agitation, and so constitute a certain danger, the situation means that a large part of the country's labour resources are lying fallow while at the front the dearth of labour is increasing.

"I have asked the Imperial Chancellor to do all in his power to improve the transport situation. Should we not succeed, at least the free labour resources at home should be made available for the army as an additional reserve for both

the fighting and labour units. It is especially important that there should be a more rapid release of the so-called exempted men. I request you to take the preparations in hand so that these measures may be begun on the 10th January at the latest, as then it will be possible to see whether the home departments are able to cope with the transport crisis or not.

(Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

16.*

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.

"G.H.Q.,

"17/2/1918.

"TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR.

"Your Excellency has referred to the conferences presided over by His Majesty in Homburg on the possibility of another strike. I may therefore take the liberty of summing up the effect of the strike on the conduct of the war.

"It consists in keeping at home a number of troops and reserves of which I have, and probably shall continue to have, urgent need at the front. Moreover, the whole munitions industry will in certain circumstances be seriously involved. It is true that the last strike did not do much harm in this direction. Its lack of success was due, however, apart from the firm, determined attitude of the Government and the military authorities, to the inadequate organization and lack of persistence of the workers, only a small section of whom took part. There is no doubt, however, that the agitation will develop. Bolshevist ideas are especially infectious among

* This letter was written in connection with the January strike which failed. The Government's attitude towards this strike had at first been hesitating. The verbal statement by a representative of G.H.Q. "that G.H.Q. would be prepared to face the resulting shortage of munitions, as this would be less harmful than the consequences of any yielding to the demands of the strikers," caused the Government to take a strong line towards the strikers. It is significant that this "unexpected" firmness of the Government immediately brought about the collapse of the strike. [The Author.]

the youthful elements (among quiet, intelligent workmen the opposite is the case). Probably, too, enemy agents and enemy money are working for a revolution. It is therefore questionable whether the new strike will be so easily dealt with. Moreover, the circumstances have changed considerably, for, firstly, in the spring the need for all kinds of munitions always increases and, secondly, the output of the munitions industry is no longer influenced by the supply of coal, but by the amount of labour.

"Your Excellency will permit me to express my views as to the possible and necessary measures to be taken to prevent a strike.

"1. It seems to me particularly important that as soon as possible it should be stated quite clearly and authoritatively that striking during the war will be regarded as treason, as well as the necessary corollary that the promotion of strikes, according to § 139 of the penal code, will be punishable by law.

"This, too, in my opinion, should be stated publicly. On this basis the trades union leaders and Social Democratic deputies could be challenged to give a clear answer as to whether they unconditionally condemn strikes during the war or not. They will be forced to show their colours. If they condemn the strike unconditionally they can be called upon to oppose it with all their might. If it breaks out in spite of them it would at any rate expose their helplessness, whereas at present they are always boasting of their power and influence. If they refuse to condemn the strike they will be regarded as traitors to their country, and the publication of this fact in the Press and Parliament will, in my opinion, not only undermine their authority but will also enlighten the great majority of the people on the anarchical tendencies of radical Social Democracy. How far Your Excellency considers this course practicable I leave to Your Excellency's judgment.

"2. The representatives of the League for Economic Peace whom I received said that, in addition to the national workers'

unions, there are many others, e.g., the Hirsh-Dunkersh unions, the Christian trades unions and the Poles, which, while recognizing the strike as a legitimate weapon, have renounced its use during war-time and acted accordingly. These associations of workers together far outnumber the Social Democratic trades unions prepared to use the strike weapon. I should prefer Your Excellency to decide whether it is possible to form a combination of these associations on the basis of the unconditional condemnation of strikes during the war. Should this appear impossible, I think the attempt might be made at least to unite the workers' organizations which favour economic peace and to extend to them the same recognition as is given to the free trades unions. I consider it a serious injustice that the free, i.e., the Social Democratic, associations should be represented on government departments, arbitration committees, etc., but not the other workers (those who favour economic peace and those who are not organized), especially as the latter far outnumber the organized Social Democratic workers.

"3. It seems to me of the greatest importance that men willing to work during a strike should be protected against terrorism on the part of the strikers. All essential measures should be taken.* As military measures are necessarily involved, I have communicated direct with the War Minister on this subject.

"From what I have said above Your Excellency will see that I do not under-estimate the importance of strikes, and consider it essential that they should be prevented. To avoid any possibility of being misunderstood, I should, however, like to add that I am absolutely opposed to yielding in any way whatever to the demands, either political or economic, of the strikers. I am as firmly convinced as ever that only by strength and firmness will it be possible to prevent strikes for any length

* Instead of this the so-called strike-clause—which protected the men willing to work—was repealed! [The Author.]

of time and to avert those evil consequences to which I have referred.

"I think I ought to say that I regard the consequences of any weakness, even though it should avert the strike for the moment, as much more serious than the drop in the output of the munitions industry and other evils which might ensue if a rejection of all the strikers' demands led to the outbreak of a strike on a large scale.

(Signed) "VON HINDENBURG."

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 6626 sec. op.

"G.H.Q.,
"18/2/18.

"TO THE WAR MINISTER.

"I have first to thank your Excellency for forwarding the copy of the report submitted to His Majesty the Emperor on the subject of strikes 5/2/1918, No. 930/18 sec. A 1.

"I am in entire agreement with Your Excellency's view that further strikes are in prospect and may easily break out in places. In spite of all my objections, in agreement with Your Excellency's representatives I stated at the conference the day before yesterday that troops and drafts would be left in Germany. In the case of future strikes, we shall not always be able to reckon on preventing injury to the munitions industry, as we have succeeded in doing this time. In view of the probable enormously increased demand for munitions of all kinds in the immediate future, a strike might be exceptionally serious. Finally, a strike and the consequent unrest at home have in any circumstances an unfavourable effect on the *moral* of the army at the front, encourage the enemy, and so lead to a prolongation of the war. These weighty military considerations also prompted the letter to the Imperial

Chancellor, of which a copy is enclosed.* I request that this letter should be treated as confidential.

"How necessary it is to clear up the situation, and to employ every means to avoid strikes, is emphasized by the communication from the Ministry of War of 15/2, No. 1367/18 sec. A 1.

"Now that the Supreme Court has unreservedly declared, in the judgment of 19/10/1917 (War Ministry of 8/12/1917, No. 7451/17 sec. A [*No.* 14]) that striking in war time is to be regarded as treason, it remains to act on this judgment, particularly with regard to treating strike-agitation and complicity in pending strikes as penal offences.

"Then it must be possible promptly to arrest all agitators and persons inciting to strike. That such measures would in certain circumstances scotch the strike is proved by the example of District Corps H.Q. VII, where great results have been attained in this way. Moreover, there can be no further objection to calling up exempted workers on strike, for, even though labour was promised that men would not be called up again for social or political reasons, this privilege can in no way be extended to traitors.

"The placing of industry under military control, mentioned in Your Excellency's report, has had a beneficial effect, as I have been assured by Admiral von Mann among others. Of course militarization is not an immediate remedy, but it is particularly effective in so far as it makes the workers realize that there is a superior authority which has power to control them and ensures effective protection to those willing to work, who always constitute an overwhelming majority.

"It does not seem to me quite certain that the courts-martial always set the right standard and consider the influence exerted by their judgments. Should the number of officers of the Judge-Advocate-General's Department as negotiators and prosecutors be insufficient, I should be ready

* Letter to the Imperial Chancellor of 17/2/1918. [The Author.]

to provide Your Excellency with others from the Field Army.

"I am particularly glad to hear that Your Excellency has taken strong steps to prevent the terrorization of those willing to work.

"In connection with the strike question, I should like to refer briefly to the wage question. According to a report received from the Mines Association, it was stated by the arbitration committee in Dortmund during the strike that a further increase in wages should be conceded by the mining companies in February.

"I assume that this report will be laid before Your Excellency, but I should like to emphasize its importance.

"I regard the action of this arbitration committee as extremely dangerous. If wages are to be raised in one place it is to be expected* that the struggle for increased wages will break out again along the whole line. There is, however, no reason for an increase of wages. On the contrary, as I have repeatedly and emphatically pointed out, the present high wages must be gradually reduced. How far it is possible to enlighten the arbitration committee through the District Corps H.Q. I must leave it to Your Excellency to decide. In view of the extraordinary importance of this matter, I wish to draw Your Excellency's attention to it.

(Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

* As actually happened. This method of gaining the support of the masses by increasing wages was adopted very often after the Revolution of 9th November, 1918. In spite of this, or rather by this means, greed and idleness became rampant. What did the ruin of our economic life matter to the agitators? They attained their object: satisfaction of their selfish desires.

17.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II./Ic. No. 82986 op.

"G.H.Q.,
"11/4/1918.

"To the War Ministry.

"From the consultation of my representative with the Chief of the War Bureau I gather the following:

"The position with regard to reserves is at present unsatisfactory. The supply of reserves from home for the field army is by a long way inadequate to replace the losses. This position must be improved if the field army is to fulfil the heavy tasks with which it is faced.

"In the *field army* itself the necessary steps have already been taken to secure men fit for active service for employment at the front. Any very noteworthy result can no longer be expected. Further, I have ordered that men fit for service on the Western Front should be withdrawn from the troops in formations left behind in Rumania until their field strength sinks to about 25 per cent. A further reduction of the troops under the Commander-in-Chief in the East is not possible in view of the immense areas to be guarded there. As regards the home country, in my opinion strong measures must be taken:

"1. To substitute female for male labour in all occupations, on a materially larger scale than hitherto.

"2. To release all labour in war industries which will become superfluous or could not be fully employed if an extreme effort were made. I am convinced that in many quarters there is still a large amount of labour, not indispensable, which is retained in various branches of industry for reasons which can no longer be approved. A commission of inquiry now, and permanent supervision of the employers seem to me necessary.

"3. To restrict all production which is not absolutely

necessary. A beginning has already been made by the limitation of the output of war material ordered by the Ministry of War at my suggestion.

"But we shall have to go a long way further in this direction. We must, of course, realize that to cut down war industries further will make itself felt seriously, both at home and in the army. But this disadvantage must be borne as long as we are certain of getting the essential minimum.

"Such a measure requires careful preparation in order that the reduction of output may be gradual and the permissible limit not exceeded.

"As a nucleus for these preparations (in addition to current hospital returns and the 30,000 men to be released from war industries from April 1 to June 30), a further 50,000 men will be transferred from war industries for active service in the army (particularly infantry and foot artillery).

"In cutting down the munition industry we must take care that no restrictions should be imposed on the following industries:

"I. *War Materials:* Coal, steel, especially hard steel, and the most important raw materials and constituents, especially for powder and explosives. Lastly, manures.

"II. *Finished products:* (1) U-boats, (2) rails and shell cases, (3) powder and ammunition, (4) aeroplanes, (5) locomotives and motor lorries of all kinds.

"In the case of coal there must be an increase of production, and therefore of the labour employed, as otherwise we shall find ourselves faced with the same serious dislocation of our economic life as we suffered last winter. For that reason I approve the proposals put forward by the Imperial Coal Controller.

"I should be grateful if, with a view to accelerating consideration of the points referred to above, a conference could be called at which the highest authorities concerned could come to complete agreement about the scale, time and nature of these measures. In my opinion it would also be advisable to

fix a time for a conference, to which officials of the War Bureau or representatives of the Corps Districts and individual representatives of the great industrial groups (the steel association, the coal syndicate, the association of chemical manufacturers) should be summoned, and at which the reasons for the measures should be made clear. If they are understood there will be less difficulty in carrying them out.

(Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

"Ref. II./I. a, No. 82986 of 11/4/1918.

"[Telegram.]

"TO THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE FIELD ARMY.

"Preparations are already in progress here to obtain further recruits for the army by cutting down all production which is not absolutely necessary, vigorously combing out exempted men from war industries and combing out the garrison troops. A conference is fixed for April 25 with all the supply authorities. Impossible to fix an earlier date because essential to examine the proposals thoroughly. April 27 is proposed for conference with representatives mentioned. It can be realized even now that your demands are not feasible, from the purely numerical point of view, without completely paralysing war industries; all the more so in view of the fact that you say coal mining and certain munitions industries must not be cut down. On the other hand, your letter contains no reference to agriculture; the motor industry, railways and railway workshops and the civil service are not mentioned. Arrangements have been made for a conference with acting G. O's C. and representatives of the War Bureau. The War Bureau thinks that at present it should reject the proposal for a conference with representatives of industrial groups. The War Bureau expects increased employment of prisoners of war and the fullest possible use of men on the L. of C.

"War Bureau.

"No. S. N. I, 1379/4 Secret."

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.

"G.H.Q.,

"5/5/1918.

"To the War Bureau.

"After discussing matters with the representatives whom I sent to the conference of April 28 and 29* I am prepared to agree to the changes in the programme of the Arms and Ammunition (Output) Department which were there decided upon. It was agreed that:

"1. The output of guns for field artillery to be reduced to 700.

"2. That of the 08/15 machine-guns should be fixed at 7,000 until further notice (October).

"3. The manufacture of revolvers should be reduced as the War Department and War Bureau think fit.

"In conclusion I must remark that, even with the greatest economy at the front, our requirements in ammunition in all probability will increase rather than decrease. Any falling-off in demands will not be before November. As the existence of adequate supplies of ammunition has a most vital effect on the operations, the output of ammunition is unquestionably the most important problem of our entire munitions industry. I gratefully recognize what amazing feats have been performed in the past, and I am convinced that in the future also the War Bureau will do everything possible in this direction. At the same time I must not fail to point out the vital importance of an adequate supply of munitions once more.

(Signed) "P. p. Ludendorff."

* Thank to the energy and intelligence of the Directors of the Recruiting and Labour Departments, the Munitions and Raw Materials Departments, the conference had speedily led to agreement with representatives of Main Headquarters. The prospect for the whole affair therefore looked much more promising. [The Author.]

18.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 87893.

"G.H.Q.,
"4/6/1918.

"To the Imperial Chancellor.

"May I draw Your Excellency's attention in particular to certain points of the 'Summary of the monthly reports of the acting G. O's C. of the Corps Districts' of 3/5/1918.*

"1. 'The state of feeling among industrial workers is affected less by food difficulties than the price of clothing, which has reached enormous heights. Thus, compared with 1913, suits and shirts have increased in price nearly 700 per cent., boots nearly 300 per cent.'

"Everyone knows that there is a shortage of these things. But the shortage neither explains nor justifies these colossal increases in price, which deliberately exceed all maximum prices. There is no need to say that these prices are quite beyond the means of the middle classes and persons in receipt of fixed incomes.

"2. 'In some places wages are so high that there is no longer any inducement to work. On the contrary, disinclination to work, love of pleasure and high living are on the increase. Workmen often lounge about all day.' From what reliable employers tell me the individual output of the male workmen in some places has fallen to 60 per cent. of the normal. That is an intolerable state of affairs in view of the general shortage of labour. There is certainly some evidence of system in this, inasmuch as reduced output per man is likely to prevent the calling-up for the army of men fit for military service. I consider that the most strenuous measures should be taken

* Received through the Ministry of War. [The Author.]

against these proceedings, which are a great menace to the State.

"3. 'The decay of morals, especially in the case of the young, is a cause for serious anxiety.'

"Here again, high wages, in addition to too much personal freedom, are responsible. I think that very serious consideration should be devoted to this question also.

(Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

19.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 8771 Secret.

"G.H.Q.,
"18/6/1918.

"TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR.

"Your Excellency is aware that the recruiting position is serious. The men available in the depots at home are totally inadequate to fill the gaps in the field army, and this although we have already made very large calls on the youngest classes. With a view to avoiding disastrous consequences I made up my mind some time back to reduce the establishment of the L. of C. troops and technical formations to the limits of bare necessity, for the benefit of the infantry, and in agreement with the Ministry of War we have cut down the output of various natures of war material very considerably in order to obtain recruits. It is impossible to go further in that direction. We shall have to adopt other measures to obtain the necessary recruits, a matter which becomes more and more urgent with the progressive development of the operations.

"The personal output of the individual worker in munition industries is continually sinking. The food situation and the increasing number of children and women employed are only

a partial explanation of this phenomenon. There have been other reasons of at least equal importance. The wages are so high that necessity no longer compels men to work or incites them to increase their output. Munition workers of both sexes are no longer concerned to increase their daily wages by a high daily output. The factory discipline is getting worse, and the evil practice of taking self-chosen holidays is gaining ground. The employers are helpless against these proceedings, for if individual works managers took action it would only mean that the workman would go off to some other industry and the employer would be unable to get someone else. Further, there can be no doubt that a large number of labour leaders and their followers are endeavouring—of course not openly—to restrict individual output with a view to obstructing the release of men for service in the army and thus diminishing their influence on the masses at home. The working classes themselves are doing much the same sort of thing, from a false sense of *camaraderie*. The behaviour of the trades unions, which seem so patriotic superficially, must not blind us or prevent us from looking below the surface.

"There is another reason for the diminution of output in munition industries: certain branches of munition industries do not offer labour such high wages or easy conditions as others. Like the motor industry, for example, they are suffering from lack of labour, as under war conditions the demand is always greater than the supply.

"Our business is to change this situation, *lay hands on all labour for the common service, raise individual output once more and thereby release men for the army.*

"Our position with regard to this matter is not unlike that of the autumn of 1916, when military events (the Battle of the Somme, Brussiloff's offensive and Rumania's intervention in the war) required an extension of our munitions programme and at the same time imposed demands on the country for drafts and new formations which could no longer be met

from ordinary sources. At that time I proposed to the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, that liability to military service should be extended to all men from 15 up to 60, and that a liability to auxiliary service should be introduced for women. To my regret Your Excellency's predecessor in office rejected this proposal. In its place came the Auxiliary Service Law, which has undoubtedly not fulfilled our expectations of it. In spite of all the efforts of the Ministry of War and the War Bureau to remedy the worst defects of this Act, it has not enabled us really to get hold of all male labour or to increase individual output to the highest possible standard. I am now compelled to return to my former proposal to extend the liability to service. The principle of compulsion embodied in this measure will give us the following results:

"1. *An effective control* over all labour, i.e., their place of work and the best use which can be made of them. At the same time the introduction of obligatory auxiliary service for women would give us better control over female labour and the methods of its employment.

"2. Individual output will be increased because we shall be able either to punish the lazy employee or transfer him to some other service.

"3. Free movement will be prevented because the workman will be legally tied to his place of work.

"Such measures as these alone will put us in a position to get large numbers of men fit for active service from war industries and give them to the army which needs them so urgently.

"I fully realize that such an extension of liability to military service and auxiliary service will have far-reaching consequences for our entire war industries. It is not possible to leave the regulation of wages to the employers when the employees are tied down to definite jobs and their output is

kept up by *official* measures. Rather will it be necessary to deal with the wages question, and therefore, as a matter of logic, the profits of the employers, by State regulations. No doubt in the long run this would mean, to a certain extent, militarization of the munitions industry, but this is also desirable on the ground that many industries are already beginning to think of peace conditions, and this cannot be tolerated in the interests of war work (neglect of invention, manufacture of articles unimportant in war). In my opinion the example of foreign States shows that the measures proposed are possible and can be successfully introduced. I need not go into details at the moment.

"In this connection may I be allowed to say that my proposals will also give us our greatest chance of effectively tackling the war profits problem, bringing about a reduction in the price of articles of daily necessity, and on that ground reducing wages in the munitions industries to a level which bears a proper relation to the cost of living of the different classes of the nation. It would thus have an extraordinary influence on our Imperial finance.

"May I ask Your Excellency to give my proposals very serious consideration, and when Your Excellency comes to Spa convene a conference on this matter between Your Excellency, the Imperial authorities concerned (the War Minister, with the Director of the War Bureau, the Secretaries of State for the Interior, the Imperial Ministry of Economics and the Treasury) and myself.

"May I leave it to Your Excellency to communicate the contents of my letter to the authorities mentioned. I think it is advisable that, in view of the great importance of my proposals, it should not come to their knowledge without a hint as to Your Excellency's attitude.

(Signed) "VON HINDENBURG."

CONFERENCE

on the subject of the letter of 18/6/1918 from the Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army referring to the question of drafts.

Present: The Imperial Chancellor, Count von Hertling, Their Excellencies von Payer, Wallraf, Baron von Stein, Count von Roedern, von Stein (Minister of War), General Scheüch, Colonel von Winterfeldt, Lieutenant-Colonel Bauer, Count Limburg-Stirum, Geheimer Regierungrat von Schlieben.

The Imperial Chancellor: We have to settle some very important questions relating to drafts for the army, labour output, the extension of compulsory auxiliary service, etc., questions of a very important political, economic and social nature. These will require the most serious examination.

The War Minister would support the proposals of the Supreme Command if he expected even the smallest result from them. That was not the case. In the previous year 100,000 men had been taken from the lines of communication. The L. of C. had now been thoroughly combed out. The men up to 60 who would now be made liable to military service were the only men who were keeping the nation going in respect of industry, agriculture and family life. If these men were called up there would be a collapse. Besides, what could be done with such men? They could not be sent to the front. They must be left where they were. To call them up would mean that their present activities would cease for many months. He could anticipate no gain, but rather much loss from these proposals. We should not get even 100,000 men in this way.*

Count Roedern looked at the matter from a business point of

* The result of the War Minister's opposition was that all the other departments came forward with objections. Any positive result was thus impossible. [The Author.]

view, which was not without importance, and asked whether the Supreme Command desired to clothe their proposals in legal forms straight away. The Reichstag was just being prorogued for three months, and that course had been urgently desired, even by the Supreme Command itself. If this new step was to be taken it must be taken legally. That would require very thorough preliminary work in the department. The Reichstag would thus have to be summoned a fortnight or three weeks later. From the purely business point of view we must look at the matter from the angle that very important questions were to be discussed by the Supreme Command at Spa at the end of July, and the preliminary work upon them would occupy the next few months, so that they could not be presented to the Reichstag before the autumn. Turning to the substance of the proposal, he could not say how far men could still be obtained for the army. He therefore confined himself to the question of economies. This was not yet ripe for discussion, but the possibility could not be dismissed out of hand. If the war lasted into the autumn it was questionable whether we could continue our present methods of war finance, which on the one side were leading us to complete bankruptcy, and on the other to the accumulation of enormous fortunes by the different classes. It was doubtful whether it would be possible to take another financial course, such as England had adopted. These questions were so important that it would take several months to examine them carefully.

Von Payer also had an impression that the proposals would have no success, even if they were put in force at once. The latter course, however, was impossible, for the reasons given by Count Roedern. The Reichstag was in such a state of nerves that it must shortly be prorogued for a few months. There would be the greatest excitement in the Reichstag if the subject were so much as mentioned. Our entire domestic situation would be affected. The question of the franchise and other measures would be demanded by way of compensation. No

concessions could be made. It was his impression that the goal which the Supreme Command had in view could be reached, not by some new wholesale scheme, but by the application of existing powers, such as modification of the certificates of release (which in their present form were giving rise to abuses) along the lines of not releasing men unconditionally, but giving them furlough to do some definite industrial work. It was questionable whether too much was not being done for industries which were apt to employ the help given to make preparations for ordinary competition under peace conditions. These questions must be carefully examined.

The War Minister: Men could not be given furlough owing to the opposition of the Reichstag. The question of the pay of men on furlough was also very important, and these men had to be paid as ordinary workmen. The solution of the problem was not easy.

Scheüch: Equal pay of men released for industry and exempted men was absolutely necessary. The point raised by His Excellency von Payer had already been thoroughly discussed in committee on the Auxiliary Service Law, as also by the committees of employers and employees. The negotiations had not led to any results hitherto, as both sides put forward claims which could not be conceded. Fluctuations in the labour market were so great that production was suffering. The men must be tied down to their jobs. He had given his sanction to that proposal on condition that there should be some guarantee against despotic behaviour on the part of the employers. It could not be given. If it was desired to introduce military control, labour would accept it, but not the employers, who did not like working with military authorities.

We must ask ourselves how many exempted men there are. The number was now so small that the change would really not pay. The employers would be the first to say that it was not required. Their first idea was to have their employees under

firmer control. Other methods should be considered, e.g., restricting workmen exempted from military service, not to a single factory, but to a definite group of works, such as U-boat construction or aircraft factories. In that way freedom of movement would be greatly limited. We could not go further. It was of no use to treat exempted men as if they were released from the army. Groener had repeatedly declared in the Reichstag that exempted men would be treated as free workmen in all circumstances. We must keep that promise.

We could not say how many men the proposals of the Supreme Command would give us. That was a question that must be settled between the Supreme Command and the Ministry of War. The question before us to-day was: If liability to service was extended would the result be so great as to outweigh political objections? He must answer in the negative, as for all practical purposes the men had been got hold of already. The old man could not be sent to the front; he could only release a younger man.

As regards the extension to women, hitherto we had had all the women we wanted, and if we needed more we had only to beckon to get them. The only difficulty was that employers preferred men fit for military service to women. Thus our business was not to get hold of women by the use of legal powers, but rather to compel employers to release as many fit men as possible by substituting women.

Lieutenant-Colonel Bauer: The step proposed had been given the most careful consideration by the Supreme Command. We had had some very unpleasant surprises of late. The offensive in Italy had been a total failure. We must expect a large number of Americans and Italians on the Western Front. It was still uncertain how many divisions Austria would send to that theatre. Our military successes had been unexpectedly great, but the position was still that if we had had another 200,000 men we should have been

certain of overthrowing our enemies on land. It was no longer possible to get them now, and thus the end of the war was postponed.

Our munitions industries were doing very well, but on the other side American help was constantly increasing. The losses suffered by the enemy would therefore be made good very rapidly. Yet we could face the next stage of the struggle with composure.

Second question: drafts for the army. England is already calling up what she can. France is better off than ourselves by one annual class. She has drawn large numbers of men from industry and replaced them with Americans. America is sending more men than we feared, and further, the American troops are fighting better than we anticipated. Nor must we forget that these men are physically of the fittest, and come into the struggle very well fed.

Our situation is not bad. Our home front is firm, and a fresh decision by arms might mean the collapse of the other side. We may hope for such a decision, though it is not absolutely certain. It is possible that the fighting will continue into the New Year. Our enemies will then be far superior to us in numbers, and for that reason the Field-Marshal has addressed his request to the Imperial Chancellor. From the purely military point of view the Supreme Command desires that abundant drafts should again flow to the armies. In March and April we had 300,000 wounded, of whom only 70,000 have returned. The result is that there are divisions in line which have the strength of a normal regiment only. In the last offensive our losses were much lower, but many divisions were very much weakened. Our position with regard to drafts must therefore be improved. There are still 1,700,000 to 2,000,000 men fit for military service in industry. These are not working as they should, and individual output has fallen considerably, on an average 30 per cent. This is not due to the food situation only, but to all the reasons which

are given in the Field-Marshal's letter. No one ought to be taking holidays now. The man who does not work must be compelled to do so, and for that reason military control is desirable. Men must not hide themselves. Those who do not come forward must receive military punishment.

Female labour. England and America had gone considerably further in this direction than we had. A great deal could still be done by training women in factories. The dangers to health must not be exaggerated. He (Bauer) asked that more should be done in this direction. Compulsory auxiliary service was the only means of really getting at the women available. Many of them were doing nothing at all, and must therefore be compelled to do something. Perhaps the end which the Supreme Command had in mind could be reached in other ways. As His Excellency von Payer had said, the certificates of release must be improved. We must prevent industry from preparing for peace conditions too soon. The Supreme Command had considered that their requirements should be embodied in an extension of the liability to service. The method, however, was still open to consideration; as regards time, the measure could not be carried through at a moment's notice. If the financial position was so serious we must ask ourselves whether it could not be remedied. It was essentially the business of the Treasury to decide whether that were possible.

The wages of exempted men and those released from the army must be equal. There was no longer any difference in the matter of wages between men called up and those liable to auxiliary service.

It was for the Imperial Chancellor alone to decide whether the political objections were so great that the proposals were not feasible. The military situation was such that we must make it our business to get as many men as possible. It was uncertain where we should get them from. The recruiting of Polish workmen was proceeding very successfully, but this

was not enough. It was a great pity that we could not keep Russian prisoners of war for ever. In view of the enormous importance of the question, he asked that it should be given the most careful consideration and not be rejected out of hand. The question of method could be discussed.

Baron von Stein: The measures proposed by the Supreme Command would not be successful. We should not get more men at the front by extending the liability to service. The men who might be got were absolutely indispensable for war work at home. We knew what the Auxiliary Service Law had cost us politically. An extension of that Act would be quite intolerable from the political point of view. All kinds of concessions would be wrung from us, so the idea could not be entertained. Matters could certainly be improved by other methods. For example we could prevent employers from making arrangements for peace at this stage, though that must be done through the military authorities. Further militarization of industry would seem to be open to objection. It was very doubtful whether that would effect any improvement in the economic situation, as also whether it could be done by military *personnel.* General Groener promised the Reichstag that exempted men should receive the same wages as men liable to auxiliary service, and we could not go back on that promise. As regards increasing individual output, no one could deny that the high wages, especially those of young people, were an evil. It was extremely difficult to say how this could be remedied, and very doubtful whether any good would be done by militarization. If everyone was to be made liable for service it was highly doubtful whether we had the men for it. A lot more could be done with existing legislation.*

Wallraf: From the standpoint of domestic politics he was glad that measures of a legal nature could not be carried through

* Unfortunately everything possible was not done. And this in spite of warning after warning from the Supreme Command. [The Author.]

at a moment's notice. The proposals would mean a fatal blow to the *moral* of the nation. At the moment public spirit was good, owing to the successes of the army. Proceedings in the Reichstag would mean more haggling than had ever been known before, not only on domestic, but on foreign political issues. The question would be asked—what is their object? How many troops have they still in the East? and so on. We must first consider whether our goal cannot be reached by other means, emergency powers for example. There must be some method which will not have a disastrous effect on opinion at home.

Scheüch also considered it impossible to go back in the question of the wages of exempted men and men called up for auxiliary service. However, everything possible in the way of remedy had already been done secretly. The figure of exemptions given by Lieutenant-Colonel Bauer was too high. It had been increased at the moment because the navy had called up a number of men for special employment. As regards recruiting for the navy, the latter adopted a different course with men fit for service than that pursued by the army. We must endeavour to secure that the navy should call up more fit men from its own industries. The Supreme Command must help.

Supervision of the individual workman would not mean any increase of his personal output. Another method—that of calling up men who are lazy—is said to have already had a good effect. Progress could be made along those lines.

The Supreme Command's notion of calling up all the women would be an illusion, as we could only call up as many women as we could find accommodation for. That would create a bad spirit and lead to injustice. Our previous system had shown good results and we must stick to it.

As regards the high rates of wages, although he did not think that the introduction of maximum and minimum

wages would be more equitable he was quite ready to look into the question.

If we were quite certain that with another 200,000 men we could now bring the war to an end, that number could immediately be produced in case of need.

The War Minister, declared that he, too, was ready for such a step. But in that case our economic life must stop and everyone be sent to the front. Training, however, would take weeks and months; the men called up could not be sent to the front straight off. Moreover, he himself did not regard the recruiting position as so terribly serious and difficult;* reinforcements could not be produced overnight.†

Von Payer: If we came before the Reichstag with a draft bill which involved compulsion for the individual, we should be faced with the danger that the Reichstag would return to its peace resolution of last year, and give it a form which would not be in our interests.

Count Roedern: He assumed from what Lieutenant-Colonel Bauer had said that no further action could be taken in the matter before the end of July.‡

The Imperial Chancellor explained that he objected to the proposals of the Supreme Command fundamentally, on the ground of their reaction on the home situation. But the end in view was the really vital matter, and the means to that end were open to discussion, as the conference had shown. The matter would, therefore, be postponed to the second half of July.

* This optimism was in direct contrast to the serious view held by Main Headquarters, a view which was unfortunately proved to be right.

† Of course not. The Supreme Command had issued repeated warnings to that effect.

‡ There was to be a conference at Spa in a few days. [The Author.]

20.

"To the Chief of the General Staff at G.H.Q.

"With reference to yesterday's conference with Major von Bockelberg:

"1. We are making preparations to recall one-third of the 1900 class by the end of September—about 15,000 infantry (with at least one month's training).

"Two-thirds in October, about 110,000 infantry.

"2. The figure of 10,000 fit men of the garrison army promised by 15/10 and 15/11 respectively will be increased if possible, and the men made available by 1/10.

"1 and 2 involve the risk of considerable injury to agriculture.

"3. The systematic calling up of fit men of the classes 1894-1900 is beginning at once.

"4. We will continue to call up 10,000 men fit for field and active service per month in accordance with yesterday's verbal promise.

"5. We will increase the figures given in Clause 4 by a further 50,000 as soon as the Supreme Command has given its consent to the reduction of output (even in railways, coal, etc.), which is inevitably involved.

"Please confirm. "W.M. 10034/18 A.M."

"I. c, No. 10220 Secret.

"*Immediate.*

"To the War Ministry, Berlin.

"Ref. your telegram No. 10034/18 Sec. A.M.

"Agree to 1 to 3.

"Para. 4. We understand here that it was only a question of calling up fit men under 35 *only*, and mainly those already trained.

"Para. 5. The result of the conferences held in Berlin on 10/9 and 12/9 will be decisive on this point.

"Thanks for promised help. This covers my telegram 8/9/1918, I. c, No. 10214 Sec.

(Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

"*Immediate.*

"U.R. I. c.

"According to telephone report from Colonel von Braun, just received, harvesting will be seriously menaced.

(Signed) "VON HARBOU."

"202.

("Cf. I. c. No. 10220 Sec.)

"His Excellency has decided that, in spite of the injury to agriculture, the 1900 class must be called up by October, 1918.

(Signed) "VON BOCKELBERG."

21.

"25/2/1918.

"To GENERAL LUDENDORFF.

"I am very glad to be able to give your Your Excellency a detailed report of the conversation with the Saxon Social Democratic Deputy Lange from Leipsic (communicated by His Excellency von Lindequist), in view of the misuse of your name which we have discovered.

"What happened was as follows: Before the sitting of the Food Control Department (Ministry of the Interior) in Dresden began, I spoke to the representative of the Social Democratic Party, a man who has been recognized in many joint conferences as usually very clear-thinking and reasonable, about the evil of strikes and the ambiguous attitude to them of the Social Democratic leaders. I also expressed my regret that the home army was thus stabbing the fighting army in the back, and doubtless merely encouraging our enemies. I said that, in spite of all the food difficulties, this would not have happened if his colleagues in leading positions

in the party had taken a stand against them. This is what he replied:

"'*Yes, Ludendorff's words knocked the bottom out of everything.*' '*What words?*' *I asked.* '*The German workman is too cowardly for a general strike.*'*

"Your Excellency knows my answer—that it was impossible that the man who had witnessed and appreciated the courage of the German workman every day in the trenches should have used such words. He shrugged his shoulders, and said in some confusion, 'Well that's what is being said!'

"I think a personal explanation by Your Excellency would be very useful and have valuable results, in view of the reasonable and proper attitude of Deputy Lange, who, as the representative of his fraction in the Landtag, has displayed in the conferences of the Food Control Department an openness of mind, a sense of reality and a faculty for calm consideration which are worthy of recognition.

"May I ask Your Excellency to take the first opportunity of putting the deputy in possession of your answer, if possible in time for a meeting of the Food Control Department, so that you may be certain that it will have wide publicity. The deputy's address is: Deputy Lange, Leipsic, Querstrasse, 29, IV. . . .

"May I take this opportunity of drawing Your Excellency's attention to a problem, the proper solution of which will continue to be of the greatest importance for the *moral* of the nation. The release of building materials by the Army administrative authorities for use in the right quarter is of supreme importance if we are to avoid the threatened shortage of small houses. As Acting President of the Central Committee for the Provision of Houses in the Kingdom of Saxony, I am seriously preoccupied with all cognate matters, and I learn to my great regret that in this sphere also the infamous system of middlemen comes between the army and

* This was an unheard-of slander, as I shall show. [The Author.]

sources of supply, and that bricks and wood are sold at exorbitant prices. This is a disease which eats out the very heart of the nation, and we must take energetic action against it. When we come to the enormously difficult question of raising the money (why does the Imperial Treasury reject our suggestion, '10 per cent. of the next War Loan will be spent on remedying the shortage of houses in Germany'?—that would give the Loan an impetus!), and think of the profiteering prices of the building material released, on top of the enormous cost of labour, we of the housing committee prophesy an internal catastrophe as the result of the coming dearth of houses, however triumphant the end of the war may be. All the millions voted will be nothing compared to the milliards required, in view of an increase in the cost of building of at least 100 per cent., and perhaps 140 per cent. to 160 per cent. in the next five years.

"As a conscientious man, I feel it my duty to bring this pressing chapter in the transitional period of our economic life to Your Excellency's earnest attention, in the hope that we may have your firm support.

"In addition to the enemies without, three internal enemies are fighting against the glorious triumph of the Protestant German imperial idea—red, black and gold internationalism; the latter perhaps with the most poisonous weapons, because it is shaking the very foundations of German honour in both responsible and irresponsible quarters, and destroying our once indestructible unity. The finest trait of the German nation, a trait which was destined to make it possible for the world to heal its wounds at German sources, is that which is most seriously menaced. We therefore like so many others bring our heavy burden of anxiety to the feet of the men to whom we look up as our incorruptible leaders and the model of all that Germans should be.

"I am, Your Excellency, etc.,

"PROF. DR. KRAFT."

"3/3/1918.

"To Prof. Dr. Kraft.

"I gladly authorize you to declare that I have never said that the German workman was too cowardly for a general strike. I am very grieved that such rubbish should have been attributed to me. Indeed, I have always said that I regarded the bulk of the working classes in Germany as far too patriotic to strike during the war.

(Signed) "Ludendorff."

"G.H.Q.,
"4/3/1918.

"To Colonel von Winterfeldt.

"Dear Colonel,

"I enclose you a letter from Prof. Dr. Kraft, from the first part of which you will see that an agitation against His Excellency Ludendorff is in progress. The letter, however, refers to another important matter, the question of housing and settlements. I myself share Prof. Kraft's opinion that it would be very desirable to devote a sum from the next War Loan for settlement purposes. Would it not be possible for Herr Damaschke to initiate a debate on the question of land reform? To my mind this is the greatest national movement at the moment. If it does not get into the limelight much, it is only because our whole Press is dependent to a certain extent on the leading banks, whose business would be seriously prejudiced in any case by a reform of the land system. The Social Democratic Press leaves the thing severely alone, because land reform would knock the bottom out of social democracy. There can be no question that if the matter came up for discussion in the Reichstag all parties would have to make substantial concessions, because, as I have said, the movement has spread far and wide in the country and the deputies would hardly be able to conciliate their constituencies with a mere refusal. House and land speculation, as well as the

shortage of houses and high rents, are gradually crying aloud to heaven.

"I cannot say how far matters can be remedied by the release of building materials. It is certainly impossible to find out exactly what the war companies are doing. I certainly share the Professor's distrust. In particular, I do not even know where the wood really is. It was just the same with steel, but with the difference that we had some control over steel, and succeeded after a long struggle in gradually securing a measure of supervision and honest dealing.

(Signed) "BAUER, Lt.-Col."

"G.H.Q.,
"4/3/1918.

"To MAJOR KEIM.

"MY DEAR KEIM,

"I enclose the letter of Prof. Dr. Kraft, of which I have already spoken to you on the 'phone, about the statements made by the Social Democratic Deputy Lange. I would be very grateful if you would ask Deputy Lange, perhaps through the medium of Under-Secretary of State Müller, how the matter began, and what is the origin of this ridiculous rumour about His Excellency Ludendorff. I need hardly stop to add that no one here at G.H.Q. would use such absurd language. We all think that workmen who do their duty so splendidly at the front will do their best at home, and that the great majority of them are absolutely loyal to their Fatherland in these serious times. That individual elements, particularly youths and women, should let themselves be influenced by unscrupulous agitators is, of course, inevitable. But that does not affect the general verdict.

"I gladly give you permission to make what use you think best of these statements in dealing with Deputy Lange. The imputation seems to me all the more infamous because His Excellency Ludendorff has always had a warm heart for the

working classes and, as you yourself know, has interested himself successfully in every social and economic scheme, the cause of the disabled, settlement questions and food questions.

(Signed) "BAUER, Lt.-Col."

"6/3/1918.

"To GENERAL LUDENDORFF.

"Perhaps Your Excellency will be good enough to allow me to add a few not unimportant remarks to my reply to your letter 15400/II. of 19/2/1918.

"At yesterday's meeting of the Advisory Food Committee for the Kingdom of Saxony I told Deputy Lange of Your Excellency's intention to give a direct explanation of the statement attributed to you: 'The German workman is too cowardly for a general strike.' In reply I received the following details about the part which this expression had played in the strike. The expression was said to have been used—according to the evidence of alleged witnesses, though it is open to doubt—at the first general conference on the strike question, at which the leaders of the Social Democratic and Independent Socialist Parties, Scheidemann* and Haase, and other party representatives from all parts of Germany were present. Next to the question of food this calculated slander on the honour of the German workman had had the greatest effect.

"In view of this revelation an immediate letter to Herr Lange, who is now at Dresden, attending the session of the Saxon Second Chamber, would be particularly useful. Herr Lange tells me he is prepared to give your explanation the widest publicity among his Party.

"I am, etc.,

"PROFESSOR DR. KRAFT."

* On October 17, 1917, Herr Scheidemann said that I had a very bad reputation in working class circles. Judging by the case in point this is not surprising. I was able to explain on this occasion, but many others never came to my notice. [The Author.]

"12/3/1918.

"To Lieutenant-Colonel Bauer.

"Dear Lt.-Col. Bauer,

"I send you a report of Dr. Müller on his conversation with Deputy Lange. For tactical reasons I let Dr. Müller deal with him alone. It shows that the matter has been one of the most infamous weapons of the strike agitators. As regards the explanation I agree with Dr. Müller's point of view. Any further action will only give the slander wider publicity. In the opinion of Deputy Ebert, Lange will keep his promise. Ebert must be given a line if he is to approach Lange and size up the man himself.

"With the assurance of my highest regard, etc.,

"Keim."

"To Major Keim.

"I take the liberty of sending you a report on my conversation with Deputy Lange of Leipsic, who came to see me this morning in response to my invitation. Herr Lange said that:

"The expression ascribed to His Excellency Ludendorff that the German workman was too cowardly for a general strike was certainly too blunt in form. But in substance His Excellency Ludendorff was alleged to have stated that the German workman had not the courage to strike. The rumour that His Excellency had used some such expression had been going from mouth to mouth among the working classes, both before and during the strikes in Leipsic, Chemnitz and Dresden. The expression had not made its appearance in the Press or pamphlets, however. Herr Lange said that he himself had heard Leipsic workmen using the expression, and that it had been reported from Dresden and Chemnitz that the phrase had been conspicuous in the conversations of the workmen, both during and before the strike. A certain connection had been discovered with the food situation in Saxony—which was known to be not of the best—and was put in words such as

these: the bad food supply to Saxony is not merely due to its character as a contributory country. It is also due to the fact that the Saxon workman, with his proverbial good nature, does not assert himself as much as the workman in Bavaria and Prussia. How that good nature is appreciated, even by very august authorities, has now been illustrated by the expression attributed to His Excellency Ludendorff.

"How the rumour had originated Deputy Lange did not know. His efforts to find out had been without result. The rumour was simply there, and had been passed from mouth to mouth among the working classes. In Berlin, I may add, the alleged statement seems to have played no part. In any case Deputy Ebert, who spoke to me about the matter a few days ago, had never heard of it. But that would have been the case even if the rumour had a great effect in Berlin also.

"Deputy Lange enjoys a very good reputation everywhere. He is a man with a sense of reality, holds the views of the majority of the Social Democratic Party, has no sort of sympathy with the Independents and thoroughly condemns the strike. He is absolutely to be believed when he says that he only spoke to Professor Kraft as he did because, if His Excellency Ludendorff had really used the words attributed to him, he regarded them as objectionable. My *exposé* of General Ludendorff's attitude on labour questions entirely convinced him that the words could not have been used, and he said that he would tell his Saxon party friends in confidence of the conversation he had had with me and do everything in his power to contradict the rumour.

"In my opinion the matter might be allowed to rest there for the time being. I have an impression that we are concerned with one of many war slanders, but that it has scarcely gained very wide currency; otherwise it would have been heard of in other parts of Germany, and so far we have no evidence that such is the case. That being so, I must advise against any explanation in the Press, or indeed any other public

explanation.* It would only mean giving the affair an importance which it does not apparently possess. Besides, an explanation in the Press would be regarded as confirmation by a good part of the public. In this particular case a public *démenti* might easily mean that use would be made of General Ludendorff's alleged statement, even in parts of the country which have not yet heard of it. It seems to me worth considering whether the Press representatives at the Press Conference in Berlin should not be told for their personal information that the alleged statement has been hawked about in Saxony but that, of course, it has no foundation in fact. I personally consider even *that* superfluous, but leave the point for consideration.

"MÜLLER."

"The First Quartermaster-General.

"G.H.Q.,
"14/3/1918.

"To PROFESSOR DR. KRAFT.

"MY DEAR PROFESSOR,

"Please accept my sincere thanks for your kind letter of the 6th inst. Through the medium of Under-Secretary of State Dr. Müller, I have had Deputy Lange questioned on the matter. According to the information I have received, the rumour in question has been current in Saxony only. Herr Lange has convinced himself of the absurdity of the rumour and promised to explain matters to his party friends. I thus regard the incident as closed.

"Whether that be so or not, I am grateful to you, Herr Professor, for having given me an opportunity of dealing successfully with lying rumours in one case at least.

"I have the honour to remain, etc.,

"LUDENDORFF."

* I much regret that I agreed with this suggestion. [The Author.]

22.

"Ministry of War.
"No. 290/10, 16 A.H. (S.).

"Berlin W. 66,
"Leipziger Strasse, 5.
"7/10/1916.

"With reference to the conference which was held, at Your Excellency's suggestion, on 28/9/16 at the Ministry of War, and in reply to the telegram I b, No. 30158, the War Ministry desires to make the following remarks on the employment of enemy foreigners in the western and eastern occupied areas.

"There are three alternatives for the recruitment of inhabitants of the occupied regions—given in order of urgency. They may be called up for war work:

"1. In Germany;
"2. In the Lines of Communication and Operations zones;
"3. In the General-Governments of Belgium and Warsaw.

"As regards the fundamental principle of recruitment, opinion is unanimous that the recruiting of *voluntary* labour is to be preferred to compulsory measures. In this connection the Ministry of War desires to emphasize the fact that more work can be got out of a man who is working of his own free will. This is particularly true of higher technical work, such as is especially required in German war industries. Moreover, regard for the necessary co-operation with German workmen and the danger to works and factories from ill-disposed elements are further arguments in favour of *voluntary* recruitment. If we wish to push this principle to the limits of the possible, our present methods will require considerable improvement.

"In the first place, it is necessary that our labour-recruiting

arrangements in Belgium should be extended on the lines agreed some time back with the Governor-General, lines which were urgently recommended by the Ministry of the Interior (as appears from the enclosed appendix, which please return), but have not yet been carried out by the Governor-General in spite of repeated requests.

"All attempts to employ Belgian labour in industries outside Belgium must be without much prospect so long as the migrating workmen have reason to fear that the step will not improve their conditions, but rather make them worse. We cannot expect large numbers of Belgian workmen to report readily for employment in Germany or the French L. of C. or Operations zones if the step means the loss of the help hitherto given to them and their families by the 'Relief Commission,' and involves serious injury to their economic position. Of almost equal importance are the continuance of superfluous public works and the continued payment of charitable relief, with the help of which the Belgian employers and even the German authorities—the latter involuntarily—keep employable labour from emigrating. It needs no demonstration that no more German labour—with the exception of a few foremen—can be employed in the occupied territory. How far the industries of occupied Belgium can be employed *on tasks useful for war purposes* is now being carefully examined. All other activities *must stop at once in any case.*

"In the case of Russian Poland, in the unanimous opinion of the administrative directors of the German Labour Department and the Ministry of War, in addition to the recruitment of labour which can be spared the main thing is for the recruiting authorities to be able to give the workman, at the time the contract is made, a definite promise of one or two weeks' leave after a certain period has expired. This attraction alone has any chance of bringing considerable numbers of Polish workmen *voluntarily* to Germany. In the form proposed by the Ministry of War there would be no objection to

this concession from the point of view of non-interruption of work, as the leave would be given only while the contracts were unexpired, so that, in case of overstaying his leave, a man might be compelled to return. The War Ministry has been continuously endeavouring to overcome the opposition of the Prussian civil ministries, particularly the Ministry of the Interior, to this concession in the case of existing contracts. The time has also come for the Minister of the Interior to abandon his opposition to the admission of Polish-Jew labour, as, from what the administrators of Russian Poland say, a large number of strong and willing Polish-Jew workers have been lost to our home industries.

"Other obstacles in the way of securing enemy (and also neutral) foreigners are the exceedingly complicated and drastic regulations about passports (proof of *bona fides*) and frontier traffic, especially those drawn up by Section 3 b of the General Staff in Berlin and carried out through the medium of the acting G. O's C. of the Corps districts. The Ministry of War would be grateful if the General Staff in Berlin could be reminded of the importance of the claims of our war industries.

"If all these measures are taken we shall succeed in obtaining voluntarily large numbers of workmen from Belgium and Russian Poland for war work in Germany. If, after the possibilities of this method have been exhausted, there is still a large number of useful men who have not been secured, there will be nothing left for it but calling-up by way of compulsion. Objections founded on international law must not hold us back; they must give way before the inexorable necessity of finding the most productive employment in war industries for all labour under German control. It must further be remembered that the technical interpretation of the phrase *opération de la guerre* in international law by many authors is much narrower than that given to it in many official quarters. The existence of a large mass of

unemployed labour is a danger to public safety. With a view to averting that danger, men may be sent compulsorily to any place where they are needed; whether at home or abroad is immaterial.

"The compulsory enrolment of Belgian labour cannot be dispensed with, particularly in view of the work required by Directors of Military Railways in the occupied districts in France. Recruitment of Belgian labour for this purpose must be carried on in every possible way, because otherwise it will be impossible to fetch a large number of prisoners of war, held up there at the moment, for urgent work at home, for which their labour is absolutely vital. In view of what was said in the conference of 28/9/1916 we must not entertain excessive hopes from the *voluntary* enrolment for this work. The War Ministry does not share the doubts with regard to the feasibility of compulsion in this direction which were expressed by the representatives of the General-Government of Belgium at the Conference of 28/9/1916. The War Ministry believes that such a measure would seriously prejudice neither voluntary enrolment for German industries nor voluntary work in the Belgian industries. The War Ministry regards the opposite result as far more probable. If compulsory enlistment for disagreeable work in the Operations or the L. of C. zones becomes a really serious threat, it will be more in the interest of the Belgians to take up and keep voluntary work in Belgian and German industries which is associated, generally speaking, with more pleasant conditions and particularly with higher earnings and less danger. It is otherwise to-day, when there is no such lever. Military pressure without and economic pressure within will thus reinforce one another. If this direct inducement to take up work in German industries does not have sufficient effect on the emigration of Belgians, the War Ministry would not shrink from direct intervention, *even in this case*, though it fully appreciates the objections urged above.

"If the War Ministry is to be fully informed about the

labour situation in the occupied regions, and in a position to judge how far it is still possible to develop the system described above, it must have first-hand information on the spot. It has therefore the honour of requesting Your Excellency to instruct the General-Governments* and the L. of C. Inspectorates that representatives of the War Ministry should be given every opportunity of examining the industrial and agricultural conditions, as well as the position of the labour market in the occupied regions.

"Your Excellency is requested to make the necessary arrangements with the Governors-General in Brussels and Warsaw.

(Signed) "P. p. VON WRISBERG."

23.†

RESULT

of a conference held on October 17, 1916, at the Ministry of the Interior (at which the Imperial and Prussian State Departments were represented), on the question of supplying labour for war industries.

I. Recruitment of labour from the occupied territories.

(*a*) Labour from the General-Government of Warsaw.—The system of recruiting Russo-Polish workmen, which has hitherto been carried on effectively by the labour authorities and the German Central Labour Bureau, is to be continued as long as possible.

The recruitment of about 30,000 Jewish workpeople, suggested by the Director of Administration in Warsaw, is to be immediately considered. (The War Ministry and the Ministry of the Interior have declared their agreement in principle with the measures suggested.)

* The General-Governments were not under the authority of the Supreme Command, so that we had no right to issue intructions to them. [The Author.]

† See No. 5.

(*b*) Labour from the General Government of Belgium.—Recruitment of labour for voluntary work is in every way preferable to compulsory enrolment. It must therefore be promoted in every way possible.

For that purpose the Industrial Bureau set up in Belgium must start to function at the earliest possible moment. The German Central Labour Bureau must be called in to help, and the experiences of that organization applied to the sphere of labour recruiting. The participation of the War Ministry will ensure that the Belgian labour is transferred directly to those quarters where war work is in progress. The Industrial Bureau must make a firm contract (model contract drawn up by the Central Bureau) with the workers who report voluntarily. In this matter the first requirement is that the men should be secured regular payment and good food. It might perhaps be desirable that all workers in munition works, including Belgian workers, should get their meat and fat from army supplies.

The place of work in Germany to which compulsorily recruited Belgian labour is to be sent must be decided by the Industrial Bureau in co-operation with the Ministry of War. The recruited workmen must be sent to their place of work in groups. They must be suitably housed there, and conducted from their quarters to their work and vice versa.

Appropriate measures must be taken to induce these "conscripted" workmen to take up voluntary work subsequently.

Concentration camps for Belgian workers compulsorily deported are not to be established, and even the word "camp" must be avoided. In its place the expression "settlements for industrial workers" will be used.

II. Recruiting labour at home.

For industries such as mining, blast furnaces, steel works, explosives, etc., and especially where work underground or in foundries is concerned, to all intents and purposes men alone can be considered. On the other hand, preference will be

given to women in the manufacturing industries, and there will only be a few men who are technical experts.

Male labour can only be obtained in very small quantities at home, so that the deficiency must be made up from labour in the occupied territories and the prisoners of war. On the other hand, a considerable amount of female labour is available. Its recruitment will only be possible if the women are guaranteed a certain measure of protection and lighter conditions. It would therefore be advisable in principle to accept the eight-hour day for female labour and only permit exceptions in special cases. But as the works have to be kept going at night also in order to make full use of their machinery, it appears necessary to allow night work for women as well. Thus, in the same works we shall have twelve-hour shifts for men and eight-hour shifts for women running simultaneously.

The introduction of compulsory labour, both for men and for women, by legislation does not seem advisable. The difficulties which would stand in its way in practice, owing to the varying standards of training and social status of the individuals concerned, are insurmountable. Further, we could not expect a result in any way commensurate with so drastic a measure, as men who are fit for any sort of work are already, with few exceptions, engaged in occupations which are directly or indirectly war work, while enough women have not yet come forward.

III. Preventing labour from leaving war industries.

We cannot recommend any modification in the Freedom of Movement Act of November 1, 1867, by means of legislation or a decree of the Bundesrat, with a view to preventing workmen from leaving industries supplying war material. A law of this kind would hardly be got through the Reichstag,* and a decree of the Bundesrat would come in for severe criticism on the part of the Reichstag. The feasible method seems to be for the Acting G. O's C. of the Corps Districts (in which

* In spite of all the evils, which were recognized! [The Author.]

the necessity arises) to forbid women to leave their place of employment, by virtue of the powers given them by Section IX b. of the State of Siege Act of June 4, 1851. Similar measures were taken in the case of industrial workers by the Acting G. O. C. of the II Army Corps by decree of June 9, 1915, and in the case of agricultural workers by decrees of the Acting G. O's C. of the I, II, IV, XVII and XX Army Corps and the III Bavarian Army Corps (all during the first half of 1915). The judicial authorities (the Imperial Courts also) have recognized the principle that if the G. O. C. himself states that the prohibition is "in the interests of public safety," the Courts have no authority to go into the question how far such an assumption is justified. At the same time, the success of such a general prohibition seems questionable if, like that issued to industrial workers in the district of the II Army Corps, it is only directed against workmen who break their contracts or leave their work before their contracts are expired, as it is unusual to make long contracts with industrial workers.

The best course would be the establishment of one central body on the model of "the War Committee for the Metal Industries for Greater Berlin" and the war committees on that pattern which have been set up in the districts of the X, XIV, XVIII, XII, XIX Army Corps and the II Bavarian Army Corps for the metal industry itself and such other branches of industry as employ metal workers in considerable numbers. The "War Committee for Metal Industries for Greater Berlin" has thoroughly proved its value. Efforts must be made to establish similar committees in the areas of our heavy industries (Rhineland, Westphalia and Silesia) where there are none to-day. In any case arbitrating bodies must be set up in these areas on the lines of those established by the Acting G. O. C. of the XI Army Corps. For the rest, if labour is to be retained, particularly in State industries, the workers and their families must be guaranteed sufficient food. The

suggestion of supplying fat and meat through the army authorities referred to under I. (*b*) above might be considered in this connection also.

Further, we shall have to see that private industry does not tempt the workers to leave State industries by the offer of higher wages.

Finally, as the War Ministry already contemplates, we must prohibit all advertisements in the newspapers, posters or other printed matter, in which offers of employment in industry are made, or industrial workers seek fresh employment.

IV. Obtaining labour from industries the maintenance of which is not absolutely necessary for war purposes.

We must make far greater efforts than hitherto to restrict industries which are not working for war purposes, in order to release labour for war industries.

In the first place, private building of all kinds, except such as is absolutely necessary in the public interest, must be forbidden. But, in addition to the building trade, we must consider further limitation of industries, such as precious metals, textiles, etc., which are not engaged in war work. In so doing we should have no intention of closing down these industries altogether, because the economic reconstruction of Germany after the war would be imperilled to a very serious degree.

Finally, as regards the release of labour by agriculture for the benefit of industry, this is only possible on a very small scale, and in any case for the two or three winter months at the outside.

(Signed) LEWALD.

24.

"The Governor-General of Belgium.
"P. A. I. 1652.

"Brussels,
"22/2/1917.

"To General Ludendorff.

"Your Excellency,*

"Baron von der Lancken, the Director of my Political Section, has given me a report on the conversations he had with Your Excellency after discussion with the Imperial Chancellor. It is a pleasure to me to note from his report that Your Excellency also is anxious to promote successful co-operation in all matters between the authorities under your control and those who are responsible to me, co-operation in which the interests of the army and the necessities of the administration entrusted to my care would both find expression.

"Your Excellency knows, and Baron von der Lancken confirms it, that from the outset my first endeavour has been to do justice to the claims of the army in the greatest possible measure. I am as determined as I ever was to put the interests of the army before all other considerations.

"Nor is it unknown to Your Excellency that the Imperial Government has addressed an urgent request to me that, in administering the region entrusted to me, I shall create a situation which will survive the war. In endeavouring to administer this country in a manner which German prestige in the world requires, and in striving to bring about a state of affairs which will enable Belgium to be used as an instrument for the re-establishment of Germany's world position, I am only pursuing the aim of turning the war to good account in the interests of our Fatherland.

"To bring this task into harmony with the satisfaction of army requirements is my constant endeavour. If I am to

* The letter had nothing in particular to do with labour questions. It simply reveals the attitude of the Governor-General to the Supreme Command.

devote all my powers to the attainment of this end I must enjoy full confidence in my efforts to meet the military claims made upon me. I must be given a free hand to adapt the measures considered essential by the Supreme Command to circumstances of which I alone am in a position to judge.

"It has been a pleasure to realize from what Baron von der Lancken says that Your Excellency bears this point in mind. I am very glad to know that Your Excellency is also prepared to use your influence in the L. of C. zones in question to enable me to pursue my general political plans, and more particularly the Flemish and ecclesiastical policies which have been approved by His Majesty. I am grateful for the contemplated issue of special and appropriate instructions to the Army Headquarters and L. of C. Inspectorates concerned.

"May I hope that this will mark the beginning of close and profitable co-operation between the authorities on both sides. Progress in that direction will materially facilitate the fulfilment of my complicated task.

"I have the honour to be, Your Excellency,

(Signed) "BARON VON BISSING,

"Colonel-General."

25.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.

"II. No. 49000.

"G.H.Q.,

"3/3/1917.

"To COLONEL-GENERAL BARON VON BISSING, GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF BELGIUM.

"Your Excellency has been kind enough to send me a copy of the half-yearly report of 24/2 Sec. II. No. 1067/17. In Appendix II. of this report the deportation of Belgian workmen from the General Government to Germany is discussed.

"In many private and official circles in Germany the view is held (and unfortunately exploited in many quarters to the detriment of the Supreme Command) that the latter is the author of the idea of compulsorily deporting unemployed Belgian workers, and is therefore responsible for the alleged total failure of that measure. This compels me to take the present opportunity of making the following remarks on the statements in Appendix II. of the half-yearly report:

"1. The deportation of unemployed workers was required for reasons of security and was carried out in conformity with international law.

"2. It was not the Supreme Command, but the Ministry of War, which was the author of the idea of compulsory deportation *en masse*. (See Sec. VI. of the Memorandum.)

"3. Compulsory deportation on a smaller scale had already been provided for by the decree of 15/5/1916, issued by the Governor-General. (See Sec. VII. of the Memorandum.)

"4. When the new munitions programme of September, 1916, was decided upon, provision had to be made to meet the shortage of labour. In the opinion of the War Ministry and industry generally (cf. Sec. IX.), which alone were in a position to judge of the labour question in Germany, this problem could only be solved by enrolling Belgian workers, most of whom were out of work. At a conference in Brussels on 11/10/1916 the industrial representative put the weekly demand for Belgian workers at 20,000 (cf. Sec. VIII. and IX.). The Supreme Command were not responsible for this conference and had no say in fixing the figure of 20,000.

"5. After the figure of 20,000 had been fixed without any reference to the Supreme Command, the latter took no steps to accelerate the preparations to deport the 20,000 men. It was only on the 11th November that the Supreme Command asked when they could begin to count on the 20,000 workers per week. They could not have done anything to hasten on the preparations, as the report of November

12, I. c, 140 Sec., by the Governor-General shows that these preparations were completed on the 12th. (Cf. pp. 26 and 27 of the Memorandum.)

"It goes without saying that the Supreme Command has vigorously supported the demands of industry for Belgian labour, without concerning itself with the details of the matter, as they considered that the fulfilment of the munitions programme, and therefore the issue of the war, were being jeopardized by the shortage of labour.

"6. The Memorandum points out (p. 26) that in many cases it is not the deportations as such, but the methods of selection (men being taken who are not unemployed), which have caused trouble, and that the so-called 'mistakes' are partly attributable to the difficulties made by the Belgians themselves.

"7. The result of the compulsory deportations was a very considerable increase in the number of voluntary engagements, and this would not have happened unless there had been the threat of compulsion in the background. (Cf. p. 29 of the Memorandum.)

"I have no need to assure Your Excellency that by these statements I am not in any way criticizing Your Excellency or individual officials of the General-Government, especially as I entirely share Your Excellency's views. But I think it is important to meet certain statements in the Memorandum with opinions and evidence which conflict with them, and in case of necessity use these in the interests of the Supreme Command.

"Meanwhile, I should not take this course without having told Your Excellency of my intention and without feeling certain that my statements would be confirmed by Your Excellency yourself. I should be particularly grateful if Your Excellency would do so.*

(Signed) "VON HINDENBURG."

* General von Bissing confirmed the contents of para. 1 to 7 above.

CHAPTER III

FINANCIAL QUESTIONS: WAGES AND WAR PROFITS

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REPRODUCED.

No.	Registered No.	To	Contents.
1	II. No. 2452 sec., 9/3/17.	War Minister and Imperial Chancellor.	Wage questions.
2	II. No. 57772.	Imperial Chancellor.	Reducing the cost of the war.
3	II. No. 72467, 8/12/17.	War Bureau, Minister of Public Works, Imperial Chancellor.	The cost of the war unnaturally high. Measures required such as reduction of war profits, reduction of wages in munition industries, bringing down prices of raw materials and food.
4	II. No. 72467 ref. II., 26/12/17.	Secretary of State of Imperial Treasury.	Reduction of wages must certainly be begun. The following steps necessary: No further rise of prices, illicit trading to be stopped, fall in prices of articles of necessity. Measures against migration of labour due to offer of higher wages.
5	II. No. 74785, 9/1/18.	War Minister.	Serious financial situation fully realized. Fundamental objections to reduction of officers' pay. Comparison with wages and profits at home. The achievements of the regular Corps of Officers.
6	II. No. 81479, 25/3/18.	Secretary of State of Imperial Treasury.	Treasury proposal to entrust commission appointed by G.H.Q. with execution of measures to limit cost of war is rejected, as G.H.Q. has nothing to do with constitutional responsibility of Chancellor. Courses open for improvement of financial situation remain: Limitation of profits, reasonable prices for raw material, limitation of wages, gradual lowering of wages, prevention of further rise in cost of food and everyday necessities.

No.	Registered No.	To	Contents.
7	II. No. 6214, 22/4/18.	Chief of General Staff and War Minister.	From the Imperial Treasury, 22 April, 1918; the Treasury reply to Chief of General Staff and War Minister.
—	II. No. 6214, 22/4/18.		
—	II. No. 8102 sec., 11/5/18.	War Minister.	Cannot agree to reducing pay of higher officers only. Rise in cost of living. Incomes in private professions, particularly banks, commerce and workers' wages appreciably increased. Financial situation can only be improved by bringing down prices of common necessities, limiting profits, etc. Wage movement at a standstill.
8	II. No. 88209, 6/6/18.	War Minister, Imperial Chancellor, War Economic Office.	Rise in cost of living particularly hard on fixed incomes, hence increase of pay for officers necessary now, not after peace. Postponement until peace not possible.
9	II.d. No. 1460, 28/6/18.	War Minister.	Letter from Minister of the Interior.
	II. No. 9043 sec., 2/7/18.	Minister of Interior.	Attitude towards wage question.
10	I. c/II. No. 93101, 26/7/18.	War Minister.	Increase of pay for all N.C.O.'s and men of mobilized units necessary. (Rise of prices, comparison with conditions at home.) Pensions of officers' widows and orphans must also be raised.

I

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 2542 Secret.

"G.H.Q.,
"9/3/1917.

"To the War Minister.

"It is incontestible that the various unpleasant revelations at home must gradually have a bad influence on the spirit of the army also. In view of the importance of maintaining in our army that excellent spirit which is doubly vital to the military issue of the war in view of the backward state of our munition industries, my duty compels me to refer to the

principal evils with an earnest request that energetic measures should be taken to counteract them.

"1. In particular *the continuous rise of wages* must make our soldiers extraordinarily bitter. Moreover, there is great irony in the fact that the soldier who offers his life and his health at the front gets a few coppers, while the workers in the factories at home are beginning to draw wages which exceed many times the salaries of the higher officials, etc. A highly qualified skilled worker to-day frequently draws more pay than a Staff officer at the front. The evil effect of this disparity is just as great at home, where men called up under the Auxiliary Service Act—and women—are working side by side with serving soldiers or officials, the former frequently receiving many times the pay of the latter, although they do less work and have less responsibility.

"But it is the families of those in military service who are the hardest hit.

"If it was considered necessary for reasons of economy to cut down the pay of the officers the same step should have been taken in the case of the auxiliary service men, and indeed on a larger scale.

"2. The ever-recurring and successful strikes have an extremely injurious effect. Starting from actual food scarcity, they are usually accompanied by demands for increases of wages, which have to be conceded off-hand by the employers because otherwise deliveries for the army would fall even further behind. The workmen know this and thanks to the work of unscrupulous agitators are perpetually exploiting the fact. There can be no doubt that the unfortunate form of the Auxiliary Service Act is partially responsible. Originally the law was intended to emphasize men's duty to their Fatherland, but instead it has become a weapon in the struggle for so-called labour rights. It is exceedingly regrettable and a bad symptom of the poor sense of duty of the strikers that, at the moment when the issue of the war is

materially dependent on what our munition industries can do, strikes break out on a large scale and the men's claims are conceded unconditionally. And yet these are the same men who only a short time back were prepared to hold out to the last for their Kaiser and Empire. It is clear that the great majority of them have been seduced by agitators.

"This situation is impossible in the long run. We must take counter measures, or this state of affairs, combined with the internal situation, will bring us to ruin.

"To remedy the evils referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, the first step would be to educate public opinion by means of propaganda. 'Propaganda' must not be left to the bad elements alone.

"The next step is to take vigorous action against the agitators, using the full powers of the law. The Auxiliary Service Act is in some senses an obstacle, but on the other hand the State of Siege Act gives us all the machinery required to deal with the situation.

"In other countries, where the workers' sense of duty is in general no worse than here, compulsory measures have had to be adopted in increasing measure towards the refractory elements.

"Your Excellency must be aware how the dangers of the continuous rises of wages, strikes and the unhindered migration of labour are regarded in industrial circles. I have before me the statements of men who emphasize the seriousness of the situation.

"It is not my business to go into the social and financial side of the question in greater detail. It is, however, clear to everyone that we are creating difficulties which can only be overcome at the cost of a severe blow to the structure of the State.

"To the Imperial Chancellor.

"I have the honour of sending Your Excellency a copy of a letter I have sent to-day to the War Minister.

"A copy of a letter from the Director-General of the Munitions Department is also enclosed. For the rest I refer to the letters of Herr Krupp v. Bohlen already forwarded to Your Excellency.

(Signed) "VON HINDENBURG."

2.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 57772 op.

"G.H.Q.,
"15/6/1917.

"TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR.

"The Secretary of the Imperial Treasury has forwarded to me a copy of his report of 21/5/1917 to Your Excellency on the financial situation of the Empire.

"I notice first of all that the monthly cost of the war is continually rising and indeed far more than the rise of prices in the munitions and other industries warrants. The reason for this mysterious increase in the cost of the war is, to a very large extent, the enormous rise in the level of wages, which both directly and indirectly (by increasing the cost of production) makes ever-growing inroads upon the national purse. Rising wages have in turn had the effect of raising the prices of everyday necessities.

"This phenomenon is extremely serious, but unfortunately we are ourselves most to blame for it. As I pointed out at the time in my letter of 23/10/1916, II. No. 37768 op., even at that time I considered it necessary to extend the liability to military service in the direction of a lower physical standard, higher age limit and so forth, and further to regard munition work as a discharge of that liability. We should then have been in a position to control wages and the cost of living; we should have kept down the cost of the war and at the same time avoided the crying injustice that the man fit for service

in the field risks his life for a meagre pittance while the stay-at-home is drawing, at no risk to himself, wages which are usually higher than the salary of a government official or the pay of a Staff officer. The Auxiliary Service Act which has taken the place of my proposals actually promotes the wage-scramble. The 'duty' mentioned in clause 1 of this law is now almost entirely forgotten, while 'rights' are everything. I need not mention that the most generous measures for improving the conditions of the working classes are desired by me as much as anyone. I regret most sincerely that the food supply of the workers in some parts failed occasionally some time back.

"The Auxiliary Service Act, in its present form, is a positive obstacle to the financial stability of the State apart from the evils of its incidental effects, such as the demoralization, especially of women and the young, the gradual extinction of the middle classes and its tendency to obliterate the distinction between duties and rights.

"As our financial stability exerts a considerable influence on the economic situation and particularly on our military situation, both now and in the future, I consider it my duty to point out these dangers and to emphasize the necessity of providing against them *at once*. My proposals are as follows:

"1. The best solution would be the repeal of the Auxiliary Service Act and the introduction of a liability to service or 'auxiliary service' for women; the question of better conditions for the working classes could be dealt with in the new bill.

"2. Secondly, it seems to me essential that all government departments and authorities should conduct an inquiry, or be examined, to see whether their staffs, both male and female, are not too large." I believe this would result in the release of considerable numbers, particularly from the newly formed departments, but also from the military departments.

"3. With or without a modification of the Auxiliary Service

Act on the lines of 1 above (see 1), local maximum rates of salaries should be fixed for the officials and auxiliary employees who are left (clerks, female clerks, etc.), and the payment of higher rates strictly forbidden. Both in industry and trade there have been bitter complaints about this.

"4. Lastly, all workers and other persons under contract who have no family to support must contribute towards the funds to provide for men disabled in the war.

"It is certain that a large number of men who have been on active service will require a period of convalescence or medical treatment to restore their health before resuming their civil occupations. The earning power of many of them will have been reduced. It is only equitable that the enormous wages of those who work at home and have only themselves to think about should contribute something to defray the expenses involved.

(Signed) "VON HINDENBURG."

3.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 72467 op.

"G.H.Q.,
"8/12/1917.

"TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE WAR BUREAU, THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS, THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR, THE IMPERIAL ECONOMIC OFFICE AND THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

"It is some time since the Secretary of the Imperial Treasury first stated that the financial position is extremely unfavourable and in the long run must make it doubtful whether we can continue the war and embark upon reconstruction when it is over. The explanation is the fact that the cost of the war has risen to an utterly abnormal figure. I have just seen the minutes of the conference at the Ministry of Public Works on 21/10 on the effect of the scale of wages in

munition works on the scale obtaining on the State railways, and the letter of 23/11 from the Director of the War Bureau on the question of the prices of articles of common consumption has come to my notice. They entirely confirm the Secretary of the Treasury's opinion and show how necessary it is that some action should be taken.

"As the solution of this problem is of extraordinary importance for the prosecution of the war and the future military resources of the Empire, I consider it my duty to make a few remarks on this matter.

"It was obvious that the shortage of raw material, food and labour during the war would lead to an all-round rise in prices. This rise could have been faced so long as it was only in proportion to the national income and that of the individual, i.e., did not lead to unreasonable earnings on one side and excessive working costs on the other, and as long as it did not prejudice our chances when peace came and we should once again compete in the world market.

"But we have exceeded that limit. The rise of prices covers the following cases:

"(*a*) *The profits of the Employers.* There is no doubt that the profits made in munitions industries and others delivering war material have exceeded a reasonable limit. They cost the State vast sums of money. I therefore welcome those efforts to limit profits which have been made, particularly in the last few months, and I can only support the proposal to examine each item in the cost of production—down to the raw material itself—and fix a reasonable price on this basis. Of course we must expect resistance on the part of the producers. For that reason we shall only get to the bottom of the matter and arrive at definite results if the committees which are to investigate prices are given powers to take evidence, or have evidence taken, on oath. I may point out that in England State intervention for the purpose of fixing prices has been extended to the smallest details, that most

war industries are under the closest State supervision, and that in that country, in spite of a considerable rise in wages, there has been an appreciable drop in the price of iron and steel, for example, during the war.

"(*b*) *Raw Material.* We have witnessed an unnatural rise in prices, not only in the munitions industries but also in many kinds of raw material which are state-controlled and many articles of daily consumption.

"I cannot understand why the prices of boots as well as oxygen and carbide, for example, have risen to many times their pre-war level and in some cases have had to be fixed by the Government. Leather, wool, linen, etc., are certainly very short, but that is no reason for their absurdly high price. In war time the operation of the law of supply and demand can only be justified within certain very narrow limits. The authorities must certainly make it their business to see that articles of common necessity are available at prices which can be paid without excessive hardship even by the poor. In a matter such as this individual hardship can only be prevented by a scheme of rationing.

"(*c*) *Food.* The level of prices is least scandalous, relatively speaking, in the open food market. The prices of the most important articles of food are not exorbitant. The fact remains that a strong campaign against illicit trading is extremely desirable. Whether really effective steps in this direction are possible seems to me questionable, at any rate so long as we do not set up courts capable of acting quickly and armed with summary powers. Here again England has set an example. The evil is certainly very widespread, even now. Our efforts to stamp it out must be all the greater.

"(*d*) *Wages.* Wages have risen to high levels during the war but the degree of the rise varies very greatly. In many places it has only kept pace with the increases in the cost of food, but in the case of large numbers of munition workers it is well above the level imposed by higher prices. My opinion

on this matter seems to be confirmed by the fact that habits of extravagance, luxury and sloth are quite general with certain sections of munition workers. There must thus be other reasons to account for these high rates of wages. The explanation is to a certain extent agitation among the workers and the systematic appeal to cupidity. The present crisis is being deliberately exploited, but the excessive profits made by the employers have had a great influence.

"As long as this situation lasts wages will continue to rise and this will directly induce higher profits.

"It will be a case of continually putting on the screw.

"That is why it is so extremely important that profits should be reduced and the cost of living brought down. That must be the first step. Meanwhile, we must at any cost prevent any further unjustifiable wage increases.

"Next, it will be necessary seriously to tackle the question of reducing the excessive rates of wages paid in war industries. I have already suggested that the rise in wages in these industries has not been accompanied by a corresponding rise in the wages of other workers. This is equally true of the whole Middle Class and the majority of persons with fixed incomes. That is intolerable. We have only two alternatives. We must either fix wages in war industries at their present level and see that the incomes of the classes and callings mentioned are raised to correspond, (though the State could hardly bear such a burden) or we must reduce munition wages to a reasonable figure. Even then we should have to increase fixed incomes, but we could keep them within tolerable limits.

"Altogether apart from this aspect of the matter the approaching struggle for the recovery of our position in the world market makes a reduction in the level of wages imperative.* The most critical stage of this struggle will be

* At that time I still thought that there was ground for hoping that the general upward movement of prices could be checked. [The Author.]

the early days of peace. No one knows when the war will end, so that our measures for restoring a healthy relation between services, incomes and wages permit of no delay. It is obvious that industry cannot stand these high wages when we get back to peace conditions. On the other hand, a sudden reduction at this moment would have incalculable consequences in labour circles and arouse very natural dissatisfaction among those who have risked life and limb at the front.

(Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

4.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"Ref. II. No. 72467 op. II.

"G.H.Q.,
"26/12/1917.

"TO THE SECRETARY OF THE IMPERIAL TREASURY.

"My representative has given me a report of the Treasury conference of the 19th inst. on the questions of wages, food prices, etc.

"I should like to say once more that I regard every method of preventing further wage increases and effecting a gradual reduction as very important in the interests of the army. It is the high wages of those workers who have stayed at home (although these rates are enjoyed by a restricted upper labour stratum only) which embitter the men at the front and demoralize the troops. It should also be remembered that if these high wages only begin to fall after the conclusion of peace the effect on the labour world will be very bad. Both the workers who have stayed at home and the men returning from the front will think that the return of the soldiers has been made an excuse to reduce wages. It would mean driving our soldiers into the camp of the radical Left. On the other hand, it is of course out of the question that the

present high level of wages can continue under peace conditions.

"The following are suggestions for preventing further rises of wages and paving the way for a reduction:

1. To prevent any increase in the prices of rationed foods.

2. Stamping out illicit trading.

3. Reducing the prices of articles of common necessity (boots, clothes) to a reasonable level.

4. Confiscating industrial profits above a reasonable figure.

5. Measures for preventing employers from attracting labour from other work by the offer of higher wages.

"I should be very glad if Your Excellency would immediately take up this question—which is so enormously important from the military, financial and social standpoint—with the other authorities concerned.

(Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

5.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.

"II. No. 74785 op.

"G.H.Q.,

"9/1/1918.

"TO THE WAR MINISTER.

"I realize the seriousness of the financial position—both now and prospectively after the war—to which the Secretary of the Treasury has drawn attention and I entirely share his opinion that the German people must learn to economize. But I object strongly to his beginning with the army and for the following reasons:

"1. The wages of munition and other workers have risen considerably, in many cases unreasonably, and the same may be said of the profits of employers and producers. The

growing indebtedness of the Empire is largely attributable to this cause. I can therefore only repeat that the remedy must begin *here*. Unfortunately this is said to be impossible, and indeed on the broad ground that these gentlemen would then produce less—in other words turn traitor to the Fatherland. Yet the army, which is badly paid taking it all round, has had to bear the hardships of a scandalously low wage for years. It has, of course, done its duty, but much reasonable discontent has been roused at the front. At long last there has been an improvement for which we cannot be too thankful. To immediately follow this improvement with a reduction in the pay of the higher officers is a step with which, as I have said, I cannot associate myself. This measure seems to me all the less justifiable as the pay of the officers concerned is not high compared with that of other men in high positions, especially having regard to the enormous load of responsibility which they bear. Besides, the proposed reduction will make little difference to the financial position of the Empire.

"2. I do not know how far *considerations of party politics* have affected Your Excellency's proposal, but I consider any concessions in that quarter a vital error. In my opinion the nation should first know what they owe to the officers, and especially the *regular officers*. I have certainly no desire to belittle the loyalty, energy, resolution and heroism of the Reserve and other officers, N.C.O.'s and men. They are worthy of the greatest admiration. But the chief burden of the war has been borne by the *regular* officers, and to-day they are still the leaders and models, quite apart from the fact that we owe it to them and their work in peace-time that our nation and army are able to defy practically the whole world to-day. The campaign of our enemies at home and abroad against 'militarism,' i.e., the German officer, is merely clap-trap. As we all know, Germany will be strong as long as the German officer remains what he was. It is certainly a remarkable fact that no one has yet seen fit to call attention to the services of

the regular officers and I am firmly convinced that when peace comes, if not before, the agitation against the officer* will begin again in Parliament. In my opinion we should make a firm stand now.

"3. It is undoubtedly a hardship that officers holding the same appointment draw different rates of pay, while those promoted after 1/10/1916 draw a reduced rate. It is true that I agreed to this reduction at the time, but I do not hesitate to say that in the meantime I have changed my opinion. I regard this reduction as unjust and a mistake.

"4. I agree with Your Excellency that after the war the German people must accustom themselves to a simple standard of living. If, however, this is to be taken as meaning that the pay of officers is to be reduced I regard it as a serious danger. There is no doubt that in certain regiments before the war there was far too much useless luxury, but on the whole the officer's standard of living was simple for the very adequate reason that the pay, especially of married junior officers, was insufficient and private means were remarkably scarce. If we reduce the pay we proletarize the Officers' Corps and hinder the foundation of families. To enable men to found families should be regarded as an essential duty of the Government. It is also necessary that officers in the higher ranks should be in a position to save money, within modest limits, in order to give their sons an opportunity of entering a profession and their daughters a chance of getting married. It is a very sad fact, apart from the social and moral aspects of the matter, that at the present time there are immense numbers of girls, the daughters of high officers and officials, who are unmarried. In my opinion, it is of great importance to secure that the officer and his family remain a strong pillar of the State. This means a rate of pay which

*This agitation reached its height during the revolution when officers were shamefully abused and insulted. Later on they were courted again because it was seen that peace and order were unattainable without their help. The officer then forgot all the abuse and did what he considered to be his duty. [The Author.]

is adequate to a modest standard of life. It might certainly be considered whether, in these circumstances, the pay of bachelors should not be reduced in order to increase that of men with large families. In that case the system would have to be extended to all ranks.

(Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

6.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 81479 op.
"Ref. 1/1/4818 of 18/3/18.

"G.H.Q.,
"25/3/1918.

"TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE TREASURY.

"I also* consider impracticable Your Excellency's suggestion to entrust a committee appointed by G.H.Q. with the execution of measures for the limitation of war expenditure. In view of the federal constitution of Germany, this committee would have to include so many representatives of the various ministries and Government departments that this in itself would preclude expeditious and useful work. Further I consider that the committee could not be presided over by a representative of G.H.Q. because the Supreme Command is a purely executive organ of His Majesty and is in no way constitutionally responsible to the Reichstag. On the other hand it is certainly true that at the present time the Supreme Command alone is in a position to realize and estimate the necessities of all the operations on land and sea, and can alone decide as to the urgency and scope of individual demands. But even if the war has, and must have, first place at the present time, economic questions (agriculture, etc.) must receive the consideration due to them. Here again G.H.Q., which in the last resort means His Majesty, must be allowed a considerable voice.

* The word "also" refers to the opinion of the War Minister.

"The processes by which the two sets of interests have been adjusted hitherto are doubtless not defined by law or the constitution. Difficulties have been avoided so far because G.H.Q. has always striven to accommodate itself as much as possible to the interests of all departments and because other authorities on their side have always displayed anxiety to meet the wishes of G.H.Q. In particular there has always been close co-operation with the War Ministry with regard to demands which affect the army, so I do not consider that any alteration in this relationship is required.

"That it is necessary, if at all possible, to improve our war finance I have insisted in letter after letter to Your Excellency. That object can be achieved, I think, in the first place by the limitation of profits, an intelligent scheme for controlling the prices of raw materials, preventing further rises in wages, or gradually bringing them down, and finally by combating further increases in the cost of food and other necessities of daily life. A reduction in the army's requirements is of course possible only in so far as it does not prejudice the conduct of operations. At the same time we and the War Ministry have found that it is possible to reduce the output of certain articles which are particularly costly.

"Should Your Excellency think that further conferences on these matters would be helpful, will you let me know so that I can send a representative armed with full powers?

(Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

7.

"The Imperial Chancellor.
"I. L. 6214.

"Berlin, W. 66,
"22/4/1918.

"TO THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE FIELD ARMY.

"With reference to your letter of March 25, 1918—II. 81479 op.—I have the honour of enclosing a copy of my

letter to the War Minister on the question of reducing war expenditure. I consider the necessity for reducing expenditure so urgent that I cannot withdraw the suggestions I made in my letter of 18/3/1918. If the fact that a representative of Main Headquarters will preside over the committee is regarded as an obstacle, this can be remedied by constituting the committee differently, a matter we could discuss.

"Your Excellency considers that the most important method of reducing expenditure is the limitation of profits, a reasonable raw material policy, the prevention of further increases in wages (or a gradual reduction of wages) and finally an effort to prevent any further increase in the cost of food and other necessities of daily life. I do not ignore the justice of these proposals, but they cannot by themselves lead us to our goal. In addition to such measures some reduction in army expenditure is essential, especially such expenditure as is not incurred directly for war purposes. This step must therefore be taken notwithstanding the objections which may be urged against it.

"I admit that a reduction in the output of various costly articles represents a certain economy. But Your Excellency knows as well as I do that these economies are balanced on the other side by increased expenditure which is due to rising military requirements, so that the net saving is reduced to a sum of from six to nine million marks per month which will not rise to more than from fifteen to twenty million marks until the beginning of next year. These figures, compared with the total expenditure on the army, which has now for a long time exceeded three thousand million marks a month, must be regarded as insignificant or not a factor of any weight in this matter. I should therefore be glad, as I have already said in my letter to the War Minister, to be relieved of the necessity of repeating my proposal that the expenditure of the military administrative authorities should be examined by a committee, and shall take the liberty, as soon as the reply

of the War Minister has come in, of asking Your Excellency to send a representative to discuss this matter with me. I do not wish to bind myself to one committee or to several committees nor to stand on ceremony. Questions of qualifications and difficulties of organization must be regarded as secondary when a matter which is vital to the conduct of the war is in issue.

(Signed) " P. p. COUNT ROEDERN."

" The Imperial Chancellor (Imperial Treasury).
" I.L. 6214,
" Ref. Memo. 2076.3.18. Z.2 of 26/3/1918.

" Berlin,
" 22/4/1918.

" TO THE WAR MINISTER.

" Your Excellency hopes for good results in the way of reduced military expenditure from the order 296. 18. G. Z. 2 of 24/3/1918, relating to the reduction of expenditure, which Your Excellency sent me, and the instructions you have issued to your departments and subordinates to examine the question of what detailed regulations can be made with a view to keeping down expenditure. I certainly hope these efforts will be successful. But in spite of the earnest and peremptory tone of this order I fear it will share the fate of all previous orders on the same subject, the fate of passing into oblivion if its effect is not seconded by direct and personal influence which will bring home the seriousness of the situation to all departmental authorities. This personal direct influence I expect from a committee which may be given *full powers* within certain limits to intervene where there is evidence of misconception, or an attitude towards military requirements which is obviously incompatible with the necessity for economy. Moreover, the committee will be in a position to help in reducing military expenditure in cases where direct intervention would perhaps be undesirable, and where it is

merely a question of assisting the judgment of various officials to whom Your Excellency has already indicated by what methods economies may be effected.

"I do not think the danger to be feared from such a committee is as great as Your Excellency anticipates. It is a method which Your Excellency—to my knowledge—adopted when we had to comb out government departments and industrial establishments; nor is it entirely new to G.H.Q., for it was adopted to make extensive changes in the organizations behind the front. If the adoption of this method was not ruled out in those cases, I believe in spite of Your Excellency's objections, which I must admit were also shared by the Supreme Command, though on other grounds, that it is equally admissible now when it is a question of concentrating the last financial resources of the Empire until the final decision of arms is reached. The Army Administration has created organizations in various spheres without troubling about questions of competence when matters of vital moment to the conduct of operations were at stake. These organizations have worked excellently. I have in mind Patriotic Instruction, the War Bureau and the control of agricultural produce.

"Your Excellency claims sole responsibility for the efficiency of the army. It must certainly be admitted that the Supreme Command, owing to its ability to review the whole field of military interests on land and sea, has a considerable say in deciding questions of scale or priority in the domain of supply as well as on economic questions. If these two sets of interests have been easily adjusted by fixing our eyes on the common goal, I may hope that the interests of my department also, which is working for the same end, will receive the consideration they deserve.

"I will not recite here all the cases which have come to my notice in which financial interests, in spite of many representations, have not received the measure of consideration

which was consistent with the demands of military efficiency itself. But I cannot forget the equipment of the press departments and War Bureau with economic sections, the expenditure on the Propaganda Service, nor the ever-recurring demands for organizations which cannot hope to show results until long after the conclusion of peace, if then. I also refrain, because Your Excellency's order seems to promise a change, from mentioning occurrences from which I was forced to the conclusion that the idea that 'money is nothing in war' had not been completely abandoned in spite of many warnings. Everything I see leaves me in no doubt that nothing will be done by ordinary measures, and that it is necessary to rule out all objections to a measure which holds out the hope, if not certainty, of a change.

"Exceptional circumstances not only sanction but *demand* exceptional measures. I therefore regret that I cannot drop my proposal of a conference on this question. May I once more request Your Excellency to arrange for a conference with me and a representative of Main Headquarters.

(Signed) "P. p. COUNT ROEDERN."

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army,
"II. No. 8102 Secret op.
"Ref. 1667/4. 18. B. 4 a of 4/5/1918.

"G.H.Q.,
"11/5/1918.

"TO THE WAR MINISTER.

"To my regret I cannot even now agree to a reduction of the pay of officers of the higher ranks.

"1. The cost of living is continually rising; it will remain very high even after the war. I consider it impossible for us to retain the scale of pay that existed before the war. It will be essential to raise it considerably if we are to enable our

officers to maintain even a modest standard of life. If we reduce their pay now we shall make it extremely difficult to raise it later on.

"2. Incomes in the open professions corresponding in social standing to the Officers' Corps, particularly those in banking and industrial circles, as well as the wages of the working classes, have been constantly and appreciably increasing. Everyone agrees that a reduction would be desirable. Unfortunately it has not only been found impossible to effect any reduction, but, as the Secretary of the Imperial Economic Office repeated to me recently—under the pressure of the munitions industries—a further increase is quite possible. This is a vicious circle. In view of all this, it is impossible to start reducing officers' pay, and that alone. Otherwise social strata would be transformed in a way which we could not justify to the officers of the German army.

"3. Further reasons are contained in my letter II. No. 74785 I. and II. of 9/1 and 20/2.

"I suggest that Your Excellency should inform the Secretary of the Treasury that a reduction in the pay of officers cannot be approved for the reasons given above. The examples cited by the Secretary of the Treasury of economies practised by certain higher officers are worthless without further inquiry. It is not shown whether the officers mentioned have private means and are unmarried or without dependents. Moreover, the situation has steadily got worse. Even though individual higher officers may perhaps have been able to economize in the early days of the war, this is certainly no longer the case to any appreciable extent, even in the field. Moreover, the measures proposed by Your Excellency cannot have any influence on the financial stability of the nation owing to the fact that the economies to be realized in this way will be negligible. We shall only get sound finance when we drastically limit war profits, bring down the prices

of common and current necessities and check the upward movement of wages.

(Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

8.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 88209 op.

"G.H.Q.,
"6/6/1918.

"TO THE WAR MINISTER.

"In my letter of 11/5/1918, II. No. 8102 Sec. Op., I informed Your Excellency that I could not sanction the proposal to reduce the pay of higher officers, because—apart from other reasons—in view of the economic developments at home an increase of officers' pay after the war will be inevitable, and such an increase would be made more difficult by a reduction now. I have recently wondered whether we should even be able to put off such an increase of pay until the conclusion of peace.

"From the correspondence between the government departments concerned and the Supreme Command* on the question of bringing down the cost of living by a serious limitation of war profits, reducing the prices of articles of everyday use, and forcing down wages, I think I must assume that in the opinion of the government departments it is impossible to anticipate any reduction in the cost of living for a long time to come and a further increase of wages is inevitable. Further, according to the reports of 35 of the G. O's C. of the Corps districts the agitation for increased wages is by no means over.

* Imperial Economic Office	I. A.F. 2756 4/5/1918.
War Ministry	33. 18. Sec. B. 4 of 12/2/1918.
Treasury	VI. 5146. I. of 6/12/1917.
	J. L. 2258 of 24/2/1918.
	J. L. 6214 of 22/4/1918.
Chief of the General Staff of Field Army . .	II. No. 72467 Op. of 8/12/1917.
	II. No. 74785 Op. of 9/1/1918.

On the contrary it would appear that continuous pressure in the direction of an increase of wages is being exerted by the representatives of labour. The employers yield to this pressure only too readily. They want to avoid strikes, and in time of war it is not they, but ultimately the State which bears the cost. From the same reports it also appears that the upward movement of prices of clothing, boots and other everyday necessities is by no means at an end. Direct evidence convinces me that prices have again risen considerably.

"These movements necessarily involve a very great increase in the cost of living. I regret that they could not be prevented and I regard it as one of our most pressing tasks to make it possible for the less wealthy classes—and in the present situation these are the people dependent on fixed incomes—to cope with the cost of living. This question is of quite special importance to the field army; its members have no share in war profits and rises in wages; on the contrary many of them have suffered appreciable financial losses. Yet these men have done far more for the community than those who have stayed at home. It is thus intolerable that our fighting men should find themselves faced with penury on the conclusion of peace. Such an eventuality must be prevented on the ground of common justice. I will not discuss here what steps are required, but one thing appears to me certain: the measures adopted hitherto have not been successful.

"But apart from these problems of the future we must tackle the existing situation at once. It is such that officers and N.C.O.'s without private means, most people with fixed incomes, and particularly the widows and orphans of those officers who have fallen in the war, have been reduced to a position that can only be described as beggary. I consider that an immediate increase of officers' pay (peace or reserve pay), as well as officers' and widows' pensions, is essential. It is out of the question to postpone this step until peace in view of present circumstances. At the same time I should like to

point out that such an increase will still be necessary even if it is found possible to bring down the cost of living to an appreciable degree, for even then the latter will not fall to its pre-war level.

"From the point of view of national finance this proposal will meet with serious objections. They must be withdrawn. It is only right that we should relieve those who are paid by the State of the consequences of the general depreciation in the value of money.

"Members of the Officers' Corps and Government officials have more than fulfilled their duty during the war. The nation owes them a debt of gratitude, and even if this cannot be expressed in terms of money we may at least ask that the most loyal servants of the State shall not suffer want.

(Signed) "VON HINDENBURG."

9.

"Minister of the Interior. "Berlin,
"II. d. No. 1460. "28/6/1918.

"TO THE WAR MINISTER.

"Secret information which has reached the President of Police shows that the intended reduction of wages in munition works has aroused a storm of indignation in labour circles, and that this reduction is calculated to mark the end of the restraint shown by the workers hitherto, in spite of the shortage of food, the increase in the cost of living and the delay in settling the suffrage question. The reduction of wages is a weapon in the hands of all those who like fishing in troubled waters, and there is therefore some danger that such a reduction, carried through over the heads of the party and Trade Union leaders, might lead to unrest and disorder.

"I must admit that this view is sound, but without expressing any opinion as to the equity and necessity of

bringing down wages in war industries, I am bound to regard it as extremely dangerous to force through the proposed reductions in the present very strained situation. The step will be likely to have the most unfavourable effect on working class opinion. To avert these disastrous effects it seems to me very necessary that the competent authorities should take strong measures to prevent the proposals going any further for the time being.

"I shall be glad to know what those authorities think of my suggestion.

"I have sent a copy of this letter to the Imperial Chancellor and the Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 9043 Sec.
"Ref. II. d. No. 1460 of 28/6/18.

"G.H.Q.,
"2/7/1918.

"To the Minister of the Interior.

"Will Your Excellency permit me the following remarks on your letter under reply:

"1. I cannot understand how it comes about that a discussion of wage reductions by a very small committee, comprising representatives of the Government and the Supreme Command only, can have become public property. There has been some gross breach of confidence here and I think appropriate action should be taken.

"2. The Supreme Command have asked that wages should be gradually reduced because the disparity of wages at home and the pay of the men at the front is a crying injustice and has aroused great discontent. The suggestion is now that less attention should be paid to the state of feeling in the army, which is doing its duty, than to working class opinion or that of their representatives who are threatening disorder and a refusal to do their duty.

"Of course I should have been only too glad if the financial burdens—including the high rates of profits prevailing—could have been reduced and some relief obtained for the future, but that is the province of the Government and the Treasury alone. Yet I cannot believe that the Government really sees itself compelled to adopt certain measures which are inconsistent with the welfare of the State merely because it is afraid of labour unrest.

"Just as breaches of discipline at the front are punished with the full power of the law, I consider that similar action should be taken against any man at home who does not do his duty and thus—I cannot put it otherwise—betrays his country. We have the necessary powers, and in the long run concessions will only mean the downfall of the Government.

"I am also convinced that the mass of our working men are much too reasonable and patriotic to render the issue of the war doubtful by their own selfishness. In any case the Government is in a position to make itself obeyed. The nation, and more particularly the working classes, must be enlightened by intelligent propaganda as to the seriousness of the situation. I do not doubt that if that is done everyone will do his duty. There is not the slightest reason why such propaganda should induce pessimism. I am sure that the methods employed by the statesmen of the Entente might be an excellent model for us as well.

(Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

10.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"I. c/II. No. 93101.

"G.H.Q.,
"26/7/1918.

"TO THE WAR MINISTER.

"I have the honour of making the following observations on Your Excellency's telegram. I consider a general increase

in the pay of all N.C.O.'s and men in active units is required at once.

"We have not succeeded in checking the general upward movement of prices. They are continuously rising. The result is that the private soldier at the front is no longer in a position to provide himself with luxuries even on the most modest scale. This affects both his spirit and efficiency, and rouses bitter feelings. Comparison with home conditions teaches the soldier at the front that his brother workman at home, far from all dangers to life and health, is, generally speaking, drawing wages which permit him an almost luxurious standard of life, and that profits have reached almost incredible heights, whilst he himself is exposing his life in the service of the community, has to endure a great strain and many privations and is never in a position to give himself the most simple pleasures. This is an intolerable situation, and we must change it as soon as possible. To increase his pay by a few marks would in no way remedy the evil. I consider that what is required is an increase all round of at least 20 marks a month. In my opinion it is impossible to reduce the pay of part of the army, and the circumstances certainly do not justify such a course. I must leave it to Your Excellency to decide whether the pay of garrison troops should also be raised.

"I shall be glad if this increase in the pay of the field army involves an increase in that of the junior officers, for our subalterns at the front—at any rate the married ones—have found themselves in an intolerable financial position.

"May I also draw your attention to the following points:

"At the final sitting of the Reichstag the Secretary of the Treasury said that he intended to obtain its sanction to the grant of a considerable war bonus to civil servants in the autumn. I take it for granted that this bonus will be extended to administrative officers, a suggestion which I made in my letter of June 6 (II. No. 88209). In my opinion

it will be impossible to confine such a bonus to civil servants. The higher army authorities certainly could not give their sanction to such a proceeding.

"Once more I must repeat my suggestion that the pensions of officers, their widows and children should be raised. In my view this step is both pressing and inevitable. I gave my reasons in the letter referred to.

"I fully realize that if effect is to be given to these proposals, it will involve a heavy burden on the national finances, but that is no reason in any case for our refusal to relieve the army of the consequences of the general depreciation in the value of money. It is not right that the army should be the poor relation while enormous profits are being made at home, wages rise to two or three times their normal level and money is practically lying about in the streets.

(Signed) "VON HINDENBURG."



CHAPTER IV

FOOD

LIST OF DOCUMENTS.

(Only the numbered documents are given.)

No.	Registered No.	To	Contents.
—	II. No. 40042, 24/11/16.	War Food Office, War Bureau, Intendant-General.	Reduction of army butter supply from home by 1,600 tons for the benefit of the munition industries.
—	II. No. 40272, 25/11/16.	President of War Food Office.	Refers to activity of Central Purchasing Commission abroad. Fighting organization—policy of artificial prices—unnecessary transport.
—	II. No. 46087, 31/1/17.	Imperial Chancellor.	Proposal to make Intendant-General member of W.F.O. to familiarize him with home food situation and facilitate co-operation with Army administration.
1	II. No. 51102, 26/3/17.	War Minister.	Refers to food difficulties. Co-operation between civil and military authorities absolutely necessary. Uniform requisition, distribution and administration of supplies. No emergency supplies.
2	II. No. 51982, 6/4/17.	Army Headquarters and Corps Districts.	Reduction of army bread ration for benefit of civil population.
—	II. No. 58726, 28/6/17.	Imperial Chancellor.	Memo. of Imperial Potato Controller on negotiations with G. G. Warsaw. Failure to get any considerable quantities from G. G. Warsaw. Action against those responsible. Regrettable that departmental friction and legal questions should hinder deliveries.
3	I. Q.M.G., 13/12/17.	Secretary of State of W.F.O.	Present system of compulsory cultivation has failed. Gradual change required. Agricultural associations and consumers' unions should be used.
—	II. No. 8733 secret, 17/6/18.	Chiefs of Staffs of Army Groups and Armies.	Harvest prospects at home bad. All unnecessary consumption of food and fodder must be prevented. The harvest to be gathered at once in occupied areas and made available for general food supply.

I.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 51102 op.

"G.H.Q.,
"26/3/1917.

"To the War Minister, General von Stein.

"The food situation at home and the prospects for the period from now to the next harvest are such that everything in any way possible must be done by the army to relieve the situation of the civil population.

"The first matter is to make good the deficit of bread corn. Serious complications will only be avoided if we can place at the disposal of the authorities at home 500,000 tons of bread corn or flour from the supplies which were originally provided for the army. With a view to seeing whether this demand can be met, I propose that on April 2, at some hour to be fixed by Your Excellency, there shall be a Conference at the Ministry of War between the Intendant-General, the Administration Department, the Food Commissioner for Prussia, the War Food Office, Main Headquarters and the Director of Field Railways. At the Conference the Intendant-General would give complete figures of all supplies at the disposal of the army administration on January 31, and of army requirements up to August 15. The figures of army requirements will be based on demands which are absolutely necessary, and *there must be no question of emergency supplies.* When we have these figures Your Excellency and I will decide whether, in view of the economic situation at home, there must be a reduction of the daily ration, which exceeds that proposed by the Intendant-General. Moreover, I regard further measures as essential in view of the present great shortage.

"It is no longer feasible to keep the administration of the corn supplies at home in the hands of two authorities, according as they are destined for military or civil consumption.

There are several reasons which have brought me to this conclusion. In the first place, complete supervision, which is absolutely necessary, can only be secured if the storage and administration of all corn supplies is in the hands of *one* authority. Further, only if we have a single administration can we strike a balance between the claims of the army and the civil population, the demands of individual parts of the Empire, and thirdly between the different kinds of corn.

"A further important reason for such a system is the transport question. There can be no doubt that we must avoid unnecessary transport if our munitions programme is to be realized even approximately. But it is equally clear that the present method of distributing corn involves a good deal of unnecessary transport, which could be avoided if there was a single administrative authority.

"I therefore invite Your Excellency to hand over the duties of collecting and distributing all corn supplies, including the Rumanian supplies, to the authorities responsible for the food supply of the civil population. As I have said above, we must abandon the idea of emergency stores, which, in view of the strained situation, would only be possible if we let the civil population starve. Moreover, the establishment of such emergency stores has resulted in a good deal of unnecessary transport. I fully realize that many objections of all kinds could be urged against my proposal, but I am convinced that all those objections have no weight against the fact that we can only hold out by striking a proper balance *everywhere* and exercising the greatest economy.

"We should be held responsible if we did not do everything possible to relieve the situation at home.

"May I ask Your Excellency to let me have your views on this matter as soon as possible.

(Signed) "VON HINDENBURG."

2.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 51982 op.
"Ref. II. No. 50769 of 23/3/17.

"G.H.Q.,
"6/4/1917.

"To all Army Headquarters.

"I. The serious shortage of bread corn requires the following changes in the rations of the Field Army (with effect from 15/4/1917) if the food supply of the civil population at home is to be secured:

"1. For the future the daily extra ration of white flour as compensation for the reduction of the meat ration (up to 20 grammes) is to be fixed at 20 g. as a maximum.

"2. The bread ration for the Field Army is fixed at 500 g.

"Army Headquarters and other Headquarters which are independent units are empowered in *urgent cases* to allow the following larger ration:—

"(*a*) Up to 1,000 g. for troops in mountainous regions above the 1,000 metre level.

"(*b*) Up to 750 g. for troops in the front line.

"(*c*) Up to 750 g. for troops withdrawn from the front line after a battle (for the first 10 days at most).

"(*d*) Up to 600 g. for fighting or L. of C. troops subjected to any exceptional strain.

"3. The bread ration in the General Governments of Belgium and Warsaw will likewise be fixed at 500 g.

"4. Please explain to the troops the necessity for these reductions (Cf. II. 50769 of the 23/3/1917).

"II. In case of doubt about the interpretation of this order the Intendant of the Field Army will decide.

(Signed) "von Hindenburg."

3.

"The First Quartermaster-General.

"G.H.Q.,
"13/12/1917.

"To Herr von Waldow, Secretary of State to the War Food Office, Berlin.

"May I be allowed to send Your Excellency the following suggestion. A conversation I had yesterday with Messrs. . . . . has confirmed my impression that our present system of compulsory cultivation is no longer suitable. In my opinion the fact that it has failed is shown by the estimated results of the harvest and the compulsory deliveries hitherto. The unprecedented increase of illicit trading and the general demoralization of our people are even stronger proof that our present position cannot be maintained in the long run.

"May I therefore ask Your Excellency to consider whether a gradual departure from the present course is not possible and necessary. In my opinion it should take the form of an attempt to enlist the aid of the agricultural associations on the one hand, and the consumers' unions on the other. It goes without saying that the Federal States, or the Empire, as the case may be, must retain the right of control and disposal.

"If Your Excellency has the time, may I suggest that you hear the gentlemen I have mentioned on the subject yourself.

"The food question is vital for the *moral* of the civil population and its power to hold out. It is even more vital for the spirit and efficiency of the army. The issue of the war may easily depend upon the concentration and proper distribution of the scanty food supplies. Hence, I feel it my duty to lay before Your Excellency my proposals, which aim at an improvement of the present system.

(Signed) "P. p. Ludendorff."

CHAPTER V

THE QUESTION OF POPULATION AND PROVISION FOR MEN RETURNED FROM THE WAR

LIST OF THE DOCUMENTS REPRODUCED.

No.	Registered No.	To	Contents.
1	II. No. 63331, op. 9/9/17.	Imperial Chancellor.	Memorandum on the question of population.
2	14/12/17.	Herr Damaschke.	War settlements.
3	February, 1918.	—	The Ludendorff Fund.
4	II. No. 84001, 19/4/18.	Imperial Chancellor.	Shortage of houses on demobilization.
5	II. No. 85873, 20/5/18.	Army Groups.	To ascertain housing requirements in the army.
6	II. No. 90431, 29/6/18.	Imperial Chancellor.	Provision of houses.
7	IIc. No. 31587, 17 and 18/6/18.	Commander-in-Chief in the East.	Settlements in area controlled by C.-in-C. in the East.
8	II. No. 81034, 15/3/18.	Editor K. Schneider.	Provision for the disabled.
9	II. No. 85363, 6/5/18.	Deputy Oeser.	Population policy.
10	II. No. 87562, 4/6/18.	War Minister.	Resources for men returned from the war.
11	RK. No. 2871, 20/8/18.	Chief of the General Staff.	Reply of Chancellor to No. 6.
12	II. No. 90431, 6/9/18.	Imperial Chancellor.	Soldiers' settlements.
13	II. No. 97645, 5/9/18.	The Ludendorff Fund.	Provision for the disabled.
14	II. No. 43617, 3/1/17.	Minister of Education.	Provision for youths at school and college.

I.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 63331.

"G.H.Q.,
"9/9/1917.

"To the Imperial Chancellor. (*Copy to the War Minister.*)

"I am sending Your Excellency herewith a very remarkable memorandum by the Director-General of Medical Services on the 'Nation and the National Forces.'*

"There can indeed be no doubt that for Germany's future it will be vital to formulate and carry through a strong 'population' programme, on the ethical, material and national sides. I regard the establishment of clear and definite principles in this matter as urgent. At the moment the suggestions put forward are not only partially contradictory, but also in some respects fanciful, unnatural, impossible of realization and even dangerous in their consequences. (See, e.g., the first Interim Report of the 16th Committee for questions of population.) On the other hand, I find valuable preliminary work in the 'Report of the Ministry of the Interior' on the 'Results of the Conference of the Ministerial Commission on the Question of the Decreasing Birth-rate.'

"I regard a Government commission as desirable if these principles are to be established. It must be formed as soon as possible. I must ask to be allowed to be represented. Further, I regard the co-operation of gentlemen with practical experience as a vital necessity. In my view the number of members must be restricted, as otherwise the deliberations will be without end or result.

"It will only be later, when some conclusions have been

* It had been drawn up, at the suggestion of the Supreme Command, by the Director-General of Army Medical Services, von Schjerning. [The Author.]

arrived at, that it will be advisable, I believe, to extend the membership, and more especially to co-opt for the common purpose the numerous associations which are already working in the same direction, e.g., the Racial Hygiene Society, the Colonization Society, and so forth.

"I have asked the Director-General of Medical Services to get into direct touch with Your Excellency with a view to following up this matter.

(Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

"TO THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF MEDICAL SERVICES.

"I thank Your Excellency for the memorandum submitted, and ask you to continue your investigations in the field you have opened up with the greatest energy. I am glad to give you my fullest support. I suggest that your co-operators get into touch with O.II.

(Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

MEMORANDUM OF THE GENERAL STAFF ON THE GERMAN POPULATION AND ARMY

Introduction.

1. The power and well-being of a State have their foundation in the number and physique of its population.

2. The truth of this proposition was patent to every person of insight even before, but it is only through the war that it has penetrated the consciousness of the whole nation.

3. The importance of *physique*—of the community as well as the individual—is obvious. The value of *numbers* has been under-estimated hitherto in many quarters.

4. Wars are decided—mainly—not on the day on which peace is signed. Germany's future is dependent to a far greater degree on the question within what time, and to what extent, she will have repaired her losses, especially *in men.*

5. Worse than the losses through the war is the decline in the figure of our population owing to the falling birth-rate.

Our greatest danger threatens us from that side.

6. In peaceful rivalry in work, as in the bloody strife of the battle-field, in the long run only those nations will remain free and vigorous who recover their numerical standard and their physical and mental powers, and maintain them at the highest possible level.

His Majesty the Kaiser and King has frequently drawn attention to this matter.

7. In this knowledge various State authorities and deputies, communes, associations and private individuals have already issued important warnings and resolutions, and demanded immediate legislative measures, as any delay in this matter means damage which can never be made good.

In this place it is only necessary to recall the conferences of the Prussian Ministerial Commission on the Decline of the Birth-rate, the debates in the Prussian House of Representatives on the population problem on February 17, 1917,* the work of the 16th Reichstag Committee for questions of population, and the memorandum of the Prussian Scientific Medical Deputation on the influence of war feeding on the health of the nation.

I. THE DECLINE OF OUR NATIONAL AND MILITARY STRENGTH

a. THE GROWTH OF THE POPULATION BEFORE THE WAR

1. The great wars of former centuries, especially the Thirty Years and Napoleonic Wars, certainly involved permanent sacrifices of German blood and property. Plague also, especially in the Middle Ages, depopulated large areas, and its effects are felt even to-day.

But all these losses, and the additional losses caused by

* Report of the 60th Session of the House of Representatives of 17/2/17.

disease, accidents, suicide and emigration, were previously amply repaired by the steady growth of our population, and more particularly by the excess of births over deaths in Germany.

2. In the year 1913 Germany had 66·9 million inhabitants. Since 1870/1 the population had increased by 26 millions.

3. The population of Germany was:

	1871	1900	1910
Country.	26·2 mill. = 63·9%	25·7 mill. = 45·6%	25·8 mill. = 39·7%
Town . .	14.8 „ = 36·1%	30·6 „ = 54·4%	39·1 „ = 60·3%
	41·0 mill.	56·3 mill.	64·9 mill.

In 1895, for the first time, the ratio turned against the country, when this had 49 per cent. of the population, while the towns had 51 per cent.

At the beginning of the war the ratio had increased to 36: 64, exactly the reverse of 1871.

One-quarter of all the inhabitants of Germany lived in the large towns (over 100,000 inhabitants).

4. The average longevity in Germany for the male population increased from 33 (1867-1870) to 46·4 (1906-1910), mainly as a result of improved national economy and hygiene.*

5. The death-rate declined. There died per thousand (excluding still-born):

1871-1880	27·2	1901-1910	18·7
1891-1900	22·2	1913	15·8

Thanks to the progress of medicine and our economic expansion in the last years before the war, about 720,000 fewer persons died per annum than might have been expected from the death-rate which had prevailed thirty years before. The decline in the death-rate was mainly in that of adults, the rate of child mortality remaining practically stationary, or indeed increasing to a certain extent. It was only after the beginning of the century that the rate of child mortality declined more than that of adults.

* Hueppe: *Deutschland's Volkskraft und Wehrfähigkeit;* von Cohr and von Schjerning Lib., 39 vols., Berlin, 1916.

It is to be presumed that by further hygienic measures—especially provision for infants and the campaign against tuberculosis—we shall have even greater success in eliminating causes of death. But, of course, the natural laws of life and death impose a certain limit.

6. Another and indirect cause of the growth of our population was the decline of emigration since 1893. Germany's industry for the requirements of the world market continuously gave those who were willing to work plenty of opportunity to render good service within the home frontiers.

7. But the greatest source of our numbers was the increase in the number of births.

Per thousand inhabitants—

Year.	Births (including still-born).	Marriages.	Deaths.	Excess of births over deaths.	Absolute excess of births over deaths.	Population (in thousands).
1870...	40·1	7·7	29·0	11·1	451,331	40,805
1872...	41·1	10·3	30·6	10·5	431,305	41,230
1873...	41·3	10·0	29·9	11·4	473,824	41,564
1875...	42·3	9·1	29·3	13·0	552,019	42,518
1876...	42·6	8·5	28·1	14·5	626,594	43,059
1880...	39·1	7·5	27·5	11·6	522,970	45,095
1883...	38·0	7·7	27·3	10·7	493,697	46,016
1887...	38·3	7·8	25·6	12·7	605,155	47,630
1890...	37·0	8·0	25·6	11·4	560,247	49,241
1898...	37·3	7·4	21·7	15·6	846,871	54,406
1900...	36·8	8·5	23·2	13·6	765,680	56,046
1901...	36·9	8·2	21·8	15·1	857,824	56,874
1902...	36·3	7·9	20·6	15·6	902,243	57,767
1904...	34·1	8·2	19·2	14·9	910,275	61,153
1910...	30·7	7·7	27·1	13·6	879,113	64,568
1911...	29·5	7·8	18·2	11·3	739,945	65,359
1912...	29·1	7·9	16·4	12·7	839,887	66,146
1913...	28·3	7·7	15·8	12·5	833,800	66,978
1914...	27·6	6·8	—	—	—	—

8. We thus owe the high figure of our population mainly to the excess of births over deaths. But, on the other hand, the figures of births reveal a disquieting and progressive decline in the productiveness of this best, most natural source, a source which we can still increase by voluntary effort.

The decline in the birth-rate began in 1876, and since the opening of the twentieth century has revealed a menacing acceleration. Immediately before the war 560,000 children fewer were born annually than should have been, judging by the percentage of the year 1900.

Since 1901 *the German birth-rate has been falling faster than the death-rate.*

9. The causes of the declining birth-rate are due only to a very slight extent to a decline in physical fertility or reluctance to marry, and is to be ascribed mainly to the voluntary restriction of families by married couples. This phenomenon, which is to be observed among all nations with an advanced culture, started in Germany with the middle and upper classes in the large towns, and gradually extended to the rest of the population, even the country population. The small family is most characteristic of persons with fixed incomes. It is not so true of the industrial classes, and least true of the country population.

The large towns produce the fewest children. (In 1876 Berlin had 47·2 births per thousand inhabitants; in 1911 only 21·6.)

The main reasons are the desire of the parents that their children shall at least maintain the same financial standard which they themselves have attained, and, further, their efforts to avoid finding themselves worse off as a result of having children. Moral and religious considerations, not to mention the shortage of accommodation, also played an important part.

10. If a stop is not speedily put to this evil Germany's world position will be in danger before long. For our eastern neighbour alone, Russia, will in all human probability have increased her present population of 170 millions to at least 240 or 250 millions in the next fifty years.

The war has certainly proved once again that superiority in numbers is not always decisive. But the great numerical

superiority of our enemies, who will continue to be a menace to us, both in a military and economic sense, compels us to regard the increase of our population as the most important of our aims in war and peace.

The case of France, whose population has declined since 1911, must serve as a serious lesson. In that year the balance on the wrong side was 35,000, and in the first half of the year 1914 it was not less than 25,000.

11. The number of children born alive per 1,000 of population:

1901 . . . . 35·7	1906 . . . . 33·1	1911 . . . . 28·6
1902 . . . . 35·1	1907 . . . . 32·2	1912 . . . . 28·3
1903 . . . . 33·9	1908 . . . . 32·1	1913 . . . . 27·5
1904 . . . . 34·1	1909 31	1914 . . . . 26·8
1905 33	1910 . . . . 28·8	1915 . . . . —

The number of still-born cases is uncertain, as many of them were not reported to the registrars.

In 1901 we reached the highest point for the century with 2,033,313 children born alive. Of these only 1,612,090 survived the first year.

The infant mortality is not exceeded anywhere in Europe except Austria and Russia. It is true that, thanks to the measures for preserving infant life, there has been a progressive and considerable decrease in our infant mortality. In 1901 269 per thousand died; in 1913 the figure was only 167. Yet Germany's achievements in this department are still far behind those of States with an inferior culture.

It is particularly bad in the case of the illegitimate children. The number of illegitimate births in Germany has relatively increased, and in 1914 already amounted to 9·8 per cent., that is almost one-tenth of the whole number of births.

In Prussia the towns produced 11·5 illegitimate children per hundred.
" " " country " 6·5 " " " " "
" " from 1,000 legitimate births 28·3 children were born dead.
" " " " illegitimate " 43·7 " " " "
" " there died of 1,000 live births 147 legit. } infants in
261 illegit. } towns.
" " " " " " " " 159 legit. } infants in
287 illegit. } the country.

Of 1,000 legitimate children in Berlin 696 survived their first year, while of 1,000 illegitimate children only 332 survived that period.

Of 1,000 legitimate children in Berlin 512 had reached the age of 19, while of 1,000 illegitimate children 136 only were of that age.

In this way we are suffering a great loss of children, especially illegitimate children, and this does not include the loss already mentioned through artificial limitation of families, which is certainly on the increase.

The death-rate among older children has certainly declined most encouragingly since 1900. But a good deal more can and must be done in this sphere.

The causes of infant mortality are far more economic and moral than medical.

12. *Venereal diseases* are a source of wastage of our national vigour.

Apart from the numerous cases of death and loss of intellectual stamina of which they and their after effects are the cause to those affected, fewer or defective children, to the number of hundreds of thousands, are born owing to their parents suffering from venereal diseases. The number of children in Prussia alone who die in infancy as a result of hereditary syphilis is put at 30,000 and more per annum.

13. Of national scourges tuberculosis is still the most widespread and deadly. Thanks to the systematic campaign against it, it has been steadily on the decline in the last thirty years. In 1913 the lowest point was reached. In 1879, 325 persons out of every 100,000 died of tuberculosis; in 1913 only 137.

Its ravages have increased as the result of the war. By 1915 there were 6 per cent. more deaths through tuberculosis than in 1914, and the figures for 1916/17 will be much more unfavourable.

14. The other plagues (particularly cholera, typhus, dysen-

tery, diphtheria, smallpox and spotted fever) were only observed in isolated cases, and their origin has been inquired into and protective measures discovered, mainly by German doctors, notably Robert Koch. (The measures in question are public hygiene, drinking water and canalization, the isolation of persons affected, destruction of disease germs, inoculation.)

b. THE FALL IN POPULATION AS THE RESULT OF THE WAR

1. The war which has been forced upon us has carried off hundreds of thousands of the strongest and best German men and fathers through wounds and disease, and it will impose further sacrifices until our enemies are at length ready for the peace we have repeatedly offered them.

2. In the last two years alone, from July, 1915, to July, 1917, at least one and a half million fewer children have been born in Germany than before, owing to the absence of the fathers.

3. The losses of births in the war will probably exceed the losses in battle.

4. The reports of the Statistical Bureau of April 28 and December 12, 1916, show that, even as a result of the considerable decline in the birth-rate before the war, from 1928 onwards a marked reduction in the number of young men liable to service is to be expected in Prussia, and that until 1934 the number of youths so liable will have fallen from 475,000 to about 424,000, that is, by about 11 per cent.

5. The great loss of men, with the military and reproductive power they represent, combined with the certain deficit in births it involves, will prejudice our military resources for a long time to come, and with them the only sure guarantee of our political and economic future.

6. In the next few years in any case, the number of men liable for service will be reduced, even if only temporarily, by premature recruitment, which is almost complete, and the voluntary enlistment of men under twenty. From the year

1934 the fall of the birth-rate will make itself felt (which is due to the absence or deaths of the fathers in the war). We shall have to expect a deficit of three million men liable to service under this head.

7. Even the quality of the army's recruiting field will also be affected by the war. The food difficulties from which Germany is suffering as a result of England's starvation schemes will not be without influence on the physical development of coming generations.

It is true that the "Prussian Scientific Medical Deputation" have proved that the children born during the war come into the world physically unaffected, that the infants are not in any way the worse for it, and that even small and school children—at any rate up to the autumn of 1916—only showed a certain loss of flesh. But at the higher ages and where the physique is poor there is a greater susceptibility to disease, especially tuberculosis.

The effects of the present underfeeding will be repaired only gradually after the conclusion of peace.

8. The medical authorities of the field army and those at home have succeeded in almost entirely preserving the nation from the introduction and spread of infectious diseases, though these were the inevitable consequences of former wars, and in enemy countries the civil populations are to a certain extent seriously afflicted with them.

9. In every war of any duration, cases of venereal disease multiply as the result of the separation of husbands and wives and the inevitable deterioration of morals and principles. The percentage of venereal cases in the army in the field is lower than that at home.

Particularly regrettable is the large number of married men who have become infected with venereal diseases under war conditions and are now a menace to the health of their families, even in the country districts which were hitherto practically sound from this point of view.

Every possible preventive measure, official, moral and medical, has been taken, including measures for the treatment of those affected, and the most comprehensive methods are at work to prevent the spread of infection. Special legislative measures for the whole Empire have been introduced. (See below.)

10. The economic position of most families has been permanently and seriously affected by the rise in the cost of living, the depression and collapse of many branches of industry, the increase of taxation, and so forth. The fixed salaries of the middle and less well-to-do classes are particularly hard hit. These circles have hitherto been a very efficient and sound element of the State, they produced many valuable individual energies which will now be partially hampered and diminished.

Unfavourable economic conditions in a civilized nation are a reason for the postponement and diminution of marriages.

11. It is to be presumed that several races will be faced with the burden of wiping out war debt and repairing war's ravages. Only limited resources are available to protect their health and restore their physical and moral strength.

12. The men who have died from wounds or disease in the war were the flower of Germany's manhood from the physical point of view, and to a great extent from the point of view of intellect and character also. There is no doubt that they could have begotten and brought up a particularly efficient generation.

c. THE MAN-POWER OF GERMANY BEFORE THE WAR

Before the war Germany's man-power had not yet declined to any considerable degree, but as early as July 24, 1909, the Director of Military Services, in a lecture to the "Scientific Senate of the Kaiser Wilhelm Akademie," drew attention to the facts that:

1. It would need all our efforts to keep it up to the required level, and indeed improve it.

2. Our man-power was dependent on the birth-rate and infant mortality.

3. This in turn affects the number and physique of the conscripts since, if the rate of infant mortality is high, the survivors are frequently unfit. All measures designed to combat infant mortality must therefore be strongly supported in the interests of the nation's man-power.

4. The civil occupation of the conscript in itself is of less importance to his physique and military efficiency than his parentage and place of origin (town or country).

5. The number of men discharged from the service as inefficient or invalids (pensioners) has certainly increased, but this does not necessarily mean that the quality of our recruits is worse, inasmuch as a number of circumstances, e.g., the introduction of the two-years' service period, the increased demands of the service, a lower standard for discharge, would account for an increase in the discharges.

6. General physical weakness is the main ground of unfitness for service (about one-third of all the cases of unfitness).

7. The influence of school on fitness for service is shown in the following ways:

(*a*) Of the higher schools the agricultural schools have supplied the largest number of fit recruits, *Gymnasien* the smallest. The *Realschulen* and *Realgymnasien* come between.

(*b*) The longer the school period the smaller is the number of "fits" among the schoolboys.

(*c*) Efficiency declines the longer the period between leaving school and calling up for service.

Thus it is the time *after* leaving school which is particularly unfavourable for young men.

From this it appears that, in addition to the extension and

reform of hygienic methods at school, we must devote greater efforts than hitherto to promoting the health of our young men after they have left school.

8. The total number of admissions to hospital in the Prussian army, including the Saxon and Würtemberg contingents, has fallen to 34·2 per cent. in the last 35 years, an annual average of 1 per cent.

9. Compared with the armies of the other States of Europe the health of the Prussian or German army is very favourable.

10. Venereal diseases in the army claim special attention.

(*a*) The decline in the number of these diseases is greatest in the Prussian and Bavarian armies.

(*b*) The great towns supply most of the venereal diseases and by far the highest proportion of infected soldiers.

(*c*) It is a vital duty of the nation and the army to fight against these diseases, the ravages of which amongst the civil population and the army are very closely associated.

11. In the last 35 years the deaths in the army have fallen to 73·1 per cent., an annual average of 2.1 per cent.

Compared with foreign armies the German army has by far the lowest death-rate.

Cases of suicide have greatly decreased in the Prussian army in the last few decades, and the proportion is no higher than that among men of similar ages in civil life.

12. The army has an educative influence on the nation, from the point of view both of health and intellect. The favourable influence of the army on the civil population is proved by the figures of the death-rate.

Its influence is also felt indirectly—in the help given by the Medical Corps when epidemics break out or threaten, in the discovery of physical defects on the medical examination of recruits, and the provision of suitable treatment for disease, etc.

13. The period of service has good after-effects on the intelligent men, because it develops greater mental activity, lucidity and decision in thought and action.

The principles given above are the gist of a very comprehensive, reliable and thorough compilation of facts and figures. They summarize our position in respect of man-power before the war and point the way to our task for the future.

The war has confirmed their truth.

d. GERMANY'S MAN-POWER IN THE WAR

The world war has made unprecedented demands on Germany's man-power, both in respect of quantity and quality. Hitherto the physical, intellectual and moral powers of the army have successfully stood a strain which exceeded all anticipation.

II. THE RESTORATION AND INCREASE OF OUR NATIONAL VIGOUR AND MAN-POWER

a. NATIONAL VIGOUR

1. The basis of the State is the family; it depends on the number and fertility of marriages. The main purpose of marriage is procreation.

2. The number of marriages has declined since 1900. It can be increased.

(*a*) Every healthy man (exceptions, such as celibates, apart) capable of procreation and earning his own living has a natural duty and, in view of the excess of marriageable German women, the chance to marry.

(*b*) The main reason for the postponement of marriage, as well as the decline in the number of marriages, is economic. Many men are averse to finding themselves worse off as the result of founding a family. Others, again, are prevented or believe themselves prevented from

marrying early by our modern social and industrial conditions (slow and costly training, positions secured late, living "according to social station").

A material increase in the starting income is impossible for financial and economic reasons, either in the civil service or the open professions. Greater simplicity of living and freedom from prejudice alone can help. The educated classes must set a better example. It is desirable that persons (of 25 at the earliest and 35 at the latest) in receipt of fixed salaries in public or private service who set up their own households should receive a bonus, and that married men should receive preference over unmarried in the making of appointments, changes of station, promotion, retirement on pension, and tax concessions. The unmarried should be taxed more heavily to correspond, say, after the age of 30. The average age for marriage is now 27. There can be no doubt that by measures such as these an earlier average could be obtained—especially among the better educated classes—and this is very desirable for social and political, moral and hygienic reasons.

(*c*) A number of men avoid marriage because promiscuous sexual intercourse gives them greater satisfaction, with fewer material and ethical claims upon them. In this matter the only help can come from better moral and social standards, a stronger condemnation and punishment of marital infidelity, insistence on the obligation of maintenance, the punishment of criminal abortion, the prohibition of the sale of articles designed to prevent conception (see below), the taxation of bachelors.

3. The increase in the number of divorces reveals a fundamental disregard of the obligations of husband and wife to each other and their joint duty to the community. The public conscience must be stirred against divorce by the Church, the schools and the Press.

4. The number of marriages increased from 1870 to 1883. Since then it has declined. Their fertility had diminished even earlier, and has been steadily on the wane.

The reasons for this are:

(*a*) physical,
(*b*) moral and economic.

5. As regards (*a*). Impotence of the man is seldom constitutional; it is usually the result of venereal disease, especially gonorrhœa.

Barrenness in women is also commonly the consequence of infection by men (especially with chronic gonorrhœa). Where it is due to the unfavourable position or development of the female sexual organs, modern medical science can often find a remedy.

It is calculated that 8 to 10 per cent. of all marriages are sterile or less fertile than they should be as a result of infection by gonorrhœa, and that in 40 per cent. of the cases of sterile marriages it is the man's fault.

6. Syphilitic infection of the parents frequently means the death of the embryo, the premature birth of immature children, or the birth of constitutionally weak and ailing children, not to mention the early decay of the procreative powers.

Counter-measures against venereal diseases must therefore be employed as the principal weapon against involuntary, natural sterility (see below).

7. Voluntary sterile marriages are due to the wish to satisfy sexual desire while avoiding its natural consequences: impregnation and the duty of looking after children.

It is morally reprehensible that purely physical gratification and the mere comfort of the married pair should militate against conception, or that children should be regarded as an irksome burden to be avoided.

The moral point of view on this question must be brought into harmony with the demands of state preservation.

By state education every German must learn to regard his duties to the state as a personal, moral obligation.

8. Religious and ecclesiastical influences also play an important part in the fertility of marriage. The fertility of Catholic marriages is greater than that of evangelical, Jewish and mixed marriages. The country produces, relatively, more children than the towns.

9. The use of preventatives is spreading from the towns into the country in increasing measure. An Act should be passed, and soon, prohibiting traffic in articles for preventing conception and procuring abortion, as well as against illegal operations. Drafts have already been prepared by the Prussian Ministerial Commission. In the case of doctors and medical students the necessity of greater restraint in the practice of artificial abortion has become imperative.

10. The purely pecuniary reasons for the restriction of families ("The Two-child System," "Neo-Malthusianism") have, as far as the "population *v.* food-supply" theory and the earning capacity of Germany are concerned, proved themselves unsound. Our economic development gave all German labour an opportunity for employment at high wages; it even necessitated the employment of foreign workers. After the war the dearth of labour will be even more strongly felt.

On the other hand, in many cases the restriction of families goes hand in hand with this same rise in social status and striving for a higher income; therefore the chief share of the responsibility for this social evil must be put down to the claim for a higher standard of living on the part of the parents—both for themselves and their descendants—and a materialistic view of life.

11. A certain impetus towards the "Two-child System" is given by the housing conditions, particularly in the towns, and more especially the large towns. The more plentiful openings for employment in urban industries and the amusements of the towns have led to a rush from the country, the

increase of ground rents and overcrowding in urban districts. Houses are continually becoming dearer, crowded more closely together, and, at the same time, less sanitary. They promote the practice of restricting families, high infant mortality, tuberculosis, rickets, as well as immorality, alcoholism and crime. For these reasons alone housing reform is a national necessity and it must include :

12. A "back to the land" policy, by preventing the growth of further industrial areas and founding workers' settlements with their own grounds in the country.

Raising the age-limit under the Factory-Workers' Protection Acts to 18. Home colonization.

Acquisition of fresh territory abroad for purposes of colonization. (Extension of territory by war.)

Division of land into small holdings for demobilized soldiers and war-workers, agricultural labourers, gardeners, artisans and workmen who know something of its cultivation and whose families will be the State's greatest reservoir (from the point of view of physical fitness also) in the new generation.

The State or the higher civil authorities to take over the burden of maintaining rural schools and roads.

A different distribution of local poor-rates.

A more intensive system of land cultivation.

Development of rural welfare work with administrative control.

13. Improvement of housing conditions in the towns.

Main object: return as far as possible to the former method of separate dwellings, with kitchen garden and poultry keeping.

Means to this end: protection of land (in the neighbourhood of the towns) which is not yet built on against artificial increase of price. Suburban settlements.

14. Sanitary counter-measures against large tenements, where these already exist, by the establishment of public

playgrounds, sports-grounds (rapidly and cheaply laid out), parks and allotments. Structural and sanitary improvements as far as existing circumstances permit.

Discouragement of the practice of taking in lodgers.

15. Imperial housing legislation binding the Federal States to a reasonable regulation of building and town-planning, land settlement and local government, rating and expropriation of property, questions of taxation and industry. National house-inspection.

16. Strengthening of credit on real property through such agencies as rural insurance societies, life insurances and savings-banks, and the encouragement of mutual building-societies, all of which relieve the burden imposed by large families; rapid construction of small houses, of which there is likely to be a serious deficiency and which will be in great demand after the war (caused by the large number of early marriages, the moving of impoverished and fatherless families from larger and more expensive houses to cheaper, smaller accommodation).

Increased taxation of landlords who refuse tenants with large families of children.

17. Each increase in the family brings increased expenditure: firstly, for accouchement and lying-in, the need for better nourishment and nursing of the mother, and afterwards for the bringing-up of the child.

18. To lighten this pecuniary burden societies have already been formed to insure parents against child-birth. Enterprises providing mutual assistance of this kind deserve warm encouragement.

19. Very good work in this direction has been done by the national allowance to the necessitous wives of men who fought in the war; the assistance for necessitous confinement cases should be continued, though in a modified form. The sickness funds might now be called upon to support pregnant and confined women for a longer period than hitherto (12 instead of 8 weeks).

20. The special allowance of food granted by the Food Control Office during the war to all expectant and nursing mothers has had equally beneficial effects.

21. With every additional child the taxation of the family should be reduced in proportion to the scale of income. Under this heading come education allowances and the benefits for married people already mentioned under No. 2 (*b*). To cover the cost of these allowances, not only bachelors, but also unmarried women might be specially taxed in proportion to their income. It would be no hardship to take the same course in the case of those families who have lost their children by death. In this connection the estates of childless persons or persons with small families would form an appropriate object of increased taxation.

22. In 1913 there came to light an extensive movement in working-class circles which revealed disinclination for, and even hostility to, the duty of having children. Its object was the establishment of a "class" state, by voluntary limitation of the birth-rate: the "birth-strike." This must be fought by every possible means. Apart from the bad example of small families set by the upper classes, the handicap on the worker with a large family in getting work and lodging and the habit of deriding him as "stupid" and "unmoral" are extremely irritating. Every mother has a right to respect and assistance; the more children she has and the poorer she is, the greater is her claim.

23. In working-class circles the continuance of the practice of compulsory saving by young people, introduced during the war, is particularly desirable. These savings are to be drawn on marriage and the acquisition of a family.

24. Reasonable loans by mutual and insurance societies for the purpose of setting up house, and especially for buying furniture and household linen, are eminently desirable in view of the high war-prices, which may be expected to continue for a long time. Otherwise, after the war many young working-

class marriages will be prevented, or entered upon under circumstances unfavourable to the birth of children.

25. The most difficult, but important measure remains a more "rational" labour system. The exhausting system of piece-work, the increasing division of labour and its tendency to become mechanical, the introduction of female labour, certainly mean larger earnings, both to the employer and employee, but sap the physical and mental faculties sooner, make for greed and self-indulgence and undermine the family instinct.

26. The expectant mother should not be burdened with hard work outside the home, particularly indoors.

27. The increasing employment of women in callings which—mentally and physically—demand a man's powers constitutes a serious danger to motherhood, family life and the feeding and upbringing of the nation (see below, page 223).

28. Germany loses 6,500 women a year as the result of confinement; more than 56,000 children are still-born. It is impossible to estimate the permanent injury to health and diminution of fertility which women suffer through unsuccessful confinements. The Midwives Bill, under discussion by the Prussian Ministerial Commission, as well as the proposed increase of maternity homes and the number of beds assigned to confinement cases, may help to remedy these losses and injuries.

29. In 1913 infant mortality in Germany amounted to 277,000 deaths; in Russia 290 infants out of 1,000 died, in Norway 68. Out of 20 civilized States, Germany, with 151 per 1,000, is seventh worst in infant mortality, and, on the other hand, in total mortality seventh best.

30. Better feeding and care of children may easily bring us at any rate level with our enemies, France and England, within a calculable period, and save the lives of from 100,000 to 150,000 infants per annum. This goal may be attained by a

return to the system of breast-feeding and less artificial feeding. Further by:

31. Enabling mothers to get advice and infants' treatment through the Infant Welfare institutions, which must be established in greater numbers in the country. Where no such institutions exist, supervision by medical officers of health, children's doctors, midwives, district nurses, lady volunteers.

Premiums for nursing mothers. Milk-kitchens in the large towns. Training of girls in the care of children and of nurses holding Government certificates.

Supervision of nurses and foster-children by the medical authorities.

32. Provision for illegitimate children. The increase of illegitimate births and the comparatively high mortality of illegitimate children make it imperative that they should have more protection, both economic and legal. Morally, too, they are in a worse position: far more illegitimate children are sent to the reformatories than legitimate. The Prussian Ministerial Commission and the Prussian Chamber of Deputies dealt with this question on the 9th May, 1916, and 17th February, 1917. The following measures were proposed:

(*a*) A more stringent enforcement of §§ 1666 and 1707 B.G.B. (Influence of the guardian on the bringing-up and education of the child.)

(*b*) Modification of § 361, 10 Str. G.B. (Responsibility of the father for maintaining his illegitimate child.)

(*c*) Abolition of the so-called *exceptio plurium concumbentium*. (Holding *all* the putative fathers jointly responsible for the cost of the child's maintenance.)

(*d*) Extension, to be followed by general application, enforced by law, of the system of State guardians, in addition to individual voluntary guardianship.

(*e*) The Chamber of Deputies favoured the transfer of

responsibility for the care of illegitimate children to the higher authorities, on lines similar to those on which poor-relief is administered, by increasing the so-called "extraordinary" poor rate.

(*f*) If these measures obtain the force of law many valuable lives will be preserved and the moral and social level of the children will be raised. The complete legal, social and economic equality of illegitimate and legitimate children would meet with serious opposition on moral, religious and social grounds. The procreation and training of legitimate children must remain the firm foundation of the State and society.

33. *Mother and child.* Just as the milk of the healthy mother is the best food for the child, so, generally speaking, the mother's care and training are superior to any other. They can be improved by educating the girls and young women who are the future mothers of the race.

34. In the increasing employment of women and mothers in industrial occupations *away from home* there lurks great danger to family life and the feeding and bringing-up of children. The importance of protecting motherhood, training women and guarding children is recognized, it is true, but there has not yet been sufficient endeavour to promote these aims (industrial hygienics, instruction in domestic economy, infant welfare).

35. Children's homes and crèches—best on Pestalozzi-Fröbel principles—should be extended, and require hygienic and medical supervision by infant welfare authorities, school doctors and school dentists. The attention of educational authorities should be called to the high death-rate of German infants and the remedial measures required (tuberculosis, rickets, whooping-cough, diphtheria).

36. Infants in large towns suffer most, physically, mentally and morally, from lack of open playgrounds. This threatens

to have a far-reaching effect on the generations to come. The towns must provide more playgrounds.

37. *School age.* The close confinement of many children in cramped rooms favours the spread of infectious diseases (measles, scarlet fever, diphtheria, whooping-cough, tuberculosis). In many cases prolonged sitting over books leads to deformity, defective vision, anæmia, teething-troubles and general debility at the time of menstruation.

38. Action has been taken—with increasing success—by the "German Society for the Care of School-Children," the school doctors, supported by the Government, many communes and teachers, against the neglect of hygienic principles in the building and organization of schools. In future all school children must, quite apart from their private medical supervision, be examined by the school doctor and dentist on going to school. The examination must be repeated at regular intervals (growth, weight, eyesight, hearing, tendency to disease, defective teeth). The report should be communicated to the school authorities and the parents with a view to medical treatment.

39. School doctors and nurses can render splendid service in improving the physique of the generations to come and promoting hygienic principles, even in the country.

40. Physical deterioration due to attendance at school is being brought into increasing prominence by school medical inspection and the advance of scientific investigation; in the case of the higher boys' schools this has been proved beyond a doubt.* In the higher girls' schools (*lycées*) the same thing is to be expected: defects and weaknesses of the blood-forming and circulatory organs, respiratory organs and eyesight.

41. *Counter-Measures:* Further improvement of school hygiene in respect of the size, ventilation, heating and lighting of class-rooms; latrines; curtailing the hours of study

* See Schjerning: *Sanitätsstatischtische Betrachtungen über Volk und Heer.* Berlin, 1910. Schwiening H. u. Nicolai: *Über die Körperbeschaffenheit der zum einjährigfreiwilligen Dienst berechtigten Wehrpflichtigen Deutschlands.* Berlin, 1909.

and increasing the time available for physical exercise (gymnastics, sports, games, excursions), a higher standard and appreciation of physical accomplishment. Particularly important: improved daily breathing exercises (attaching special importance to exhalation).

42. The period of puberty demands specially careful, medical, pedagogic and hygienic treatment. These years are of decisive importance for the development of the body and character. The increased restlessness and emotional strain require intelligent watching by parents and teachers, in order that they may be directed into their proper channels. Rousing a sense of pleasure in personal co-operation for the building-up of body and mind, delight in nature, sport, games and song, patriotic fervour, exercise of artistic faculties, increased interest in moral problems (reverence). Boys require physical exercise and competitive games, girls require gentle treatment and social intercourse, together with a certain amount of muscular exercise.

43. In this sphere the school must take the lead. This growing need is responsible for: the "League of Young Germany," with the scout movement, boys' "hostels" and many other institutions, encouraged by Imperial decree since the educational conference of 1891.

44. The older school-children should be more thoroughly instructed in the history of their country and citizenship (political geography, world-commerce, raw materials, questions of population, military questions). They must be taught not to regard the State as something strange, not to say hostile, something which merely demands sacrifices; it must be brought before their minds as a living, life-controlling organism, as their own flesh and blood.

45. The young people who have just left school, particularly the middle and elementary schools, live in a state of personal freedom which has hitherto been widely abused. The weekly wage is for the most part spent on free evenings

and public holidays in degrading, unhealthy and precocious indulgence. During the war the earnings, and with them the demands, of young people rose to an unreasonable height. This has given rise to dangers against which the State, the Church and society of all classes and conditions must be on their guard (compulsory saving, taxation, cultivation of a sense of social duty, encouragement of self-culture by lectures, exhibitions of artistic and intellectual work, encouragement of physical culture). This age, too, requires improved instruction in citizenship and physical hygiene (see below).

46. Their worst enemies are tobacco, drink and precocious illicit sexual intercourse. Until enlightenment and the good example of the educated classes take the field against the increasing abuse of nicotine and alcohol, a heavier duty (monopoly) on tobacco and alcohol will be found to be the best counter-measure to excessive consumption. From the point of view of state finance also, this course cannot well be avoided much longer.

47. The practice of smoking too soon and too much injures the nervous system, heart and blood-vessels, the digestive organs and kidneys; at the same time it leads to a foolish waste of money. Smoking by young boys under 17, and the sale of tobacco to them, must be prohibited if parents and children are to be taught better.

48. Still greater physical, moral and economic harm is wrought by the abuse of alcohol.

In 1911 the following sums were spent in Germany:

On spirits	4,026	million	marks.
„ tobacco	1,086	„	„
„ Army and Navy	1,274	„	„
„ national education	670	„	„
„ insurance	852	„	„
„ general Imperial expenditure	2,897	„	„
„ Imperial debt	4,944	„	„

in 1901:

„ bread	1,700	„	„
„ meat	2,250	„	„

One-sixteenth of the total potato crop, one-thirteenth of

the rye and barley crops, found their way into the German breweries and distilleries, in addition to which 320 million marks were spent on foreign barley and potatoes, for the most part for the production of alcohol.

This has a serious effect on the nation's food, the increase of population, economy, health and morality.

For the growing body alcohol is poison; for the adult, when indulged in moderately, it is certainly a pleasant stimulant, but never a food or lasting tonic. Its habitual and excessive use is injurious to body and character. Alcohol and disease, alcohol and accidents, alcohol and poverty, alcohol and crime, are closely related.

49. *Counter-Measures:* Enlightenment and education by the State and municipal authorities, Church and schools, support of the moderation and total abstention movements ("German Union against Misuse of Alcoholic Drink," "Good Templars," "Blue Cross," etc.). Increasing the number of homes for inebriates. Cutting down the number of licensed houses (out of 28,519 Berlin houses 15,358 were used as hotels and public-houses). Raising the tone of licensed houses (Gotenburg system). State monopoly of spirits, with limitation of manufacture and progressive taxation of alcoholic drinks in proportion to their strength.

50. There is a close connection between alcohol and illicit sexual intercourse and the spread of venereal disease. By far the greatest number of cases of immorality and infection of young men and girls is traceable to the influence of alcohol (breakdown of moral and intellectual scruples, excitement of sexual desire, with consequent enervation).

51. The increase in venereal diseases and their consequences are dealt with on pages 216, 229. The inroads made by this evil are becoming ever more serious: it ruins the health of untold thousands—often decades after infection—is the cause of miscarriage and premature birth, and the origin of numberless unhappy, and wholly or partly sterile marriages.

Many methods have been suggested for stamping it out or lessening its effect.

52. The safest way is continence until marriage. The highest moral sense alone will enable virile young men to keep to this course, although they should keep to it until full manhood is attained (late marriage of educated classes). It is much easier to keep the other sex, who are naturally more passive from a sexual point of view, on the right path by educational influences and strict control at home.

At the same time, there remain—particularly among the male sex—a large number of persons who, in spite of all teaching and warning, do not curb their natural inclinations. In most cases the men fall victims to prostitution, and from that very generally to venereal disease, which they then help to spread.

53. The Prussian Ministerial Commission and the 16th Reichstag Committee on the Questions of Population have suggested and partly worked out various administrative schemes and bills by way of counter-measures. These are directed to the:

(*a*) Prevention of prostitution on the public streets, in licensed houses and places of amusement, regulation of the housing question, better hygienic supervision of professional prostitution, suppression of brothels, educative influences for young prostitutes, special establishments for incurable and psychopathic prostitutes.

(*b*) Severer punishments for seducing unprotected girls of good character and circulating obscene pictures and printed matter; the suppression of loosely conducted bars, prohibition of absinthe, keeping children (under 17) out of cinemas (except children's performances).

(*c*) Education in sexual matters in seminaries and training colleges for the clergy and teachers, State examination of medical students in skin and venereal diseases,

oral and printed medical instruction in sexual-ethics for the people and male school-children; support of the "German Society for fighting Venereal Disease."

(*d*) Imprisonment for persons having sexual intercourse when they *know* themselves to be infected (prosecution only on complaint). On this point serious objections have been raised before the Commission on the grounds of the probability of false evidence. Prohibition of quack treatment of venereal disease (newspaper advertisements), treatment through the post; punishment of public sale and display of preventive articles; compulsory treatment of infected prostitutes; medical examination of nurses; criminal prosecution for wet-nurses who spread infection.

(*e*) More and better free public institutions for the treatment of venereal disease. (Help from insurance organizations, public bodies, sick funds, and life insurance societies in the treatment of in- and out-patients suffering from venereal diseases.) Provision for efficient hospital treatment for these diseases in the hospitals in the country and small towns.

(*f*) Compulsory notification of venereal disease by doctors. Against this serious objections have been raised, as in that case it is to be feared that greater secrecy would be preserved and the disease be allowed to run on without treatment, or inferior treatment (quack remedies) be resorted to.

54. The efforts of the State, the Church and the local authorities with regard to the physical and moral health and strength of the people must not cease at a definite age. Popular hygiene and education must continue from birth to death. Work and moderation are the best guarantee of general and individual welfare.

55. The most important problems in the immediate future

are the restoration and improvement of the nation's food supply and our national economy.

In this matter the war has wrought a great deal of havoc and yet taught us a great deal as well.

56. There is no doubt that before the war Germany ate and drank too much and too well, but there is also no doubt that by now the average standard of living and physique has deteriorated more and more, owing to the blockade and the necessity of meeting the vast requirements of the army. The shortage of fat has had a particularly pernicious effect, chiefly on elderly persons. But the other articles of food have also become so scarce and expensive that the reasonable physical needs of the majority of the population have not always been satisfied.

57. Until the conclusion of peace any considerable increase in production is impossible, in spite of all our successful efforts, and some the results of which are still to seek. Even now, owing to the fact that food is scarce abroad also, it will be some considerable time before compulsory rationing can be abolished. Meanwhile, home production and importation from abroad require the greatest possible development, and the fixing of prices, as well as distribution, must be carried out with the assistance of the State.

58. If it is found possible to procure more fats and oils the consumption of meat can be reduced, and compensation secured by way of a vegetarian diet.

59. For children, invalids and the weak, milk is urgently necessary. Further, the demand for sugar requires special attention.

60. On the other hand, the production of spirits and beer must be greatly reduced.

61. The aim of our whole food policy is still to secure our independence of other countries by increased and improved home production, making good the damage done to our home food supply by the war, and accumulating fresh supplies by increased imports.

AGRICULTURE

62. In spite of the failure of the corn harvest in 1914 and the potato crop in 1916, and notwithstanding the reduction of imports, German agriculture, practically from its own resources, has provided the requirements of the German people, the army (in spite of its increased demand) and the prisoners of war throughout the campaign.

63. Cattle rose from about 20,182,000 head on the 2nd December, 1912, to about 21,337,000 head on the 1st February, 1917.

The stock of pigs (13 million) still exceeds that of any other country (per head of population), and justifies the slaughter of from 3 to 3½ millions without touching the breeding stock.

64. The corn supplies will last until the new harvest. The rise in the cost of food is considerable, but in respect of wheat and potatoes is below that of England.

65. Attention has been frequently called to the necessity of maintaining and increasing home agriculture; protective duties, increase of farming and peasant classes, and colonization, new territory, return to the land, supply of manures (nitrogen obtained from air), agricultural machinery and electric power to supplement reduced manual labour, rural housing and sanitation.

66. The mining and metal industries, the pillars of the German war industry, are worked to their greatest capacity, as also the manufacture of arms, munitions, motor vehicles, aircraft, wagons and machinery, and undertakings for the production of war material. Large new factories have been built, the standard of output has continually been raised. The profits of private enterprises—after putting considerable amounts to reserve, writing-off and taxes—still allow for increased dividends.

67. Potash and zinc works and the chemical and pharmaceutical industries have also prospered and extended. On the

other hand, other important branches of industry are suffering from lack of labour and coal, as well as of raw material and failing markets and other results of the war (house property, building, hotel industry, shipping, etc.).

68. There is a plentiful supply in the country of the most important raw materials, and, generally speaking, substitutes, at least in sufficient quantities to meet requirements—e.g., nitrates obtained from the air to replace Chili saltpetre are already being manufactured in quantities in excess of the needs of German agriculture in peace-time; arrangements have already been made for doubling the output.

To increase the supply of raw material to meet the needs of peace (wool, cotton, leather, metals, sulphur, india-rubber and other colonial products), as well as the reorganization and reopening of various branches of industry, will involve great cost and labour.

For this also rapid reorganization, safeguards in the way of commercial treaties, distribution of the available man-power and tonnage in proportion to the urgency of the need, should be in the hands of the State.

69. The new Government offices, departments and auxiliary departments that have grown up from the needs of war (War Bureau, Food Control Office, etc.) must continue their activity until military and industrial demobilization is complete.

70. German transport, especially the railways—to a less extent inland water transport also—has suffered a great strain as regards both material and personnel, in coping with goods and passenger traffic at home and the transport of troops and war material, both within and without the frontiers. How heavy this transport was is proved by the railway takings for goods traffic in 1916, which exceeded those of the peace year 1913.

71. Our merchant fleet has suffered heavy loss through our being cut off from the high seas and the isolation of ships in

foreign ports. In view of the considerable reduction of enemy and neutral tonnage attention to this matter promises particularly profitable results. The German canal system has shown itself in need of development.

72. The German Empire has up to now raised war loan amounting to 79 milliard marks; of this six issues raised about 60 milliard marks, and from 85 to 90 per cent. of the war expenditure was provided for up to April, 1917, by long-dated loans or treasury bills with several years to run. Thanks to careful and clear-sighted co-operation on the part of foreign countries the rate of interest and issue price have been kept far lower than has been the case with enemy countries, which—except Japan—have involved themselves in continually increasing dependence upon England, but most of all on America.

73. It is to be hoped that it may be possible to finance further war expenditure on equally favourable terms; the very low value of the German mark will probably right itself at an early date with the resumption of the import and export trade, foreign securities and other sources of income.

74. German private national capital has been estimated by the Treasury at between 300 and 330 milliard marks. German state capital in 1913/14 stood at 24 milliard marks, the national debt at 21 milliard marks; thus, per head of the population:

Germany	314·9 M.	national debt.
Great Britain	313·2 „	„ „
United States	47·0 „	„ „

The total burden of taxation in 1911 amounted to:

	Germany.	England.	France.
Total—mill. . . .	4,079·6 M.	4,720·1 M.	3,776·4 M.
Marks per head .	62·75	106·07	96·09

75. These figures, and the marked increase during the last decades in the figures of private fortunes and income (from 43 to 45 milliard marks annually), taxable capacity, wages and consumption, bear witness to the financial strength and resources of Germany.

76. But the interest on and extinction of the war debt and

pensions to disabled soldiers and dependents will swallow up such enormous sums that the burden will have to be borne by several generations. It will be impossible to avoid heavy taxation of income and capital, tapping new sources of taxation (monopolies, legacies, transport). Increased industrial output, calling upon labour which has hitherto been unproductive, improved skill and greater use of machinery must help to compensate for loss of lives and property.

77. All these things, however, will not suffice to restore a sound finance and our strength and independence if the conclusion of peace does not bring us compensation for our losses in the form of new territory, indemnities, commercial treaties and raw material.

b. PROPOSALS FOR THE RESTORATION AND INCREASE OF GERMANY'S MILITARY POWER

1. After the conclusion of peace, the peace-movement, already strong among the people, in the Press and in Parliament, will make itself felt with greater weight as a reaction against the burdens and sacrifices of the war.

2. Comprehensible and natural as the general longing for the peaceful reconstruction of public and private life may be, it is necessary that the Government and the people's representatives should at once fully realize and bring home to the nation that there is no such thing as a certain, lasting "world-peace" as a result of international and natural crises; that even the best peace-treaty after this world-war must contain the seeds of future friction and dissension; that international movements in favour of peace, disarmament and arbitration can only become effective when backed by military power.

3. Germany has shown her readiness for peace since 1871; for the future a permanent peace for the people and the army is an urgent need.

If she wishes to maintain peace as long as possible and not see the fruits of all her sacrifices wasted, her first aim, in spite

of exhaustion, impoverishment and peace-tasks, must be to restore and increase her military power.

4. Hitherto, Germany has had to guard 5,000 kilometres of land frontier and 2,500 kilometres of the North Sea and Baltic coasts. Her unfavourable politico-geographical position forced her to maintain a strong army and a strong fleet.

5. Expenditure on armaments amounted to:

1905–1914.	Army. Mill. M.	Navy. Mill. M.	Army & Navy.	
			Mill. M.	M. per head.
Germany	9,338·9	3,787·5	13,126·4	201·8
Austria-Hungary	4,664·6	968·7	5,663·3	110·8
Great Britain	5,661·3	7,991·9	13,653·2	304·7
France	7,222·2	3,191·3	10,413·5	258·6
Russia	10,280·8	2,973·2	13,254·0	87·3
Italy	3,085·9	1,747·1	4,833·0	140·2

Our expenditure therefore remained, comparatively speaking, far lower than that of France, to say nothing of England. The following were the figures for military and naval establishments:

1914.	Military establishments.	Ships (completed and building, 1914). Displacement in 1,000 tons.	
		Total.	Battleships.
Germany	800,000 men	1,345·4	667·7
Austria-Hungary	424,300 „	405·6	183·5
Great Britain (regular army)	399,000 „	2,798·5	1,084·3
France	790,000 „	1,077·4	518·6
Russia	1,426,000 „	757·1	314·9
Italy	305,000 „	604·7	252·4

6. If Germany had spent less on her army she would have suffered for it bitterly in the present war. The war has shown that there has been much false economy with regard to our military establishment, training and equipment. Under the increased stress of war conditions, enormous sums of money and a vast amount of labour have had to be called on for the

increase of personnel and material, all of which could have been done at less expense by preparation in peace.

7. The unhappy, bitter controversies in the Government and Parliament that were common form when the question of army establishments came up have since been recognized by clear-sighted men as the cause of very heavy sacrifices, which could have been avoided by greater foresight and generosity on the part of Parliament. From this the following lesson is to be learnt:

Germany needs, not only rapid and complete reconstruction, but also preparation for the future by an increase and improvement of her armaments; the people and their representatives must prepare themselves for this.

8. The war and the present situation have shown that with regard to the raising of troops, production of equipment and munitions, and establishment of reserves, we are in a position to do considerably more than in the past.

9. The financial position depends on the terms of the peace treaties and imperial finance and policy.

10. In order to obtain a comprehensive view of the situation, expert counsel and investigation are imperative, and that *now*.

11. These questions are closely related to the questions of population discussed above, for if we restored our population to its old level, and increased it, a higher economic and military standard would be possible. The cost of an improved policy in the matter of population can be approximately estimated by an examination of the individual proposals; in cases where our financial position is at present unequal to these demands they must for a time remain secondary to our military requirements. For upon the fulfilment of these the whole future of Germany may depend at any moment.

12. The Supreme Command is interested mainly in the following points:

a. Military Policy and Commercial Policy.

(*a*) Future demarcation and defence of frontiers.

(*b*) Acquisition of new territory for the purpose of strengthening the army; tapping new sources of raw material for military purposes.

(*c*) Temporary occupation of conquered territory (tying down part of our forces).

(*d*) Possible negotiations on international agreements, particularly the laws of war and international law.

(*e*) Alliances with other powers; our military achievements in this connection; news services, commercial treaties (having regard to particular military requirements).

(*f*) Reconstruction and improvement of the means of communication and transport (railways, ships, roads, canals).

(*g*) Military and economic demobilization.

(*h*) Development of war industries (arms, munitions and material, clothing, supplies, aircraft, engineering, medical and remount organizations), both private and public.

b. Military Organization and Policy with regard to increasing the Population.

(*a*) An increase in the number of marriages and births.

(*b*) Endowment of pregnancy and motherhood, and welfare work for infants in arms (including the illegitimate).

(*c*) Welfare work in the school period.

(*d*) Welfare work (both physical and educational) for the young after the school leaving-age.

(*e*) General national hygiene. Promoting health and moderation by work and physical exercise; fighting the "Culture virus" infectious diseases, venereal diseases; housing reform, home settlements; adjustment between the town and country population; national food régime;

education in civic responsibilities ; rousing and intensifying a sense of military patriotism.

(*f*) Improving the army's raw material by promoting physical efficiency in youth (gymnastics, sports, games, school and club rambles, competitions, playgrounds).

(*g*) Parliamentary sanction for the Cadet Corps Bill, on the draft of which the War Ministry is now working. Obligatory service in the Cadet Corps for all youths between 17 and 22. The Cadet Corps will be an imperial organization, but it must be worked by the military authorities. It will aim at (1) physical exercises as a basis for military service and at the same time calculated to promote general physical fitness and efficiency (military gymnastics). (2) Training in special military branches.

(*h*) Changes in our army and national defence system to incorporate the lessons of the war. (Extended period of service ; converting the present classification of fitness for field, garrison and home service into a classification into fitness for military or labour service. Selection for special arms or technical military branches with closer regard to intellectual and professional qualifications.)

(*i*) Increase in number, and enlargement of military training establishments, to make good the heavy loss of officers, medical officers and N.C.O.'s. Prolonged peace-training of administrative officers for war conditions.

(*k*) Physiological research and improvement of military training and modern methods of warfare (gas, air-fighting) in co-operation with the " Kaiser-Wilhelms-Institut, Dahlem," the " Kaiser-Wilhelms-Akademie, Berlin," and the "Fürst-Donnersmarck-Institut," as well as the military " Stadion " in Frohnau-Berlin and the Military Physical Training Institute and the " Imperial Committee for Physical Training."

(*l*) Improved military medical supervision of those

wounded in the war (officers and men) with a view to preserving valuable military material and reducing the pensions fund; erection of a model military convalescent home in Frohnau-Berlin in connection with the military medical and scientific "Fürst-Donnersmarck-Institut."

(*m*) Hygienic home treatment of infectious army cases (particularly venereal diseases) before discharge from the service. (A counter-suggestion is made calling for the compulsory retainment of venereal cases, not cured, after demobilization.)

The questions of military and economic policy under *a.* (*a-h*) require agreement and co-operation between the General Staff and the Imperial Government. In so far as they require working out beforehand the military departments are already engaged upon them. Similar action on the part of the civil departments, where this has not already begun, is urgently requested.

The questions of population and military organization under *b.* (*a-m*), which concern the immediate and more distant future, have already been the subject of valuable investigation by the above-mentioned Prussian Ministerial Commission and the 16th Imperial Committee, and it has already resulted in negotiations, suggestions and draft bills. There is an urgent demand for the formation of an advisory committee to deal rapidly with the most pressing necessary requirements and financial possibilities. It is suggested that the following should be represented:

From the Supreme Command:*

General Staff, War Ministry, Admiralty, Director-General of Army Medical Services.

From the Government:

Imperial Chancellor, Ministry of the Interior (Ministry of Health), Treasury, Ministry of Justice.

* The proper military authority.

It is further recommended that the members of the Reichstag should be represented, and, as necessary, the departments and experts engaged in the preliminary work; co-operation of the Press, education of the people and propaganda work by the associations and unions mentioned in the memorandum.

2.

"14/12/1917.

"To Herr Damaschke.

"Dear Sir,

"In the documents* I have received from you the following points strike me as important:

"1. The reference to the period after 1871—Men of the Landwehr returning from the campaign had great difficulty in finding houses for themselves and their families, and were in many cases completely homeless, an experience which must naturally have been a source of the bitterest disappointment and great discontent. Such an occurrence should only happen to a nation once. This serious lesson must be remembered if we wish to survive the judgment of history.

"2. The note on the straits of families with many children, which in many cases are already finding great difficulty in obtaining accommodation in which a healthy, moral family life is possible. At the present time the decisive issue for our whole future is that we should remain a healthy, growing nation and avoid the state of affairs that prevails in France. No measure, however, seems to promise such certain prospects of improved conditions as the planning and building of houses which provide space, air and light for a numerous and healthy posterity.

"3. The housing question is not confined to any particular calling or social status. Our officials, workmen, artisans and business people, in fact all who are dependent upon the

* Herr Damaschke had visited G.H.Q., had a conference with us, and left his documents behind.

emoluments of their work, have the same vital interest in seeing that the value of these emoluments should not be prejudiced by any artificial increase in the cost of the land. But the State and the employees also have the same interest in seeing that the money spent on improving the conditions of their officials and employees should be laid out to advantage. Much discontent and economic friction—which would be more injurious than ever to our people after this war—will be avoided by the provision of homes for workers.

"4. The statement of the Oberbürgermeister of Ulm, who has had successful experience and testifies to the feasibility of soldiers' settlements, i.e., the solution you propose—colonies on an economic basis, which are safeguarded from abuses and yet do not restrict the personal freedom of their tenants.

"I wish every success to the work of the Central Committee for Soldiers' Settlements, as these are not only the most fitting token of our gratitude to our comrades who have done and sacrificed so much, but will also be the most abundant source of strength for our beloved German Fatherland in the future.

(Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

"Central Committee for Soldiers' Settlements.

"Berlin N.W.,

"Lessingstrasse, 11,

"14/12/1917.

"The undersigned wishes to submit to Your Excellency a short memorandum on the question of soldiers' settlements.

"The branch organizations connected with the Central Committee for Soldiers' Settlements number 3,507 at the present time and represent about 6 million German families.

"On the 24th May, 1916, the Reichstag passed the following resolution:

"'The Imperial Chancellor is requested to give active assistance to the efforts to promote the establishment of settlements for those who fought in the war, as well as their widows

and families. We ask him, as soon as possible, to frame such regulations as will ensure that these settlements shall fulfil their purpose for all time.'

"This resolution was carried unanimously, and thus this important question was removed from the arena of party strife.

"If words can now be translated into deeds, not only will our soldiers be relieved of their greatest anxiety, but a vital service will be rendered to social peace and the national future of our people will be secure.

"Your Excellency's obedient servant,

"ADOLF DAMASCHKE,

"President of the Central Committee for Soldiers' Settlements."

3.

AN APPEAL

Germany is engaged in her greatest war; the struggle is drawing to its end. Thousands upon thousands of fighting men in the Army and Navy are coming back with crippled limbs and shattered health. To restore their strength for the service of Germany's economic life and to ensure their future is a duty of gratitude in which the home country must not fail. It is the function of the State alone to provide them with pensions. This must be supplemented by efforts for their social welfare. It is for this purpose that the organizations which culminate in the Imperial Committee for the Care of Disabled Soldiers and Sailors have been formed. To promote the development of this great social service is the object of the *Ludendorff Fund!* Let everyone contribute! The victims of the war, weighed down with cares, must be made happy toilers in the service of Germany's future! Honour

the men who fought and suffered for us! This great object can only be attained if we all stand together.

VON HINDENBURG, Field-Marshal;
COUNT VON HERTLING, Imperial Chancellor;
VON STEIN, General War Minister;
DR. KAEMPF, President of the Reichstag;
LUDENDORFF, General, First Quartermaster-General, Honorary President.

THE OBJECT OF THE LUDENDORFF FUND

Provision for disabled men is primarily the duty of the State, and must remain so. The Imperial Government cannot and must not be relieved of this responsibility by the raising of a general fund. But even when the question of pensions is dealt with on broad and generous lines by the State, no help can be given in any case which is *really* worthy of our patriotic and social sentiments. Official help must inevitably be systematic, and this necessity of rules and regulations makes it impossible to do justice to the needs of each individual case. There remain countless cases in which immediate help is called for if real want and despair are to be prevented. This can only be given by voluntary generosity.

It is here that the Civil Fund for disabled men comes in. Its object is to bring the men back into civil life, to restore their strength to the service of the German nation. This wide field of activity covers advice and training for careers, the provision of work, complete curative treatment, colonies, help in housing and family matters, as well as pecuniary help in cases of special need.

In the important and closely allied sphere of provision for widows and orphans, large sums have been flowing in from voluntary sources since the outbreak of the war; thanks to this strong support from all classes, the national fund already has at its disposal more than 100 million marks for widows and orphans of fallen soldiers.

It is certain that the German nation feels the same warm sympathy for its disabled soldiers and sailors. They know what they owe to these loyal men who have offered their bodies as a protecting wall against foreign invasion, carried the war far into the enemy's country and shielded their homes from violence and devastation.

It is our sacred duty to give generous help to those who have bled and suffered for us where State provision does not, and cannot reach. To obey this call of the Fatherland is the aim of the Ludendorff Fund.

As a general fund for the whole Empire it appeals to every German. At the same time it will help to remedy the widespread evil of overlapping effort.

The Ludendorff Fund is administered by the combined organizations of the German Federal States, controlled by the Imperial Committee for the Care of Disabled Soldiers and Sailors. The funds will, on principle, be devoted to the districts in which they have been raised.

Huge sums are required. No German must fail; each must contribute to the best of his power. It is a question of nothing less than the restoration and maintenance of the national vigour of Germany, which is bleeding from the countless wounds that the most terrible of all wars has inflicted upon our Fatherland.

THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

Berlin W9, Bellevuestrasse, 8,
8th February, 1918.

THE LUDENDORFF FUND FOR DISABLED MEN

I. One Imperial Fund, to take the place of the various small funds now existing.

The loud and urgent appeal that will be made to our people in the coming weeks and months by the Ludendorff Fund —"Give for the Disabled!"—is no new appeal. The

comprehensible discontent which has recently accompanied each fresh appeal for some new benevolent fund will certainly have no place on this occasion.

The appeal to the German people to give for the disabled has already been made many times. The sympathy aroused by the visible wounds of the disabled, the helplessness of the severely wounded and the sick, the efforts of the individual professions and callings to provide for their colleagues and fellow-workers, the desire of many benevolent societies to get control of the new funds, has given rise to an enormous number of small and minor welfare organizations and collecting societies of every possible description.

For the blind, who of course aroused the greatest sympathy, ample, perhaps unnecessarily generous, funds were raised. Special funds were appealed for to assist in providing expert advice and treatment for men with injuries to the brain and other serious cases. The provision of artificial limbs was taken up by other societies and individuals. Other organizations collected funds for those needing cures, or chose the provision of dwellings and settlements for disabled men as their sphere. A widespread movement (now fortunately abandoned)—especially at the beginning of the war—aimed at the erection of "Heroes' homes," in which disabled soldiers were to be herded together in barracks. Individual collections by professional societies (e.g., business men, teachers, artists, sportsmen) tried to provide for their disabled colleagues. The distress of the families of disabled men who were in want produced special funds organized by ladies.

Many of these efforts and enterprises were well-meant, but were based on pure social "dilettantism." Others were merely calculated efforts for selfish ends. Many were sound at bottom, but could not be really helpful so long as there was so much dissipation of effort. The decrees of the Bundesrat of 22nd July, 1915, and 15th February, 1917, which required State supervision of public collections, however beneficial their

influence may have been, could not completely remedy this waste because there was no great central fund covering the whole Empire.

Considerable indignation was aroused in wide circles of contributors who were insistently pestered to subscribe towards the most doubtful and superfluous causes, and there was a growing demand for one general fund for the disabled which would put an end to all the dispersion of effort and, by concentrating all the contributions in one central fund, would ensure that the money reached the quarters where it was really needed.

This is where the Ludendorff Fund should, and will prove useful. It has come into existence by general consent as the Imperial Fund for disabled soldiers; it enjoys the confidence of the leaders of the economic world and is supported by all the disabled men's welfare organizations in the Federal States of our German Fatherland.

II. THE NECESSITY FOR THE FUND

Everyone is agreed that the present scale of pensions for the disabled is inadequate and that the first and most important duty of the State is to raise it. But there should be no illusions as to the limits within which the provision of pensions is possible.

When the definite figures are available after the conclusion of peace we shall know what sums are required to raise military pensions by even a comparatively modest amount. In any event the pensions will in many cases be inadequate to give disabled men that firm foothold in life which they will need in a yet fiercer struggle for existence. In addition there is the fact that every administrative measure must necessarily be more or less rigid and cannot adapt itself to the requirements and urgency of individual cases. That is only possible with voluntary schemes, which are not hedged about with legal regulations. Even the grants of supplementary pensions from

the War Ministry's fund for cases of special hardship cannot meet the difficulty adequately. This is the inherent weakness of what are necessarily cut-and-dried administrative measures. Finally, provision must be made for sick and otherwise disabled soldiers who are unable to prove the connection between their complaint and war-service, so that, according to the regulations, they are not eligible for a pension.

Soon after the outbreak of the war the defects and limitations of the pension system were recognized and we cast about for some means of supplementing it. This was the origin of the sound and practical idea that the discharge of the debt of gratitude we owe to our disabled men, a debt which can never be fully repaid, should not be limited to the provision of medical treatment and pensions, but calls for further efforts to rehabilitate all the disabled as far as possible, restore them as efficient wage-earners in their former calling, or at least put them in the way of making full use of the powers that are left to them. A noble aim, of great importance for our economic life!

But, inspiring as that aim is, it is very difficult to translate it into accomplished fact. The problem can be solved only on the broadest lines. For this reason all classes, especially our leaders of industry, are called upon to devote themselves to the attainment of the end in view—increasing the earning capacity of the disabled and restoring them to active life. All institutions working for the social welfare of the disabled are co-ordinated in the Central Welfare Organization, which was formed in Prussia in connection with the provincial organizations and in the Federal States in co-operation with the civil authorities. It is based on the tried principles of local control, works in close touch with the professional associations, and, thanks to the active support of the leaders of German economic life, it is in a position to deal with the changing needs and demands of practical life without bureaucratic prejudice. A complete net of local branches has been spread

over the whole of Germany, while on the other hand unity of aim has been secured by the establishment of an Imperial Committee for the Welfare of Disabled Soldiers as their common head.

The sphere of labour of the central organization is extraordinarily wide; for there are many ways of attaining the end in view, the reinstatement of the disabled in positions in which their disablement is least hampering to themselves, their fellow workers and employers, and in which their efficiency most nearly approaches that of the worker sound in wind and limb. The Employment Council first finds out whether the disabled man can continue his previous calling or must be employed in some new form of work. Where a change of employment is necessary a theoretical and practical training must be offered him. If he proves able to resume his former employment the local branch, which is in close touch with all labour exchanges, must find him a suitable situation. . . In order to maintain the physical capacity of the man for as long as possible it is necessary to provide him and his family with good accommodation. In suitable cases it will sometimes be possible to settle a man on his own land. If the disabled man threatens to break down under the strain of his work more quickly than a healthy man he must be helped by cures and convalescent treatment. But in cases where the war has completely destroyed a man's capacity for work and perhaps condemned him to a sick bed for life, the civil organization will see that he is provided with nursing and everything to alleviate his suffering and so allow his wife an additional opportunity of making a living. The children of disabled men also will be given the training which their fathers would have given them if the war had not reduced their earning capacity.

Vast sums are required if this great social service is to be performed. To raise them is the plain duty of the country. That it is possible is proved by the national fund for the

widows and children of those who have fallen in the war, which has already succeeded in raising 100 million marks for this cause, thanks to the enthusiastic help of all sections of the community. A sum quite as large is needed for the disabled men, for whom the sympathy of our people is certainly not a whit less.

III. THE ORGANIZATION FOR RAISING THE FUND

The collecting organization has General Ludendorff for its honorary president. Since the scheme was first conceived he has had the warmest interest in it and has taken an active part in promoting the gradual development of the organization. With him Hindenburg, the Imperial Chancellor, the War Minister and the President of the Reichstag have signed the appeal and thus proclaimed the significance of the enterprise in the clearest possible manner.

The preparation and initiation of the scheme is in the hands of the Central Committee, its translation into action in those of the federal and provincial collecting committees which have been formed to work under the welfare committees established by the central organization, and in particular in those of the local committees, which are an extension of the local welfare committees already established everywhere.

On all these bodies industrial interests and especially the professional and other unions are appropriately represented. In this way they are able to exercise an influence—an influence to be desired—on the collecting of the funds and the provision of employment, as well as on the manner in which the money is laid out.

In certain States, e.g., Bavaria, Saxony, Baden and Mecklenburg-Schwerin, funds had been already opened. These will be continued under the name of the "Ludendorff Fund" within the framework of the general Imperial fund, but will maintain their independent organization.

Further, the spending of the money will be based on the principle that the funds raised in any particular district shall be used for the benefit of that district. An exception to this rule will be made in the case of certain great industrial enterprises, where subscriptions will be applied to general purposes in all parts of Germany and thus help to compensate for the financial weakness of some parts of the Empire, which are only able to contribute comparatively small amounts, however great their generosity.

In distributing the funds the experiences and difficulties which have accompanied the administration of previous large funds will have to be borne in mind. The Ludendorff Fund must keep in the closest touch with the contributors and beneficiaries and endeavour to reconcile the just desires of the various states and districts of the Empire with the general interests of Germany as a whole while showing the special consideration they merit to the areas less capable of helping themselves.

May success attend these efforts for the welfare of our sorely tried Fatherland and its loyal sons who have sacrificed their limbs and health for it.

4.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 84001 op.
"Measures for relieving the house shortage on demobilization.

"G.H.Q.,
"19/4/1918.

"To the Imperial Chancellor.

"I have been informed by various officers that N.C.O.'s and men of the field army are feeling considerable anxiety, not only with regard to their future employment but also as

to whether they will be able to find suitable housing accommodation on their return to civil life. No one can deny that there is ground for this anxiety, for we must certainly anticipate that the flood of demobilized men from the army will make the shortage of houses in the great towns, which existed even in peace time, an even more acute problem.

"The reasons are obvious:

"1. During the years of war the scale of building has been reduced to vanishing point, so that we have not had even the normal increase in the number of dwelling-houses.

"2. By the conversion of peace industries into war industries the centres of population have shifted, so that in many places industries have either been closed down or had to work short time while, on the other hand, some industries by taking up war work have developed into greater importance, with the result that large numbers of workmen have migrated from one industrial area to another.

"3. As the result of war marriages many new families have come into being and these will not feel the need for houses until after the conclusion of peace. It must also be expected that a great number of marriages will then take place.

"4. If special measures are not taken a heavy influx of demobilized men into the large towns rather than into the country is to be expected.

"For these reasons the period immediately following the conclusion of peace will bring an acute dearth of houses, especially in the large towns, while *per contra* there may be a surplus of houses in the small towns and particularly in the country.

"In these conditions, which are bound to materialize, there is undoubtedly an element of danger, and in the interests of the future of our field army, I take the liberty of drawing Your Excellency's attention to the matter.

"I also ask Your Excellency to allow me to make a few observations as to how this danger may be averted.

"The building of small tenements by utilizing military barracks will not have much success. In these circumstances it will, perhaps, be impossible in the early days of peace to avoid imposing legal restrictions on the men's freedom of movement, e.g., only those discharged soldiers might be allowed to go into the towns who can prove that they can find accommodation there. It has been pointed out to me that the rôle played by labour certificates in the distribution of labour might well be played in this matter by 'residence' certificates, which could be issued in conjunction with the labour certificates. If this is contemplated it will be necessary for these measures to be brought into harmony with the general schemes which are part of our population and settlement policy.

(Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

5.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 85873 op.

"G.H.Q.,
"20/5/1918.

"The Supreme Command has been requested to ascertain from the various units of the army approximately what number of new or prospective households will require to be provided with simple furniture (about enough for a kitchen and bed-sitting room).

"Such inquiries are certainly necessary to ensure that the requirements can be met; but for military reasons it is not possible to extend them to all units of the army.

"I am therefore asking the Army Group Headquarters to experiment with particular units and formations in their area, collate the information received and from that to calculate the requirements of all the units in the Group.

"In making these inquiries it is important to avoid giving

the troops even the slightest impression that peace is imminent. For these reasons it might perhaps be advisable for the duty of obtaining this information to be assigned to the intelligence officers at army headquarters.

(Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

6.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 90431 op.

"G.H.Q.,
"29/6/1918.

"TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR, COUNT v. HERTLING.

"May I express to Your Excellency my most respectful thanks for your encouragement and support in connection with my memorandum of 9/9/1917, II. No. 63631 op., on questions of population.

"Among these the question of housing during the further course of the war is becoming particularly important and urgent; it is not only a source of future anxiety to large numbers of combatants but becomes of first-rate importance when we consider the effect of the war on the nation's armed forces and man-power.

"The great scarcity of small houses, particularly in industrial centres, the rise of wages, prices, especially the cost of building, and rents, as well as the dearth of the necessary building material and labour, are well known. These obstacles can be overcome only partially during the war. Not until demobilization shall we have a chance of embarking on the following wholesale remedies:

"House building, the provision of fuel for brick-making and lime-burning, granting leave to skilled workmen, the employment of prisoners of war, using barracks and barrack construction material, particularly timber; further, the early demobilization of men in the building trades, stopping the

influx of unemployed and homeless individuals into the large towns, so far as that can be done by legislation, and other measures.

"Meanwhile we must get on with the preliminary work. A start has been made.

"On 10/5/1918 the Reichstag asked the Government to frame a Bill providing a subsidy of 500 million marks—with proportionate contributions from the Federal States and municipalities—for the erection of small houses.

"This very laudable resolution, however, does not realize that the step makes precautions against speculation absolutely necessary. It is essential to prevent an increase in the price of the land or open competition for the new houses, otherwise the scheme would do more harm than good. Further, the standard of all other rents would be raised, and the financial position of the less wealthy and people with fixed incomes would become quite impossible.

"The only way to prevent this is by at once introducing legislation to expropriate, forbid the alienation of, and impose restrictive covenants upon, all property erected with the assistance of the government subsidy. (Right of repurchase, etc.)

"Further, the Government and the Reichstag, by the resolution of 24/5/1916 (Soldiers' Settlements), the Act of 3/7/1916 (Commutation of Pensions), and recently by further appropriate measures, have already recognized the urgency of the housing problem and indicated other lines upon which help can be given. These must be adopted and developed.

"At the session of the Central Committee for Soldiers' Settlements of the 8th and 9th of June last, proposals for an Imperial Bill on home colonies and soldiers' settlements were discussed. These proposals are backed by a national movement in the whole army and nation, a movement in which the most important representatives of all parties, denominations and classes are co-operating, and more par-

ticularly the authorities and experts from town and country, government departments and municipal and local bodies.

"To give legal effect to these proposals at the earliest possible moment is one of our most pressing tasks, even from the point of view of the *moral* of the army.

"I believe that Your Excellency agrees with me that the present situation makes it imperative that the competent authorities should take up this task without loss of time, and I ask Your Excellency to be kind enough to let me know what has been done already and what is possible in the future, so that I may be in a position to relieve the just and natural anxiety of the troops through the medium of the Patriotic Propaganda organization. By this means exaggerated hopes could be directed into calm and more orderly channels before it is too late.

(Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

7.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.

"Gen.-Qu. II.c, No. 31587. "G.H.Q.,
"17/6/1918.

"I wish to bring the enclosed memorandum on the land question in the area of the military administration in the East to the notice of all authorities who have any influence on our land settlement policy in the east and to publish it in the '*Befehls- und Verordnungsblatt—Oberost*,'* together with the enclosed orders of the Quartermaster-General on the subject of the expropriation and colonization of land in Courland.

"If legislative or other measures dealing with land, land credits and syndicates would appear to be necessary, I must ask that the Quartermaster-General be consulted beforehand, as he keeps me in touch with developments in the land question in the east.

(Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

* "General Routine and Army Orders: Commander-in-Chief in the East." [Tr.]

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"Gen.-Qu. No. 31587.
"Orders relating to the land question in the area of the Eastern Command.

"G.H.Q.,
"17/6/1918.

"The needs of the army and the country require that the agricultural possibilities of the area under the control of the C.-in-C. in the East should be developed at once. Very large numbers of men are returning to the regions adjacent to the eastern military frontier. Extraordinary measures are imperative if distress among the homeless is to be prevented and full use made of their labour.

"This means fresh tasks for the military administration which has already done good work for the restoration of sound economic conditions. Land which has fallen out of cultivation must be tilled; settlements have to be established. Such agriculture as there is now has to be made more prosperous by the development of credit. Public utility organizations, with the services of the greatest experts in the German Empire at their disposal, have been set up for this purpose and are now at work.

"If the frontier States which have been neglected by Russia for centuries are to be within the protecting wall of German economic life, the German home markets to be thrown open to them, German organizations to provide them with roads, railways and canals, and German credits to facilitate the expansion of their economic powers, the whole nation, the whole community, must reap the benefit. A thin stratum of landowners cannot be allowed to snatch all the profits of the new dispensation by speculating in land, the value of which has been raised by the victory of Germany.

"Land bought at high prices and burdened with mortgages is not a suitable nursery for a healthy race. Farms which are costly to run would only be a heavy burden to the settlers.

So long as prices of farm produce rule high it can be borne, but every economic set-back would be ruinous. Pride in their own property and the joys of ownership would vanish. Discontent, sloth and ill-feeling towards their deliverers would be the result.

"Of course it will be impossible to prevent a gradual rise in the value of land, but it is certainly not a matter of indifference which social classes or how many persons get the benefit of the higher value. The prosperity of a nation does not depend upon the existence of a small number of big capitalists, but on the possession of the greatest possible number of efficient, independent, settled and home-loving citizens who provide the State with its greatest need—men and women sound in body and mind. Such a race of settlers will only be forthcoming if the land speculator is kept at a distance.

"For these reasons the military administration in the eastern border States has a particularly heavy burden of responsibility, especially at the present time when the transition to peace conditions is in progress. Every effort must be made, and made without stint, to suppress all inducements to speculation among the inhabitants.

"The conscientious enforcement of the regulations issued by the Quartermaster-General and the Commander-in-Chief in the East will avert the perils to the community which inflated land values represent, and prepare the way for a sound policy of land settlement.

(Signed) "VON HINDENBURG."

8.

"The First Quartermaster-General.
"II. No. 81034 op.

"G.H.Q.,
"15/3/1918.

"To Herr Karl Schneider, Kray-Essen.

"Dear Herr Schneider,

"I have to thank you warmly for kindly sending me a copy of your pamphlet, 'The Disabled Soldier Problem.' I have read it with interest and, speaking generally, can only concur in your views.

"You are, unfortunately, only too right in saying that the debt of gratitude owed by those who have remained at home to the men who have been disabled in the war is not so freely recognized as it used to be, and that the feelings of these men are not treated with the consideration they deserve.

"I am heartily in agreement with your views on the importance of keeping considerations of party politics out of the question of welfare work for the disabled.

"I have forwarded your pamphlet to the Minister for War and drawn his attention to the importance of preventing disabled men from turning to purely party organizations.

(Signed) "P. p. Ludendorff."

9.

"The First Quartermaster-General.
"II. No. 85363 op.

"G.H.Q.,
"6/5/1918.

"To Herr Rudolf Öser, Member of the Chamber of Deputies.

"Dear Sir,

"I have read your valuable, lucid and enthusiastic work, '*Mehr Kinder, Mehr Erbe*,' with great interest.

"I also recognize the question of population as the determining factor in the future of our nation, and I therefore share your views on all material points.

"The Supreme Command has already worked out a memorandum on the subject of restoring the man-power and national energies of the country to their old level, and indeed raising it. It has been forwarded to the Imperial Chancellor and is being examined by the Ministry of the Interior. If you would care to have it, a copy of the memorandum can be lent to you. At G.H.Q. the questions under consideration are being dealt with by Major Hochheimer, of the staff of the Director-General of Medical Services. May I suggest that you look at the available material and get into personal touch with that officer?

"With regard to your request that the Supreme Command should circulate your pamphlet at the front, I should be ready and happy to meet your wishes. But there is no doubt that the front takes little interest in long dissertations, and those on unfamiliar subjects. The soldier at the front does not read them. Your valuable idea would be more useful if you first made a short synopsis of your work, which might be used for the purpose you suggest and would create interest in the complete work. (Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

10.

"II. No. 87562 op.
"Ref. No. 434/4. 18 C. 3 F. (See next letter.)
"Telegram of 4/6/1918.

"To THE MINISTER FOR WAR.

"I thank Your Excellency for your communication on the subject of proposals for giving assistance to men who have fought in the war. I regard the solution put forward by Your Excellency as a minimum for what must be done for these men and intend to take up the question again when time allows. (Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

"Ministry for War.
"No. 434/4. 18 C. 3 F.
"Ref. No. 69663 op. "Berlin W. 66,
"25/5/1918.

"With my letter of 19/1/1918 I forwarded to Your Excellency a copy of a memorandum to the Secretaries of State for the Navy and the Colonies dealing with the question of relief for those who have fought in the war. The ministers in question have replied that they fully concur in my view. I should like to point out once more that the result of this correspondence shows that the award of a considerable gratuity to all soldiers at the front is out of the question, as such a course does not promise an economic benefit proportionate to the amount expended and, in view of the present financial position, would not be feasible even if the latter were materially improved on the conclusion of peace. I consider, however, that the time has come to press on with the measures definitely provided for by the Act of 22/6/1871—measures designed to secure that officers, military officials and men who have been seriously prejudiced in their civil occupations by being called to the colours shall be given such help as is possible in resuming their former employment. I have been in touch with the Secretary of the Treasury and will reserve further comment for a future date.

(Signed) "VON STEIN,
"War Minister."

II.

"The Imperial Chancellor.
"No. 2871.
"Ref. II. No. 90431 op. of 29th June, 1918.
"G.H.Q.,
"20/8/1918.

"I entirely share the view of Your Excellency that increased importance must be attached to the questions of

housing after the war and raising the level of our population and man-power. The competent authorities are already engaged upon a number of important measures.

"Having regard to the fact that in nearly all towns and industrial centres a shortage of houses is to be anticipated after the war as a result of heavy costs of building in the period of transition and that this cannot be remedied by private enterprise alone, the guarantee of financial assistance from public funds—and indeed the co-operation of the Empire, the Federal States and municipal and urban authorities with a view to relieving the situation resulting from this temporary rise of prices—is a condition precedent to the revival of building activity and to any inducement to people to purchase their own homes. Negotiations with a view to the provision of such assistance have already been opened with the Federal Governments by the Imperial Economic Office and it may be assumed that estimates will be included in the next Imperial Budget. In all housing and settlement schemes preferential treatment will be given to those who have fought in the war and measures will be taken to exclude the undesirable intervention of speculators.

"But even if the burden of increased building costs are transferred to the Empire, the State and municipalities, all building enterprise in the period immediately after the end of the war will be hampered by a serious dearth of building material. The provision of building material is therefore the second condition precedent to the revival of building activities and land settlement.

"The first item to be reckoned with is an almost irremediable shortage of bricks. Out of about 18,000 brick works in Germany before the war 17,600 have had to be closed down from time to time owing to the shortage of coal. At present the brick works actually working number about 1,200. In view of the coal shortage an increase in this number is impossible. The Coal Controller, after several conferences,

has issued a definite statement that he cannot allow more than 100,000 tons of coal per month to the brick works. This alone prevents more brick works from resuming operations. But the output of the works now active can only meet a very small portion of the demand for bricks.

"There will also be a shortage of other building materials, though this will be less widely felt. For these reasons it is necessary to make a supreme effort—by granting leave to miners and employing prisoners of war—to increase the output of coal and consequently the output of bricks and lime. This would soon be followed by a revival of activity in many of these industries through the return of skilled men from the army and the employment of prisoners of war.

"A factor of decisive importance for the adoption of these emergency measures is the attitude of the army administrative authorities. If they are hostile, (such hostility not being dictated by the necessities of war) or even merely dilatory, they would have to share the responsibility for the threatened shortage of houses.

"Legislative measures take third place as, in view of the general state of the building market and building trades, such measures can only be effective if a revival of building enterprise and the production of the building material required is found practicable; yet it goes without saying that the Government will make the greatest effort to pave the way for comprehensive housing and population schemes by suitable legislation. We must remember that the hopes aroused by the enthusiasm of the land reformers exceed in many ways the limits of what is possible.

"Next I must point out that the so-called 'Commutation Act' facilitates the settlement of the disabled by allowing them to draw a single lump sum in place of an annual pension, and that the resources of the Housing Fund of the Imperial Economic Office can be made available for the settlement of disabled men.

"The proposals brought forward by the land reformers, and quite recently by the Housing Committee of the Reichstag, for an Imperial Housing Bill and a Soldiers' and Sailors' Settlements Bill have been under examination by the Imperial Government for a long time. Thanks to the activity of the land reformers there has been considerable misapprehension in the services about these so-called settlements. The men have taken up the proposals of the land reformers enthusiastically in the hope of possessing small holdings of their own, but they have no desire to obtain a property so closely hedged about by restrictive covenants as the land reformers intend. The purport of the so-called Soldiers' and Sailors' Settlements Bill is not understood by the mass of the people. If the settlements are to be tied by restrictive covenants in the way desired by the land reformers, it would be necessary to give these settlements special financial grants from public funds in addition to the building subsidies already provided for, as otherwise they would be unattractive in comparison with free holdings. The necessary funds for financing the soldiers' settlements on this scale are not available. The idea which the land reformers have put forward of calling on the credit banks to finance these settlements is, in the opinion of the directors of the Reichsbank, incompatible with the principles of sound banking. I am therefore led to the conclusion that it will be necessary to abandon the idea of forcing those soldiers who wish to settle on holdings of their own to accept hard and fast legal conditions, as otherwise there will be little inducement to them to do so. Anyone who is willing to accept the restrictive conditions can do so. All we can hope to do is to give legal sanction to the special terms of these holdings and impose detailed conditions which correspond in principle to the Settlements Act now in force in Brunswick. The question whether the introduction of such a Bill is advisable is under consideration, but no final decision has yet been reached. It must further be considered whether questions

of settlements and housing should be left to the legislatures of the different States, or an Imperial Settlements Bill be introduced.

"In any case it is important to remember that the exaggerated expectations of the troops should be directed into more reasonable and hopeful channels, and that some check should be placed on the extravagant enthusiasms of the land reformers who are endeavouring, and not without success, to interest highly placed personages in their cause and use their names to advertise their activities.

"The right of expropriation is the affair of the State Governments, but the Imperial Government should also seriously consider whether the interests of a sound housing policy do not require that the law on this matter should not be uniform throughout the Empire.

"Finally, may I mention that I recently appointed an Imperial Housing Controller in the Imperial Economic Office in order to secure uniformity in this matter during the period of transition? I selected for this post Under-Secretary of State Baron von Coels who is also Housing Commissioner for Prussia.

(Signed) "HERTLING."

12.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 90431 op. II.
"Ref. 20/8/18, Rk. No. 2871. "G.H.Q.,
"6/9/1918.

"I am very grateful to Your Excellency for the memorandum on measures for remedying the house famine, the relief of which will do much to fortify the *moral* of the field army.

"I am particularly gratified to note that the public funds which are to bear the burden of the present high cost of building are to be applied mainly for the advantage of men who have served in the war.

"Like Your Excellency I regret the stagnation in the building trade during the war and the obstacles which still stand in the way of procuring the necessary building material —particularly bricks and lime.

"Of primary importance is the shortage of coal for the brick works. I am always making the greatest efforts to restrict our demands on the Coal Controller to the minimum which is absolutely vital for military purposes.

"It is impossible to release miners from the army at present; there are also obstacles in the way of using prisoners-of-war labour. Perhaps foreign labour can be obtained for this purpose.

"The legislative measures mentioned by Your Excellency are of the greatest importance.

"Seeing that stagnation in the building trade will continue for a long time and the house famine will become considerably worse, it is necessary that the sufferers from these causes shall at least be assured that their just desires will certainly be met as soon as sufficient building material and labour is available. Meanwhile the legislative measures for providing building subsidies and sites must be hurried through. When that has been done the numerous classes who are hardest hit by the house famine will show more patience in putting up with the unpleasant overcrowding of the intervening period and will be less easily moved to unrest and excesses.

"Hitherto our legislative efforts have been hampered by the absence of any guarantees against inflated land values and rents, and thus an ever-rising cost of living.

"Up to the present, advances of wages and so forth have usually been swallowed up by an immediate rise in the value of land and in increased rents. There is a danger that even the proposed subsidies to the building trade for the erection of small dwellings may find their way into the pockets of land speculators.

"This fear is shared by all who are not personally interested

in its realization, and has seized on all the men in the services who will be the worst sufferers from the house famine. It represents one of the greatest sources of patriotic anxiety to those who have the welfare of our population and armed forces at heart.

"There is only one sure safeguard against this peril in the long run, i.e., imposing legal restrictions upon the assignment of land which has been ear-marked as public building estates, and of houses built with public subsidies. This will frustrate unrestricted speculation. Temporary measures, such as the act permitting the commutation of pensions, are inadequate for this purpose; they tempt the recipient of the money not to trouble about the cultivation and development of his property as the enticing prospect of an automatic rise in value will induce him to re-sell before long. The imposition of legal restrictions on the right to assign is no small matter,* but is accepted by men who are undeniably expert lawyers and economists (von Gierke, Zorn, A. Wagner, E. Meyer and others) as a just, reasonable and profitable method of putting the land to the best use for the benefit of the whole community.

"Thus the propaganda of the land reformers, especially that in favour of soldiers' and sailors' settlements, is having very unsettling effects, not only at home but among the field army, which the Government and the General Staff can no longer afford to ignore.

"In Brunswick a Settlements Act has already been passed which is in harmony with that view. Bavaria and other Federal States are taking the same course. The Empire must not lag behind.

* It was very remarkable that the parties directly interested in land speculation tried in every possible way to frustrate the restrictions—very embarrassing from *their* point of view—on the right of sale. How successful they were is illustrated by the fact that even the Imperial Chancellor adopted this point of view of the "fundamental and inalienable right." Land reform, without protecting the small-holder against speculators, is unquestionably impossible and would defeat the whole object.

"The soldier's wish to establish his own home will not be diminished by the fact that certain restrictive covenants are included in the unusually favourable terms on which he enjoys his holding, so long as he is assured quiet possession and a profitable return.

"The sound and comprehensible longing of our troops for a piece of property of their own is already being exploited by the English air-propaganda service which is dropping thousands of incendiary leaflets among the soldiers at the front, leaflets in which the German State is represented as grudging her sons even a 'flower-pot full of earth.'

"Judging by the expressions in the home Press, an overwhelming majority of the Reichstag is thoroughly friendly to the proposed settlements and the Soldiers' and Sailors' Settlements Bills.

"The Independent Social Democrats alone raised a protest on 10/5/1918—by the mouth of Deputy Wurm, and for obvious reasons—against chaining the workman and the returned warrior to his own hearth.

"I hope that Your Excellency will succeed in getting the Soldiers' and Sailors' Settlements Bill passed in the next session of the Reichstag.

"If this problem of the expansion of our population and our armed forces is solved along promising lines it is likely to have a permanently steadying and invigorating effect on the spirit of the men in the field and their dependants at home.

"When the measures and decisions of the Reichstag become known in the army, I will see that the men are warned against exaggerated hopes with regard to the length of time that must elapse before the settlements materialize.

(Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

13.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 97645/op.

"G.H.Q.,
"5/9/1918.

"To the Administrative Committee of the Ludendorff Fund, c/o Direktor Heinrich.

"With reference to my letter of 14/8/1918, II. No. 95067 op., I beg to submit the following observations:

"The provision of medical treatment for disabled men will require a good deal of money and large staffs after the war.

"In view of the heavy burden of debt this duty can only be performed in part by the State, even in respect of those who can establish a legal claim to gratuitous state treatment. Apart from these cases there remain a great number of service men who are in need of treatment and cannot afford it, but have no legal or officially recognized claim to free cures, etc.

"The arrangements—both existing and anticipated—for providing treatment are very far from being adequate to meet either class of case, and it is essential that fresh and effective measures should be taken.

"It is proposed to erect a large modern convalescent home, fitted with all the approved curative installations, in the woods of Gross-Berlin. A beautiful, healthy and extensive estate near Frohnau has been presented for this purpose by the late Prince Donnersmarck to His Majesty the Kaiser. The plans for the home are complete. One hundred officers and 200 N.C.O.'s and men will find accommodation, treatment and nursing there for cures lasting several weeks or months. Further, the establishment has room for an additional 200 out-patients, who will be able to reach Frohnau quickly by special trains from the Stettin station.

"The number of cases per annum which can be treated is estimated—for treatment averaging six weeks—at about 3,000 officers, N.C.O.'s and men as in-patients, and a further 2,000 as out-patients.

"This sanatorium is to be equipped and run by the best medical and nursing staffs in the army. The following courses of treatment are proposed:

"1. Baths (warm, cold, hot, Irish-Roman, vapour, electric, fango, mud, sand, oxygen, carbonic acid).

"2. Electrotherapy, diathermic X-ray and radium treatment, light rays.

"3. Massage and medico-mechanics, physical exercises.

"4. Surgical and orthopedic treatment.

"5. Climatic-dietetic treatment.

"The plans are ready and have been approved by experts and the Academy of Architects.

"The cost runs to about five million marks. In view of the financial situation of the Empire the Imperial Treasury have serious objections to including this item in the estimates, although the necessity for building such an institution is fully recognized.

"As the requirements of the disabled permit of no delay in the building of this establishment the funds must be provided in some other way, and indeed the whole sum or at least the greater part of it.

"It is a matter of indifference from what source Germany raises the money in a case where all that happens in the long run is that certain capital changes hands while remaining in the country, and meanwhile valuable human resources are preserved.

"The Ludendorff Fund should come to the rescue where the government help is inadequate.

"Here is an urgent and profitable subject for your consideration. May I suggest that the sum required for building

the proposed establishment should be placed at the disposal of the Government, which would then only have to bear the cost of running and upkeep? The opportunity is particularly favourable because the site has cost nothing, and the fact that the plans and preliminary work are already in hand guarantees rapid building. In this way a crying need of the large numbers of disabled men in Greater Berlin—and of particularly serious cases all over the Empire—will be met.

"It remains to be considered whether the Ludendorff Fund, in view of its great voluntary contribution to the building fund, should not have some say in the selection of the beneficiaries, i.e., by nominating for admission some of its own *protégés*. Negotiations on this matter might be opened with the Medical Department of the Ministry of War which is working on the plans for the institution.

"Further details as to how the matter stands will be found in the enclosure. If necessary I or my representative at G.H.Q., Major Hochheimer, will be happy to supply more material. If desired Major Hochheimer is ready to discuss the matter with you. I should be grateful if you would tell me what you decide.

(Signed) "P. p. LUDENDORFF."

14.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"II. No. 43617.

"G.H.Q.,
"3/1/1917.

"TO THE PRUSSIAN MINISTER OF RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR INSTRUCTION, HIS EXCELLENCY HERR V. TROTT ZU SOLZ.

"I am taking the liberty of submitting the following proposal, to which I hope Your Excellency will give specially favourable attention.

"The longer the war lasts the more serious grows the

position of those students from the universities and higher schools who are on active service. While they—and this is not the worst aspect of the matter—are risking life and health, those who have remained at home are overtaking them and only too easily robbing them of their future livelihood. This is not a fair reward for the services of university and other students who have become an absolutely integral part of our army and most of whom are officers or acting officers. The Fatherland has every reason to be grateful to them.

"The point is that these youths have become men under the strain of responsibility and the moral and physical claims that war makes. It is incontrovertible that we shall require efficient, energetic men in the front ranks of every calling. Strength of character and a clear, practical grasp of life such as war gives are of greater value than a merely *theoretical* education. I do not in any way wish to underestimate the necessity for a thorough school and university education, for I have repeatedly emphasized the debt we owe to the intellectual training of our young men. But the lack of a school and university training can be sufficiently made good by suitable measures, while that is not the case with the advantages to be derived from the schooling of war.

"In my opinion, gratitude and justice urge us to secure that students from the universities and higher schools who are now on active service shall not be at a disadvantage on their path through life as compared with those who have not fought. Many courses suggest themselves and the choice must of course be left to Your Excellency. At the same time I should like to make the following suggestions.

"*Schoolboys from the Higher Schools.*

"(*a*) In principle all scholars who have reached *Oberprima* standard* will be allowed to continue their education free on condition that they attain matriculation standard. Special

* Approximately the same standard as the English Sixth Form. [F. A. H.]

courses at the universities might be helpful as a preliminary to this extended period.

"(*b*) Scholars who have not reached *Oberprima* standard might be sent on special courses in certain *Gymnasien* with a view to preparing for the *Abiturienten** examination. In any case they should no longer be treated as schoolboys.

"*Students.*

"(*a*) In the case of ex-service men it might be possible to depart from the rule of requiring a minimum period of study. Otherwise, the prescribed examination standard must be maintained.

"(*b*) On passing the civil service or other public examinations, ex-service men will be allowed to count their time in the army as time spent at school or the university (i.e., as though uninterrupted by the war). This will restore them to their rightful place in front of their colleagues who had temporarily got the start of them by taking no active part in the war and were thus able to devote *all* their time to their studies.

"This course presupposes that for the next few years the candidates, particularly women, coming from the universities will not be appointed to the vacancies according to the establishment, but that some of these vacant posts will be definitely reserved.

"(*c*) No compensation is possible for students who have graduated and taken up private callings and professional appointments. Nor, in my opinion, is it necessary, as these men will be able to forge ahead unassisted, thanks to the energetic and firm grasp of life which the war has given them.

"I have felt it my duty to appeal to Your Excellency so that the schoolboys and students in the army may not be handicapped and shall receive their due. The State, too, will reap the benefit. I feel sure that Your Excellency will agree with me in principle.

(Signed) "VON HINDENBURG."

* For school-leaving certificate. [F. A. H.]

The Minister of Education replied as early as 15/1/1917. He agreed unreservedly with what has been said above and referred to the arrangements he had himself made with a view to preventing scholars of the higher educational institutions, and students of the technical schools who had volunteered for service or been called to the colours, from being prejudiced in any way in their future careers. The letter concluded:

"I am entitled to hope that when these arrangements are complete the young men who have sacrificed so much in the service of their country will be at no disadvantage in their careers as compared with those who have remained at home, but rather that their efficiency will enable them to recover the lead that is their due, if not immediately, at any rate at a later stage of their career. This is in accordance with Your Excellency's suggestions and desires."

CHAPTER VI

THE SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN. WILSON'S PEACE MEDIATION AND ATTITUDE

LIST OF MEMORANDA REPRODUCED.

No.	Date.	To	Contents.
1	10/9/16.	Conversation with representative of the Admiralty Staff.	Views on the opening of the submarine campaign.
2	23/9/16.	Imperial Chancellor to His Majesty.	Instructions for the Ambassador, Count Bernstorff. Offer of peace on the submarine campaign.
3	5/10/16.	Chief of the General Staff to the Imperial Chancellor.	Responsibility for the submarine campaign.
	6/10/16.	Imperial Chancellor to Field-Marshal von Hindenburg.	Reply to same.
4	27/11/16.	Imperial Chancellor to Chief of the General Staff.	Our peace offer.
5	8/12/16.	Letters exchanged between Chief of the General Staff and the Imperial Chancellor.	Our peace offer and the submarine war.
6	12/12/16.	—	Army Order of His Majesty.
7	—	—	The peace offer.
8	20/12/16.	My telegram to Secretary of State Zimmermann.	Proposal to introduce the unrestricted submarine campaign.
9	21/12/16.	Secretary of State Zimmermann to Baron von Lersner.	Reply to same.
10	21/12/16.	—	The Wilson note of 18/12/16. Peace mediation.
11	23/12/16.	Field-Marshal von Hindenburg to the Imperial Chancellor.	Proposal to begin the unrestricted submarine campaign.

No.	Date.	To	Contents.
12	24/12/16.	Imperial Chancellor to the Field-Marshal.	Reply to same.
13	24/12/16.	Secretary of State Zimmermann to Baron von Lersner.	Attitude to Wilson's proposals.
14	26/12/16.	Field-Marshal to Imperial Chancellor.	The necessity of the submarine campaign.
15	5/1/17.	—	Reply of the enemy Powers to our peace offer of 12/12/16.
16	5/1/17.	—	Army Order of His Majesty.
17	9/1/17.	—	Report of General von Bartenwerffer on the conference on the opening of the submarine campaign.
18	12/1/17.	—	Reply of the enemy Powers to Wilson's offer of mediation.
19	14/1/17.	Secretary of State Zimmermann to Baron von Lersner.	Opinion of the ambassador, Count Bernstorff, on the position of the United States.
20	—	—	Memo. on armed merchantmen.
21	22/1/17.	Secretary of State Zimmermann to Baron von Grünau.	Instructions of 16/1/17 to Ambassador Count Bernstorff.
22	22/1/17.	Secretary of State Zimmermann to Main Headquarters.	Reply of the ambassador, Count Bernstorff, and attitude of Foreign Office towards it.
23	22/1/17.	—	Wilson's speech to the Senate.
24	27/1/17.	Count Bernstorff to the Foreign Office.	Proposal for mediation of President Wilson.
25	29/1/17.	Imperial Chancellor to Count Bernstorff.	Reply to Wilson's proposal.
26	11/2/17.	Count Bernstorff to the Foreign Office.	America will not yet enter the war.
27	16/10/18.	Chief of the General Staff to the Imperial Chancellor.	Main Headquarters and the submarine campaign.

I.

Representatives of the Admiralty Staff at General Headquarters.

No. 2597.

G.H.Q. in the East,
10/9/1916.

In accordance with the instructions of Your Excellency I have to-day handed General Ludendorff the Kalkmann

Memorandum for his perusal. I laid emphasis on its origin, which enjoins discretion, and its high value. With regard to the communication to the Field-Marshal I most particularly pointed out its most important point—the considerable danger that neutrals might intervene if we renounced the submarine campaign.

L.: Is sorry that the question has got on to the political rails; he considers it is a purely military matter. With regard to the danger of war with neutrals, he thinks a different view might be taken, as the memorandum of the Admiralty Staff shows. But for him the opinion of the leading statesmen is decisive. He always bases his decisions on actual situations.

I: The Chief of the Admiralty Staff is firmly convinced that the actual situation among the neutrals is otherwise than the Chancellor thinks.

L.: He was thinking of the actual situation with regard to our military resources. When the Chancellor tells him that there is a danger that Denmark might join our enemies he could not ignore that view on the ground of a suspicion to the contrary. But this all led up to the result that for the time being we had not the requisite military resources. It was the fault of the Austrians. He had had to send to their front two divisions which had been earmarked for Transylvania, and he was now unable to carry out the project he had in mind. The Western Front was requiring reserves. It was only when he was absolutely sure that all our fronts would hold that he could give his consent. He would then do so gladly. He had certainly taken risks many a time in his campaigns, but only when he was convinced that victory would follow. We must be quite clear that our military situation at the moment was unfavourable.

I: In this case also nothing was required but a certain audacity, to which he was quite accustomed in his decisions. It was just because we were in an unfavourable position that it

was desirable to give an impression of strength by deciding on the U-boat campaign.

L.: A bluff of that kind was not boldness but frivolity, and he would not be guilty of that.

I: We must not forget that we must start the U-boat war in about the first six weeks of the good season.

L.: Yes, that's a pity. Should we not be able to limit ourselves to the western coast? Would we thus be able to deal with the Dutch North Sea trade?

I: We should leave the neutrals a free exit to the ocean. It was just on the west coast, Cardiff, that many neutrals trafficked. If they lost a ship there the Dutch would be just as annoyed as if it had been in the North Sea.

L.: Agreed.

I: There has been talk of postponing the matter until the Presidential election. There is no purpose in that. The re-election of Wilson is a certainty as the betting is three to one on him.

L.: He did not attach much importance to these political aspects, as to him the question was a purely military one, as he had said.

The conversation was interrupted at this point as L. was suddenly called away to the King of Bavaria.

General L. summoned me again this morning.

He then handed me back the Kalkmann report. It had made a great impression upon him. Hitherto he had not realized its effect upon the prospect of peace. That was a very important point. The fleet was still hoping for a tactical decision. Your Excellency had told him that for that purpose U-boats would be required on a larger scale than previously. Could we not manage without them, and use them for the submarine campaign?

I answered him with a reference to the concluding sentence of the first report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet on

the Battle of Skaggerack. General L. was entirely in agreement with that view. He gave his opinion on the question to the following effect:

He attached great importance to the Navy's being told and fully realizing that the General Staff desired the U-boat campaign as soon as our military position was stabilized. That was not the case at the moment. Ten days earlier he had hoped that it would be the case. He had prepared five divisions for Transylvania, but meanwhile he had been compelled to send three of them to the Austrians. New formations would not be ready before the end of the month, and what could not happen before then? He had to retain Halicz, as otherwise we should lose the last oil-fields, and Your Excellency had, in fact, drawn his attention to the approaching danger of a shortage of lubricating oil. (Please let me have further information on this point.) In Schleswig we had three battalions. Now, instead of two years ago, 20,000 men had begun to construct positions there. It was a direct incitement to the Danes at this stage. The Austrians were nothing more than a sieve. If he had only Germans to deal with he should say that by the beginning of October he thought we should possess the necessary military security. But as he had to work with Austrians he could not bind himself in any way, but only say that he had hopes of reaching that position.

I said that that was the outside limit for us. If we postponed any longer we should be in the spring, and that, having regard to the Austrians, would be too late.

General L. replied that he could not accept that as certainty. We should be able to carry them with us for some time yet. But he certainly did not wish to postpone the U-boat campaign to the spring. We could rest assured that it would begin as soon as we were safe in a military sense. In the light of events, it was all a question, as the English had shown on the Somme, of whipping up and employing everything one had in the way of resources. From that point of view he

thought it a good thing that we had not begun the U-boat campaign in the spring. Although it was not his business to judge whether we had enough boats, it was a great satisfaction to him to know that we now had so many boats that even he, no expert, was able to believe in success.

He had expressed himself very frankly, as he was extremely anxious that there should be the fullest confidence and understanding between the military and naval chiefs.

2.

[Telegram.]

"Berlin, 23/9/1916,
"4.35 p.m.

"The Imperial Chancellor to His Majesty the Kaiser and King.

"In accordance with Your Majesty's command I have thoroughly gone into the question of the instructions to be issued to Your Majesty's ambassador in Washington, and venture to put forward the following suggestions.

"Count Bernstorff will be informed for his personal guidance that in the military sphere a certain pause has ensued, even if our lines can be held at all points. The fighting on so many fronts still demands enormous forces and a conclusion of the war is desirable on many grounds.

"Your Majesty's Navy promises itself a rapid success with the now largely increased number of U-boats and, in view of the economic situation of England, a success which would compel our principal foe, England, to make peace in a few months after the inauguration of an unrestricted submarine campaign.

"There is another eventual path to the conclusion of the war, for President Wilson might make a proposal of peace to the Powers. The latter must be in any case without definite proposals of a territorial kind, as that question must

be the subject of particular peace negotiations. Any action of this kind on the part of the President must be inaugurated very soon, as otherwise we should have to take other decisions. It would be too late if Wilson waited until shortly before or after his election. Moreover, the negotiations for the acceptance of the peace proposals must not be allowed to drift on indefinitely as in that case the step would bring us no advantage, but only a loss of time for the inauguration of the submarine campaign. Any considerable delay would also have the result that the Powers would be able to make further preparations to continue the war next year, so that all prospects of peace within a reasonable time would be lost.

"Count Bernstorff will discuss the matter with Colonel House—the medium through whom Your Majesty's ambassador deals with the President—and ascertain the intentions of Mr. Wilson. Any intervention by the President for the sake of peace, which had better seem spontaneous, could rely on a good reception among us, and that alone would mean victory for Wilson in his election campaign.

"I have put forward these proposals in agreement with Admiral von Holtzendorf.

"VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG."

3.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
"No. 14925 P.
"Ref. Telegram 1204.

"G.H.Q.,
"5/10/1916.

"TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR.

"In the conference held at Pless at the end of August or the beginning of September—I cannot give the date with more exactitude—Your Excellency expressed the view, if I

remember rightly, that the decision whether the unrestricted submarine campaign should be adopted fell primarily to the General Staff. Your Excellency merely reserved the right to hear our allies on the question and announce certain agreements with other nations.

"In discussing matters with members of the Reichstag also Your Excellency is said to have insisted on the responsibility of Main Headquarters in the U-boat question. I have not been informed of the actual words which were used. From many expressions which have reached my ears I assume that in fact it is believed in wide political circles that the responsibility for the submarine campaign is at the door of Main Headquarters alone.

"From the telegram referred to I believe I need no longer assume that Your Excellency had any other view of the question of responsibility than that with which I credited you. I understand that point of view thoroughly. But I should be glad of an answer to this letter in order to know for certain how far the responsibility for the intensified submarine campaign rests on the shoulders of Main Headquarters.

(Signed) "VON HINDENBURG."

"THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR TO FIELD-MARSHAL VON HINDENBURG.

"In answer to Your Excellency's note of the 5th inst.—14925 P.—I have the honour to reply that at the conferences held in Pless on the 30 and 31 August I reserved my final opinion on the inauguration of the unrestricted submarine campaign—as I then expressly emphasized—until Your Excellency had defined your attitude on the matter. Your Excellency there gave it as your standpoint that however anxious you were for the employment of this most ruthless weapon the uncertain military situation, especially with regard to the friendly or unfriendly attitude of Holland and Denmark, did

not enable you to give a decision one way or the other. In reply to the repeated and urgent questions about the attitude of Main Headquarters which have been put to me in secret conferences with the party leaders and in the present meetings of the Committee of the Reichstag, I have answered that, for military reasons, the General Staff have not given a final opinion at the moment.

"For the rest I may say this: A command of His Majesty to commence unrestricted submarine warfare is in itself an expression of military authority. But as that unrestricted U-boat campaign is directed, not only against enemy, but also neutral ships, it directly affects our relations with neutral States and thus represents an act of foreign policy. Moreover, the ruthless submarine campaign cannot be begun until we have withdrawn the concessions made to the United States of America with regard to the conduct of submarine operations, and also until we have modified the agreements made with Denmark and Sweden. Those also are acts of foreign policy, for which I, in case His Majesty commands them, have to take the sole and untransferable responsibility, even though, as I need hardly state, Your Excellency's opinion is of quite special importance in enabling me to decide my attitude. Lastly, I hope that I shall have Your Excellency's approval of the view that, quite apart from the fact that foreign policy is directly affected, so decisive a measure as the unrestricted submarine campaign should not be decided upon without reference to the Imperial Chancellor.

"I very much regret that the course of the conferences in August left any doubt whatever as to the situation.

"VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG."

4.

"The Imperial Chancellor.
"A.D. 4311.
"I. No. 24578.

"Berlin,
"27/11/1916.

"To the Chief of the General Staff.

"Turkey and Bulgaria have now also approved the proposed peace step. Some slight modifications suggested by Bulgaria in the text of the note can be settled in the course of this week. The way for this step is thus more or less prepared.

"The Auxiliary Service Law will, I hope, be passed this Thursday or Friday. A period of about a week between its passing into law and our peace step will be enough to avoid producing a false impression.

"The military situation alone will determine whether and when the offer of peace shall be made. With regard to this, a necessary condition precedent seems to me that we should reach a military high-water mark (not to be followed by a deadlock, of course), and simultaneously, as far as is humanly possible, be safe against reverses which might change the whole situation. Only the military leaders are in a position to say whether on that account we ought to wait for the great Italian offensive which has been announced, as also—if it is to be expected—the Russian offensive on the north-eastern front in Transylvania, not to mention our advance in Wallachia.

"The prospects of our peace offer remain uncertain. To judge by reports in front of me the movement in favour of peace in France is making headway. In Russia the domestic situation, though certainly very difficult to judge, seems to imply a progressive disintegration of the state authority. In recent times England has been anxious on account of the food question, the submarine campaign, the defeat of Rumania and the lack of confidence in the reliability of Russia. We are

not yet in a position to judge how far the fall of Sturmer, apparently the handiwork of England, has altered the situation to our disadvantage. On the whole I am entitled to assume that an offer of peace by us—the condition precedent for which, as I have said, is a favourable military situation on our side and for our enemies prospects which contain no promise of victory—could in any case meet with resolute opposition from France alone.

"President Wilson has informed Count Bernstorff in confidence that between now and the New Year he is thinking of issuing a fresh appeal for peace. It is absolutely uncertain whether he will really carry out his intention. He is undecided and very much afraid of a rebuff. We must expect that he will only issue his appeal when he need not expect a firm refusal from the Entente: that means when the Entente finds itself in a situation which makes their refusal of even a peace proposal by us improbable.

"I will not discuss whether our prospects in peace negotiations which were opened after an appeal by Wilson would be more favourable than where the negotiations were the result of a peace offer of our own. But there is no doubt that we should be in a better position if the refusal to negotiate by the Entente followed an appeal of Wilson's than if it were the reply to an offer of peace by us.

"For that reason the unpopularity with which an appeal by Wilson would be regarded by many circles among us need not weigh greatly with us in our decisions. On the other hand, in view of the irresolution which will mark the behaviour of Wilson up to the very last minute, and the increasing disinclination of our enemies with the approach of winter to enter into negotiations, we must not allow the psychological moment for our own peace offer to pass unexploited.

"I must ask Your Excellency to give me your views, and especially for an opinion as to how, in all human probability, the military situation will develop. Owing to the necessity

of coming to an understanding with our allies, as well as confidentially informing the Bundesrat, the political party leaders and the Press; a decision must be reached certainly four or five days before it is carried into effect.

(Signed) "BETHMANN-HOLLWEG."

Note.—"His Excellency had not replied on the evening of the 6th December, after the capture of Bukarest. He wishes to discuss the matter with the Chancellor personally at Pless on the 8th."

5.

NOTES FOR MY SUMMARY

The military situation is such that an offer of peace can be made by the Government when

(1) The operations on land and the submarine campaign at sea will be continued uninterruptedly.

(2) An army order is issued announcing this, and

(3) The political authorities can be certain that it will bring the peace which Germany needs.

As regards (1)

(*a*) The operations to be continued until the Sereth is reached.

(*b*) We have troops ready for use against Denmark and Holland and begin the unrestricted submarine campaign at the end of January.

His Majesty, as Highest War Lord, will request that Main Headquarters negotiate with the political authorities on this footing.

LUDENDORFF.

For six weeks Main Headquarters had accepted the idea of a peace offer, on the assumption that the offer should not appear to be a sign of weakness. For that reason the following conditions were imposed:

(1) A good military situation.

(2) The passing into law of the Auxiliary Service Bill.

Both conditions have been fulfilled.

Moreover, Main Headquarters declared six weeks before that the approval of our allies should be obtained to the peace offer.

That has been done, and our allies have not only approved, but are actually pressing for the step to be taken.

Under these circumstances, to draw back from our proposed action would only be possible if there was a fundamental change in the situation. There has been no such change.

Subsequently, Main Headquarters have made their consent dependent upon three new conditions. Apart from the fact that these new demands do not seem consistent with the previous course of events, the following remarks may be made upon these conditions:

(1) It goes without saying that military operations on land and sea will be continued. If our enemies accept our offer of peace and suggest an armistice, we shall have to determine what is to be our attitude to such a new situation when it eventuates.

(2) There is nothing to say about the army order in its proposed form.

(3) The condition that the political leaders must anticipate a peace such as Germany requires does not admit of a precise expression of opinion in view of its vagueness and the differences of view as to what claims should be put forward as the basis of a desirable peace.

(4) The unrestricted submarine campaign can only be begun after we have withdrawn the concessions we have made to America, Holland, Denmark and Sweden. Whether it will be possible to withdraw them in January, 1917, can only be finally decided when we have considered what the general situation will be at that time. Certainly not to-day. On the other hand, if our offer of peace is declined we shall be able to emphasize our point of view with regard to armed merchantmen.

I should have been grateful if Main Headquarters had not laid the present proposals before the All-Highest before communicating with the political authorities.

6.

ARMY ORDER.*

"Soldiers! In that consciousness of victory which you have won through your bravery I and the rulers of our faithful allies have made our enemies an offer of peace.

"It is uncertain whether we shall thereby achieve our aims.

"With God's help, you have to continue to stand fast against our enemies and defeat them.

"WILHELM I. R.

"G.H.Q.,
"12/12/1916.
"*To the German Army.*

"This order is also addressed to my Navy, which has faithfully and effectively put forth all its strength in the common struggle.

"WILHELM I. R."

7.

THE PEACE OFFER OF DECEMBER 12TH, 1916.

The note ran as follows:

The most fearful war which History has ever seen has now been raging for nearly two and a half years in a large part of the world. This catastrophe, which the bond of a thousand years of common civilization was unable to prevent, is destroying the most valuable achievements of humanity. It threatens to shatter into fragments the spiritual and material progress which was the pride of Europe at the beginning of the 20th century. Germany and her allies, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria

* Drawn up by me and approved in every detail by the Imperial Chancellor. [The Author.]

and Turkey, have proved their invincible might in this war. They have won great victories over their enemies, superior in numbers and war material. Their lines stand inviolable against the incessant attacks of the armies of their foes. The latest onslaught in the Balkans has been rapidly and victoriously frustrated, and recent events show that the further continuance of the war cannot break their powers of resistance, but that, on the contrary, the general situation justifies the expectation of fresh victories.

The four Allied Powers were compelled to take up arms to defend their existence and their national freedom to develop. Even their glorious feats of arms have made no change in those aims. They have always adhered to the conviction that their own rights and justifiable claims are in no way in conflict with the rights of other nations. They have no desire to dismember or destroy their opponents. Borne up by the consciousness of their military and economic strength, and ready, if need be, to continue the war which has been forced upon them to the very last, yet inspired by the desire to avoid further bloodshed, the four Allied Powers propose that peace negotiations should be entered upon at the earliest possible moment and the war brought to an end. The proposals they bring to these negotiations, which are designed to secure the existence, honour and freedom to develop of their peoples, form, they are convinced, a suitable basis for the establishment of a lasting peace.

If the fighting is to go on, in spite of this invitation to peace and reconciliation, the four Allied Powers are resolved to continue it to a victorious end. But they proudly decline, before Humanity and History, all responsibility.

8.

"Pless.
"P. No. 16287 P.

"20/12/1916.

"To His Excellency von Zimmermann.

"After Lloyd George has refused our peace offer by his declaration in the House of Commons, I am convinced, in view of the impressions I have gained on the Western Front, that the U-boat campaign must now be inaugurated in full force.

"Ludendorff."

9.

"No. 1612.
"Reply to Telegram No. 1103a (No. 16287 P.).

"Berlin,
"21/12/1916.
"P. No. 16337 P.

"Secretary of State to Baron von Lersner.

"We must first wait for the formal reply of our enemies to our peace offer. The question of armed merchant ships, for which a note has been prepared, will then be dealt with. At the moment there are serious objections to the unrestricted submarine campaign, not only on account of America, but with regard to European neutrals also. This is the view of His Majesty the Kaiser also.

"Zimmermann."

10.

President Wilson's Note of December 18th, 1916, delivered in Berlin on December 21st.

"Berlin,
"20/12/1917.

"The American Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin to the Secretary of the Foreign Office.

"The President of the United States has instructed me to suggest to the Imperial German Government á course of

action with regard to the present war which he hopes that the Imperial Government will take under consideration as suggested in the most friendly spirit and as coming, not only from a friend, but also as coming from the representative of a neutral nation whose interests have been most seriously affected by the war and whose concern for its early conclusion arises out of a manifest necessity to determine how best to safeguard these interests if the war is to continue.

"The suggestion which I am instructed to make the President has long had it in mind to offer. He is somewhat embarrassed to offer it at this particular time because it may now seem to have been prompted by a desire to play a part in connection with the recent overtures of the Central Powers. It has, in fact, been in no way suggested by them in its origin, and the President would have delayed offering it until those overtures had been independently answered but for the fact that it also concerns the question of peace and may best be considered in connection with other proposals which have the same end in view. The President can only beg that his suggestion be considered entirely on its own merits and as if it had been made in other circumstances.

"The President suggests that an early occasion be sought to call out from all the nations now at war such an avowal of their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be concluded and the arrangements which would be deemed satisfactory as a guarantee against its renewal or the kindling of any similar conflict in the future as would make it possible frankly to compare them. He is indifferent as to the means taken to accomplish this. He would be happy himself to serve, or even to take the initiative in its accomplishment, in any way that might prove acceptable, but he has no desire to determine the method or the instrumentality. One way will be as acceptable to him as another if only the great object he has in mind be attained.

"He takes the liberty of calling attention to the fact that

the objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war are virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world. Each side desires to make the rights and privileges of weak peoples and small States as secure against aggression or denial in the future as the rights and privileges of the great and powerful States now at war. Each wishes itself to be made secure in the future, along with all other nations and peoples, against the recurrence of wars like this, and against aggression of selfish interference of any kind. Each would be jealous of the formation of any more rival leagues to preserve an uncertain balance of power amidst multiplying suspicions; but each is ready to consider the formation of a league of nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world. Before that final step can be taken, however, each deems it necessary first to settle the issues of the present war upon terms which will certainly safeguard the independence, the territorial integrity, and the political and commercial freedom of the nations involved.

"In the measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world, the people and Government of the United States are as vitally and as directly interested as the Governments now at war. Their interest, moreover, in the means to be adopted to relieve the smaller and weaker peoples of the world of the peril of wrong and violence is as quick and ardent as that of any other people or Government. They stand ready, and even eager, to co-operate in the accomplishment of these ends, when the war is over, with every influence and resource at their command. But the war must first be concluded. The terms upon which it is to be concluded they are not at liberty to suggest; but the President does feel that it is his right and his duty to point out their intimate interest in its conclusion, lest it should presently be too late to accomplish the greater things which lie beyond its conclusion, lest the situation of neutral nations, now exceedingly hard to endure, be rendered altogether

intolerable, and lest, more than all, an injury be done civilization itself which can never be atoned for or repaired.

"The President therefore feels altogether justified in suggesting an immediate opportunity for a comparison of views as to the terms which must precede these ultimate arrangements for the peace of the world, which all desire and in which the neutral nations, as well as those at war, are ready to play their full responsible part. If the contest must continue to proceed towards undefined ends by slow attrition until the one group of belligerents or the other is exhausted, if million after million of human lives must continue to be offered up until on the one side or the other there are no more to offer, if resentments must be kindled that can never cool and despairs engendered from which there can be no recovery, hopes of peace and of the willing concert of free peoples will be rendered vain and idle.

"The life of the entire world has been profoundly affected. Every part of the great family of mankind has felt the burden and terror of this unprecedented contest of arms. No nation in the civilized world can be said in truth to stand outside its influence or to be safe against its disturbing effects. And yet the concrete objects for which it is being waged have never been definitely stated.

"The leaders of the several belligerents have, as has been said, stated those objects in general terms. But stated in general terms, they seem the same on both sides. Never yet have the authoritative spokesmen of either side avowed the precise objects which would, if attained, satisfy them and their people that the war had been fought out. The world has been left to conjecture what definite results, what actual exchange of guarantees, what political or territorial changes or readjustments, what stage of military success even, would bring the war to an end.

"It may be that peace is nearer than we know; that the terms which the belligerents on the one side and on the other

would deem it necessary to insist upon are not so irreconcilable as some have feared; that an interchange of views would clear the way at least for conference and make the permanent concord of the nations a hope of the immediate future, a concert of nations immediately practicable.

"The President is not proposing peace; he is not even offering mediation. He is merely proposing that soundings be taken in order that we may learn, the neutral nations with the belligerent, how near the haven of peace may be for which all mankind longs with an intense and increasing longing. He believes that the spirit in which he speaks and the objects which he seeks will be understood by all concerned, and he confidently hopes for a response which will bring a new light into the affairs of the world.

"LANSING."

II.

"No. 16340 P. Telegram. "23/12/1916.

"TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR.

"In connection with the exchange of telegrams between General Ludendorff and Secretary of State Zimmermann with regard to the submarine campaign, I must inform Your Excellency of my opinion that, in view of the military situation, we must lose no time in adopting the measure of torpedoing armed enemy merchantmen without notice.

"The Entente are continuing the war with all the resources at their disposal. There can be no doubt about *that* after we have received such a slap in the face from all their Parliaments. Moreover, Wilson's efforts can change nothing if our enemies do not let themselves be undeceived. I regard Wilson's suggestions as being inspired by England in order to delay us. In my opinion, and bearing in mind our strong military position,* we may now refuse to take any further interest on

* With regard to the neutrals. [The Author.]

national grounds. It would be a serious default on our part, and one that is unjustifiable in a military sense, if we allowed ourselves to be held back.

"The army now at grips with the enemy would regard this matter in the same light. Officers and men expect us to employ all our resources and ignore secondary matters. It is impossible to guarantee the *moral* of the army if its resolution is to be undermined.

"I therefore beg Your Excellency to be guided by this point of view in taking the diplomatic steps required.

"England cannot yet be overthrown merely by torpedoing armed enemy merchant ships. Sharper measures must be resorted to in order to break her will.

"During the conferences in Pless at the end of August Your Excellency made the decision in favour of the unrestricted submarine campaign dependent upon my declaration that, judging by the military situation, the right moment had come. That moment will be the end of January. Our victory in Rumania will then have been exploited. On the other hand, we must not leave our enemies a long time in which to complete their equipment for the decisive struggle on land.

"Holland, Denmark and the Northern States must be offered a free sea passage round the north of England. The question whether certain concessions can be made to America must be examined. But for the sake of this possibility the submarine campaign must not be effectively hampered. I expressly reserve my opinion on this matter. The diplomatic and military preparations for the unrestricted submarine campaign must be taken in hand at once, so that it may start at the end of January. I request Your Excellency to call conferences on this matter with Main Headquarters and the Chief of the Naval Staff.

"VON HINDENBURG."

12.

"No. 1628 Telegram.
"Reply to Telegram No. 11121a (No. 16340 P.)
"For Field-Marshal von Hindenburg.
"Berlin,
"24/12/1916."

"IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR TO FIELD-MARSHAL VON HINDENBURG.

"In the first place, will Your Excellency permit me to refer you to my note of the 6th October last, in reply to your remark that, during the conferences at the end of August in Pless, I made the decision to resort to the unrestricted submarine campaign dependent upon Your Excellency's declaration that, judging by the military situation, the right moment had arrived?

"In that note I defined my position to the effect that the unrestricted U-boat campaign, inasmuch as it was directed not only against enemy, but also neutral ships, immediately affected our relations with neutral States and therefore represented an act of foreign policy for which I alone had to bear the responsibility—a responsibility I could not transfer—even though it was self-evident that at any given moment Your Excellency's opinion was of special importance in enabling me to decide my attitude.

"Having said that, please allow me to emphasize that I am at one with Your Excellency in the view that, in the first place, the question of torpedoing armed enemy merchant ships must be cleared up with America. The reception of the reply of our enemies to our peace offer must be considered at the earliest moment at which the note, which is already prepared, can be handed to the American ambassador. No one to-day is in a position to say what that answer will be. Probabilities seem to show that it will mainly be a refusal, though it may leave some back door open.

We must not close that door. We should certainly do so if, before we received the reply, we took the new step with regard to armed enemy merchant ships. It would also mean that the political success at which we are aiming in our offer of peace, as well as its reaction on the peace movement in the countries of our enemies, would be seriously compromised. Even at this stage we have to contend with the notion, popular in neutral as well as enemy countries, that our whole step for peace is *mala fide* and indeed only staged at all as a starting point for the unrestricted submarine campaign. I have no need to argue that we must do everything to avoid intensifying that impression. Unfortunately a large number of German papers have made such a misconception of our purpose easy for our enemies by immediately replying to the speech of Lloyd George and Wilson's note with a summons to our U-boats. These articles are equally harmful to us if we have to resort to the intensified submarine warfare later on. We have the greatest possible interest in seeing that foreign countries do not get timely warning of this possible development, and I have therefore issued the necessary instructions to the Press. It seems to me absolutely essential that Main Headquarters should take the sharpest measures to secure that such discussions should not take place in the Press, and must therefore request Your Excellency to issue corresponding instructions at the earliest possible moment.

"As regards the question of unrestricted submarine operations I have hitherto adopted the standpoint that it can only be considered when our military situation offers us the guarantee that European neutrals can be restrained from making an attack upon us. Your Excellency believes that that time will have come by the end of January. On that assumption, and so far as I can bring myself to Your Excellency's conviction that the advantages of a wholesale and ruthless submarine campaign outweigh the disadvantages of the entry of America into the ranks of our enemies, I shall be prepared

to consider even the unrestricted U-boat warfare. There are no objections to summoning conferences with Main Headquarters and the Chief of the Naval Staff as soon as our peace step has reached some conclusion or other by the eventual reply of the Entente.

"I will of course fully bear in mind the *moral* of the army, to which Your Excellency expressly draws my attention, in the diplomatic handling of the whole matter.

"VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG."

13.

"Telegram No. 1630.

"Berlin,

"24/12/1916.

"SECRETARY OF STATE TO BARON VON LERSNER.

"To avoid the intervention of President Wilson in the peace negotiations we have made up our minds to reply to his note, our reply being in the sense of our peace offer, but stating clearly that we wish to deal directly with our enemies. The reply will be handed over next Tuesday in order to anticipate the answer of the Entente to our peace offer if possible, and thus make us independent of its tenor.

"The form of words which, having been approved by His Majesty, and agreed with the Austro-Hungarian Government, will doubtless meet with the assent of the Cabinets in Sofia and Constantinople, is as follows:

"The Imperial Government has received and considered the humane suggestions of the President of the United States of America to find a basis for the establishment of a lasting peace in the same friendly spirit which inspires the communication of the President. The President points to the goal on which his heart is set and leaves the choice of the way open. It appears to the Imperial Government that a direct exchange of views is the best method of arriving at the result desired.

It therefore has the honour of proposing, in the sense of its declaration of the 12th December which suggested peace overtures, that delegates of the States at war should assemble at some neutral place at the earliest possible moment.

"The Imperial Government also is of the opinion that the great work of preventing future wars should be taken in hand after the conclusion of the present struggle. When that moment is reached it will gladly be prepared to co-operate with the United States of America in that lofty task.

(Signed) "ZIMMERMANN."

14.

"P. No. 16377 P. Telegram.

"26/12/1916.

"To the Imperial Chancellor.

"I was sorry to receive Your Excellency's telegram of December 24th. I must say so frankly, and Your Excellency will approve my doing so, as there must be no shadow of misunderstanding between the Imperial Chancellor and the General Staff.

"In my telegram I had insisted on the necessity of immediate and energetic action at sea, as I regarded it as the only means of bringing the war to a speedy conclusion. Your Excellency thinks that this method cannot yet be adopted. Unfortunately our military situation makes it impossible that negotiations of any kind should be allowed to postpone military measures which have once been recognized as essential, and thus paralyse the energy of our operations. I must adhere to that view in no uncertain manner, and therefore repeat my request that submarine operations against armed merchantmen should be begun at once without preliminary negotiations and that conferences on this intensified campaign should be held at once.

"Your Excellency asks me to use my influence with the Press. For the very same reasons as Your Excellency General Ludendorff had suggested a conference on the same topic in Berlin. As far as I can see, Your Excellency's subordinates have not borne Your Excellency's efforts in mind. General Ludendorff has also pressed for the establishment of a press authority at the Imperial Chancery with a view to a uniform control of the Press, as that control has hitherto failed in various ways.

"Acting under a misconception of Your Excellency's words at the Reichstag Committee in the middle of September, the majority of the German people are holding Main Headquarters solely responsible for the decision of the question whether the intensified submarine campaign shall be resorted to or not. That is quite wrong. As long as Your Excellency and Main Headquarters are at one in their views I need not trouble about that. But as our opinions seem to be in marked conflict I am bound to remark, in order to make the position of Main Headquarters clear, that Your Excellency as Imperial Chancellor naturally claims the exclusive responsibility, but that it goes without saying that I myself shall never cease to insist with all my might and in the fullest sense of responsibility for the victorious outcome of the war, that everything of a military nature shall be done which I regard as necessary.

"VON HINDENBURG."

15.

Reply of the Allied Powers, handed in on January 1, 1917.

"The Allied Governments of Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Montenegro, Portugal, Rumania, Russia and Serbia, united in the defence of the liberty of nations and faithful to the engagement they have taken not to lay down arms separately, have resolved to answer collectively the so-called proposals of peace which have been addressed them on

behalf of the enemy Governments, through the intermediary of the United States, of Spain, of Switzerland, and of the Netherlands.

"The Allied Powers are constrained to preface their answer by protesting strongly against the two essential assertions in the note of the enemy Powers which attempts to throw upon the Allies the responsibility of the war and which proclaims the victory of the Central Powers.

"The Allies cannot admit an assertion which is doubly inexact and which is sufficient to render barren any attempt at negotiation.

"For thirty months the Allied Powers have suffered a war which they had tried by every means to avoid. They have demonstrated their attachment to peace by their acts. This attachment is as strong to-day as it was in 1914; after the violation of her engagements, it is not upon the word of Germany that peace, broken by her, can be based.

"A suggestion without any conditions for initiating negotiations is not an offer of peace. The so-called proposal, devoid of substance and of precision, circulated abroad by the Imperial Government, appears less as an offer of peace than as a manœuvre of war.

"It is based upon a systematic disregard of the nature of the struggle of the past, present and future.

"As to the past, the German note ignores all the facts, dates and figures which prove that the war was desired, incited and declared by Germany and Austria-Hungary. At The Hague it was the German delegate who rejected all suggestion of disarmament. In July, 1914, it was Austria-Hungary who, after having addressed to Serbia an ultimatum, of which there exists no precedent, declared war on her despite the satisfaction immediately obtained. The Central Empires thereafter repulsed every attempt made by the Entente to bring about a pacific solution to what was a local conflict. England's offer of a conference, the French proposal of an international

commission, the request for arbitration addressed by the Emperor of Russia to the Emperor of Germany, the understanding reached between Russia and Austria-Hungary on the eve of hostilities; all these endeavours were left by Germany without answer and without issue. Belgium was invaded by an Empire which had guaranteed her neutrality and which itself unhesitatingly proclaimed that treaties are 'mere scraps of paper' and that 'necessity knows no law.'

"As regards the present, the so-styled offers of Germany are based upon a 'war map' which covers Europe alone; which expresses only the exterior and transitory aspect of the situation, but not the real strength of the adversaries. To conclude a peace based on the above would be to the sole advantage of the aggressors, who, having believed they could attain their object in two months, perceive after two years that it will never be attained.

"For the future, the ruins caused by the German declaration of war, the innumerable aggressions committed by Germany and her allies against the belligerents and against neutrals demand penalties, reparations and guarantees; Germany eludes one and all.

"In reality, the overture made by the Central Powers is but an attempt calculated to work upon the evolution of the war and of finally imposing a German peace.

"It has for its object the troubling of opinion in the Allied countries; this opinion, in spite of all the sacrifices endured, has already replied with an admirable firmness and has denounced the hollowness of the enemy declaration.

"It desires to strengthen public opinion in Germany and amongst her allies, so gravely shaken by their losses, fatigued by the economic encirclement, and crushed by the supreme effort which is exacted from their peoples.

"It seeks to deceive, to intimidate public opinion of neutral countries, long ago satisfied as to the original responsibilities, enlightened as to the present responsibilities, and too far-

seeing to favour the designs of Germany by abandoning the defence of human liberties.

"It strives finally to justify new crimes in advance before the eyes of the world; submarine warfare, deportations, forced labour and enlistment of nationals against their own country, violation of neutrality.

"It is with a full realization of the gravity, but also of the necessities of this hour, that the Allied Governments, closely united and in perfect communion with their peoples, refuse to entertain a proposal without sincerity and without import.

"They affirm, once again, that no peace is possible as long as the reparation of violated rights and liberties, the acknowledgment of the principle of nationalities and of the free existence of small States shall not be assured; as long as there is no assurance of a settlement to suppress definitely the causes which for so long a time have menaced nations and to give the only efficacious guarantees for the security of the world.

"The Allied Powers, in termination, are constrained to expose the following considerations, which bring into relief the particular situation in which Belgium finds herself after two and a half years of war. By virtue of international treaties signed by five of the great Powers of Europe, amongst which figured Germany, Belgium profited by a special statute which rendered her territory inviolate, and placed the country itself under the guarantee of these Powers, sheltered from European conflicts. Nevertheless Belgium, despite these treaties, was the first to suffer the aggression of Germany. It is why the Belgian Government deems it necessary to specify the purpose which Belgium has never ceased to pursue in fighting beside the Powers of the Entente for the cause of right and justice.

"Belgium has always scrupulously observed the duties imposed upon her neutrality. She took arms to defend her independence and her neutrality, violated by Germany, and to remain faithful to her international obligations. On the 4th of

August, at the Reichstag, the Chancellor acknowledged that this aggression constituted an injustice contrary to the right of nations and agreed in the name of Germany to repair it.

"After two years this injustice has been cruelly aggravated by the practice of war and occupation, which have exhausted the resources of the country, ruined its industries, devastated its cities and villages, multiplied the massacres, the executions and imprisonments. And at the moment that Germany speaks to the world of peace and humanity she deports and reduces to servitude. Belgium before the war had no other wish than to live in concord with all her neighbours. Her King and her Government have only one purpose: the re-establishment of peace and of right. But they will only consider a peace which Belgian citizens by the thousand demand shall assure to their country legitimate reparation, guarantees and security for the future.

"SHARP."

16.

"TO MY ARMY AND NAVY.*

"Acting in concert with rulers allied to me I had proposed to our enemies that we should immediately enter into peace negotiations. They have declined our suggestion. Their hunger for power desires the destruction of Germany.

"The war is still continuing.

"Before God and Humanity the enemy Governments alone must bear the heavy responsibility for the further terrible sacrifices which I desired to spare you.

"In your just anger at the boundless frivolity of our foes, in your firm will to defend our holiest possessions and secure a happy future for our Fatherland, your hearts will turn to steel.

* The order was drawn up by me and approved after slight changes by the Imperial Chancellor. [The Author.]

"Our enemies have not desired the hand of understanding I offered them. With God's help our arms will compel them to accept it.

"WILHELM I. R.

"G.H.Q.,
"8/5/1917."

17.

Notes of the Conference between the Imperial Chancellor, Field-Marshal von Hindenburg and General Ludendorff at Pless at 11.15 a.m. on January 1, 1917.

The Chancellor. When His Majesty orders the intensified submarine operations the Chancellor will endeavour to secure that America will still remain "out." Certain concessions—which have been previously discussed with the Naval Staff—must be made. We must, however, reckon on the entry of America into the war.

The Chancellor had a more favourable opinion of the attitude of European neutrals. Our peace note had had a good effect. Holland and Denmark will not join in, certainly so long as they do not think the U-boat campaign will bring us victory.

As regards Switzerland it is to be feared that the Entente, when the food supplies of Switzerland begin to get short, will put pressure upon that country to allow the march through of French troops and eventually bring her in on their side.

It is possible that Denmark will lay up her shipping.

The Chancellor asks that the military measures on the neutral frontiers, particularly the Danish, will not be such as to imply too serious a threat.

General Ludendorff. We only intend to employ cavalry on the frontiers. A few regiments.

Imperial Chancellor. The decision to embark on the unrestricted U-boat campaign is therefore dependent upon the results we expect from it. Admiral von Holtzendorf offers us the prospect that we shall have England at our mercy by

the next harvest. The experiences of the U-boats in recent months, the increased number of boats, the bad economic situation of England certainly form a reinforcement for luck. Taking it all round the prospects of the unrestricted submarine campaign are very favourable. Of course those favourable prospects are not capable of proof. We must be quite clear that, judging by the military situation, great military blows are scarcely likely to bring us final victory. The U-boat campaign is the "last card." A very serious decision! "*But if the military authorities regard the U-boat campaign as necessary I am not in a position to oppose them.*"

The Field-Marshal. We are in a position to meet all eventualities, against America, Denmark, Holland and even Switzerland.

The submarine operations in cruiser form have hitherto brought us only a slightly greater measure of success. We need the most energetic and ruthless action possible. Therefore the U-boat war must begin not later than February 1, 1917. The war must be brought to a speedy end on account of our Allies, though *we* could continue for some time longer.

The Chancellor. It is to be remembered that the U-boat war may mean postponing the end of the war.

General Ludendorff. The U-boat war will improve the situation even of our armies. The ammunition supply will suffer from the shortage of timber and coal. That means a relief for the troops on the western front. We must spare the troops a second Somme battle. Our own experience, the effect of the transport crisis, show that that relief is certain. Moreover Russia's offensive capacity will be diminished by the shortage of ammunition due to the lack of tonnage. The Siberian Railway will not be enough for Russia by itself.

The Chancellor. On America's eventual entry into the war, her help will consist in the delivery of food to England, financial assistance, the supply of aeroplanes and a force of volunteers.

The Field-Marshal. We are already prepared to deal with that. The chances of the submarine operations are more favourable than they are ever likely to be again. We can and must begin them.

Chancellor. Yes, we must act if victory beckons.

The Field-Marshal. We shall be reproached later on if we let the moment slip.

Chancellor. The position is certainly better than last September.

General Ludendorff. The measures we shall take against neutrals are in no way provocative. They are purely defensive.

Chancellor. And suppose Switzerland came into the war or the French marched through that country.

The Field-Marshal. That would not be unfavourable, from the military point of view.

18.

REPLY OF JANUARY 12, 1917, OF THE ALLIED POWERS TO WILSON'S OFFER

The Allied Governments have received the note which was delivered to them in the name of the Government of the United States on the 19th of December, 1916. They have studied it with the care imposed upon them, both by the exact realization which they have of the gravity of the hour and by the sincere friendship which attaches them to the American people.

In a general way they wish to declare that they pay tribute to the elevation of the sentiment with which the American note is inspired and that they associate themselves with all their hopes with the project for the creation of a league of nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world. They recognize all the advantages for the cause of humanity

and civilization which the institution of international agreements, destined to avoid violent conflicts between nations, would bring; agreements which must imply the sanctions necessary to insure their execution and thus to prevent an apparent security from only facilitating new aggressions. But a discussion of future arrangements destined to insure an enduring peace presupposes a satisfactory settlement of the actual conflict; the Allies have as profound a desire as the Government of the United States to terminate as soon as possible a war for which the Central Empires are responsible and which inflicts such cruel sufferings upon humanity. But they believe that it is impossible at the present moment to attain a peace which will assure them reparation, restitution, and such guarantees to which they are entitled by the aggression for which the responsibility rests with the Central Powers and of which the principle itself tended to ruin the security of Europe; a peace which would, on the other hand, permit the establishment of the future of European nations on a solid basis. The Allied nations are conscious that they are not fighting for selfish interests, but above all to safeguard the independence of peoples, of right, and of humanity.

The Allies are fully aware of the losses and suffering which the war causes to neutrals, as well as to belligerents, and they deplore them; but they do not hold themselves responsible for them, having in no way either willed or provoked this war, and they strive to reduce these damages in the measure compatible with the inexorable exigencies of their defence against the violence and the wiles of the enemy.

It is with satisfaction, therefore, that they take note of the declaration that the American communication is in nowise associated in its origin with that of the Central Powers, transmitted on the 18th of December by the Government of the United States. They did not doubt, moreover, the resolution of that Government to avoid even the appearance of a support, even moral, of the authors responsible for the war.

The Allied Governments believe that they must protest in the most friendly, but in the most specific manner against the assimilation established by the American note between the two groups of belligerents; this assimilation, based upon public declarations by the Central Powers, is in direct opposition to the evidence, both as regards responsibility for the past and as concerns guarantees for the future; President Wilson in mentioning it certainly had no intention of associating himself with it.

If there is an historical fact established at the present date, it is the wilful aggression of Germany and Austria-Hungary to insure their hegemony over Europe and their economic domination over the world. Germany proved by her declaration of war, by the immediate violation of Belgium and Luxemburg, and by her manner of conducting the war, her simulating contempt for all principles of humanity and all respect for small States; as the conflict developed the attitude of the Central Powers and their Allies has been a continual defiance of humanity and civilization. Is it necessary to recall the horrors which accompanied the invasion of Belgium and of Serbia, the atrocious regime imposed upon the invaded countries, the massacre of hundreds of thousands of inoffensive Armenians, the barbarities perpetrated against the populations of Syria, the raids of Zeppelins on open towns, the destruction by submarines of passenger steamers and of merchantmen, even under neutral flags, the cruel treatment inflicted upon prisoners of war, the juridical murders of Miss Cavell, of Captain Fryatt, the deportation and the reduction to slavery of civil populations, etc.? The execution of such a series of crimes, perpetrated without any regard for universal reprobation, fully explains to President Wilson the protest of the Allies.

They consider that the note which they sent to the United States in reply to the German note will be a response to the questions put by the American Government, and, according to the exact words of the latter, constitute "a public declaration

as to the conditions upon which the war could be terminated."

President Wilson desires more: he desires that the belligerent powers openly affirm the objects which they seek by continuing the war; the Allies experience no difficulty in replying to this request. Their objects in the war are well known; they have been formulated on many occasions by the chiefs of their divers Governments. Their objects in the war will not be made known in detail, with all the equitable compensations and indemnities for damages suffered, until the hour of negotiations. But the civilized world knows that they imply in all necessity and in the first instance the restoration of Belgium, of Serbia, and of Montenegro and the indemnities which are due to them; the evacuation of the invaded territories of France, of Russia and of Rumania with just reparation; the reorganization of Europe, guaranteed by a stable regime and founded as much upon respect of nationalities and full security and liberty, economic development, which all nations, great or small, possess, as upon territorial conventions and international agreements suitable to guarantee territorial and maritime frontiers against unjustified attacks; the restitution of provinces or territories wrested in the past from the Allies by force or against the will of their populations; the liberation of Italians, of Slavs, of Rumanians and of Tcheco-Slovaks from foreign domination, the enfranchisement of populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire, decidedly repugnant to western civilization. The intentions of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia regarding Poland have been clearly indicated in the proclamation which he has just addressed to his armies. It goes without saying that, if the Allies wish to liberate Europe from the brutal covetousness of Prussian militarism, it never has been their design, as has been alleged, to encompass the extermination of the German peoples and their political disappearance. That which they desire above all is to insure a peace upon the

principles of liberty and justice, upon the inviolable fidelity to international obligation with which the Government of the United States has never ceased to be inspired.

United in the pursuits of this supreme object the Allies are determined, individually and collectively, to act with all their power and to consent to all sacrifices to bring to a victorious close a conflict upon which they are convinced, not only their own safety and prosperity depend, but also the future of civilization itself.

THE ENGLISH DECLARATION OF JANUARY 16, 1917

I gather from the general tenor of the President's note that, while he is animated by an intense desire that peace should come soon and that when it comes it should be lasting, he does not, for the moment at least, concern himself with the terms on which it should be arranged. His Majesty's Government entirely share the President's ideas, but they feel strongly that the durability of peace must largely depend on its character and that no stable system of international relations can be built on foundations which are essentially and hopelessly defective.

This becomes clearly apparent if we consider the main conditions which rendered possible the calamities from which the world is now suffering. These were the existence of great Powers consumed with the lust of domination in the midst of a community of nations ill prepared for defence, plentifully supplied indeed with international laws, but with no machinery for enforcing them and weakened by the fact that neither the boundaries of the various States nor their internal constitution harmonized with the aspirations of their constituent races or secured to them just and equal treatment.

That this last evil would be greatly mitigated if the Allies secured the changes in the map of Europe outlined in their joint note is manifest, and I need not labour the point.

It has been argued, indeed, that the expulsion of the Turks

from Europe forms no proper or logical part of this general scheme. The maintenance of the Turkish Empire was, during many generations, regarded by statesmen of world-wide authority as essential to the maintenance of European peace. Why, it is asked, should the cause of peace be now associated with a complete reversal of this traditional policy?

The answer is that circumstances have completely changed. It is unnecessary to consider now whether the creation of a reformed Turkey, mediating between hostile races in the Near East, was a scheme which, had the Sultan been sincere and the Powers united, could ever have been realized. It certainly cannot be realized now. The Turkey of "Union and Progress" is at least as barbarous and is far more aggressive than the Turkey of Sultan Abdul Hamid. In the hands of Germany it has ceased, even in appearance, to be a bulwark of peace and is openly used as an instrument of conquest. Under German officers Turkish soldiers are now fighting in lands from which they had long been expelled, and a Turkish Government, controlled, subsidized and supported by Germany, has been guilty of massacres in Armenia and Syria more horrible than any recorded in the history even of those unhappy countries. Evidently the interests of peace and the claims of nationality alike require that Turkish rule over alien races shall, if possible, be brought to an end; and we may hope that the expulsion of Turkey from Europe will contribute as much to the cause of peace as the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, of Italia Irredenta to Italy, or of any of the other territorial changes indicated in the Allied note.

Evidently, however, such territorial rearrangements, though they may diminish the occasions of war, provide no sufficient security against its recurrence. If Germany, or rather those in Germany who mould its opinions and control its destinies, again set out to domineer the world, they may find that by the new order of things the adventure is made more difficult, but hardly that it is made impossible. They may still have

ready to their hand a political system organized through and through on a military basis; they may still accumulate vast stores of military equipment; they may still persist in their methods of attack, so that their more pacific neighbours will be struck down before they can prepare themselves for defence. If so, Europe when the war is over will be far poorer in men, in money, and mutual good-will than it was when the war began, but it will not be safer; and the hopes for the future of the world entertained by the President will be as far as ever from fulfilment.

There are those who think that for this disease international treaties and international laws may provide a sufficient cure. But such persons have ill learned the lessons so clearly taught by recent history. While other nations, notably the United States of America and Britain, were striving by treaties of arbitration to make sure that no chance quarrel should mar the peace they desired to make perpetual, Germany stood aloof. Her historians and philosophers preached the splendours of war, power was proclaimed as the true end of the State, and the General Staff forged with untiring industry the weapons by which at the appointed moment power might be achieved. These facts proved clearly enough that treaty arrangements for maintaining peace were not likely to find much favour at Berlin; they did not prove that such treaties, once made, would be utterly ineffectual. This became evident only when war had broken out, though the demonstration, when it came, was overwhelming. So long as Germany remains the Germany which, without a shadow of justification, overran and barbarously ill-treated a country it was pledged to defend, no State can regard its rights as secure if they have no better protection than a solemn treaty.

The case is made worse by the reflection that these methods of calculated brutality were designed by the Central Powers, not merely to crush to the dust those with whom they were at war, but to intimidate those with whom they were still at

peace. Belgium was not only a victim, it was an example. Neutrals were intended to note the outrages which accompanied its conquest, the reign of terror which followed on its occupation, the deportation of a portion of its population, the cruel oppression of the remainder. And lest the nations happily protected, either by British fleets or by their own, from German armies should suppose themselves safe from German methods, the submarine has (within its limits) assiduously imitated the barbarous practices of the sister service. The War Staffs of the Central Powers are well content to horrify the world if at the same time they can terrorize it.

If then the Central Powers succeed, it will be to methods like these that they will owe their success. How can any reform of international relations be based on a peace thus obtained? Such a peace would represent the triumph of all the forces which make war certain and make it brutal. It would advertise the futility of all the methods on which civilization relies to eliminate the occasions of international dispute and to mitigate their ferocity. Germany and Austria made the present war inevitable by attacking the rights of one small State, and they gained their initial triumphs by violating the treaty guarantees of the territories of another. Are small States going to find in them their future protectors or in treaties made by them a bulwark against aggression? Terrorism by land and sea will have proved itself the instrument of victory. Are the victors likely to abandon it on the appeal of neutrals? If existing treaties are no more than scraps of paper, can fresh treaties help us? If the violation of the most fundamental canons of international law be crowned with success, will it not be in vain that the assembled nations labour to improve their code? None will profit by their rules but Powers who break them. It is those who keep them that will suffer.

Though, therefore, the people of this country share to the full the desire of the President for peace, they do not believe

peace can be durable if it be not based on the success of the Allied cause. For a durable peace can hardly be expected unless three conditions are fulfilled: The first is that existing causes of international unrest should be, as far as possible, removed or weakened. The second is that the aggressive aims and the unscrupulous methods of the Central Powers should fall into disrepute among their own peoples. The third is that, behind international law and behind all treaty arrangements for preventing or limiting hostilities, some form of international sanction should be devised which would give pause to the hardiest aggressor. These conditions may be difficult of fulfilment. But we believe them to be in general harmony with the President's ideas, and we are confident that none of them can be satisfied, even imperfectly, unless peace can be secured on the general lines indicated (so far as Europe is concerned) in the joint note. Therefore it is that this country has made, is making, and is prepared to make sacrifices of blood and treasure unparalleled in its history. It bears these heavy burdens, not merely that it may thus fulfil its treaty obligations, nor yet that it may secure a barren triumph of one group of nations over another. It bears them because it firmly believes that on the success of the Allies depend the prospects of peaceful civilization, and of those international reforms which the best thinkers of the New World, as of the Old, dare to hope may follow on the cessation of our present calamities.

19.

"Telegram No. 86. "Berlin,
"14/1/1917.

"THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO BARON VON LERSNER.

"Our Ambassador at Washington telegraphs on the 10th inst.:

"'Have given Lansing the memorandum on armed merchant ships. In my opinion, action in the sense of this

memorandum will frustrate Wilson's peace mediation' [Pencil note by His Majesty on the margin: 'Nothing is known of this, and it will neither be invited or accepted'], 'and mean a break with the United States unless we at least postpone our action against armed merchantmen until we have come to some agreement with the Government here. Perhaps agreement could be reached that Americans must be warned not to take service in ships that are armed offensively. But in any case this Government must be given time. As Wilson decides *everything*, a discussion with Lansing must be considered purely academic.' (Continuation follows.)—(Signed) 'BERNSTORFF.'

(Signed) "ZIMMERMANN."

"Telegram No. 93.

"Continuation of Telegram No. 86 of January 14.

"Berlin,

"15/1/1917.

"THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO BARON VON LERSNER.

"The Imperial Ambassador in Washington wires further:

"'Lansing will not reply until he receives instructions from Wilson. In the case in point the latter must first read the memorandum.

"'From here I cannot judge how much importance Your Excellency attaches to Wilson's peace action. Apart from that, my duty compels me to say definitely that I consider a breach with the United States inevitable if action is immediately taken in the sense of the memorandum.'"

20.

DRAFT* OF A MEMORANDUM OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT ON THE TREATMENT OF ARMED ENEMY MERCHANTMEN

The German Government, in its memorandum of February 8, 1916, on the treatment of armed merchantmen, produced a

* I have various drafts in front of me, but I have reason to believe that the one given was handed in at Washington. [The Author.]

series of proofs to show that the trading ships armed by the Powers opposed to us could no longer be considered as engaged in peaceful trade but must be regarded as warships. Since that time the material available as proof of our contention has materially increased.

It appears from numerous newspaper reports and debates in the Parliaments of our enemies that the number of merchant ships which have been provided with guns has greatly increased in the course of the year 1916. Responsible statesmen in those countries, such as Lord Crewe and Admiral Laçaze, have stated that the goal of their endeavour is the provision of guns for *the whole* merchant fleet. The result of these decisions was a conference of shipowners, held in London on December 10, at which representatives of the Government were present. For some time past public opinion in enemy countries has been demanding that guns should also be fitted on the bows of merchant ships. As a matter of fact bow guns had already been observed by German warships in the Mediterranean.

A large number of undoubted facts shows that the arming of merchantmen is no longer for defence, but for the purpose of making attacks on the German submarines whose operations are limited to cruiser warfare. It is only necessary to recall the British secret Government orders which were published in the German memorandum of February 8, 1916. Meanwhile secret Admiralty orders have also been found on the French and Italian merchant ships captured by German naval forces, and these completely confirm the offensive character of the armament. Thus, on October 29 last year, confidential instructions of the French Admiralty were found on the French steamer "Marie Thérèse." Among them was the order:

"De commencer le feu dès que le sous-marin sera à bonne portée."

To the same effect was a secret order found on July 31 last on the steamer "Città di Messina":

"Se una nave avvista un Sommergibile di prora e molto vicino, sia immerso, che al momento che emerge la miglior manovra che possa fare è di accostargli risolutamente addosse. In tale caso o lo investirà, cosa che affonderà il Sommergibile ed almeno, come si è visto in casi già avvenuti, ucciderà parte o tutte l' equipaggie, lanciandolo per l' urte contro le pareti, o obligherà il Sommergibile a sommerger ed a venire a galla di poppa, posizione assai svantaggiosa per esso. Da quell' istante bisognerà far molta attenzione di poppa e fuggire alla massima velocità, cercando di mantener il Sommergibile dritto di poppa se il mare è calmo o se questo non è abbastanza agitato perchè, se preso di prora di prora, impedisce il tiro efficace al Sommergibile."

Moreover, in a manner that excluded all possibility of doubt, the British Government interpreted the orders it has given through the medium of Lord Crewe on November 15, 1916. He said:

"The German submarine is an enemy which it is permissible and proper to destroy, if you can, at sight."

The offensive intentions of enemy merchant vessels have been clearly revealed to German naval commanders. The number of cases is steadily increasing in which enemy merchant ships, without themselves being attacked, have taken offensive action against German submarines. In quite recent times we have had proof of the execution of the secret orders. Thus on November 8 last the French steamer "Mississippi" fired at a German submarine which was passing her a long way off, took no offensive action against her, and indeed had no intention even of stopping her. Again, on December 4, the armed English steamer "Caledonia" tried to ram a German submarine, although she had no intention of attacking, much less actually attacked her. Lastly, in November alone it has been ascertained that three attacks by unknown enemy steamers were made on

German submarines which had done nothing whatever against them. During recent months six similar cases have been reported from the Mediterranean.

In view of events like these armed enemy merchant ships cannot claim to be treated in accordance with the ordinary rules of warfare. They have taken on the character of vessels of war, even judging by the principles which were set forth by the Government of the United States on March 25, 1916, in its memorandum on the status of armed merchant vessels.

It appears from the American memorandum that, either in neutral waters or on the high seas, a ship must be regarded and treated as a warship if, *inter alia*, it has instructions or orders to make attacks from the Government of a belligerent State. The American Government certainly maintains that on the high seas the establishment of belligerent character must rest, not upon suspicion, but upon convincing proofs. But now these proofs are so overwhelming that there is no longer any room for doubt. If the American memorandum insists that the presence of armament on a merchant vessel is not in itself sufficient reason for its being regarded as a warship, the German Government must point out that the belligerent character of the present armed enemy merchant ships is indicated by many things besides the armament itself—the most important of which are the above-mentioned instructions of the enemy Governments and the surprise attacks on German submarines which have been the outcome of them.

Further, the American Government will only recognize the existence of official instructions to undertake attacks when they are accompanied by a threat of punishment in case of neglect to attack and a promise of prize-money in case of successful attack. Here, again, the conditions precedent are demonstrably satisfied. For captains who had not carried out the orders to sink German U-boats, when they had a chance of doing so, are punished in England. Thus the "Daily Chronicle" as early as September 8, 1915, reports that Ernest Alfred Sheldon,

member of the Royal Naval Reserve and captain of an armed merchantman, was dismissed the service by sentence of a court-martial in Devonport, for having failed to attack a German submarine. Moreover, it is known from parliamentary debates in England, not only that rewards are given by the State for the sinking or attempted sinking of German submarines, but that claims to such rewards are examined by the authorities, and that it is only when this examination turns out to the satisfaction of the Government that the reward is given. The reward takes various forms. It is generally money, and therefore resembles prize-money if it is not actually described as such. Sometimes it is a gold watch or the distinction of promotion to the rank of naval officer. In addition to all this is the fact that the guns' crews of British merchant vessels, which are recruited from the British Navy and Naval Reserve, do not lose their military character and their amenability to the disciplinary authority and powers of the naval authorities by their posting to merchant ships, and therefore continue to form part of the British naval forces. For these reasons, ships manned and carrying instructions are no longer armed exclusively for their own defence, as the American memorandum presupposes if their non-belligerent character is to be accepted. On the contrary, they render the same services, in the sense of their orders, as warships exclusively appointed to deal with the submarine danger, and the circumstance that they are also employed on peaceful duties is no ground for any difference in their treatment by German submarines as belligerent.

Finally, the American memorandum admits that a warship may appropriately use force to compel the surrender of a merchant ship when such a ship either offers resistance after a summons to surrender, or attempts to escape, or uses its armament before being summoned to surrender, with a view to keeping the enemy at a distance. It gives the merchant vessel the right to use force in self-defence when it is certain

of being attacked by a hostile warship, as otherwise the exercise of that right would be so limited as to be ineffective. This very reason argues that a warship, which is empowered to exercise the right of prize, is allowed to use force when it is certain of being attacked by an enemy merchant vessel.

From the proofs communicated above, and in accordance with the sense of the American memorandum, the German Government has come to the conclusion that the armed merchant ships of their enemies must be considered as belligerent in this war. It is thoroughly convinced that it is acting on the same principles as those laid down by the British Government in the note of January 18, 1916, from Mr. Secretary Lansing to the British ambassador. For in that note the American Government itself recognized the view that, at the present stage of the U-boat, the arming of a merchant ship seems to have the character of offensive armament, as the placing of guns on trading vessels can only be explained by an intention to make the ship superior to the submarines and thus prevent warning and search by them.

21.

"Telegram No. 139.

"Berlin,

"10 a.m.

"Jan. 22, 1917.

"The Secretary of State to Baron von Grünau.

"In agreement with the Chief of the Naval Staff, the following instructions have been issued to the Imperial Ambassador in Washington on the 16 inst. (under No. 157*):

"After their peremptory rejection of our peace offer the Entente have stated in their reply to Wilson that they have decided to continue the war in order to rob Germany of

* These instructions were not put before me before they were sent. [The Author.]

provinces in East and West, tear Austria-Hungary to pieces and destroy Turkey. In the military operations which are directed to that end the Entente violate all the rules of international law in practically stopping all trade between Germany and neutrals and between neutrals themselves. Out of consideration for neutrals, Germany has hitherto not made full use of the submarine weapon. After the Entente have made an understanding impossible on the basis of the Central Powers' proposals of equality of rights for all nations, and especially after their declaration that the only possible peace is one which means the destruction or dishonour of the Central Powers and must be dictated by the Entente, Germany can no longer refrain from using this weapon. We do not doubt that the President will understand the situation created by the brutal lust for war and destruction which animates the Entente, and will see that the intentions, now revealed, of the Entente restore to Germany that freedom of action which she reserved in the note of May 4, 1916.

"Germany will therefore reply to the measures of her enemies, measures which are contrary to international law, by forcibly preventing all sea-borne traffic from and to England and France—even in neutral ships—in a certain area round Great Britain and France. This is to date from February 1 next.

"Neutral ships which are found in this area will also be sunk. The area is bounded by a line running along and 20 sea miles distant from the Dutch coast to the Terschelling lightship, the degree of longitude from Terschelling lightship to Udsire, a line from there past point 62° N. 0° W. Long. to 62° N. 5° W.—a point 3 sea miles south of the most southerly point of the Faroe Islands—from there past a point 62° N. 10° W. to 61° N. 15° W.—57° N. 20° W. to 47° N. 20° W.—to 43° N. 15° W.—then along the 43° N. Lat. to 20 sea miles from Cape Finisterre, and along and 20 sea miles distant from the northern coast of Spain to the French frontier.

"From this measure the German Government anticipates a speedy end of the war and that return of peace which the President himself so earnestly desires. Germany and her allies had hoped, as did the President, that that goal might be reached by the path of negotiation. But now that the war is to take its course, through the fault of our enemies, the Imperial Government believes that it may feel quite certain that the President will not close his eyes to the necessity of a measure which seems likely to hasten the end of this terrible waste of life. They feel all the more certain because the neutrals, under the pressure of the Entente, find themselves most seriously injured in being compelled to abandon all trade and intercourse, or at any rate to restrict it to the limits which our enemies voluntarily permit, without regard for the rules of international law.

"We therefore assume with confidence that the President will now warn the American ships about to start for the barred zone, or require American subjects not to convey passengers or send goods by enemy ships voyaging to English and French ports in the barred zone.

"Moreover, it is in the President's power to hasten the end of the war most effectively by putting energetic pressure on England, in the form of a prohibition of exports of food and war material.

"The above is for Your Excellency's personal information. Absolute secrecy is necessary for military reasons. Give no hint to the Government there, and make no official pronouncement before February 1. On making your communication you will say that the orders to the submarines will allow a sufficient period of grace for neutral ships and adequate security for passengers on unarmed merchant ships. Further, neutral ships which are on their way to or from ports in the barred zone can avoid it, or leave it by the shortest route, without any risk of being sunk, if they are informed immediately. In the same way, neutral vessels may leave

ports in the barred zone before 4 o'clock on the evening of February 4 and cross it by the shortest route.

"In answer to the objection to the endangering of lives of Americans on enemy cargo boats on their way to the barred zone, please point out that enemy owners are in a position to prevent entry into the barred zone in time.

"Your Excellency will also repeat previous offer of free passage of limited number of American passenger steamers to Falmouth. Conditions: fixed, known route, no contraband of any kind, special distinguishing marks reserved for these ships, course to be agreed upon.

"I am well aware that our action may involve the danger of a break, and possibly war with the United States. I beg Your Excellency to communicate to me in detail any points in the handling of this matter which might diminish the danger of a break. I should particularly like your opinion as to whether the concessions provided for neutral ships and passenger steamers are adequate, or whether a period of grace should be allowed, and, if so, what period. I must remind Your Excellency in conclusion that precautions must be taken to make German steamers utterly unusable. Your Excellency is responsible for giving the necessary password in such good time and by so safe a channel that no German steamer falls into foreign hands in an effective condition.

"Please confirm receipt immediately.

"ZIMMERMANN."

22.

No. 293-25-2c. Ref. 17004 P.

COUNT BERNSTORFF WIRES No. 222 OF JANUARY 19 TO 22, 1917.

"Reply to telegram No. 157 of 16/1. War inevitable in view of your intentions."

I have immediately got into touch with Admiral von Holtzendorf and strongly urged him to adopt the period of

grace proposed by Count Bernstorff and do everything he can to diminish the danger of a break with America. I insisted that the postponement of a breach with America would be desirable if only because the enthusiasm aroused, even in our trenches, by the employment of the U-boat weapon might be seriously damped if a declaration of war by America was the immediate result. The Admiral understood my point of view entirely and promises me a conciliatory reply in the morning. But a period of grace of a month seems to him too long in any case.

23.

WILSON'S SPEECH TO THE SENATE ON JANUARY 22, 1917

GENTLEMEN OF THE SENATE:

On the 18th of December last I addressed an identic note to the Governments of the nations now at war, requesting them to state, more definitely than had yet been stated by either group of belligerents, the terms upon which they would deem it possible to make peace. I spoke on behalf of humanity and of the rights of all neutral nations like our own, many of whose most vital interests the war puts in constant jeopardy. The Central Powers united in a reply which stated merely that they were ready to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss terms of peace. The Entente Powers have replied much more definitely and have stated, in general terms, indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply details, the arrangements, guarantees and acts of reparation which they deem to be the indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement. We are that much nearer a definite discussion of the peace which shall end the present war. We are that much nearer the discussion of the international concert which must thereafter hold the world at peace. In every discussion of the peace that must end this war it is taken for granted

that that peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should overwhelm us again. Every lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man must take that for granted.

I have sought this opportunity to address you because I thought that I owed it to you, as the council associated with me in the final determination of our international obligations, to disclose to you without reserve the thought and purpose that have been taking form in my mind in regard to the duty of our Government in the days to come, when it will be necessary to lay afresh and upon a new plan the foundations of peace among the nations.

It is inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in that great enterprise. To take part in such a service will be the opportunity for which they have sought to prepare themselves by the very principles and purposes of their polity and the approved practices of their Government ever since the days when they set up a new nation in the high and honourable hope that it might in all that it was and did show mankind the way to liberty. They cannot in honour withhold the service to which they are now about to be challenged. They do not wish to withhold it. But they owe it to themselves and to the other nations of the world to state the conditions under which they will feel free to render it.

That service is nothing less than this, to add their authority and their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world. Such a settlement cannot now be long postponed. It is right that before it comes this Government should frankly formulate the conditions upon which it would feel justified in asking our people to approve its formal and solemn adherence to a League for Peace. I am here to attempt to state those conditions.

The present war must first be ended; but we owe it to candour and to a just regard for the opinion of mankind to say that, so far as our participation in guarantees of future peace is concerned, it makes a great deal of difference in what way and upon what terms it is ended. The treaties and agreements which bring it to an end must embody terms which will create a peace that is worth guaranteeing and preserving, a peace that will win the approval of mankind, not merely a peace that will serve the several interests and immediate aims of the nations engaged. We shall have no voice in determining what those terms shall be, but we shall, I feel sure, have a voice in determining whether they shall be made lasting or not by the guarantees of a universal covenant; and our judgment upon what is fundamental and essential as a condition precedent to permanency should be spoken now, not afterwards, when it may be too late.

No covenant of co-operative peace that does not include the peoples of the New World can suffice to keep the future safe against war; and yet there is only one sort of peace that the peoples of America could join in guaranteeing. The elements of that peace must be elements that engage the confidence and satisfy the principles of the American Governments, elements consistent with their political faith and with the practical convictions which the peoples of America have once for all embraced and undertaken to defend.

I do not mean to say that any American Government would throw any obstacle in the way of any terms of peace the Governments now at war might agree upon, or seek to upset

The Italian ambassador in Petersburg, Carlotti, cabled to Sonnino on 13/1/1917:

"The United States ambassador here, speaking in the name of Wilson, has formally announced to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that, contrary to the rumours spread by several journals here, the President has no intention of addressing a second note to the Powers now at war."

It is not clear what induced Wilson to take this step. It is certain that he knew of our determination to conduct the U-boat campaign on and after February 1 without restrictions. Gerard proves that. Moreover, there is a well-founded suspicion that all the telegrams, which had to be sent by English cables, were deciphered. [The Author.]

them when made, whatever they might be. I only take it for granted that mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents themselves. Mere agreements may not make peace secure. It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantee of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations, could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind.

The terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will determine whether it is a peace for which such a guarantee can be secured. The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.

Fortunately we have received very explicit assurances on this point. The statesmen of both of the groups of nations now arrayed against one another have said, in terms that could not be misinterpreted, that it was no part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their antagonists. But the implications of these assurances may not be equally clear to all—may not be the same on both sides of the water. I think it will be serviceable if I attempt to set forth what we understand them to be.

They imply, first of all, that it must be a peace without victory. It is not pleasant to say this. I beg that I may be permitted to put my own interpretation upon it, and that it may be understood that no other interpretation was in my

thought. I am seeking only to face realities, and to face them without soft concealments. Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, as an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last. Only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit. The right state of mind, the right feeling between nations, is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance.

The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded if it is to last must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak. Right must be based upon the common strength, not upon the individual strength, of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend. Equality of territory or of resources there of course cannot be; nor any other sort of equality not gained in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate development of the peoples themselves. But no one asks or expects anything more than equality of rights. Mankind is looking now for freedom of life, not for equipoises of power.

And there is a deeper thing involved than even equality of rights among organized nations. No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property. I take it for granted, for instance, if I may venture upon a single example, that statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent and

autonomous Poland, and that henceforth inviolable security of life, of worship, and of industrial and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own.

I speak of this, not because of any desire to exalt an abstract political principle which has always been held very dear by those who have sought to build up liberty in America, but for the same reason that I have spoken of the other conditions of peace which seem to me clearly indispensable,—because I wish frankly to uncover realities. Any peace which does not recognize and accept this principle will inevitably be upset. It will not rest upon the affections or the convictions of mankind. The ferment of spirit of whole populations will fight subtly and constantly against it, and all the world will sympathize. The world can be at peace only if its life is stable, and there can be no stability where the will is in rebellion, where there is not tranquillity of spirit and a sense of justice, of freedom, and of right.

So far as is practicable, moreover, every great people now struggling towards a full development of its resources and of its powers should be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea. Where this cannot be done by the cession of territory, it can no doubt be done by the neutralization of direct rights of way under the general guarantee which will assure the peace itself. With a right comity of arrangement no nation need be shut away from free access to the open paths of the world's commerce.

And the paths of the sea must, alike in law and in fact, be free. The freedom of the seas is the *sine qua non* of peace, equality and co-operation. No doubt a somewhat radical reconsideration of many of the rules of international practice hitherto thought to be established may be necessary in order to make the seas indeed free and common in practically all circumstances for the use of mankind, but the motive for such

changes is convincing and compelling. There can be no trust or intimacy between the peoples of the world without them. The free, constant, unthreatened intercourse of nations is an essential part of the process of peace and of development. It need not be difficult either to define or to secure the freedom of the seas if the Governments of the world sincerely desire to come to an agreement concerning it,

It is a problem closely connected with the limitation of naval armaments and the co-operation of the navies of the world in keeping the seas at once free and safe. And the question of limiting naval armaments opens the wider and perhaps more difficult question of the limitation of armies and of all programmes of military preparation. Difficult and delicate as these questions are, they must be faced with the utmost candour and decided in a spirit of real accommodation if peace is to come with healing in its wings, and come to stay. Peace cannot be had without concession and sacrifice. There can be no sense of safety and equality among the nations if great, preponderating armaments are henceforth to continue here and there to be built up and maintained. The statesmen of the world must plan for peace and nations must adjust and accommodate their policy to it as they have planned for war and made ready for pitiless contest and rivalry. The question of armaments, whether on land or sea, is the most immediately and intensely practical question connected with the future fortunes of nations and of mankind.

I have spoken upon these great matters without reserve and with the utmost explicitness because it has seemed to me to be necessary if the world's yearning desire for peace was anywhere to find free voice and utterance. Perhaps I am the only person in high authority amongst all the peoples of the world who is at liberty to speak and hold nothing back. I am speaking as an individual, and yet I am speaking also, of course, as the responsible head of a great Government, and I feel confident that I have said what the people of the United

States would wish me to say. May I not add that I hope and believe that I am, in effect, speaking for liberals and friends of humanity in every nation and of every programme of liberty? I would fain believe that I am speaking for the silent mass of mankind everywhere who have as yet had no place or opportunity to speak their real hearts out concerning the death and ruin they see to have come already upon the persons and the homes they hold most dear.

And in holding out the expectation that the people and Government of the United States will join the other civilized nations of the world in guaranteeing the permanence of peace upon such terms as I have named I speak with the greater boldness and confidence because it is clear to every man who can think that there is in this promise no breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but a fulfilment, rather, of all that we have professed or striven for.

I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world; that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

I am proposing government by the consent of the governed; that freedom of the seas which in international conference after conference representatives of the United States have urged with the eloquence of those who are the convinced disciples of liberty; and that moderation of armaments which

makes of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggression or of selfish violence.

These are American principles, American policies. We could stand for no others. And they are also the principles and policies of forward-looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail.

24.

"Washington,
"27th January, 1917.

"COUNT BERNSTORFF TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE.
[Telegram.]

"House suddenly invited me to visit him on behalf of Wilson, and told me the following as an official message from President.

"First of all, Wilson offers privately to mediate for peace on basis of his appeal to Senate, i.e., therefore without reference to territorial terms of peace. Wilson's simultaneous request to us to submit our terms of peace is not to be regarded as private. House revealed to me the following ideas of the President. Our enemies had openly put forward impossible peace terms. Thereupon President had developed his programme as a direct contrast to these. Now we are also morally bound to make our peace terms known, because our desire for peace would otherwise appear insincere. After Your Excellency had informed Mr. Wilson that our peace terms were moderate, and that we agreed to second peace conference, President thought he had given expression to our wishes in his appeal to the Senate.

"Wilson hopes that we shall communicate our peace terms to him, which might be published both in Germany and over here, so that they could become known immediately all over

the world. If only we had confidence in him, President was convinced that he would be able to bring about both peace conferences. He would be particularly pleased if Your Excellency were at the same time to declare that we are prepared to enter the second peace conference on the basis of his appeal. Our declaration might be shown to have been actuated by Wilson's having sent us a direct request for our peace terms. President is of opinion that note sent to him by the Entente was a piece of bluff which need not be taken seriously. He hopes definitely to secure peace conferences, and quickly too, so that the unnecessary bloodshed of the spring offensive may be averted.

"To what extent Your Excellency will and can meet Wilson it is impossible to tell from this side. Meanwhile, I beg leave to submit the following remarks for your consideration. If the U-boat campaign is opened now without any further ado, the President will regard this as a smack in the face, and war with the United States will be inevitable. The war party here will gain the upper hand and the end of the war will be quite out of sight, as whatever people may say to the contrary the resources of the United States are enormous. On the other hand, if we acquiesce in Wilson's proposal, but the scheme nevertheless comes to grief owing to the stubbornness of our enemies, it would be very hard for the President to come into the war against us, even if by that time we began our unrestricted U-boat war. At present, therefore, it is only a matter of postponing the declaration for a little while so that we may improve our diplomatic position. For my own part, I confess that I am of opinion that we shall obtain a better peace now by means of conferences than we should if the United States joined the ranks of our enemies.

"As cables always take several days, please send instructions by wireless, in case Telegraphic Code 157 cannot be used on February 1st.

(Signed) "BERNSTORFF."

"Wilson offered officially, but in first place privately, to mediate for peace, on basis of his appeal to Senate: that means without reference to territorial terms of peace. Wilson's simultaneous request for communication of our peace terms not to be regarded as private.

"I am wiring with full particulars through State Department. To begin U-boat war without previous negotiations regarding above proposals would *inter alia* put us seriously in the wrong, and owing to Wilson's personal sensitiveness would make prevention of rupture quite impossible.

(Signed) "BERNSTORFF."

25.

"Telegram No. 65.

"Reply to Telegram No. 239.

"Berlin,

"29th January, 1917.

"BETHMANN-HOLLWEG TO COUNT BERNSTORFF.

[Telegram.]

"Please thank President on behalf of Imperial Government for his communication. We trust him completely, and beg him to trust us likewise. Germany is ready to accept his secret offer of mediation for the purpose of bringing about a direct conference of the belligerents, and will recommend similar course to her Allies. We wish our acceptance of offer, as well as offer itself, to be treated as quite secret.

"A public announcement of our peace terms is at present impossible, now that Entente have published their peace terms, which aim at the degradation and annihilation of Germany and her Allies, and have been characterized by President himself as impossible. We cannot regard them as bluff, as they entirely agree with professed opinions of enemy Powers, expressed not only before, but afterwards. They also correspond exactly with the objects for which Italy and Rumania

entered the war, and, as regards Turkey, with the assurances made on behalf of Russia by both England and France. So long as these war aims of our enemies are publicly maintained it would be impossible to interpret public announcement of our own peace terms as anything else than a sign of weakness which at present does not exist, and would only lead to a prolongation of the war. In order to give President Wilson a proof of our confidence, however, tell him, just for his own private information, the terms on which we should have been prepared to take part in peace negotiations if the Entente had accepted our offer of peace on the 12th December, 1916.

"The restitution to France of that part of Upper Alsace occupied by her. The acquisition of a strategical and economic safety-frontier zone, separating Germany and Poland from Russia.

"Colonial restitution in the form of an understanding which would secure Germany colonial possessions compatible with the size of her population and the importance of her economic interests.

"Restoration of those parts of France occupied by Germany, on condition that certain strategic and economic modifications of the frontier be allowed, as also financial compensation.

"Restitution of Belgium under definite guarantees for the safety of Germany, which would have to be determined by means of negotiations with the Belgian Government.

"Economic and financial settlement, on the basis of exchange of the territory occupied by either side; this to be restored at the conclusion of peace.

"Compensation for German concerns and private persons who have suffered damage through the war.

"Renunciation of all economic arrangements and measures which after the peace would constitute an obstacle in the way of normal commerce and trade, with the conclusion of corresponding commercial treaties.

"The Freedom of the Seas to be placed on a secure basis.

"The peace terms of our Allies coincide with our own views, and are subject to the same limits.

"We are, moreover, prepared to enter the international conference which he wishes to call after the war, on the basis of his communication to the Senate.

"Your Excellency will give President these details at the same time as you hand him note relating to unrestricted U-boat war, and will inform him as follows:

"If his offer had only reached us a few days earlier we should have been able to postpone opening of the new U-boat war. Now, however, in spite of best will in the world, it is, owing to technical reasons, unfortunately too late, as extensive military preparations have already been made which cannot be withdrawn, and U-boats have already sailed with new instructions. Form and content of enemy's reply to our offer of peace and the note of the President were so abrupt and harsh that, in view of the life and death struggle which has once again been proclaimed against us, we cannot any longer delay the use of those means which appear to us best calculated to end the war quickly, and for the relinquishment of which we could not have borne the responsibility.

"As the order regarding the unrestricted U-boat war shows, we are prepared at any moment to make every possible allowance for America's needs. We would beg the President to resume—or continue—his efforts and declare ourselves ready to discontinue the unrestricted U-boat war the moment we are completely assured that the President's efforts will lead to a peace that would be acceptable to us.

"BETHMANN-HOLLWEG."

26.

[Telegram.]

"Washington.

"No. 245 of 10/2/17.

"COUNT BERNSTORFF TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

[Telegram.]

"As nothing has occurred since February 1 which affects America, war fever has abated considerably. The country does not want war.* If a case occurs, Wilson will at first only take measures to protect American ships, and see what we shall do. Actual war may be postponed for some time to come if we take no action against the United States itself. In case of necessity negotiations can still be carried on through the Austro-Hungarian ambassador or the Swiss minister. In any case Wilson will not enter into an alliance with our enemies.

(Signed) "BERNSTORFF."

27.

"Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.

"No. 71357 M II.

"G.H.Q.,

"16/10/1918.

"TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR.

"An article of Professor von Schulze-Gaevernitz on 'Wilson's Peace Mediation' (evening edition of the *Vossische Zeitung* of October 10, 1918) discusses the question as to who is responsible for having caused the failure of the peace efforts of the President of the United States through the declaration of the unrestricted U-boat campaign.

* If the submarine campaign had really been the direct cause of the participation of the United States in the war, she must have declared war at the beginning of February. To wait until April would have been unworthy of a great nation. She did not actually enter the war until the military situation of the Entente had become worse. [The Author.]

"With a view to clearing up this question I feel it my duty to send Your Grand-Ducal Highness the following remarks, which are based on documentary evidence.

"When I took over my present duties, the former Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, at a conference in the Castle of Pless on August 30, 1916, made the decision to resort to intensified submarine operations dependent upon my declaring that the right moment had come, judging by the military situation. The military situation at that moment—Rumania had just declared war and extremely heavy fighting was in progress on the eastern and western fronts—made such a declaration untimely, having regard to neutrals.

"At the end of December, 1916, Rumania was vanquished, but the situation was still extraordinarily serious. For in 1917 we saw ourselves faced with attacks by very superior enemy forces in east and west, and the problem of resisting them seemed all the more difficult because the Hindenburg programme had only just been introduced. We had to fear that we should have to meet a great superiority in man-power and especially material.

"There were then no signs of the Russian revolution. On the contrary, Russia was planning great new formations. In the west we were coping with an immense superiority of material, a superiority only too well known to our fighters in the Somme battle. Thus, in spite of all the objections we had to find some means of limiting the enemy's superiority in material, and those means were the unrestricted submarine campaign. For that reason we wired to the Foreign Office on December 20, 1916, that the U-boat operations must now begin at full pressure.

"On December 23, 1916, I amplified that communication to the Imperial Chancellor, explaining that the moment for the opening of unrestricted U-boat warfare would be the end of January.

"On December 24, 1916, the Imperial Chancellor explained

that he would be ready to initiate discussion of the unrestricted submarine campaign as soon as our peace proposals came to a conclusion, one way or the other, by the eventual reply of the Entente. Recurring to the views he had put forward on October 6, 1916, the Imperial Chancellor defined his position in the following words: 'The unrestricted submarine campaign, inasmuch as it is directed not only against enemy, but also neutral ships, immediately affects our relations with neutrals and therefore represents an act of foreign policy, for which I alone have the responsibility, a responsibility which cannot be transferred.'

"On December 26, 1916, I wired to the Imperial Chancellor:

"'Acting under a misconception of Your Excellency's words at the Reichstag Committee in the middle of September, the majority of the German people are holding Main Headquarters solely responsible for the decision of the question whether the intensified submarine campaign shall be resorted to or not. That is quite wrong. As long as Your Excellency and Main Headquarters are at one in their views I need not trouble about that. But as our opinions seems to be in marked conflict I am bound to remark, in order to make the position of Main Headquarters clear, that Your Excellency, as Imperial Chancellor, naturally claims the exclusive responsibility, but that it goes without saying that I myself shall never cease to insist with all my might and in the fullest sense of responsibility for the victorious outcome of the war, that everything of a military nature shall be done which I regard as necessary.'

"On January 9, 1917, the decisive conference took place at the Castle of Pless, and the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, first stated the effect which the unrestricted U-boat campaign might have on the neutral States and declared that: 'the decision to embark on the unrestricted U-boat campaign is therefore dependent upon

the results we expect from it;' and 'if the military authorities regard the U-boat campaign as necessary, I am not in a position to oppose them;' also, 'We must act if victory beckons.'

"The Imperial Chancellor did not say a word about the unrestricted submarine campaign crossing an effort at peace mediation on the part of President Wilson. Nor was any diplomatic action in America in favour of peace ever mentioned in the discussions between the Foreign Office and the Supreme Command on the submarine operations. The conferences never dealt with anything but the question whether, and when the right moment for commencing those operations would arrive, having regard to the military situation.

"I learned of the peace action of President Wilson through the following documents:

"1. A copy of a telegram from the Imperial Chancellor on September 23, 1916, in which the proposal was made to His Majesty that Count Bernstorff should be instructed to induce President Wilson to make peace proposals to the Powers as as soon as possible, and in any case before his re-election. No such peace proposals followed.

"2. A letter of November 27, 1916, from the Imperial Chancellor, in which it was stated that agreement had been come to with the Allied Powers with regard to peace proposals on the part of the Central Powers. The Imperial Chancellor said:

"'President Wilson has informed Count Bernstorff in confidence that between now and the New Year he is thinking of issuing a fresh appeal for peace. It is absolutely uncertain whether he will really carry out his intention. He is undecided, very much afraid of a rebuff. We must expect that he will only issue his appeal when he need not expect a firm refusal from the Entente.'

"The peace offer of the Central Powers followed on December 12, 1916.

" 3. Telegram of the Foreign Office on 24/12/1916, giving *verbatim* a reply to a note from Wilson referring to the principles on which a lasting peace could be reached. The telegram opened with the words:

" 'To avoid the intervention of President Wilson in the peace negotiations we have made up our minds to reply to his note, our reply being in the sense of our peace offer, but stating clearly that we wish to deal directly with our enemies.'

" The Imperial Government were thus averse to Wilson's intervention.

" 4. The instructions sent to Ambassador Count Bernstorff by the Government on or about January 7, 1917. They begin with the words:

" 'American intervention in real peace negotiations is undesirable owing to public opinion. . . . Please handle the question of communicating our peace terms in a dilatory manner. On the other hand, I authorize you to emphasize our willingness to co-operate in that part of the programme in which the President is particularly interested (Court of Arbitration, League of Nations).'

" Here, again, the Government attached no importance to his intervention.

" 5. A telegram of January 10, 1917, from Count Bernstorff, forwarded by the Foreign Office on January 14 and 15, 1917,* in which the Ambassador points out that the memorandum on armed merchant vessels 'will frustrate Wilson's peace mediation,' and that he considers 'a breach with the United States inevitable if action is immediately taken in the sense of the memorandum.'

" Meanwhile, on January 1, 1917, the Imperial Chancellor received His Majesty's command to open the unrestricted submarine campaign, and on the 16th the appropriate instructions were issued to Count Bernstorff. The Government declared:

* No. 19. [The Author.]

"'We have decided to take the risk' (of a break and possibly war with the United States).

"6. A telegram of January 19, 1917,* from Ambassador Count Bernstorff, communicated by the Foreign Office, which contains the words:

"'If military reasons are not absolutely imperative, postponement' (of the unrestricted U-boat submarine campaign) 'extremely desirable. Wilson believes he can bring about peace on the basis of the equality of rights of all nations, as proposed by us.'

"The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added that he had strongly urged the Chief of the Naval Staff to adopt the more definite period of grace proposed by the Ambassador, and thus lessen the danger of a break with America.

"It would also have been too late to withdraw the order for unrestricted submarine operations, as some of the U-boats must already have started out on their mission.

"To-day, as then, the documentary evidence and my own recollections confirm my conviction that the Government no longer attached any importance to the peace mediation of Wilson, which they had originally suggested, but Wilson himself had hesitated over for months.

"I summarize the matter thus:

"1. The charge of having compelled the Imperial Chancellor to pursue a double-faced policy with regard to the United States certainly does not touch myself and General Ludendorff.

"2. Objections that the diplomatic action of President Wilson might be frustrated by the U-boat operations were never put into words (either by the Imperial Chancellor or the Foreign Office) during the discussions on the decision to begin such operations.

(Signed) "VON HINDENBURG."

* No. 22. [The Author.]

Note.—On January 31, 1917, confirming the account just given, the Imperial Chancellor told the Reichstag Main Committee that he had stated on a previous occasion that:

"As soon as I am convinced, in agreement with the Supreme Command, that the unrestricted U-boat campaign will bring a victorious peace nearer, the submarine war will begin." . . .

He added: "That moment has now come." In this, the Imperial Chancellor was acting with the complete consent of the majority of the Reichstag, as appears from the following:

The report, No. 353, of October 7, 1916, of the Main Committee of the Reichstag, runs as follows:

"In the name of all the members of the Centre Party in the Committee for Imperial Affairs the following declaration is issued:

"The Imperial Chancellor is solely responsible to the Reichstag for all political decisions relating to the war. The Imperial Chancellor's decision must therefore be based essentially on the decisions of the Supreme Command. If a decision is given *in favour of* the unrestricted U-boat campaign the Imperial Chancellor may be certain of the approval of the Reichstag."

2. The views in the concluding paragraphs of the letter of October 16, 1918, are widely held among the German people. The proceedings before the Committee of Inquiry have revealed their falsity.

The former Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann, has made a special reply to the letter. That reply came to my knowledge only during the proceedings before the Committee of Inquiry. It contains nothing worth noting. [The Author.]

28.

WILSON'S POLICY AS IT APPEARS FROM THE REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY

A.

(*a*) *Extract from the examination of the former Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, on October* 31.

"From the point of view of international law we may think what we like about the American deliveries of arms and ammunition, but in the then situation they meant preferential treatment for our enemies, without which the war would have ended very much sooner in all probability. We were always being told that President Wilson could take no action against these deliveries for reasons of international law. But it must be very doubtful whether he would have interfered, even if that obstacle had not existed. *On this point Count Bernstorff had given us the enormously important information that President Wilson had told him, through Colonel House, immediately after our 'Sussex' note, that he could do nothing against England's naval measures, even though they were a violation of*

international law, because public opinion in his country would not permit it, owing to the close association of American trade with the Entente. This communication seems to me of fundamental importance from two points of view. In the first place—I will only state the actual fact here—Wilson told us repeatedly that if we gave up the unrestricted submarine campaign he would compel England to conform to the Declaration of London. Now, by our 'Sussex' note, we had fulfilled Wilson's condition. Colonel House's communication thus shows that America was firmly bound by the limits imposed upon her by the close commercial relations between herself and England.

"It is clear that in such a situation Wilson's freedom of action was extremely restricted, even with regard to his proposed peace action."

(*b*) *Extract from the examination of the former Imperial Chancellor on November* 17.

"Count Bernstorff has revealed something *to-day* which seems to me of outstanding importance. He has given utterance to his conviction that America could only have been kept back from entering the war against Germany if we had accepted her as a mediator for peace. I believe Count Bernstorff's view is perfectly right. It is in keeping with that interview, which has been referred to many times already, of Mr. Secretary Lansing in which he said, 'America is getting nearer and nearer to war.' Entirely consistent with Count Bernstorff's conviction is the cross-examination to which President Wilson was subjected in the Senate or Congress in August of this year. In the course of that cross-examination he stated his belief that he would have gone to war with Germany even if we had not started the submarine campaign.*

* In his speech of September 27, 1918, Wilson also said that they had entered the war when its character was perfectly clear and when it was plain that no nation could stand on one side or be indifferent to its results. As a matter of fact a Council of Defence was created as early as the summer of 1916. It apparently made preparations for war, though ostensibly engaged in other duties.

He believed that war could only have been avoided if he himself had mediated for peace.

"Looking back, we can now say without fear of contradiction, 'Yes, if we had put ourselves into the hands of President Wilson—for that is what it meant.'"

Deputy Dr. Sinzheimer. "Count Bernstorff did not quite say that, Your Excellency."

The Witness (Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, former Imperial Chancellor). "I think I have repeated his words accurately —Count Bernstorff has confirmed it himself and he is my neighbour. Perhaps these questions can be put to me later. It is very difficult to develop a train of reasoning when one is interrupted. But I might add that Count Bernstorff has told me myself that I gave the sense of his words correctly. Whether I actually gave his very words seems to me a secondary matter. Indeed, in these great war questions it always seems to me a secondary matter to attach vital importance to the actual wording of every individual telegram or document. Further, there is no question of the actual wording.

"I will therefore proceed with the statement I had begun. There is no question, looking back over the course of events, that it would have been better for us to have put ourselves in the hands of President Wilson and accepted his peace mediation, even though—a point I must emphasize—in my opinion the entrance of America into the war did not make it inevitable that we should come to the Peace of Versailles. But what was the position then? If we had put ourselves in the hands of President Wilson we should be dealing with a man who, on his own statement and that of Count Bernstorff to-day, was not friendly to us, a man against whom Senator Stone (as Dr. Helfferich told us yesterday) in the Senate made twenty very serious charges of unneutral and unfriendly behaviour to Germany. We should have been dealing with a President who informed Count Bernstorff immediately after our 'Sussex' note that nothing could be done against England, as it would

be contrary to the commercial interests of his country. Those are the actual facts. In the conflict for the soul of Wilson which has developed here I will not take any part. But I am not of those who come forward as Wilson's advocates.

"Could we have assumed, in spite of the actual facts, that if Wilson had really wanted he was in a position to suggest to the Entente terms of peace which the German people might have found acceptable, having regard to the military situation at the time? If we had accepted President Wilson as our advocate we should certainly have been compelled to accept all the Entente's conditions which he put before us. We should have been entirely in his hands. We could not have said: 'We reject these terms.' That would have meant the resumption of war with the Entente and America, and the German nation would never have allowed it. Of course not. We should have been firmly in President Wilson's power. I repeat that even the experience of the Peace of Versailles would have seemed preferable to such a peace. But could we—and this was the main question we had to face at the end of January—give ourselves into Wilson's hands, as the situation was then. I considered it impossible. If you think that was a mistake, you must judge and condemn me accordingly. I considered it impossible."

(*c*) *Both the statements produced, which are based on records, show clearly what the actual position was with regard to Wilson's mediation.*

The only remarkable point is that Ambassador Count Bernstorff did not report two such extremely important statements to his superior, the Imperial Chancellor, at the time, but left him in doubt on such vital points of Wilson's policy.

B.

LETTER FROM A GERMAN OFFICER CAPTURED BY THE AMERICANS

"Munich,

"Fraunhoferstrasse, 14,

"7/11/19.

"YOUR EXCELLENCY,

"A few weeks ago I returned from my Franco-American captivity. I have seen and heard many things in my fifteen months as a prisoner of war which might be of general interest.

"To-day I will only refer to the question which is agitating the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry, i.e., the U-boat campaign. On this question I have heard a good many conversations between American officers and men, with whom we were on good terms, generally speaking. The American does not feel the hatred which inspires all the French. If you ask Americans whether they participated in the struggle as the result of the intensified U-boat war, they smile slyly and say: 'Well, that's what our papers say, *and yours too*, a thing we can't understand! We had to protect our wealth. If you had won—and you would have won if we had not come in—we should have lost all our wealth. Of course you wanted nothing from us.' Another American officer gave utterance to the same point of view. Put shortly, it was this: 'To the great mass of the nation the intensified submarine campaign was the reason for America's entry into the war. Our cinemas had worked up a particularly violent agitation against Germany. But we really had to fight for business reasons, for you Germans would have been on top. If you had had food and war material you would certainly have won.'

"An American soldier said: 'Everything we had read over there' (America) 'of the Germans, or seen in cinemas, had enraged us against the Boches. Next time they will rouse us, not against Germany, but against France.' In November of

last year I asked another soldier, who had just come from a transport: 'Why are you against us in the war?' 'We have been told it is because you started the submarine campaign. We believed that over in America, but in France we have changed our minds. We had to help the defeated French and English. We get nothing out of it, except our millionaires.' I have retained a particularly lively recollection of the following conversation, in the spring of 1919: 'The Germans are usually very cute,' said an American captain, 'but the submarine campaign was stupid, stupid because it gave us and our friends so much time to store food and take our counter-measures. The intensified U-boat campaign came too late, but if you had started it at once it would have brought you victory. We were delighted when Tirpitz had to go and Ludendorff was being perpetually rebuffed in Berlin. The only thing you lacked was a Clemenceau at home.'

"I feel it my duty to report these conversations, from the most various quarters, to Your Excellency, especially after reading the evidence of the late German Ambassador in America before the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry. The few statements I have given will serve to show that there are very various views about the U-boat war, even in America.

"Yours obediently,

"WILHELM VON THOMA,

"Lieutenant,

"3 Bav. Inf. Regt."

C.

There can be no doubt now that the United States decided to intervene in the war in April, 1917, when it was turning in Germany's favour; that is, after the outbreak of the Russian revolution in March had made it possible that we might get rid of the eastern front and attack with our whole strength in the west. (See the Appendix to this chapter.)

29.

THE EFFECTS OF THE SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN

a. In the Spring of 1917.

1. The confessions of the American, Admiral Sims, about his visit to England at the end of March, 1917. The Admiral says that in November of that year England was going to her doom as the result of the U-boat campaign. (Published in the German papers in October and November, 1919.)

2. In the *Sunday Pictorial* of January 12, 1919, Winston Churchill said: "Only a little more and the submarine campaign, instead of bringing in America on our side, would have forced us into unconditional surrender through starvation."

3. In the *Morning Post* of November 22, 1918, Lord —— told a gathering of the National Political League that he did not think it would ever be known how near we actually were to starvation for some time, in spite of the few submarines which were operating against us.

4. On April 9, 1917, the Italian Ambassador in Paris telegraphed to Sonnino:

"Speaking of the attitude of the United States of North America, Ribot told me that there is nothing to indicate that the United States will join the alliance or will associate herself with the Treaty of London, which binds each contracting party not to make a separate peace. Ribot certainly appreciates the importance of the now inevitable participation of the United States in the peace; but this does not make much change in the situation, because the United States was already virtually the arbiter of war and peace. In this connection he quoted the remark of Your Excellency to Barrère. He assured me that at the moment there was no special compact with the United States and no negotiations were in progress for the formation of a commission. On the

whole he thought that the intervention of the United States was an act of Providence, because it would possibly hasten the end of the war, or at least revive our courage a little *as we were approaching exhaustion.*"

On May 29, 1917, the Italian Ambassador in Paris reported to Rome a significant change for the worse in the internal situation. This was also under the influence of the heavy losses in the Aisne–Champagne battle of April and May, 1917.

On May 31, 1917, he again reported that:

"In France very disquieting symptoms of an agitation which will become more serious if the war continues are to be observed."

On May 12, 1917, the Italian ambassador in Paris reported to Rome:

"Thomas told me that the tonnage lost by England and France in the month of April amounted to 860,000 tons, and did not conceal from me his anxiety about the difficulty of producing a sufficient number of ships to cover requirements in the short time allowed, even with the help of America and the 600,000 tons which have been seized from Germany."

5. Telegram from Sonnino to the Italian Ambassador in Petersburg on May 18, 1917.

"Rodd has brought the following memorandum to my notice:

"'The situation created by the submarine campaign and the necessity of meeting the requirements of the civil population of the Allied States have moved the British Government to take certain decisions which the British Ambassador is authorized to communicate to the Minister of Foreign Affairs for his own information only:

"'1. The needs of the civil population of the Allied Powers can be secured by the British Government only if the forces of the Salonica Army are reduced to a figure

which is sufficient to hold a fortified camp which could protect the harbour of Salonica.

"'2. The method of this reduction must be settled later; but in any case an agreement is being drawn up under which two cavalry brigades and an infantry division are to be withdrawn after June 1.'"

On July 6, 1917, the Italian Ambassador in Petersburg telegraphed to Rome:

"The trade delegate asks that the following telegram should be forwarded to the Minister of Commerce:

"'Urgently request that you ask Professor Attilice to demand from the Russian Section of the Inter-Allied Supplies Commission, as an exceptional case, the assignment of at least 200 tons of freight per week on the steamers of the Liverpool–Archangel route* for Italian goods which go via England and are destined for Russia. This seems to be the only way in which trade between Italy and Russia can be carried on, and it will practically cease altogether if we do not succeed in securing this tonnage. I should be very much obliged for an immediate reply, in order that I may take the necessary steps with the competent authorities here.'"

On June 5, Sonnino telegraphed to the Italian Ambassador in Petersburg:

". . . The military situation of the Entente in Macedonia is getting worse after the recent decisions, in which account had to be taken of the lack of tonnage required for the supply of the Army of the Orient. The English have already withdrawn several units or are about to do so. Further, we are faced with the prospect of the enterprise being confined to a fortified camp at Salonica. In these circumstances our High Command must look into the question what will then be the situation of our Albanian Expeditionary

* Russia complained at various times that owing to the submarine danger she did not get enough heavy artillery and ammunition through Archangel. [The Author.]

Force, a force which would have to rely on its own efforts alone in the very probable case of a hostile offensive. . . ."

6. In the situation produced by the U-boat campaign, the Entente *laid violent hands on Greece.*

As early as May 18, Sonnino telegraphed to the Italian Ambassador in Petersburg:

"With a view to guaranteeing the safety of the garrison of Salonica, the Allies must be assured of the good will and friendship of Greece also."

b. In the Summer of 1918.

1. On March 29, 1918, Sonnino telegraphed to the Italian Ambassador in Washington:

"Will Your Excellency kindly represent to the American Government the necessity of some of the Dutch tonnage being assigned to Italy for her essential needs which have not been met? I have no need to ask Your Excellency, who knows our situation, to take a strong personal interest in the matter. I would be glad of a telegraphic report about the views of the American Government on this question, and to know how much tonnage will be reserved for us. I am cabling London and Washington."

2. The Italian Ambassador in Washington telegraphed to Sonnino on March 31, 1918:

"Thank you for the information as to the visit of Sir Guy Granet, of whose Italian sympathies I will make good use. As regards his putting pressure on the American Government with a view to persuading them to postpone sending their contingents to Europe until October and meanwhile use the tonnage for the transport of the corn and artillery material stored here, he will have to proceed with caution. This problem, which is a very ticklish one, having regard to the self-sufficiency of the Americans, could only have been solved with any chance of success earlier on if the inter-allied conferences in Paris and London had strongly emphasized the

necessity of supplying the needs of the civil population and the troops as a first call. As a result of the contrary decision reached at those conferences, our demands for more tonnage were rejected.

"The events which are taking place in France now absolutely preclude any attempt of this kind. The public appeal of Lloyd George that the American reinforcements should be sent across the ocean as fast as possible was pressed on Wilson by Lord Reading, as Reading himself confirmed yesterday. My great efforts to secure for Italy a portion of the Dutch tonnage which has been requisitioned to-day are therefore blocked by a fresh obstacle. Although Italy's urgent necessities are realized even by Lansing and the other authorities concerned . . . I am quite convinced that in consequence of recent events the whole of the Dutch tonnage will now be used for the transport of troops and equipment to France.

"Yesterday I impressed on Lord Reading the extraordinary risks which we and the allies would run if Italy were faced with a food crisis immediately before a possible strong enemy offensive. He himself said that it was the duty and interest of the allies to guard against such an eventuality, and if the American tonnage were inadequate England must use her own to secure the necessary deliveries to Italy. However, I will again insist that however urgent the requirements of the moment, those of our country shall not be neglected."

3. On April 2, 1918, the Italian Ambassador in Washington telegraphed to Sonnino:

"When I asked Polk to-day about the agreement with Sweden, he told me the contents of the telegram which the ambassadors of the allies had sent to their governments. The telegram puts forward a suggestion that an ultimatum should be presented to Sweden, demanding her signature to the agreement *and threatening that in case of refusal the Swedish tonnage would be requisitioned in the same way as the Dutch.* Polk told me that the American Government did not accept

this proposal. It was the high-handed action* with regard to Holland and the feelings of enmity thus aroused which were an obstacle to the repetition of the measure in existing circumstances. As it was established beyond doubt that fear of Germany kept Sweden from signing the agreement, the American Government tried to effect a compromise on the basis of the assignment of part of the Swedish tonnage in return for a guarantee of a certain quantity of food for Sweden. Negotiations to that end are in progress. Polk told me further that it had been decided here to publish the text of the unsigned agreement in Sweden with a view to showing the public that it contains no threats or in fact anything which is in conflict with the true interests of Sweden."

4. On April 5, 1918, the Italian Ambassador in Washington telegraphed to Sonnino:

"In reply to England's appeal to send the largest possible contingent of troops to Europe at once, the American Government has decided to send troops on a larger scale than that provided for before the present German action in France. For this purpose they will make the maximum effort. They are talking about a contingent of one million (?) men who are to be landed in France between now and . . .

"This effect of the urgent appeal of the allies in the military sphere is a fresh and great obstacle to our further demands for tonnage. I regard it as my duty to report this in order that in the final decisions of the inter-allied conferences in Europe account may be taken of our serious situation, a situation which had been realized here. In fact they had decided to give us help if the sudden change in France had not claimed all their resources. Current events emphasize once more that want of co-operation which was revealed by the recent agreement with regard to the Dutch tonnage—an agreement

* It is again characteristic how violent hands were laid on Holland and the other neutrals, just like Greece in the summer of 1917. Always the same will to victory. [The Author.]

which was drawn up in London and led to the division of 50 per cent. of the tonnage between the United States and England, while Italy and France were entirely excluded from the negotiations."

5. On April 9, 1918, Sonnino telegraphed to the Italian Ambassador in Washington:

"I have brought Your Excellency's telegram (about the impossibility of purchasing ships in America) to the notice of the Minister of Transport, and in view of the serious situation he points out that it is absolutely essential to apply to the American Government for the assignment of some new construction. Even the maximum activity of our yards would be insufficient to-day to keep pace with the losses, as 20, or at the most 30, ships could be built per annum and thus 14 or 9 years respectively would be required to build the 291 ships which we have lost between January 1, 1915, and March, 1918, out of our total number of 612. It is confirmed that in case the American Government makes difficulties about transferring new construction to private individuals the Royal Government must step into their shoes and buy the ships themselves.

"I direct Your Excellency's close attention to this matter and would like to hear from you at the earliest opportunity."

6. Stockholm. June 19, 1918.

"Advocate X., who resides in London, sends the following communication:

"'*In England there is a good deal of talk about England being war-weary and possibly ready to make peace in the near future. It is only Clemenceau's Government which keeps up the 'moral' of the French nation.*

"'The English ascribe their defeat to better German generalship as well as the circumstance that they have few officers, and those only moderately trained. In leading circles it is thought that the war will last another two years. No considerable forces from America can reach France before the autumn of 1918 so that there can be no question of an Entente

offensive before the spring of 1919. Until then the Entente will have to remain strictly on the defensive. The Americans display the liveliest interest in the prosecution of the war and in all their actions one sees a growing determination to take over the leadership in every department. However, serious observers, and even high officers, make no secret of the fact that this American energy is only a bluff by which Germany cannot be overthrown in a military sense. They are apparently thinking of taking England's place and rendering her dependent. Thus in recent times the training period for the American Army, which was not brilliantly trained in any case, has been reduced. Hitherto, men were trained in 100 days, officers in 180. The normal period is now 80 days for men and 120 for officers.

" 'The shortage of oil and fat is very great. With the exception of bread, ration cards have been introduced for practically all foods and all prices have mounted very high.' "

c. In the Autumn of 1918.

The captain of a battleship sends the following report on conditions in England at the time of the surrender of the fleet:

" The English officers were very reserved in their remarks about affairs in England, although they were not asked about them. On the other hand, conversations with members of the crews (which unfortunately have not been entirely avoided) show that there is an extraordinary shortage of food and raw materials in England. The men said that the Grand Fleet had been at sea a fortnight at the end of October or beginning of November. During the last week the crews had had to live on bread and marmalade. The men complained of too little kit. They had on their one and only blue rig-out. The clothes of the officers, too, were mostly old and shabby. The boots were extremely dilapidated; the uppers

were broken and the soles held together with strips of rubber and leather.

"The English were surprised that our signal flags were still made of cloth. They had been using paper flags for a long time. The signaller who came on board had paper flags. Things such as oil, petroleum, cotton-wool, twist and linen seemed to be very short. They were surprised at the stores they saw in our store-rooms. The English boatswain asked our boatswain for some emery paper as he himself had no more.

"At Scapa a young English officer told the commander of one of our destroyers that England could not have continued the war another fortnight."

March 29, 1919.

"I* was staying at the Hotel X. at Weimar with an Italian officer. We got into conversation. It was not until the end of the conversation that I let him know who I was. He told me of his great astonishment at the way in which the people of Weimar were still living. There was no comparison with the conditions in Italy. The army had always had everything it needed, and indeed more than it needed at the end. The civil population had suffered terribly. The bread ration comprised only 200 grammes *per diem*, with a scale for the heavy and heaviest workers of 250 and 300 grammes. There was no more butter and only 200 grammes of margarine per month. The meat ration was between 900 and 1,000 grammes per month. There had been practically no house coal for the last two years. He had spent two full winters in unheated rooms in Milan. The use of gas was only permitted for cooking and restricted to three hours a day. The public had borne everything patiently."

* An officer friend of mine. [The Author.]

30.

Foreign Armies Section.
No. 17189.

G.H.Q.,
19/9/1918.

ESTIMATE OF THE AMERICAN HELP FOR THE ENTENTE

An estimate of the American progress was issued from time to time by this Section to the military authorities as "Information about the Army of the United States of America." America's aid was therein judged as follows:

"On the entry of the United States into the war her army was assessed at about 250,000 men (7,000 officers and 125,000 men of the Regular Army and 120,000 men of the National Guard)."

On April 5, 1917, the following statements were made about the future development of the army.

"In all probability we must expect that the United States will expand and reorganize her army. It will take a considerable time. There will be no lack of men. Thanks to the highly developed war industries the production of equipment will be a relatively simple matter. The main difficulty is to be seen in the shortage of training *personnel.*"

On May 26, 1917, it was said:

"There is no doubt about the development of the American armies. But, having regard to the experiences of England, about ten months will be required for the formation, equipment and training of larger units. The demands on tonnage for the supply of the Entente precludes the possibility of transporting men on any considerable scale so long as the U-boat operations remain effective. We need not therefore stop to discuss how far the Entente is in a *position to bring large bodies of* American troops to Europe.

"It is therefore improbable that American recruits will be

brought to Europe and portions of the new American armies organized in France, as the Press demands. The Regular Army will have to supply cadres and training *personnel* for the new formations, and thus for the time being it is not available as a whole.

"Thus we need not anticipate the appearance of large forces of United States troops in the theatre of war *before the winter.* Yet, for political reasons, the transport to France of a weak Expeditionary Corps (one or two divisions) of the Regular Army is possible in the course of the summer. Further, specialist troops and officers will probably be sent, and there may be conscription, while English, French and Italian subjects residing in America who are of military age may be sent home."

In July, 1917, we were able to gain some insight into the reorganization of the American Army, as well as its methods of mobilization and conscription. On July 25 it was possible to estimate the military progress of the United States up to the end of 1917 in the following terms:

"Portions of the Regular Army have already been sent to France as a specially constituted Expeditionary Corps. At the beginning of June General Pershing, as Commander-in-Chief, arrived there with his staff. The first formed bodies landed at the end of June. It is said that troops of all arms are there. More transports are expected.

"The Regular Army will at first produce but a small number of trained troops as it must supply the cadres and training *personnel* for the numerous new formations on a considerable scale. The National Guards and New Armies need much more time for their organization, training and equipment, so that the bulk of them will not be ready for transport before the beginning of 1918. The scale of transport will then be dependent upon the tonnage available.

"Thus, as far as we can see, *this year* the United States will only be able to send an Expeditionary Corps of a strength

of one or two divisions to the theatre of war. In addition a considerable number of specialist and labour units must be expected.

"The Entente has been promised a particularly strong reinforcement in the shape of aviators.

"It can be assumed that so far there is not more than one division in France and that its equipment for the field is not yet complete. Landing seems to have taken place at several ports in France, and also in England. St. Nazaire, where there are said to be considerable camps and depots, must be regarded as the principal port.

"The Expeditionary Corps still requires training. This will be given it in camps at first and afterwards on quiet parts of the line. On their first appearance at the front the American troops will be regarded as equal in value to the new English divisions."

Taking it all round, this estimate proved accurate.

On December 11, 1917, the possibility of a reinforcement of the American Army in France before the spring of 1918 was considered.

"In France the presence of the 1st (Regular) Division only has been established beyond doubt. Parts of it are under instruction in the line. Hitherto it has not been in line as a unit. Its participation in an attack during the winter is possible.

"According to the latest reports it is to be assumed that the 26th and 42nd (National Guard) Divisions have recently begun to land. There are American troops training in England also. One way and another, the total figure of the United States forces sent to Europe may have reached about 75,000 men.

"The 26th and 42nd Divisions are not to be expected at the front for the time being. They still require training. They can be ruled out, as regards an offensive operation, until the spring of 1918.

"The United States Government is said to have undertaken to send an army of 450,000 men to France by the spring of 1918. It is possible that at the Paris Conference the Entente repeated their urgent request for American aid. The immense preparations being made by the Americans in France (camp and railway construction, extension of harbours, erection of factories) justify the assumption that we must expect strong American reinforcements.

"The transport and supply of the troops of the United States depend upon the question of tonnage. In view of the shortage of tonnage a larger number than 450,000 men is hardly to be expected. The bulk of that force cannot be equal to offensive operations in the spring of 1918. The value of the Americans at first will therefore be in their relieving French and English divisions on quiet fronts."

In an estimate of the military situation of the Entente in the winter of 1917/18 the following was said about the United States:

"The United States is in course of building up an army of about 50 divisions. Of these three have so far landed in France and one of them is undergoing instruction in the line. The two others still require considerable training behind the front.

"By the spring of 1918 the American forces in France may reach a strength of 15 divisions. The bulk of these divisions will only be fit for employment on quiet fronts. The participation of more than the three divisions which are now in France in a spring offensive is not to be expected.

"The Corps of Officers is not yet trained up to the standard of the great war. Thus the independent employment of considerable American units in serious situations is precluded for that reason.

"The human material, arming and equipment of the American troops are good. The training is still defective. On the other hand, the first unit in the line fought well during a German attack. It is therefore to be expected that the

American soldier will prove a worthy foe after more training and experience of war."

In this report the Americans up to the spring of 1918 were over rather than under-estimated. When the German offensive began the Expeditionary Force had not yet reached the strength of 15 divisions for which we had allowed. Moreover, the total number of men landed up to and including March amounted to only 370,000 (instead of 450,000).

At the urgent request of the Entente America materially increased the monthly figures after April, 1918. The following figures for the months from May, 1917, to July, 1918, were published by the American War Minister in July, 1918:

1917.		1918.	
May	1,710	January	48,766
June	12,261	February	48,227
July	12,968	March	83,811
August	18,323	April	117,212
September	32,523	May	244,345
October	38,259	June	276,372
November	23,016		
December	48,340		

The scale of the transport from May, 1918, onwards is not equally well known. Judging by previous experience the reports on the subject are open to doubt. An opinion can only be given when we have more precise figures. As most of the troops remained behind the front for training when they arrived, reports were few at first and could only be gathered after a delay.

From time to time the Americans published the figures of the troops they had sent to France by wireless. But these figures were regarded as propaganda and therefore false, a proceeding which previous experience justified.

Moreover, our opinion of the tonnage required for transport on such a scale made the very large figures seem incredible. As a matter of fact the requisitioned neutral tonnage and the German ships which were repaired proved more useful to the Americans than we had allowed for. Besides, England (this was only known later), putting her own requirements on one

side, brought over two-thirds of the Americans on British ships. That also had not been considered possible, and no allowance had been made for it. America brought over no fully equipped units. Arms, transport, guns and horses—to a certain extent material also—were supplied by the Entente in France. All this made it possible to increase materially the number of men per ship.

On July 2 the American reinforcements were summed up comprehensively.

"Before the entry of America into the war there were already about 1,500 Americans in the service of the Entente. They comprised aviators, supply and medical formations.

"At the end of June the first troops of the Expeditionary Corps landed. By the autumn they reached a strength of 40,000 men. From these the 1st Division was formed, which appeared in the line at the end of October.

"Judging by credible reports of our agents the United States had undertaken to send 450,000 to 500,000 men to France by the beginning of April. At the end of 1917 two divisions of the reorganized National Guard arrived (the 26th and 42nd). In addition there were several single regiments, from which the 2nd Division was formed.

"On the assumption that the United States could carry out its promise the American reinforcements for the Entente up to the spring of 1918 were reckoned at 15 divisions. (See "The Military Position of the Entente in the Winter of 1917/18." Foreign Armies Section. No. 6730A, of December, 1917.) In addition we had to anticipate the arrival of a large number of Line-of-Communication and labour formations.

"When the German offensive began the American numbers we had anticipated had not yet materialized. France and England were disillusioned. At the urgent request of the Entente the Americans have materially increased the figures since April.

"At the moment there are 7 or 8 American divisions at

the front. Another division had just been put into the line. We suspect the presence of a further 9 or 10 divisions in Europe. They are still undergoing training. Thus there are presumably about 18 divisions in all in Europe.

"We must expect a steady increase in the American forces. A further 26 divisions have been formed in America. The Government intend to send them all over in the course of this year.

"There can be no doubt about the determination of America to employ all her resources in the war.

"Nothing is yet known about the formation of yet more new divisions at home, but we must expect and allow for it. Recruits have been called up in April and May, and the process is said to be continuing on a considerable scale. There is no shortage of men for drafts and new formations.

"The possibility of transporting the 26 divisions this year, as well as mastering the problem of the whole supply for the American Army, is dependent upon tonnage. The transport achievements of the Americans in recent months show that the transport of the men is not impossible. In both May and June at least 4 divisions have arrived in Europe. In addition large quantities of food and material for the army have been brought over. Some of the tonnage has also been used for the supply of food to England, France and Italy. A temporary increase in the shipments of troops would be possible if the export of food were stopped for a time after the harvest in Europe.

"So far the interruption of the transport movements by submarine operations has had no vital influence.

"The value of the American divisions must, generally speaking, be regarded as high, allowing for their present slight war experience and their defective training. In the defensive even the youngest troops have proved themselves doughty opponents. The American soldier has shown himself to be brave, vigorous and smart. They are not afraid of losses.

The leading is not yet up to the required level. When the Americans appear as large independent forces French instruction and help will be indispensable at first.

"In judging the fighting value of the Americans we must remember that the troops which have arrived hitherto are to be regarded as élite. We must wait and see if the divisions still to come are equal to them. The recently identified 77th Division has revealed a bad *moral* and moderate intelligence. Its inadequate training seems to show that it has been put into the line too soon."

Since that time the following figures have become known:

Up to the beginning of September the American Army comprised a total of three million men. From American official sources we know that up to August 31, 1,600,000 men were sent to Europe.

In France 35 divisions were identified.

15 new divisions were formed in America after July 1.

Thus, there are another 23 divisions here.

Supplement, March 20, 1919.

On November 2, 1918, 40 divisions were believed to be in Europe. The following final figures have now been proved to be correct:

36 battle divisions.

7 divisions used for supplying drafts.

43 divisions.*

On November 11, 1918, according to the Press, there was a total of 2,200,000 men in France. The ration strength was actually 1,920,000.

Review.

To appreciate correctly the American reinforcement to the armies of the Entente in France the following figures, given

* At the beginning of October 90,000 drafts were required, and before November 1, 45,000 were available. [The Author.]

by "The Times" (published in the evening edition of the "Vossische Zeitung" of January 9, 1920), are of outstanding importance:

"In 1918 the combatant strength of the British armies in France sank from 1,290,000 to 1,160,000 between March 11 and November 11, while that of the combatant infantry fell from 616,000 to 426,000. In the same period the number of American 'combatant troops' rose from 123,000 to 1,160,000, but the number of rifles from 49,000 to 320,000 only. The total ration strength of the British fell from 1,830,000 to 1,730,000, while the American rose from 245,000 to 1,920,000. The percentage of effective fighting men among the Americans was therefore surprisingly low."

I cannot go into these figures in detail. But even if the reduction in the strength of the French infantry as the result of our victories in the months of March, April, May and June was a fact, it is clear that the accession of strength to the Entente through the Americans (compared with the loss of the Russian Army) was for a long time not as great as has mistakenly been supposed.

But the Army of the United States was none the less able to deprive us of victory, and made possible that of the Entente after the strength of our army had been broken by the revolution.

Appendix.

1. After this chapter was written I have seen General Pershing's report on the part played by the United States in the war. It was published in several American journals. The report will be discussed in Chapter XV.

2. The following extracts are of interest.

a. Ambassador Count Wedel in the "Hamburger Nachrichten" on the views of Count Tarnowsky:

"The question whether the United States would have participated in the struggle with Germany if there had been

no unrestricted submarine campaign has again been freely discussed of late, but it is still impossible to come to a more definite conclusion. The views of the last Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Washington, Count Adam Tarnowsky, may be of interest, as he remained in Washington after the departure of the German Ambassador and until the declaration of war. That the declaration of war was not an inevitable consequence of the unrestricted submarine campaign is proved by the fact that at first the United States only replied to the U-boat war by breaking off diplomatic relations, and it was only after a considerable pause that the declaration of war followed. The break with Austria followed simultaneously.

"After his return to Vienna, Count Tarnowsky told me that at the start the Americans had laughed at the unrestricted submarine campaign and made light of the German navy's notion that England could be defeated by such methods. But when the reports of the great number of sinkings began to come in the scoffers were dumbfounded. The Americans became more and more uneasy, and the conviction began to grow that America must intervene actively if England was to be saved. It was not the U-boat war as such, but the fear that England might thereby lose the war that produced the American declaration of war.

"Count Tarnowsky, who is now conducting foreign affairs in Warsaw and even then considered himself a Pole first and foremost (as he himself declared), may be relied upon for a sound judgment, and we must ask ourselves whether an American mediation for peace would not have had a pro-English and anti-German character in any case, and whether it could have led to results satisfactory to us. I gave my superiors at the time a full report of what Tarnowsky said, which agreed in the most remarkable way with the statements of Admiral Sims. Penfield, the American Ambassador in Vienna, was also very anti-German from the beginning of the war, and this was known all over Vienna, thanks to his frankness.

He used to say that there was nothing against Austria-Hungary, but 'Germany must be crushed.'"

b. According to the "Tägliche Rundschau," quoted in the "Schlesische Zeitung," Professor Eugen Kuhnemann writes:

"The prevailing opinion is still that America's participation in the war was caused by Germany's unrestricted U-boat campaign. If that were so, it is obvious that America would have the right to take such action only if the submarine campaign threatened her with a wrong which she had not had to suffer at the hands of any of Germany's enemies. In her submarine operations Germany blockaded the seas round England. But long before that England had blockaded the seas round Germany. Wilson declared the English blockade illegal and incompatible with international law. The difference in the eyes of the American nation was that while the English blockade only threatened American goods the German involved American lives. The distinction was illusory. When the English blockade began, two American ships in the English blockade zone ran on mines and were sunk with the loss of American lives. The fact was concealed intentionally from Congress by the Government. Thus the only real difference between the English and German blockades was that the Americans voluntarily submitted to the declaration of an English blockade zone, and on the other hand voluntarily refused to recognize the German. Before the war the 'New York American' said, 'That no American lives will be lost by an English blockade will be true only if we do not enter the English blockade zone. We should also lose no lives at the hands of the Germans also if we kept away from *their* zone.' The rights of America were infringed as much by the English as by the Germans. The only thing is that American profits suffered less through England, as American trade was based entirely on England and the Entente, as was established before the Committee of Inquiry. Immediately before the outbreak of war an American from Boston revealed the fact

that the American Government had wilfully kept Congress in ignorance of most important evidence which proved that America had suffered the same injuries from England as from Germany. In the week before the declaration of war Edmund von Mach went to Washington in order to make a last desperate effort to save peace.

"He is now publishing pamphlets on America's war. There is such force in his charges against the American Government that he would be insane if he could not prove every word. The second pamphlet, 'Anything, but not the Truth,' tells of his heroic but vain attempt in the week preceding the fatal Good Friday to publish the truth in Washington, appeal to the American sense of justice and prevent the war at the last minute. He called on a senator whose pre-eminent position on one of the most important committees of the Senate gave him high standing in that assembly. 'I put before him the facts with regard to the documents which had been held back. I showed him a letter from the Secretary of State (the Foreign Minister, Lansing) which contained proved inaccuracies. He was not in the least surprised, but when I pressed him to introduce a resolution in the Senate that the truth should be known he declined, not because I was wrong in my charges against the State Department (Foreign Office), but because he *knew* I was right. Then he said, "On the eve of our entrance into this fearful war we could not allow the whole world to know that we were governed by a set of liars."'"

c. The Minister Hanotaux (according to the "Vossische Zeitung"):

The former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gabriel Hanotaux, and the author of a number of historical works, is publishing in parts a history of the world war, for which purpose the records of the French Foreign Office are placed at his disposal, as in the case of his previous works. Of these the documents which interest us are those which prove the eagerness of the French for peace at the time of the Battle of the Marne in 1914.

Even in Germany there had been a rumour that at the time of the first Battle of the Marne a desire for peace had been expressed by official circles in France, and that England had upset the plans of the Viviani Ministry by threats. Hitherto, documentary proofs had been lacking. They are now supplied by Hanotaux, who guarantees the truth of the following occurrences in Part 101 of his history.

When several influential politicians demanded an immediate peace with Germany at the time of the Battle of the Marne, England sent an ultimatum to Bordeaux where the French Government was then installed, as is well known, which contained the following expressions: If France does not withdraw her peace step her coasts will be blockaded by the British fleet. France had then invoked the mediation of the United States of America. Hanotaux says that three American envoys then appeared before the French Government—the then American Ambassador in Paris and his predecessor and successor—and told official France that she must hold out because the United States would intervene in the war in any event. That was in the autumn of 1914. "At the moment," said the three envoys, "there are only 50,000 influential people in America who insist on America's participation in the war, but in a short time there will be one hundred million."

Hanotaux also says that at the same time a well-known American remarked that the annual sum required to rouse the American nation to hatred against Germany would stagger imagination, but would be a good investment.

END OF VOLUME I



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